

91st CONGRESS }  
1st Session }

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

{ REPORT  
{ No. 91-698

UNITED STATES SENATE LIBRARY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION BILL, 1970

DECEMBER 3, 1969.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed.

Mr. MAHON, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted the following

REPORT

together with

SEPARATE VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 16090]

The Committee on Appropriations submits the following report in explanation of the accompanying bill making appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970.

APPROPRIATIONS AND ESTIMATES

Appropriations for the military functions of the Department of Defense, including military assistance related to the conflict in Southeast Asia, are provided for in the accompanying bill for the fiscal year 1970. This bill does not provide for other military assistance, military construction, military family housing, or civil defense, which requirements are considered in connection with other appropriation bills.

There is a summarization of the appropriations business of the session near the end of this report.

The new budget (obligational) authority enacted for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year 1969 and the estimates and amounts recommended by the Committee for the fiscal year 1970 appear in summary form in the following table.

## SUMMARY OF BILL BY MAJOR CATEGORIES

Functional title	Appropriation, fiscal year 1969 (new budget obligational authority)	Budget estimate, fiscal year 1970 (new budget obligational authority) <sup>1</sup>	Committee bill	Committee bill compared with—	
				Appropriation, 1969	Budget estimate, fiscal year 1970
Title I—Military Personnel.....	<sup>2</sup> \$23, 877, 103, 427	\$24, 376, 900, 000	\$21, 057, 200, 000	-\$2, 819, 903, 427	-\$3, 319, 700, 000
Title II—Retired Military Personnel.....	( <sup>3</sup> )	( <sup>3</sup> )	2, 735, 000, 000	+2, 735, 000, 000	+2, 735, 000, 000
Title III—Operation and Maintenance.....	22, 355, 818, 000	21, 792, 100, 000	20, 878, 100, 000	-1, 477, 718, 000	-914, 000, 000
Title IV—Procurement.....	20, 619, 500, 000	20, 886, 800, 000	18, 092, 148, 000	-2, 527, 352, 000	-2, 794, 652, 000
Title V—Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation.....	7, 549, 828, 000	8, 222, 400, 000	7, 197, 600, 000	-352, 228, 000	-1, 024, 800, 000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b><sup>2</sup>74, 402, 249, 427</b>	<b>75, 278, 200, 000</b>	<b>69, 960, 048, 000</b>	<b>-4, 442, 201, 427</b>	<b>-5, 318, 152, 000</b>
<b>Distribution by organizational component:</b>					
Army.....	<sup>2</sup> 24, 473, 208, 223	23, 955, 300, 000	22, 348, 000, 000	-2, 125, 208, 223	-1, 607, 300, 000
Navy.....	<sup>2</sup> 20, 698, 463, 204	22, 804, 000, 000	20, 809, 548, 000	+111, 084, 796	-1, 994, 452, 000
Air Force.....	25, 058, 824, 000	23, 959, 434, 000	22, 359, 634, 000	-2, 699, 190, 000	-1, 599, 800, 000
Defense Agencies/OSD.....	4, 171, 754, 000	4, 559, 466, 000	4, 442, 866, 000	+271, 112, 000	-116, 600, 000
<sup>4</sup> Total, Department of Defense.....	<sup>2</sup> 74, 402, 249, 427	75, 278, 200, 000	69, 960, 048, 000	-4, 442, 201, 427	-5, 318, 152, 000

<sup>1</sup> January 1969 budget, as amended in H. Doc. 91-100.

<sup>2</sup> Includes amounts warranted by Treasury Department pursuant to P.L. 91-31.

<sup>3</sup> Included under "Military Personnel."

<sup>4</sup> Includes funds for "Retired Pay Defense."

### SCOPE OF THE BILL

The Committee considered budget estimates totaling \$75,278,200,000. The estimates presented in House Document No. 91-15, the President's Budget of January 1969, totaled \$77,740,200,000. Budget amendments from the new Administration, contained in House Document No. 91-100, made reductions in these requests in the amount of \$2,462,000,000.

The accompanying bill recommends appropriations in the total amount of \$69,960,048,000, a decrease of \$5,318,152,000 below the revised estimates, a decrease of \$7,780,152,000 below the original January estimates, and a decrease of \$4,442,201,427 below the appropriations enacted for the fiscal year 1969.

The dollar reductions recommended by the Committee are larger than any proposed by the Committee since the fiscal year 1954, after the end of the war in Korea, when a new Administration did not formally amend the budget estimates of its predecessor. Committee reductions that year were over \$6,300,000,000.

As the fighting in Southeast Asia slows down, reductions in military spending can be made in some areas directly related to the war. Inventories which have been built up to meet higher levels of activity may, in some instances, provide some day-to-day requirements without falling below levels which must be maintained. While fighting still continues today in Southeast Asia, and substantial numbers of U.S. personnel remain in that area, local forces are assuming ever increasing roles in combat operations. The Committee has relied heavily on the guidance of officials of the Department of Defense in reducing the funding of items directly related to the war in Southeast Asia. Further withdrawals of U.S. forces may make additional funding reductions possible during the remainder of this fiscal year, but the Committee has not deleted funds on this basis. The enemy could again escalate the intensity of combat and the Committee does not want American forces to be placed in jeopardy by shortages of needed supplies and equipment if this should occur.

As was pointed out in the hearings, the Committee is concerned that too rapid withdrawal of some U.S. forces could imperil the forces which remain. Every precaution must be taken to avoid this situation.

The Committee is, of course, aware that budget reductions of the magnitude recommended may, in some degree, limit the power and effectiveness of U.S. armed forces. The significance of this depends on the comparative strengths of our military forces and those of our opponents. It can be argued that the removal of one person from an attained total constitutes a reduction in the effectiveness of the armed forces, but such a reduction would not affect the balance of military power. The Committee is firm in its belief that the appropriations recommended will provide for a reasonably acceptable military posture in the light of all the circumstances.

### NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET OUTLAYS

Most, but not all, of the appropriations for National Defense are carried in the accompanying bill. The January Budget includes total Budget Authority of \$82,985,000,000 under the "National Defense" classification. Of this amount, estimates totaling \$77,740,200,000 were considered in connection with the accompanying bill. Amounts for National Defense considered in connection with other appropriation

bills include \$1,949,000,000 under the Military Construction Appropriation Bill, \$610,000,000 for Military Assistance under the Foreign Assistance Appropriation Bill, and \$2,438,000,000 for Atomic Energy considered under the Public Works Appropriation Bill. Other relatively small amounts are considered in connection with other appropriation bills.

Total National Defense outlays (expenditures) are classified in the January 1969 President's budget at \$81,542,000,000 for the fiscal year 1970. Within this total, the subtotal for Military Functions and Military Assistance is projected at \$70,000,000,000 in expenditures for 1970.

The new Administration reviewed the January budget and made changes which were announced on April 15, 1969, involving reductions in projected outlays for Military Functions and Military Assistance of \$1,097,000,000 below the January budget and reductions of \$3,048,000,000 below the January budget in new budget authority. Subsequent to those April revisions, the Administration has announced its efforts to hold overall budget spending to the target amount set by the Administration and established in law by P.L. 91-47. In consonance with this, reductions were announced in the expenditure program of the Department of Defense to the extent of \$3,000,000,000 below the revised total of \$77,903,000,000 announced on April 15, 1969. The reductions below the budget estimates recommended in the pending bill with respect to new budget obligational authority are expected to result in an expenditure outlay reduction of the magnitude announced by the Administration.

The Committee continues to feel, as it has stated for many years, that this country must maintain its military superiority over any other nation. It is the feeling of the Committee that this country does now have military superiority and that steps must be taken now and in subsequent years to continue to maintain our overall military superiority. The recommendations made are consistent with this objective.

#### REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTIONS

The Committee has explored in some detail the recommendations for budget reductions suggested by the Administration and many of them have been fully embraced in the reductions below budget estimates recommended in the accompanying bill. The Committee is well aware of the requirements of the fiscal situation and realizes that without a healthy economy and a reasonably sound dollar the probability of maintaining our military superiority would be greatly jeopardized. The great national need to halt the erosion of the economy by inflation, a painful burden to millions of Americans, is as important to the Defense effort as to any other sector of the economy. As the largest purchaser of goods and services, the Defense Department has itself been hard hit by economic inflation. The Committee has joined with the President and the Secretary of Defense in making reductions in spending wherever reasonably possible in an effort to reduce inflation. Some otherwise attractive programs are not funded at this time because of the need to hold the line on the overall budget.

Some of the reductions recommended by the Committee below the budget amounts, and in some cases below the funding levels presently being considered by the Administration, have been made somewhat general in an effort to encourage greater economy and better management in the Department of Defense. The Committee is proceeding

in this instance as it has in former years in pointing up various shortcomings and inadequacies in certain programs and management practices by making reductions in an effort to drive home more sharply the need for administrative corrections. Many specific instances of management deficiencies are pointed out in the various discussions in the Report. This does not mean that no progress is being made in the Department. Progress is being made and significant accomplishments have been brought to the Committee's attention, but the problems are numerous and much remains to be done.

Certain programs provided for in the budget are probably desirable, but the Committee believes that some of these programs are not yet ready for funding to the full extent requested. Certain other programs have been deleted or reduced by the Congress in enacting the annual authorizing legislation.

### DELAY IN REPORTING BILL

The Committee recognizes that the Defense Appropriation Bill is being presented at a very late date this year.

The annual authorization legislation upon which much of this bill is predicated was not approved by the President until November 19, 1969, the conference report having cleared Congress on November 6, 1969. The Senate passed the legislation on September 18, the House on October 3. It was necessary that the Committee hear the Secretary of Defense following Congressional clearance of the authorization in order that the Committee might determine precisely the position of the Administration, including its allocation of priorities, with respect to the programs affected by the authorization.

After authorization is approved on a bill of the magnitude, importance, and complexity of the Defense bill, it is desirable that the Appropriations Committee have a reasonable time in which to complete final hearings, mark the bill, write an adequate report, and present the bill to the House of Representatives.

The Committee spent many weeks in hearings, beginning with a briefing in January of 1969 and concluding with a final session with the Secretary of Defense on November 17, 1969. The main body of hearings were concluded on October 13, 1969.

The Committee report this year is more extensive than in most former years. It is based upon the most extensive year of hearings and investigations yet undertaken by the Committee. Those who wish information in connection with the overall situation or more information on any specific detail may avail themselves of the printed hearings of the Committee which amount to seven volumes and 5,947 pages.

### RELATIVE CONTROLLABILITY OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS

The committee has at all times been alert to the fundamental need for the Congress to maintain its control over military expenditures. It has been alleged that the mere size of the Defense budget makes it relatively uncontrollable. While the size of the Defense budget creates a tremendous workload on those who must deal with it, the committee believes that control of the congressional power of the purse is being maintained. At a time when many programs throughout the non-defense area have been or are being removed by one means or another from effective annual appropriation review, the Defense program continues under the restraints of this review.

In testimony on June 17, 1969, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) said, concerning control by Congress of Defense funds:

"First, I believe it is significant that we lack automatic financial authority. For many [non-defense] Federal programs, outlays are determined by the operation of formulas and other statutory provisions, and are not controlled through the appropriation process. To quote from the President's budget for fiscal year 1970 (p. 15), '\* \* \* in some cases, national priorities are arbitrarily distorted by the fact that the outlays for some Federal programs are sheltered in basic law from meaningful annual control \* \* \*'. The budget for 1970 (p. 20) showed that only \$20.6 billion of civilian program outlays were relatively controllable—about 17 percent of the total. The remainder involved statutory formulas, permanent authorizations, et cetera.

"In contrast, the Department of Defense has relatively few programs that are uncontrollable in this sense. Payments to retired personnel and claims (estimated at \$2,735 million and \$41 million, respectively, for fiscal year 1970) are the only such programs we have. Even these, it should be emphasized, are subject to specific, annual appropriations—they are not covered by permanent or indefinite authority or other such arrangements.

"In short, Congress can change the Defense budget totals directly and expeditiously through the appropriation process. For most of the remainder of the budget, this is not the case. In this sense, I believe, the Defense budget system is a more effective instrument for the prompt registration of congressional policy choices.

"A second factor of considerable importance in appraising the responsiveness of the budget system to a change in priorities is the matter of carryover balances. Where there are large carryover balances, budget outlays obviously tend to be less responsive to current appropriation action than would otherwise be the case. Table 8 presents the unexpended balances for military programs and other programs as forecast in the 1970 President's budget for June 30, 1969.

"It will be noted that Defense has 10 percent of the unobligated balances for the Federal budget, and 21 percent of the unexpended balances. Unexpended balances are equal to about 7.4 months of outlays for Defense, versus 18.3 months for the rest of the Government.

"A third and related matter of great importance to an inquiry on priorities concerns the management of carryover balances. The questions involved here are these: once funds are provided by the Congress, are they more or less automatically and routinely applied to the purpose for which appropriated? Or, conversely, are there effective procedures for applying these funds to higher priority programs as circumstances change?

"In the Department of Defense, there are well established and, we believe, effective procedures for reassessing priorities

and reapplying resources that the Congress has provided in the past. These changes are effected through financing adjustments, reflected in our annual budget submission, and through reprogramings."

#### CLOSER CONTROL OF CARRYOVER BALANCES

With regard to the latter points made, the tables on pages 16 and 17 are the usual tabulations carried each year in the report showing the unobligated and unexpended balances available to the Department of Defense.

The Committee has always taken account of carryover balances in its reviews and decisions on new funding requests. But in order to bring these balances under closer control, the Committee is recommending language in the accompanying bill providing that appropriations for major procurements be available for only three fiscal years (with the exception of shipbuilding where the nature of the construction requires a five-year term) and that appropriations for research, development, test, and evaluation be available for only a two-year period. Heretofore, they have generally been made on an "available until expended" basis.

The Department of Defense recognizes these terms as approximate average spend-out periods and in its internal operations requires that the military departments obtain the approval of the Secretary of Defense for the re-utilization of any balances available beyond these time periods.

A general provision (Sec. 641) is incorporated, providing that unobligated balances of funds heretofore appropriated under each of the procurement and R.D.T. & E. heads shall not be available beyond the dates specified for the current year funds. Rather than cancel these earlier appropriations at this time, the Committee recommends their relatively brief continuation since many of the current budget plans are built upon the continued availability of funds heretofore appropriated. The unobligated and unexpended balances will ultimately be closed out as prescribed by law for all expired accounts.

#### NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS

In House Report No. 91-035, dated November 12, 1969, the report accompanying the Military Construction Appropriation Bill for 1970, the Committee called attention to some of the problems surrounding the use of so-called nonappropriated funds. The major import of the Committee remarks at that time was directed to the construction of facilities utilizing these funds which are generated from income-producing activities for the morale, recreation, and welfare of the serviceman and his dependents.

As was noted in that report, these activities are often, if not always, supported indirectly with appropriated funds, but they are not subject to the normal Congressional appropriation review process and are not accounted for in the same manner as appropriated funds.

The Committee wishes at this time to reiterate the position taken in the earlier report with respect not only to a reporting of planned construction activities but a more definitive reporting of the support

provided from appropriated funds, especially in terms of numbers of military personnel assigned to assist in nonappropriated fund activities on a duty basis. The Committee staff will work out the reporting details with officials of the Department.

### CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

On November 24th, the President announced decisions made as a result of studies he requested of the nation's policies and programs in the area of chemical and biological weapons and defenses. It appeared that some of the decisions made could result in financial savings in the fiscal year 1970 Budget. Inquiry was directed to the Department of Defense in this regard. It has been ascertained that reductions totaling \$2,000,000 in appropriations to the Army and the Air Force are possible by the President's decision. The reductions have been made and are reflected in the amounts recommended in the accompanying bill under "Other Procurement, Air Force," and under "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army."

The Committee anticipates a greater impact on the fiscal year 1971 Budget, at which time the Department will have had time to implement the announced program revisions.

Other reductions in the area of chemical and biological programs totaling \$10,500,000 are recommended in separate actions not directly related to the President's announced change.

### STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

The United States and the Soviet Union are presently engaged in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Helsinki, Finland. The conference is generally referred to as the SALT talks. Because the present SALT talks are preliminary in nature, there is no reason to believe at this time they will have any impact on the fiscal year 1970 Defense Budget. If a safe and meaningful limitation on strategic weapons were to be agreed to, the budgetary impact would be felt in future years.

The Committee has been assured by the Secretary of Defense and by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Department of Defense is well represented at the conference and that the Defense Department will be kept well advised of the proposals advanced during the progress of the talks.

### MAJOR MILITARY PROGRAMS

This section of the report describes briefly U.S. military forces in terms of their principal military missions, rather than in the form of budget categories for which appropriations are made.

The table below lists the major military forces programs in the fiscal year 1970 Department of Defense budget request as amended on April 15, 1969, for the Titles contained in the bill. The Committee's proposed changes are summarized in a single entry at the bottom of the table.

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

## Major military programs as applicable to titles I, II, III, IV, and V

(In millions of dollars)

Major military program	Fiscal year 1970 budget estimates
Strategic forces.....	\$7,482
General purpose forces.....	28,990
Intelligence and communications.....	5,839
Airlift and sealift.....	1,957
Guard and reserve forces.....	2,757
Research and development.....	5,394
Central supply and maintenance.....	9,328
Training, medical and other general personnel activities.....	9,399
Retired pay (funded).....	2,735
Administration and associated activities.....	1,233
Military assistance funded by Department of Defense.....	2,414
<b>Total obligational authority.....</b>	<b>77,528</b>
<b>Deduct:</b>	
Financing adjustments.....	-1,850
Proposed appropriation transfers.....	-400
<b>Estimate, new budget (obligational) authority.....</b>	<b>75,278</b>
<b>Changes recommended by Appropriations Committee.....</b>	<b>-5,318</b>
<b>New appropriations in accompanying bill.....</b>	<b>69,960</b>

The next table shows the amended fiscal year 1970 budget request by both major military program and budget title, with the total Committee changes shown at the bottom of the table. These changes are discussed elsewhere in the report.

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

## Distribution of President's fiscal year 1970 budget estimates for Titles I, II, III, IV and V by major military program

(In millions of dollars)

Major military program	Title I military personnel	Title II retired military personnel	Title III oper- ation and mainte- nance	Title IV procure- ment	Title V R.D.T. & E.	Special Foreign Cur- rency Program	Total title I, II, III, IV and V
Strategic forces.....	1,545		1,505	3,065	1,367		7,482
General purpose forces.....	9,215		5,673	13,371	731		28,990
Intelligence and communications.....	1,295		1,565	1,992	985	2	5,839
Airlift and sealift.....	382		234	1,304	37		1,957
Guard and reserve forces.....	1,283		1,032	442			2,757
Research and development.....	287				5,105	2	5,394
Central supply and maintenance.....	291		7,877	1,100			9,328
Training, medical and other general personnel activities.....	6,663		2,210	526			9,399
Retired pay (funded).....	2,735						2,735
Administration and associated activities.....	398		808	26	1		1,233
Military assistance funded by Department of Defense.....	283		888	1,242	1		2,414
<b>Total obligational authority.....</b>	<b>24,377</b>		<b>21,792</b>	<b>23,128</b>	<b>8,227</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>77,528</b>
<b>Deduct:</b>							
Financing adjustments.....				-1,841	-5	-4	-1,850
Appropriation transfers.....				-400			-400
<b>Appropriations.....</b>	<b>24,377</b>		<b>21,792</b>	<b>20,887</b>	<b>8,222</b>		<b>75,278</b>
<b>Changes recommended by Appropriations Committee.....</b>	<b>-3,320</b>	<b>+2,735</b>	<b>-914</b>	<b>-2,795</b>	<b>-1,025</b>		<b>-5,318</b>
<b>New appropriations in accompanying bill.....</b>	<b>21,057</b>	<b>2,735</b>	<b>20,878</b>	<b>18,092</b>	<b>7,198</b>		<b>69,960</b>

The following discussion focuses principally on the more significant Committee changes to the amended budget requests. Detailed descriptions and justifications of the contents of the various programs can be found in the Committee's published hearings.

#### STRATEGIC FORCES

This major military program comprises the strategic offensive forces, the continental air and missile defense forces and the Civil Defense effort. (Funding for Civil Defense is not included in this bill nor in the preceding tables.) These general nuclear war forces are designed to achieve two distinct objectives, namely:

(1) The deterrence of deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies through the maintenance of a highly reliable capability for inflicting an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first strike. The overriding importance of this capability demands that it have first call on our resources.

(2) In the event a nuclear war nevertheless occurs, the limitation of damage to our population and industrial capacity to the extent it is in our power to do so.

For as far ahead as can now be projected, the offensive elements of the strategic forces will continue to consist of a mix of manned bombers and missiles (both land based and sea based) along with the necessary reconnaissance and command and control systems.

To help replace the B-58s which will be phased out of the force this year and some of the older B-52s, which will be phasing out of the force in the years ahead, the Air Force will begin deployment of a limited number of FB-111s this year. Procurement of this aircraft will be completed with fiscal year 1969 funds already available to the Department of Defense. In order to preserve our ability to maintain a manned strategic bomber force beyond the late 1970s, funds are included to permit the start of engineering development of an advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA), now designated the B-1.

To make certain that our nuclear deterrent forces remain adequate to their task regardless of what actions our opponents might take in the future, a number of major improvements are planned for our strategic missile forces. First, the current MINUTEMAN force will be upgraded with the new MINUTEMAN III missile. Flight testing is progressing satisfactorily and the initial deployment should start by the close of this fiscal year. Second, work is continuing on the development of superhard silos suitable for either the MINUTEMAN III or a new ICBM, as well as on the development of the technology needed for a new strategic missile system for the more distant future. Third, funds are provided to convert six more Fleet Ballistic missile submarines to the multiple-warhead POSEIDON. By the end of fiscal year 1974, our missile forces are programmed to include: 1,000 MINUTEMAN, a large proportion of which will be MINUTEMAN IIIs; 54 TITAN IIs; and 656 POLARIS and POSEIDON submarine launched ballistic missiles.

With respect to strategic defensive forces, funds are included in this bill to initiate deployment of Phase I of the SAFEGUARD ABM system, i.e., two sites to be located in the MINUTEMAN fields. Phase I would provide protection for a part of our MINUTEMAN force, as well as the operational and test experience needed to expand the system if that should be required in the years ahead. The bill includes a total of \$779.4 million for SAFEGUARD—\$400.9 million for RDT&E, \$345.5 million for Procurement, \$23.2 million for Operations and Maintenance, and \$9.8 million for Military Personnel. The total does not include the \$14.1 million of military construction for SAFEGUARD carried in another bill. Additional funds are provided to continue advanced ballistic missile defense development efforts.

Our present air defense system is considered too costly in relation to its effectiveness and is now in the process of being phased down. The problems involved in a new modernized air defense system, however, have not yet been resolved. Pending the resolution of those problems, the bill includes funds to continue, at a prudent rate, development work on AWACS, a new airborne warning and control aircraft, and on the avionics required for a new or modified interceptor.

The cost of the Strategic Forces in fiscal year 1970, for the accounts covered in this bill, is estimated at \$7.5 billion.

#### GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The General Purpose Forces include most of the Army's combat and combat support units, nearly all Navy units, all Marine Corps units, and the tactical units of the Air Force. These forces are designed to perform the entire range of combat operations short of general nuclear war.

The bill recommended by the Committee will provide for further improvements in the firepower, mobility and readiness of our general purpose forces and for the replacement of supplies and equipment consumed in the Southeast Asia conflict. Principally because of the demands of that conflict, the financial requirements of the General Purpose Forces remain at a high level.

Further discussion of the specific forces, equipment procurement programs and financing will be found in subsequent sections of this report.

#### AIRLIFT AND SEALIFT

Included in this program are: the Military Airlift Command's strategic airlift aircraft; the tactical airlift aircraft assigned to the Tactical Air Command and the Unified Commands; the transport and troop carrier aircraft in the reserve components; and the troop ships, cargo ships, tankers and "forward floating depot" ships of the Military Sea Transportation Service.

Although the past several years have seen dramatic increases in the rapid deployment capabilities of our forces, the experience of Vietnam has underscored the importance of still further improvements in this area. The amended budget provides funds for the procurement of the fourth squadron of the very large payload C-5A transport aircraft.

For the accounts covered in this bill, cost of the Airlift/Sealift forces in fiscal year 1970 is estimated in the amended budget at \$2.0 billion.

#### GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

The Budget as amended will support the retention of seven Air Reserve and Air National Guard units previously scheduled for deactivation in fiscal year 1970.

The cost of the Reserve and Guard Forces (for the accounts covered by this bill) in fiscal year 1970 is estimated in the amended budget at \$2.8 billion.

#### RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The research and development program comprises all research and development effort not directly identified with elements of other programs and, in 1970, is estimated (for the accounts covered in this bill) in the amended budget at \$5.4 billion. The Committee's recommendations for this program are discussed elsewhere in the report.

#### OTHER PROGRAMS

This category covers the remaining major defense programs: Intelligence and Communications; Central Supply and Maintenance; Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities; Administration and Associated Activities, and Military Assistance funded by the Department of Defense. Included in Intelligence and Communications are such activities as intelligence operations, communications, weather service, air rescue and recovery, and the National Military Command System. Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities includes such functions as recruiting, transportation, housing, retirement pay, etc., of the serviceman and his family, except for those costs which can be directly attributed to another major program. Retired Pay, the only item included for which a separate appropriation is made, will cost \$2.7 billion in fiscal year 1970, reflecting the continued rise in the number of military personnel on the retired rolls. Central Supply and Maintenance encompasses a wide variety of activities such as the operations of the Military Sea Transportation Service, the Military Airlift Command, the purchasing, storing and inspection of materiel and the major rebuild and overhaul of common stock items. Military Assistance funded by the Department of Defense covers the cost of aid furnished our Free World allies in Vietnam. For fiscal year 1970 the cost of these other activities covered by the accounts in this bill is estimated in the amended budget at \$30.9 billion.

#### FORCES TO BE SUPPORTED BY ORGANIZATION

In this section of the report, the military forces and programs considered by the Committee are discussed by organizational component.

As shown in the following table, the amended budget request projects a total active duty military personnel strength of 3,451,878 at the end of fiscal year 1970. Subsequent public announcements indicate that this number is now proposed to be 3,235,100. The details supporting this reduction appear in the discussion under Title I.

## Active duty military personnel strengths

(In thousands)

	June 30, 1968, actual	Dec. 31, 1968, actual	Fiscal year 1969 actual		Fiscal year 1970 <sup>1</sup> estimate	
			Average	End	Average	End
<b>Army:</b>						
Officers.....	168.0	169.9	169.6	172.4	169.7	171.9
Enlisted.....	1,471.7	1,269.3	1,336.9	1,337.0	1,344.6	1,333.8
Cadets, USMA.....	2.4	3.5	3.4	2.8	3.6	3.6
<b>Total, Army.....</b>	<b>1,670.2</b>	<b>1,462.8</b>	<b>1,509.9</b>	<b>1,511.9</b>	<b>1,517.9</b>	<b>1,509.3</b>
<b>Navy:</b>						
Officers.....	85.2	85.2	85.8	85.0	85.3	86.1
Enlisted.....	678.4	655.6	669.2	665.2	676.9	676.5
Midshipmen, USNA.....	4.6	4.4	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.2
Aviation Cadets.....						
<b>Total, Navy.....</b>	<b>768.2</b>	<b>745.1</b>	<b>759.1</b>	<b>756.6</b>	<b>766.4</b>	<b>766.9</b>
<b>Marine Corps:</b>						
Officers.....	34.6	25.0	24.9	25.7	26.1	26.1
Enlisted.....	282.7	288.1	284.9	284.1	290.7	288.4
Aviation Cadets, MARCABS.....						
<b>Total, Marine Corps.....</b>	<b>307.3</b>	<b>313.0</b>	<b>311.7</b>	<b>307.8</b>	<b>316.8</b>	<b>314.5</b>
<b>Air Force:</b>						
Officers.....	139.6	136.9	137.8	135.2	134.5	135.0
Enlisted.....	761.5	746.3	745.1	722.9	723.0	722.0
Cadets, USAFA.....	3.7	3.4	3.4	3.9	3.7	4.2
<b>Total, Air Force.....</b>	<b>904.8</b>	<b>886.6</b>	<b>886.3</b>	<b>862.1</b>	<b>861.3</b>	<b>861.2</b>
<b>Total, Department of Defense:</b>						
Officers.....	415.4	417.0	418.1	418.3	415.6	419.1
Enlisted.....	3,121.4	2,979.3	3,038.1	3,030.2	3,035.2	3,020.8
Officer Candidates, Cadets and Midshipmen.....	10.7	11.3	11.0	10.8	11.5	12.0
<b>Grand total.....</b>	<b>3,647.4</b>	<b>3,407.5</b>	<b>3,467.0</b>	<b>3,459.4</b>	<b>3,462.4</b>	<b>3,451.9</b>

<sup>1</sup> Fiscal year 1970 estimates are those projected in the President's 1970 Budget as amended in April 1969.

Note: Detail may not add to totals due to rounding.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

For fiscal year 1970, the amended budget proposes Army active forces of 18 divisions, 11 brigades and 5 armored cavalry regiments. Maneuver battalions—the basic building block of the ground forces—total 217. Other major forces include 67 missile battalions and 7 Special Forces Groups.

The amended budget provides for the procurement of one thousand and fourteen aircraft, including large quantities of UH-1H IROQUOIS utility helicopters and OH-6/58 light observation helicopters. In the missile category, the Army requested substantial quantities of TOW and SHILLELAGH anti-tank missiles and REDEYE and CHAPARRAL air defense missiles. A wide variety of ground munitions would be procured in order to support the projected levels of combat activity in Southeast Asia. Procurement of communications equipment, combat and support vehicles and weapons, although lower than in fiscal year 1969, would still be at relatively high levels in fiscal year 1970. The Committee's recommendations on Army procurement are discussed in Title IV of this report.

A summary of major Army forces, as projected in the amended budget, follows:

## Summary of major forces, fiscal years 1968-70

	Actual		Planned <sup>1</sup> June 30, 1970
	June 30, 1968	June 30, 1969	
Divisions.....	18	18	18
Brigades.....	11	11	11
Armored cavalry regiments.....	5	5	5
Maneuver battalions.....	217	217	217
Aviation units.....	213	223	233
Special forces groups.....	7	7	7
Missile battalions <sup>2</sup> .....	891 <sup>2</sup>	74	674
Aircraft inventory—active.....	9,709	10,790	11,376
Active duty military personnel.....	1,570,186	1,511,946	1,609,310
Reserve component personnel (paid drill training).....	(633,421)	(650,276)	(663,257)
Army National Guard.....	389,182	388,954	404,032
Army Reserve.....	244,239	261,322	261,220

<sup>1</sup> End fiscal year 1970 data reflect the force levels projected in the President's fiscal year 1970 budget as amended April 18, 1969.

<sup>2</sup> Missile battalions include surface-to-surface units (PERSSING, SERGEANT and HONEST JOHN) and Air Defense units (NIKE-HERCULES, HAWK and CHAPARRAL (1969 and 1970 only)).

## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

The amended budget would support an active fleet of 880 ships at the end of fiscal year 1970, compared with 886 at the end of fiscal year 1969 and 932 at the end of fiscal year 1968, and an active aircraft inventory (Navy and Marine Corps) of 8,376 at the end of fiscal year 1970, somewhat less than at the end of fiscal year 1969. A number of new ships will join the fleet during this fiscal year, including 8 nuclear attack submarines, 15 amphibious warfare ships and 12 escort ships.

The amended budget provides for construction of a third nuclear-powered attack carrier, one nuclear-powered guided missile frigate, five destroyers, two general purpose assault ships, and two nuclear-powered attack submarines. It also includes funds to procure long leadtime components for five more nuclear attack submarines, three nuclear-powered missile destroyers, eight destroyers and two general purpose assault ships. A total of 440 aircraft would be procured, including A-6 all-weather bombers, EA-6B electronic countermeasures aircraft, A-7 attack aircraft, P-3 patrol aircraft and F-4 fighters. The amended budget also requested the initial procurement of the Navy's new F-14A general purpose fighter and continued development of the new carrier-based ASW aircraft, the S-3. Funds are included for substantial quantities of missiles, ammunition, and other types of supplies, weapons and equipment.

A summary of major Navy forces follows:

## Summary of major forces, fiscal years 1968-70

	Actual		Planned <sup>1</sup>
	June 30, 1968	June 30, 1969	June 30, 1970
Commissioned ships in active fleet.....	932	886	880
Warships.....	423	400	385
Other.....	509	486	495
Carrier air groups.....	27	25	23
Patrol and warning squadrons.....	32	31	31
Marine divisions.....	4	4	4
Marine air wings.....	3	3	3
Aircraft inventory—active.....	R, 491	R, 513	R, 376
Active duty military personnel.....	(1, 072, 484)	(1, 055, 415)	(1, 081, 339)
Navy.....	765, 232	775, 644	765, 668
Marine Corps.....	307, 252	309, 771	311, 471
Reserve components personnel (paid drill training).....	(170, 589)	(181, 722)	(177, 000)
Naval Reserve.....	123, 404	132, 710	129, 000
Marine Corps Reserve.....	46, 685	49, 078	48, 000

<sup>1</sup> End fiscal year 1970 data reflect the force levels projected in the President's fiscal year 1970 Budget as amended April 15, 1969.

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

For end fiscal year 1970, the amended Air Force budget provides an active force structure of 66 combat wings and 117 squadrons of combat support flying forces. The MINUTEMAN missile force, which has already reached its planned strength of 1,000 will continue to be strengthened as the new MINUTEMAN III replaces the older MINUTEMAN I. More than 1,000 new aircraft would be delivered to the forces during fiscal year 1970, including F-4s, F-111s, A-37s and C-5s. A number of the older model fighters and interceptors are scheduled to phase out during the year as the newer planes are delivered. In addition, the amended budget provides for the continued development of the Air Force's new air superiority fighter, the F-15.

With respect to new procurement, the amended budget requests funds for 662 aircraft, including A-7s, RF-4s, F-111Ds and C-5As. Funds are also requested for MINUTEMAN III strategic missiles and for such tactical missiles as the anti-radar SHRIKE and Standard ARM and the air-to-air SPARROW. Finally, provision is made in the amended budget for procurement of conventional bombs to support projected consumption in Southeast Asia.

A summary of major Air Force forces follows:

## Summary of major forces, fiscal years 1968-70

	Actual		Planned <sup>1</sup>
	June 30, 1968	June 30, 1969	June 30, 1970
USAF combat wings (including missile wings).....	76	67	66
USAF combat support flying forces (squadrons).....	145	132	117
Aircraft inventory—active.....	14, 635	14, 300	14, 362
Active duty military personnel.....	904, 759	862, 082	861, 200
Reserve components personnel (paid drill training).....	(118, 308)	(128, 340)	(138, 531)
Air National Guard.....	75, 291	83, 414	85, 471
Air Force Reserve.....	43, 017	44, 926	50, 060

<sup>1</sup> End fiscal year 1970 data reflect the force levels projected in the President's fiscal year 1970 Budget as amended April 15, 1969.

## DEFENSE AGENCIES

The amounts requested for the various activities funded in the "Defense Agencies" category and the Committee's recommendations are discussed in connection with the specific appropriation accounts later in this report.

## UNEXPENDED AND UNOBLIGATED BALANCES

The following tables compare the unexpended and unobligated balances for the military functions of the Department of Defense over the past several years, for both the entire Defense Budget and for the accounts covered by this bill. The unobligated balances associated with the accounts in the bill are projected in the amended budget to decrease between end fiscal year 1968 and end fiscal year 1970, from \$11.7 billion to \$8.4 billion; the unexpended balances during this period are projected to drop from \$40.9 billion to \$38.1 billion.

It should be noted that in these tables, estimated unobligated and unexpended balances have been revised from amounts printed in the 1970 Budget to reflect the effect of changes in financing resulting from enactment of the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1969, together with re-estimates of obligations and expenditures in fiscal years 1969 and 1970 related to the April 15, 1969 budget amendments and more recent experience.

*Unexpended balances, fiscal years 1957-70*

(In millions of dollars)

Fiscal year	Total unexpended balance	Pertaining to appropriations in the bill <sup>1</sup>
At end of—		
Fiscal year 1957.....	34,600	31,955
1958.....	32,086	29,044
1959.....	31,635	29,139
1960.....	30,660	28,415
1961.....	28,606	26,888
1962.....	28,697	27,161
1963.....	30,019	28,237
1964.....	29,966	28,211
1965.....	32,943	31,148
1966.....	41,210	38,111
1967.....	45,227	42,626
1968.....	44,016	40,902
1969 (est).....	41,769	38,970
1970 (est).....	\$ 42,320	\$ 39,642

<sup>1</sup> Includes balances of Department of Defense revolving and management funds.

<sup>2</sup> These amounts do not reflect the reductions recommended in the accompanying bill.

## Unobligated balances, fiscal years 1967-70

(In millions of dollars)

Fiscal year	Total unobligated balance	Pertaining to appropriations in the bill
At end of—		
Fiscal year 1967.....	10,809	10,103
1968.....	7,904	6,690
1969.....	7,513	6,626
1970.....	8,638	7,734
1961.....	7,167	6,463
1962.....	7,120	6,584
1963.....	9,170	8,150
1964.....	9,961	9,008
1965.....	11,029	10,103
1966.....	12,654	11,830
1967.....	13,725	12,244
1968.....	13,494	11,666
1969 (est).....	13,668	12,022
1970 (est).....	19,354	18,440

<sup>1</sup> These amounts do not reflect the reductions recommended in the accompanying bill.

As shown above, an estimated total of \$38,970,000,000 of unexpended balances of funds is to be carried into fiscal year 1970 pertaining to the appropriation accounts provided for in the accompanying bill. Of this amount, almost \$26,948,000,000 represents legally binding documents calling for ultimate cash payment such as contracts for ship, aircraft, or missile construction. Such major weapons systems are normally fully funded even though deliveries may not occur for 2 or 3 years, or 5 years in the case of capital ships.

Approximately \$12,022,000,000 of the carryover balances represent amounts which are made available to fund authorized programs, but which are not yet obligated in the technical, legal sense. By and large these funds are committed to the programs for which initially appropriated awaiting the completion of contracting or other legal prerequisite of obligation.

The bill this year limits fund availability so as to assist in reducing these large carryover balances.

## TITLE I

## MILITARY PERSONNEL

## ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY

The accompanying bill includes appropriations totaling \$21,057,200,000 for fiscal year 1970 for military personnel, a decrease of \$3,319,700,000 below the budget estimate of \$24,376,900,000. Of this reduction, \$2,735,000,000 is a result of the transfer of "Retired Pay, Defense" from Title I to a new Title II. The actual Committee reductions in the Military Personnel requests total \$584,700,000. Of the \$23,877,103,427 appropriated in fiscal year 1969 for Military Personnel, \$2,450,000,000 was for "Retired Pay, Defense." The reduction below the comparable 1969 appropriation is \$369,903,427.

Appropriations made under this title finance the programs identified briefly below:

*Pay and allowances.*—Funds are provided for the pay and allowances of active duty officers and enlisted personnel, and cadets at the military academies. Included in these are basic pay; incentive pay; special pay to physicians, dentists, veterinarians, divers, and others; basic allowances for quarters and subsistence; station allowances overseas; uniform and clothing allowances; separation payments; social security contributions; and reenlistment bonuses.

*Subsistence of enlisted personnel.*—Funds are provided for the feeding of enlisted personnel, including both the basic allowance for subsistence and subsistence in kind.

*Permanent change of station travel.*—Funding is included to provide for permanent change of station travel for military personnel, either as individuals or as organizational units. Transportation; per diem allowances; travel of dependents; transportation of household goods; port handling charges; dislocation allowances; nontemporary storage of household goods; minor supplies and services incident to organizational movement; expenses of separation travel; and temporary duty directly related to permanent change of station are all included in this item.

*Other military personnel costs.*—Funds are also provided for other military personnel costs which include apprehension of military deserters, interest on personnel deposits, and death gratuities.

Subsequent to the submission of the revised budget the Department of Defense announced that because of reduced draft calls and the phase down of operations in Vietnam, the end fiscal year 1970 active duty military personnel strength will be reduced to about 3,235,100.

#### SIZE OF HEADQUARTERS STAFFS

The Department of Defense and the military Services have their principal headquarters in the greater Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. In addition, all of the Services have personnel assigned to major command and administrative headquarters located in various areas of the country.

When these military and civilian personnel and those assigned to the Headquarters of the Unified and Specified Commands located throughout the world are considered, the organization appears to be considerably overstaffed. The sheer weight of numbers of administrators and managers and supporting personnel cannot help but introduce cumbersomeness and impinge upon the decisionmaking process up and down the line.

The number of military and civilian personnel assigned to Headquarters in the Washington Metropolitan Area is illustrative of the magnitude of this bureaucracy. According to information provided by the Department of Defense, the number of people in headquarters activities in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area during fiscal year 1970 will be 72,893 civilian and 42,029 military. The Committee feels that a Washington area headquarters staff of almost 115,000 is unwarranted and represents top-heaviness even for an organization the size of the Department of Defense.

The Committee has therefore made a substantial reduction in both civilian and military manpower on this account.

## PERSONNEL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

The Committee took note of various projects and programs in the Services designed to assist military personnel in returning to civilian life or to enter the military service. Presentations were made by the various Services and by the Secretary as to the various programs and projects known as Project 100,000, Project Transition, Project Value, and Project Referral. The Committee feels that appropriate assistance by the Department of Defense or by the Services to men upon entering the service or about to return to civilian life is desirable. Descriptions of the various programs in this area conducted by the Department of Defense appear on pages 400 through 402 of Part 7 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Hearings for 1970. The overall hearings indicated that reductions in funding would be appropriate in this area.

The basis for the Committee reduction, by program for both Titles I and III, is as follows:

### PROJECT 100,000

Project 100,000 offers an opportunity for individuals who were previously disqualified to enter the armed forces. In the past, individuals who could not meet minimum mental standards or who had certain physical defects were precluded from military service. Physical defects are corrected and those individuals who had previously failed to meet the mental standards are given remedial reading training and other help as they go through basic training. While the Committee supports this project, its cost has risen at a very rapid rate and as a result the Committee feels that a total reduction of \$1,745,000 would not seriously interrupt the program but yet will provide the needed impetus for the Department of Defense to review the program and determine the reason for the large increase in cost.

### PROJECT TRANSITION

Project Transition is designed to help enlisted personnel leaving military service become gainfully employed on their return to civilian life.

Available information on Project Transition indicates that a substantial amount of funds is being expended for very little value. Of the total number of personnel being released from active military duty, very few participate in the program and those who participate receive very little training. It also appears that those who deserve this training most are the ones who do not have an opportunity to participate in the program. For instance, a soldier or airman returning from duty in Vietnam or another area overseas to the United States for discharge is not afforded the opportunity to enroll in the program. Nor are sailors assigned to fleet duty in the Atlantic or Pacific released in time to participate in the program. It appears the only avenue available for participation is the assignment to duty in the United States prior to discharge from the service.

With the Service's announced "early out" program, it appears that even fewer of these people will be participating in the program during fiscal year 1970. Considering all the deficiencies and discrepancies in the program, and the increased funding required each year, the Com-

mittee believes this program should be reviewed in detail. In line with this thought, the Committee is reducing by \$4,015,000 the funds requested by the Services for this program for fiscal year 1970.

#### PROJECT VALUE

Project Value is a joint Department of Labor-Department of Defense program. The Department of Labor funds the program as part of its concentrated employment program to train hard-core unemployed young men and women for productive employment. However, the Department of Defense does incur some costs in connection with the supervising and counseling of the enrollees employed at military activities. Funds requested for this program were reduced by \$200,000.

#### PROJECT REFERRAL

Project Referral was established in fiscal year 1969. Under this project, the Department of Defense is setting up a computerized referral service for retirees. The general purpose of the project is to match retirees from military service with prospective employers, in both the private and public sector of the economy. The Department of Defense advised the Committee that the project was established in recognition of the vast reservoir of unique skills represented in military personnel scheduled for retirement from the armed forces. The Department of Defense requested an appropriation of \$1,152,000 for this program. The project seems to be of doubtful value since the President has announced a plan to set up within the Department of Labor a program very similar to Project Referral that will be available generally. Therefore, the funds requested to support this project are reduced by \$975,000, an amount equal to that proposed by the Department of Defense and testified to by the Secretary on page 402 of Part 7 of the Defense Hearings.

#### BASIS FOR COMMITTEE ACTION

The Committee reductions totalling \$584,700,000 below the budget request for military personnel can be categorized into three broad areas: (1) reductions as a result of announced decisions by the Department of Defense in such areas as troop withdrawals from Vietnam and Thailand, reductions in end-strengths, base closures, ship and aircraft deactivations, et cetera; (2) general across-the-board reductions in areas of which the Committee has been critical for many years, such as: (a) management of military personnel including such functions as rotation of duty and frequency of permanent change of station, (b) the number of military personnel assigned to headquarters' staffs both in Washington and in the field and the number of military personnel assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (c) the number of military personnel assigned to public affairs, public relations, and public information activities, and (d) military personnel assigned to automatic data processing activities, an area of importance to the defense effort but yet an area that has expanded at an astronomical rate in recent years resulting in inefficiency and duplication of effort; and (3) specific reductions resulting from changes in the conditions on which the

estimates were predicated, such as: (a) computation of rates in the case of shipment of privately owned vehicles, (b) reduced requirements for funds for subsistence of enlisted personnel as a result of increased absentee rates being encountered in mess halls both in this country and overseas.

In the case of the Reserve and Guard components, modest reductions were made to reflect what appears to be overly optimistic estimates on the part of the Services as to their ability to meet their projected drill strengths. This would seem to be especially true in light of the significant reductions planned by the active forces during fiscal 1970.

In addition, appropriate reductions were applied to the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to reflect the failure of authorization of 673 Reserve and 1,993 Guard spaces.

### MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$8,409,969,223
Budget, 1970.....	8,551,700,000
Recommended in the bill.....	8,312,000,000
Reduction.....	239,700,000

† Includes amounts warranted by Treasury Department pursuant to P. L. 91-31.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$8,312,000,000 for Military Personnel, Army. This represents a decrease of \$239,700,000 below the budget estimate of \$8,551,700,000. The amount appropriated for the fiscal year 1969 for Military Personnel, Army totals \$8,409,969,223 and the amounts recommended herein for fiscal year 1970 represent a decrease below the past year of \$97,969,223.

The Committee action in the case of this appropriation results primarily from certain actions announced by the Department of Defense. The actions which will result in significant dollar savings are as follows:

(1) Phases I and II of the Vietnam troop withdrawal amounting to a reduction in authorized "in-country" strength for the Army of about 30,000.

(2) Cancellation of the November and December 1969 draft call.

(3) Announced end strength reduction to 1,435,400, a reduction of 73,900 from the 1,509,300 requested in the amended budget.

The Committee estimates that the above actions will result in savings in 1970 of approximately \$222,070,000, of which \$30,000,000 will result from the redeployment of troops from South Vietnam and \$192,070,000 will result from the announced end strength reduction of 73,900. Since the cancellation of the November and December draft call is a part of the overall reduction in end strength, a saving figure is not assigned to the cancellation of the draft. In addition to the above announced reductions, the Committee also made general across-the-board reductions in those items and activities addressed earlier.

Specifically, the recommended reductions are as follows:

Headquarters staffs.....	\$1,800,000
Public Affairs.....	570,000
Automatic Data Processing Operations.....	5,000,000
Project 100,000.....	1,170,000
Permanent Change of Station Travel.....	2,000,000

In addition to the above general reductions, specific reductions were made in several areas. The Committee has been advised of an increase in the absentee rate at Army mess halls, both in this country and overseas, since the original budget estimates were prepared. While an increase in the absentee rate produced a significant saving, this was offset to a large degree by increases in the cost of subsistence. However, even with the increase in subsistence costs, a saving of \$6,200,000 can be realized.

During the hearings, a discussion regarding the New Food Item Program revealed that in order to evaluate a new food item, the Army will procure enough of the item for one million meals. In the opinion of the Committee, a smaller size sample would serve equally well for evaluation purposes. The Committee has therefore cut the sample size to five hundred thousand meals at a saving of \$750,000.

A modest reduction of \$140,000 was also made in the area of Support Service Contracts to comport with the corresponding reduction made in this activity in the Operation and Maintenance account.

### MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$4,455,200,000
Estimate, 1970.....	4,508,500,000
Recommended in the bill.....	4,370,000,000
Reduction.....	138,500,000

<sup>1</sup> Includes amounts warranted by Treasury Department pursuant to P. L. 91-31.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$4,370,000,000 for Military Personnel, Navy. This represents a decrease of \$138,500,000 below the budget estimate of \$4,508,500,000. The amount appropriated for the fiscal year 1969 for Military Personnel, Navy, totals \$4,455,200,000 and the amounts recommended herein for fiscal year 1970 represent a decrease below the prior year of \$85,200,000.

The Committee action in the case of this appropriation results primarily from certain actions announced by the Department of Defense. The actions which will result in significant dollar savings are as follows:

(1) Phases I and II of the Vietnam troop withdrawal amounting to a reduction in authorized "in-country" strength for the Navy of approximately 6,000.

(2) Announced end strength reduction to 694,300, a reduction of 72,600 from the 766,900 requested in the amended budget.

The Committee estimates that the above actions will result in savings in 1970 of approximately \$133,200,000, of which \$6,000,000 will result from the redeployment of troops from South Vietnam and \$127,200,000 will result from the announced end strength reduction of 72,600.

In addition to the above announced reductions, the Committee also recommended general across-the-board reductions to cover those items and activities addressed in the introduction to this Title of the Report.

Specifically, the recommended reductions are as follows:

Headquarters staffs.....	\$2,755,000
Public affairs.....	725,000
Automatic data processing operations.....	1,300,000
Project 100,000.....	175,000
Project Transition.....	75,000
Permanent change of station travel.....	1,300,000

In addition to the above general reductions, specific reductions were made in several areas. The Committee has been advised of an increase in the absentee rate at Navy mess halls, both in this country and overseas, since the original budget estimates were prepared. While an increase in the absentee rate produced significant savings, this was more than offset by increases in the cost of subsistence. To allow for this increase in subsistence costs, an additional \$1,600,000 was added to the budget.

A reduction of \$520,000 was made in the area of funds to support Operation "Deepfreeze" to comport with the corresponding reduction made in this activity in the Operation and Maintenance account.

In addition, a reduction of \$50,000 was made in connection with the shipment of privately-owned motor vehicles. Testimony during the hearings revealed that the averaged rates used in computing the requirement were overstated in some cases.

### MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$1, 534, 734, 204
Estimate, 1970.....	1, 577, 000, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	1, 518, 000, 000
Reduction.....	59, 000, 000

<sup>1</sup> Includes amounts warranted by Treasury Department pursuant to P. L. 91-31.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$1,518,000,000 for Military Personnel, Marine Corps. This represents a decrease of \$59,000,000 below the budget estimate of \$1,577,000,000. The amount appropriated for the fiscal year 1969 for Military Personnel, Marine Corps, totals \$1,534,734,204 and the amounts recommended herein for fiscal year 1970 represent a decrease under the prior year of \$16,734,204.

The Committee action results primarily from certain actions announced by the Department of Defense. The actions which will result in significant dollar savings are as follows:

(1) Phases I and II of the Vietnam troop withdrawal amounting to a reduction in authorized "in-country" strength for the Marine Corps of approximately 27,000.

(2) Cancellation of the November and December 1969 draft call.

(3) Announced end strength reduction to 294,200, a reduction of 20,300 from the 314,500 requested in the amended budget.

The Committee estimates that the above actions will result in savings in 1970 of approximately \$52,900,000, of which \$18,000,000 will result from the redeployment of troops from South Vietnam to the United States and Okinawa, and \$34,900,000 will result from the announced end strength reduction of 20,300. Since the cancellation of the November and December draft call is part of the overall reduction in end strength, a savings figure is not assigned to the cancellation of the draft.

In addition to the above announced reductions, the Committee also made general across-the-board reductions to cover those items and activities addressed in the introduction to this Title of the Report.

Specifically, the recommended reductions are as follows:

Headquarters staffs.....	\$1, 300, 000
Public affairs.....	460, 000
Automatic data processing operations.....	100, 000
Project transition.....	40, 000
Permanent change of station travel.....	500, 000

In addition to the above general reductions, a specific reduction is recommended in subsistence funds. The Committee has been advised of an increase in the absentee rate at Marine Corps mess halls, both in this country and overseas, since the original budget estimates were prepared. While an increase in the absentee rate produced significant savings, these were offset to a large degree by increases in the cost of subsistence. However, even with the increase in subsistence costs, savings of \$3,700,000 can be realized.

### MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$6, 093, 600, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	5, 952, 800, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	5, 835, 300, 000
Reduction.....	117, 500, 000

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$5,835,300,000 for Military Personnel, Air Force. This represents a decrease of \$117,500,000 below the budget estimate of \$5,952,800,000. The amount appropriated for the fiscal year 1969 for Military Personnel, Air Force, totals \$6,093,600,000, and the amounts recommended herein for fiscal year 1970 represent a decrease below the previous year of \$258,300,000.

The Committee action on this appropriation results primarily from certain actions announced by the Department of Defense. The actions which will result in significant dollar savings are as follows:

(1) Phase II of the Vietnam troop withdrawal amounting to a reduction in authorized "in-country" strength for the Air Force of approximately 2,500.

(2) Announced end strength reduction to 811,200, a reduction of 50,000 from the 861,200 requested in the amended budget.

The Committee estimates that the above actions will result in savings in 1970 of approximately \$113,100,000, of which \$2,500,000 will result from the redeployment of troops from South Vietnam and \$110,600,000 will result from the announced end strength reduction of 50,000.

In addition to the above announced reductions, the Committee also made general across-the-board reductions to cover those items and activities addressed earlier.

Specifically, the recommended reductions are as follows:

Headquarters staffs.....	\$1, 880, 000
Public affairs.....	700, 000
Automatic data processing operations.....	900, 000
Project 100,000.....	400, 000
Project transition.....	400, 000
Permanent change of station travel.....	1, 500, 000

In addition to the above general reductions, specific reductions are recommended in several areas. The Committee has been advised of an increase in the absentee rate at Air Force mess halls, both in this country and overseas, since the original budget estimates were prepared. While an increase in the absentee rate produced significant savings, the savings were more than offset by increases in the cost of subsistence. To allow for this increase in subsistence costs, an additional \$2,280,000 was added to the budget.

A modest reduction of \$900,000 was made in the area of Commercial Air Travel since testimony during the hearings indicated that better utilization could be made of existing Military Airlift Command flights.

### RESERVE PERSONNEL, ARMY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$287, 200, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	311, 000, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	308, 000, 000
Reduction.....	3, 000, 000

### RESERVE PERSONNEL, NAVY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$129, 150, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	140, 400, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	131, 400, 000
Reduction.....	9, 000, 000

### RESERVE PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$36, 550, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	45, 700, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	45, 000, 000
Reduction.....	700, 000

### RESERVE PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$71, 800, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	88, 200, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	83, 400, 000
Reduction.....	4, 800, 000

### NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, ARMY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$320, 900, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	363, 500, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	356, 800, 000
Reduction.....	6, 700, 000

### NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$88, 000, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	103, 100, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	97, 300, 000
Reduction.....	5, 800, 000

### RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$2, 450, 000, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	2, 735, 000, 000
Recommended in the bill (now carried in new title II).....	0

**TITLE II**  
**RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL**  
**RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE**

**ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY**

This year the Committee recommends that the appropriation for Retired Pay, Defense be set out as a separate title rather than appear as a portion of Title I, Military Personnel.

An appropriation totaling \$2,735,000,000 is recommended in the accompanying bill for Retired Pay. This amount is the same as the budget request and an increase of \$285,000,000 over the \$2,450,000,000 appropriated for Retired Pay in fiscal year 1969.

The appropriation made under this title finances (1) pay of retired military personnel on the retired lists of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force; (2) retainer pay of members of the Navy and Marine Corps Fleet Reserves; and (3) payments to eligible survivors pursuant to the Retired Servicemen's Family Protection Plan.

**RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE**

Appropriation, 1969 (carried in title I of the act)-----	0
Estimate, 1970 (carried in title I of the budget)-----	0
Recommended in the bill.....	\$2, 735, 000, 000

The Committee recommends the creation of a separate Title because of the fact that Retired Pay is rapidly becoming a major item of expense in the Department of Defense Budget. In addition, funding requirements for this activity are uncontrollable in the usual sense through the appropriation process since the retirees of the Department of Defense and their survivors must be paid as provided for by law. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, and in order to separate "non-military" costs from "military" costs, the Committee recommends that appropriations for retired pay be established as a separate title of the bill.

During the hearings this year, the Committee asked the Department of Defense to project the requirements for Retired Pay through the year 2000. The projections are as follows:

**Projected number of military personnel receiving retired or retainer pay and annual disbursements, Department of Defense**

(Number of persons in thousands; dollar amounts in millions)

Fiscal year	Constant Active Force <sup>1</sup>	
	Number receiving retired pay	No pay or price increases
1975.....	1,029	\$4,033
1980.....	1,275	5,058
1985.....	1,426	5,876
1990.....	1,568	6,505
1995.....	1,671	6,980
2000.....	1,738	7,318

<sup>1</sup> Assumes that the Active Force remains unchanged at the June 30, 1966, level.

Note: The figures assume a 12.6-percent increase in basic pay effective July 1, 1969.

**Projected number of military personnel receiving retired or retainer pay and annual disbursements, with assumed pay or price index increases, Department of Defense**

(Number of persons in thousands; dollar amounts in millions)

Fiscal year	Constant Active Force <sup>1</sup>	
	Number receiving retired pay	Pay and price increases <sup>2</sup>
1975.....	1,029	\$4,422
1980.....	1,255	5,260
1985.....	1,426	6,536
1990.....	1,568	8,173
1995.....	1,671	10,328
2000.....	1,738	12,766

<sup>1</sup> Assumes that the Active Force remains unchanged at the June 30, 1966 level.

<sup>2</sup> Pay rates are assumed to increase by 3.5 percent annually from fiscal year 1971 to the year 2000. The price index is assumed to increase by 1½ percent annually to the year 2000.

Note: The figures assume a 12.6-percent increase in basic pay effective July 1, 1969.

## TITLE III OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

### ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY

The revised budget estimates for the operation and maintenance of the military forces for fiscal year 1970 total \$21,792,100,000. The Committee recommends appropriations totaling \$20,878,100,000. This is a reduction of \$1,477,718,000 below the appropriations for fiscal year 1969 and a reduction of \$914,000,000 below the revised budget estimate for fiscal year 1970.

#### APPROPRIATION. COVERAGE

Funds appropriated for operation and maintenance are used to cover the necessary day-to-day costs involved in support of our military establishment. These costs are related to (1) the size of the active forces and the numbers of personnel in the reserve components; (2) the tempo of operations, readiness, and deployment of the forces; (3) the training of personnel in the use of weapon systems and equipment; and, (4) the types of military facilities to be operated and maintained. The appropriations for operation and maintenance are directly related to the ability of our armed forces to react quickly, deploy effectively, and to maintain their overall state of readiness. Substantial amounts of the operation and maintenance appropriations are directly related to the tempo of the war in Vietnam.

In addition to financing the operation of force units in training or in combat, these appropriations provide for the individual training of military personnel in basic military skills, and in specialty skills ranging from aircraft pilot to cook; for medical care of the military, their dependents, and retired military personnel and their dependents; for the operation of logistic support systems; for the complex of command controls; for communications systems worldwide; for the education of dependents overseas; for certain support of Free World forces in Southeast Asia; and for the operation of base establishments in support of these functions.

Some of the programs and/or activities planned to be supported under the amended budget by operation and maintenance funds during fiscal year 1970 are (1) a planned active inventory of about 35,000 aircraft, with fuel and related costs for about 18,200,000 flying hours, (2) support for about 880 active ships having about 2,400,000 programmed steaming hours, (3) 212 service hospitals with an expected patient load of about 42,000, (4) the operation of 61 major service supply depots, (5) the support of about 660 active major military installations and, (6) the direct-hire of about 832,000 civilian employees.

The budget request for operation and maintenance includes funds in the amount of \$664.7 million for the maintenance of real property;

\$453 million for travel costs of both military and civilian personnel; \$576.1 million for the operation and maintenance of world-wide defense communication systems; \$853.9 million for the support of forces of the Government of South Vietnam and other Free World forces in Southeast Asia; \$76.6 million for the military-civilian assistance functions in South Vietnam which are being administered principally by the Department of the Army; \$1,781.7 million for the transportation of supplies and equipment; \$2,154.3 million for depot level maintenance and modernization of aircraft, engines, and accessories of which \$1,190.1 million will be performed by service depots and \$964.2 million by contractor operations; \$135.6 million for the support of dependents overseas education; and a total of \$5,985.7 million for the payment of civilian salaries and related costs.

### PROGRAM CHANGES

All of the programs and/or activities discussed in the previous two paragraphs are affected to some degree by Department of Defense announced curtailments in operations in Southeast Asia and reduced operations in other areas of the world. These reductions were in part to comply with the government-wide expenditure limitation enacted in the Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1969, Public Law 91-47. Curtailment of operations in Southeast Asia was initiated by the Department of Defense as a part of its Vietnamization program.

In line with the decision to cut back defense operations in Southeast Asia and to also generally reduce non-Southeast Asia force levels and operations, the Department of Defense has announced certain modifications to the force structure for which operation and maintenance funds were originally requested. In arriving at reductions applicable to the operation and maintenance request of the Services and Defense Agencies, these modifications were taken into consideration. It is difficult to calculate the exact amount which may be applicable to any one announced action. Therefore, the Committee's approach was to assign a value to the area of operation affected, taking into consideration the phase planning of the particular decision as best it could be developed by the Committee.

Committee reductions applicable to announced operational cutbacks and other reductions specifically recommended are discussed in subsequent sections of the report on this title of the bill.

### MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONS

During the hearings each year, much time has been spent delving into procedures for managing the vast sums being requested as well as the related programs on which the funds will be expended. The Committee believes this line of inquiry provides an insight into whether or not good management exists. The Committee can thus be assisted in its determination as to whether the program should be continued, reduced in funding, or additional funds granted.

Reduction in force levels, cutbacks in operations, and deactivation of installations are not the only ways to achieve savings. Thought must be given to ways of improving management of this vast military operation. For example, consideration should be given to the elimination of duplicate training programs. A case in point is schools

operated for the training of young legal officers. Each Service operates its own Judge Advocate General School. The similarity of basic legal training would indicate that one school managed by one of the Services would be sufficient for the training of all legal officers. There is only one code of military justice and only one armed services procurement regulation in which instructions would have to be given, as well as other courses similar in all Services. It may be necessary later for the legal officers to specialize in subjects particular to one Service, but this training could be provided for without separate complete schools.

Another area where operating costs may well be reduced is in the training of women officers and enlistees for the Services. A consolidation of basic military training for these women would seem to be feasible. Subsequent specialized training in the particular operations of the women's choice would not be affected. Intelligence schools now being operated separately by each Service could also be consolidated into one school for training in basic intelligence operations.

These are but a few of the areas in which operational costs could be reduced substantially. In addition, such other areas as communications, air defense, automatic data processing operations, and similar programs could be reviewed for the elimination of duplication of functions and overlapping responsibility. Some of these areas are discussed separately in this section of the report.

The Committee believes that streamlining of Defense operations is in order, but caution must be taken that the streamlined programs are properly managed. The decision of the Secretary of Defense to appoint a panel to review Departmental operations is a timely move. The panel should leave no stone unturned in order to obtain sufficient facts to be able to recommend the necessary management changes for improved operating procedures.

The Committee believes that ways must be found to reduce operating costs to the bare minimum in line with providing the best in defense for the nation.

### EXCESS STOCKS

During the hearings on the budget request for 1970, extensive discussion was held concerning the amount of excess stocks in Southeast Asia. The Committee was pleased to learn of the programs underway to control and redistribute all supplies and equipment excess to immediate needs in that area of activity. The Committee directs that the Department not destroy any supplies or equipment for the simple expedient of disposal to avoid transfer to another theater of operation. All stocks should be inventoried, controlled, and placed in the supply line for redistribution.

### AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

Last year and again this year the Committee, in cooperation with the General Accounting Office, reviewed the practices of various component organizations of the Department of Defense in planning and installing new automatic data processing equipment for use in computerized management systems. The results of last year's review indicated that the degree of control over the planning, development, and installation of the equipment for these systems varied widely. There was a general lack of coordination and planning within and

among the Services and/or Defense Agencies relating to the adaptability of the various management systems to one another.

The Committee had been advised last year that the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, had been delegated the sole responsibility for the management review of all facets of automatic data processing management systems. The Committee believed that this was a step in the right direction and that a thorough review and analysis of all systems should be undertaken as soon as possible. The Committee also believed that a close working relationship should be arranged between the new review offices established in each Service and the new office under the cognizance of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller. It was apparent to the Committee that only through such a direct coordinated effort could adequate control be established for the planning, adaptation, coordination, and installation of these automatic data processing management systems.

In the report on the Department of Defense Appropriation Bill for 1969, the Committee expressed the belief that until such time as these newly established offices had an opportunity to review various systems in existence and those being planned for the future, expansion of all systems should be held in abeyance.

In spite of this request, the Services were permitted to proceed with the expansion of many systems without thorough review. It was evident from the Committee's review this year that there is still a need for improved management of these costly systems. It was disclosed that existing systems were still being improved or new systems installed without careful consideration of the product of other systems already in existence or of other parallel systems being developed.

The Committee has been advised that the review process within the Office of the Secretary of Defense has again been divided between various offices. The Committee believes that the review and approval process should be a centralized responsibility of one group whomever the Secretary so directs. The Committee also believes that the review groups established in the various Services in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense should make a thorough analysis of all expansions of on-going systems and the development of new systems before implementation goes forward.

The Committee is not convinced that the Air Force Phase II base level system is required for practically every Air Force base in the United States. It would appear feasible that at some bases the present so-called second generation equipment could be utilized to provide adequate information instead of procuring a new generation of equipment. The Committee directs the Department to take a hard look at this program before further implementation.

The Committee does not look with favor upon the negotiation of lease agreements which require the lessor to provide office space for Government employees, as in the case of the LITE program. Nor does the Committee believe it was necessary for the Air Force to enter into a contract to upgrade the computers for the LITE program from second to third generation models. The Committee directs that the Department again review the needs for this new equipment and the additional office space.

For the operation of ADP systems in fiscal year 1970, the Department requested \$1,250,000,000. This is a substantial increase over the actual cost incurred for fiscal year 1968. The Committee does not be-

lieve that the review it envisioned was made in sufficient depth before requesting this large increase in funding for fiscal year 1970. Therefore, the Committee is directly reducing the requests of the Services and Defense Agencies for ADP operations to emphasize its view that close review and better management must be exercised over this most costly operation.

The Committee action is not intended to stop the expansion, development, or installation of new automatic data processing systems in the Department of Defense. Rather, the Committee desires assurance that these systems will be given adequate management review and evaluation before implementation decisions are reached to be sure that they are necessary, are being effectively designed, and will be efficiently operated. Once these objectives have been met, the Services and Defense Agencies should modernize and expand as needed. However, the Committee will continue to give this operation close scrutiny.

The Department of Defense recently announced plans to proceed further with the acquisition of a new family of 34 standardized computer systems for use in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System at an estimated cost of over \$500,000,000. The Air Force has announced its intention to proceed with the acquisition of a new generation of computers for the Advanced Logistics System at an estimated cost of approximately \$370,000,000. Severe difficulty has been encountered in the design of both of these systems. The Committee desires that the Department proceed with caution in the implementation of both systems. The Committee directs that the General Accounting Office immediately commence a comprehensive review of the need, requirements, and implementation features of these systems in line with the Committee's directive of September 24, 1969. The Committee requests that the Department of Defense assist the General Accounting Office in every way possible.

#### OPERATION OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

The Committee spent considerable time again this year reviewing the operation of the various communications systems of the Department of Defense. Last year's review disclosed a number of deficiencies in the operation of the various systems, and a lack of cooperation with the Defense Communications Agency on the part of the military departments in the operation of the Defense Communication System (DCS). The Committee reported last year that the Department of Defense was undertaking several studies toward better utilization of the various communications assets in the Department and that improvements should be forthcoming in the near future.

Regretfully, none of the studies underway at the time of the Committee's reporting last year were completed. The Committee hearings this year disclosed that there was the same duplication of management responsibilities, ineffective cooperation, duplicate review procedures, and an inadequate effort towards the elimination of dedicated networks.

## LACK OF COORDINATION

For several years, the Defense Communications Agency has been in the process of expanding the DCS to Europe. One of the principal reasons for incorporating communications in Europe into the DCS was to eliminate most of the dedicated systems in use in that area and effect substantial savings.

It came to the Committee's attention this year that while the Defense Communications Agency was expanding the DCS in Europe, the Army was in the process of developing and installing a completely new tactical communication switching system for the use of the Seventh Army. It was testified that this new "Tactical Automatic Digital Switching System", called TADSS, is intended to replace and upgrade present non-DCS manual relays at three locations in Germany.

The Army has thus far invested \$1,984,700 in this system and for 1970 is requesting an additional \$1,676,200. However, it was stated that the cost for 1970 may increase to \$2,230,000 if the Army decides to lease three additional TADSS's. The estimated cost for fiscal year 1971 and subsequent years is \$3,753,000 each year.

While the Defense Communications Agency is trying to eliminate dedicated communications systems and save money, the Army is establishing a new tactical switching system. The Committee directs that TADSS development be discontinued immediately.

In addition to TADSS, the Army is developing another comprehensive, tactical communication system. This new "Random Access Discrete Address System," referred to as "RADAS," is in effect the equivalent of a tactical mobile automatic dial telephone system. Development began in fiscal year 1963 while DCA plans were being implemented to expand the AUTOVON system worldwide. A total of \$21,600,000 has been spent through 1969 on RADAS.

The Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering advised our investigative staff that there were considerable differences of opinion over the future usefulness of RADAS, and it may not be further funded. For this reason, only a small contingency fund, \$200,000, was placed in the fiscal year 1970 budget. The Committee subsequently learned that in April 1969, the Army entered into a cost-plus-fixed-fee letter contract amounting to \$2,400,000, with an estimated total definitized cost of \$5,400,000. During hearings, Army officials testified that funds for the contract will have to be derived through reprogramming of fiscal year 1969 balances and reprogramming of fiscal year 1970 funds at the time of apportionment.

After six years of development effort the system concept is still unproven. As presently configured, RADAS will not interface with the DCS, or the MALLARD system. (The latter system is also under development and is discussed later herein). The Army believes that the future of RADAS can only be determined after a complete military potential test and that the system is being continued for possible use as an independent task force communication system.

This project is another example of development work being carried out on tactical systems without giving thorough consideration to the overall communication requirements of the Army or the Department of Defense. To design a communication system which will not "communicate" with other systems is, in the opinion of the Committee indefensible and funding such development via the reprogramming route without the Committee's knowledge is intolerable.

The Committee directs that development work on RADAS be discontinued.

These are major deficiencies in the management of communication systems and they illustrate the validity of the Committee's position that very close scrutiny of communications operations and development is most needed. Although the Army is prominently mentioned in this discussion, all services are independently developing various communication systems which require closer supervision by the Department of Defense.

#### CURRENT REVIEW

The Committee has been advised that communications operations in the Department of Defense are currently receiving a thorough review by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and his staff. We have also been advised that this is one of the operations to which the Blue Ribbon Panel, appointed by the Secretary, will give serious study.

There is a need for better overall management of existing communication assets; a need for centralization of control over all communication operations, including the possible elimination of "strategic" and "tactical" differentiation. It would seem that technology has advanced beyond the artificial distinction of tactical versus strategic communications. The current use of tactical communications satellites for strategic purposes is a good example. It would appear to be advantageous to establish one end-to-end Defense telecommunications system to serve all users, both tactical and strategic. In addition, it appears reasonable to the Committee that the complete authority and responsibility for all Defense telecommunications should be centralized in one approving office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Also, serious consideration should be given to having the Director of the Defense Communications Agency report directly to the Secretary of Defense or his designee at the OSD level.

Notwithstanding the improvements required, the Committee recognizes the need for a reliable and viable communication network. The Committee's desire is that existing management deficiencies be corrected so that there can be no doubt as to the effectiveness and efficiency of the nation's defense communication systems.

#### FUNDING COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES

Another area which needs special attention is the funding control for communication systems. Funding for operations of the various systems, procurement of assets, and research is spread throughout the Defense Agencies and Military Services budget requests, even though requested for the same system. For example, the fiscal year 1970 funding request for the Defense Satellite Communication System

is \$127,000,000. Of this amount, \$39,000,000 is for Research and Development, \$76,300,000 for procurement of equipment, and \$11,700,000 for operations. The following schedule shows the distribution of these amounts among the various appropriation requests.

*Funds Requested*

(In millions)

Service	Research and development	Procurement	Military personnel	Operation and maintenance	Total
Army.....	39.5	51.4	32.4	54.3	31.8
Navy.....	3.7	2.3	1.3	1.4	11.6
Air Force.....	22.8	55.6	1.3	1.3	80.9
DCA.....	3.0				3.0
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>39.0</b>	<b>79.3</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>127.0</b>

As can be seen from the above schedule the control of funds for this project is divided. The Committee can readily understand the desire of each Service to be identified with defense systems. It appears, however, that prudent management would dictate that the Defense Communications Agency be given full funding responsibility and direct control over the research, implementation, and operations of any communication system of the scope of the Defense Satellite Communication System.

**OTHER PROGRAMS AND/OR ACTIVITIES**

The Committee is reducing other Defense programs and/or activities for various reasons, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

**SERVICE SUPPORT CONTRACTS**

The Committee has noted over the last few fiscal years that the costs of service support contracts have substantially increased in each Service. Information provided the Committee indicates that a large increase is again intended for fiscal year 1970. The Committee recognizes the need for these contracts but the cost of this operation is increasing at a rate which appears to be disproportionate to needs. The Committee is reducing funding for fiscal year 1970 in this area for each of the Services in order to hold the cost of these contracts at about the fiscal year 1969 level. The Committee intends to give this matter further attention in its review of the fiscal year 1971 budget request.

**MANAGEMENT STUDIES**

The Committee noted that the Services and Defense Agencies increased their request in 1970 for various management studies by independent commercial consultant firms. The Committee's prior review of the requirement for, and utilization of, these studies demonstrated the need for close overall Defense management of these funds. The review of the 1970 budget request only serves to emphasize the Committee's position. The Committee is still of the opinion that the Department of Defense is not exercising proper control over when and

what type of studies should be made. Therefore, the Committee reduced the Operation and Maintenance funds requested by the Services and Defense Agencies for these studies.

A separate statement regarding management studies made for the Office of the Secretary of Defense is contained in the discussion on Defense Agencies.

#### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The Committee again reviewed the defense intelligence operations with officials of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence units of the Services. This review indicated the need for the Department of Defense to exercise tighter control over this important operation and to improve the management of the entire system.

The Committee has been advised by the Secretary of Defense of recent organizational changes he has initiated to endeavor to improve intelligence operations and the intelligence product. Notwithstanding these new studies and organizational changes, the Committee did not see any reason for increased funding for fiscal year 1970 and accordingly reduced the Department's and Service's requests.

#### PUBLIC INFORMATION

The Committee's Surveys and Investigations Staff conducted a comprehensive review of the public affairs, public relations, and public information activities conducted by the Department of Defense. The staff report pointed out numerous areas of duplication, ineffective utilization of personnel, and a lack of overall control of this operation.

The report was furnished to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs for corrective action. The Committee was subsequently advised that management changes are being initiated and operational improvements should be forthcoming in the very near future. However, the Committee's hearings on the various budget requests indicated over funding in this area. The Committee has also been informed that personnel reductions will be made in this area. Therefore, appropriate reductions were made against the budget request for the Services for fiscal year 1970.

#### MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE CONSTRUCTION

The Committee has maintained a continuing interest in the manner in which the planning, design, and supervision workload for construction is allocated between the services. The Committee feels that the two construction agencies of the Department of Defense, the Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command, provide a sufficient capability to carry out construction for the Department of Defense. In some instances, it may be advantageous for an agency or department which is sponsoring a small construction project to carry through the planning, design, and supervision of construction for the project if it can do so with existing personnel. However, the Committee has no intention of funding the additional personnel and other overhead expenses which would be involved in another construction agency. The Committee therefore directs that no personnel, either military or civilian, shall be hired nor any expenses incurred

by the Air Force or the Defense Agencies in connection with the establishment of any additional construction agencies in the Department of Defense.

### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$7, 986, 310, 000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	7, 504, 500, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	7, 214, 447, 250
Reduction.....	290, 052, 750

The recommended reduction of \$290,052,750 encompasses many activities in operations of the Department of the Army. The major reductions are associated with the redeployment of forces and reductions in force levels, as previously discussed in connection with Title I of the report.

In addition, the Army has announced the inactivation of the 9th Infantry Division which has an immediate effect on the requirements for operation and maintenance funds. The Army has also announced a reduction of about 18,000 full-time permanent civilian employees during 1970.

The Committee assigned a reduction of \$80,000,000 to the withdrawal of forces from Southeast Asia which entails reduced combat support. For reduction in force levels and the inactivation of the 9th Infantry Division, the Committee reduced operating support requests by \$62,200,000. Funds for civilian employees and related costs were reduced by \$40,000,000. The Army advised the Committee that a reduction of \$3,700,000 could be made to the request for overseas dependents education.

### OTHER REDUCTIONS

Other reductions are set forth in the following table, the reasons were previously discussed.

<i>Activities</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Automatic data processing operations.....	\$25, 000, 000
Communications operations.....	16, 000, 000
Intelligence operations.....	10, 200, 000
Public affairs, relations, and information.....	1, 000, 000
Service support contracts.....	21, 000, 000
Headquarters operations and administration.....	18, 000, 000
Management studies.....	2, 000, 000
Project transition.....	2, 000, 000

### FIELD EXERCISES

The Committee reduced the request for field exercises by \$7,000,000 since with the cut-back in force levels and the withdrawal of troops from overseas, it appears highly improbable that the Army would be able to carry out the planned program and obligate the \$24,600,000 requested for fiscal year 1970.

### SUBDUED INSIGNIA

The Committee also disallowed the request of \$1,900,000 for the purchase and world-wide distribution of subdued insignia. The first increment of funding for this new program was deleted from the Second Supplemental request for fiscal year 1969.

### CIVILIAN MARKSMANSHIP PROGRAM

The \$52,750 in the Army budget request for support of this activity has been transferred to a separate paragraph under this title of the bill.

### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY, 1966

(Appropriation to Liquidate Contract Authorization)

Appropriation, 1969.....	0
Estimate, 1970.....	(\$142,165,000)
Recommended in the bill.....	0
Reduction.....	(142,165,000)

These funds were requested for liquidation of obligations incurred during fiscal year 1966 pursuant to Section 3732 of the Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 11). The Committee does not believe there is any need to fund this deficiency at this time.

### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$5,376,200,000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	5,323,700,000
Recommended in the bill.....	5,037,300,000
Reduction.....	286,400,000

The reduction of \$286,400,000 recommended by the Committee is associated with (1) announced curtailments of operations, (2) areas where the Navy appears to be overfunded, and (3) operations which the Committee believes should be cut back or eliminated.

### REDUCED OPERATIONS

The Navy has announced the deactivation of 101 ships in addition to the 66 originally planned for fiscal year 1970. The number of operating aircraft will also be reduced by about 160. In addition, the Navy and Marine Corps will withdraw forces from Southeast Asia which affects the request for support funds. The Navy and Marine Corps will also reduce full-time permanent civilian employees by about 15,800.

For the withdrawal of forces from Southeast Asia and reduced combat support operations, the Committee reduced the Navy's operation and maintenance request by \$35 million. In connection with the deactivation of ships and aircraft, the Committee applied a reduction of \$86 million. A \$50 million reduction was assessed against decreased civilian personnel strength.

### OTHER REDUCTIONS

Reductions applicable to specific areas previously discussed are set forth in the following table:

<i>Activities</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Automatic Data Processing operations.....	\$30,000,000
Communications operation.....	12,000,000
Intelligence operations.....	8,300,000
Management studies.....	4,000,000
Service support contracts.....	15,000,000
Public affairs, relations, and information.....	400,000
Headquarters operations and administration.....	20,000,000
Project transition.....	1,300,000
Project value.....	200,000

## ANTARCTIC OPERATION—DEEP FREEZE

Last year, the Committee suggested that the Navy reduce its budget support of Operation Deep Freeze. Evidence showed that the Navy's financial support of this scientific research effort had been increasing over the years. The Committee believed that because of the financial situation last year, funding could be reduced. In last year's report the Committee pointed out that if additional funding was needed to support high priority research and test, it should be sought from other governmental programs in support of scientific research.

Hearings this year revealed that the Navy gave no consideration to the Committee's suggestion. In fiscal year 1969, the Navy funded this operation at \$8,700,000, the amount requested in the budget. For 1970, the Navy requested the same amount.

The Committee has not changed its opinion of last year. However, to ensure curtailment of Navy participation in this operation a reduction of \$1,200,000 was made.

## COMPETITION IN SHIP REPAIRS

The Committee feels that, to the greatest extent feasible, the ship repair work of the Navy should be awarded on the basis of competitive bids without regard to the geographical limitations of naval districts. The morale and retention rates of Navy personnel, many of whom have families living in the home port area, require that competition be limited when the work can be done in the home port. However, it has been the practice of the Navy to restrict repairs to the "Naval District" of the home port when repair work could not be accomplished at the home port itself. The Committee feels that this practice is unnecessarily restrictive, and that better prices and a better distribution of repair work among the available facilities could be accomplished if repairs were open to competition by all facilities capable of performing the repair work located within 350 miles of the home port of the vessel involved. The Navy has sufficient legislative authority to implement the recommended change in procedure.

## HELICOPTER PILOT TRAINING

Both the Navy and the Air Force give helicopter pilots training in fixed-wing aircraft prior to helicopter pilot training. Fixed-wing pilot training is very, very expensive. For several years the Committee has discussed with the Navy and the Air Force the need for training helicopter pilots in fixed-wing aircraft. The Committee generally suggested during the hearings that consideration be given to discontinuing this type of training. This suggestion was never taken by either Service. So, last year the Committee stated in its report that fixed-wing training for helicopter pilots could be dispensed with at this time, especially in view of the urgent need for helicopter pilots. The Committee pointed out that fixed-wing training could later be provided for those pilots whose subsequent duty would require it.

This year, both Services testified to the fact that they did not intend to comply with the Committee's desires. It costs on the average about \$60,000 per trainee to become proficient in a fixed-wing aircraft prior to helicopter training. Since both Services train approximately 1,000 helicopter pilots each year, the total cost for fixed-wing training is about \$60,000,000 in the two Services each year.

Since helicopter training qualifies a trainee to pilot the aircraft, the Committee does not see the need for fixed-wing training first. The Committee believes that the \$60,000,000 expended for fixed-wing training could be used to better advantage for more urgent requirements. Therefore, the Committee directs that this training be discontinued.

In taking this action, the Committee is reducing each Service request for pilot training by \$10,000,000. With this reduction, sufficient funds will still be available for a gradual phaseout of the program by June 30, 1970.

The Committee also believes it would be desirable for the Navy and the Air Force, in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to give serious consideration to allowing the Army to train all helicopter pilots. The Army has the largest training facility for this purpose and, the Committee understands, the Army could expand the base plant if additional requirements were placed upon it. It costs the Army about \$30,000 to train a helicopter pilot, whereas it costs the other Services much more. It would also be expected that with an increased production rate, the Army's average cost for helicopter pilot training would decrease.

Helicopter pilots trained by the Army are well-qualified as has been demonstrated in Vietnam. The Committee recognizes that advanced training in the particular operating procedures of the Navy and Air Force would be required after their basic helicopter pilot training. This training could be accomplished without any difficulty. The Committee desires a report on this suggestion by the Secretary of Defense.

#### PILOT TRAINING

The Navy has advised the Committee that pilot training will be cut back by 350 during fiscal year 1970. The Committee therefore reduced the Navy request by \$13,000,000.

#### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, NAVY, 1966

##### (APPROPRIATION TO LIQUIDATE CONTRACT AUTHORIZATION)

Appropriation, 1969.....	0
Revised estimate, 1970.....	(\$66,000,000)
Recommended.....	0
Reduction.....	(66,000,000)

The request is disallowed since there is no urgent requirement for these funds at this time.

#### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$455,190,000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	457,000,000
Recommended.....	420,000,000
Reduction.....	37,000,000

Of the recommended \$37,000,000 reduction, most is applicable to announced Marine Corps withdrawals from Southeast Asia, reduced force levels and the partial inactivation of the Fifth Marine Division.

For withdrawals of forces from Southeast Asia, the Committee has applied a reduction of \$16,200,000. The Committee applied a reduction of \$13,000,000 for reduced force levels and inactivation of the Fifth Marine Division. The request for civilian personnel salaries and related costs was reduced by \$4,000,000.

## OTHER REDUCTIONS

Other operations and/or activities are reduced as follows:

<i>Activities</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Service support contracts.....	\$500, 000
Management studies.....	300, 000
Automatic data processing systems.....	2, 000, 000
Headquarters operations and administration.....	1, 000, 000

## OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS, 1966

(Appropriation to Liquidate Contract Authorization)

Appropriation, 1969.....	0
Revised estimate, 1970.....	(\$2,500, 000)
Recommended in bill.....	0
Reduction.....	(2, 500, 000)

This request is not being funded for the reasons previously stated in connection with the Army and Navy request for these funds.

## OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$6, 866, 700, 000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	6, 711, 700, 000
Recommended in bill.....	6, 454, 500, 000
Reduction.....	257, 200, 000

The Air Force has announced reductions in Southeast Asia as well as non-Southeast Asia operations which affect the request for operation and maintenance funds for fiscal year 1970. The Air Force has also announced a reduction of 13,000 full-time permanent civilian employees.

The Committee assigned a reduction of \$50,000,000 for reduced operations in Southeast Asia. For the termination of non-Southeast Asia operations, the Committee reduced the budget request by \$56,400,000. The Air Force advised the Committee that the request for overseas dependents education could be reduced by \$2,000,000. Funds for civilian employees and related costs were reduced by \$40,000,000.

The Air Force has also stated that it will not proceed with the Hard Rock Silo site survey project to the extent originally planned for fiscal year 1970. The Committee therefore reduced funds for this project by \$6,000,000, cutting the request back to the 1969 funding level.

## OTHER REDUCTIONS

Other operations and/or activities reduced for reasons previously discussed are as follows:

<i>Activities</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Intelligence operations.....	\$11, 200, 000
Field exercises.....	6, 000, 000
Automatic data processing operations.....	23, 000, 000
Headquarters operations and administration.....	16, 000, 000
Service support contracts.....	20, 000, 000
Helicopter pilot training.....	10, 000, 000
Communications operations.....	15, 000, 000
Public affairs, relations, and information.....	800, 000
Project transition.....	200, 000

## JOINT CONTINENTAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS INTEGRATION PLANNING STAFF

During the hearings on the fiscal year 1969 request for operation and maintenance funds, the Committee expressed concern at the request for \$400,000 for the establishment of a Joint Continental Defense Systems Integration Planning Staff. This staff was to be assigned the mission of planning for the effective integration of defense systems which contributed to continental aerospace defense.

At first, the Committee was concerned that such a defense had not already been planned. However, after being assured that there were established plans for the defense of the Continental United States, the Committee's concern turned to the need for the establishment of this new staff. Notwithstanding the expressed criticism of such need, the Department of Defense proceeded with full implementation during fiscal year 1969, and named the Air Force as executive agent.

During the hearings on the operation and maintenance budget request for 1970, the Committee again questioned the need for this group and the funding required. It developed that the cost for 1969 was increased by \$193,000 to a total of \$593,000. The estimated cost for fiscal year 1970 is \$1,642,000.

The duties proposed to be performed by this joint staff are the same that have been carried out by the services for a number of years, particularly the Air Force. It appears from the justification provided, that most of these duties should be performed by the Air Force for its own information.

The Committee directs that this staff be phased out and is reducing the funds requested by \$600,000. The remaining \$1,042,000 will be required for phase-out costs through June 30, 1970.

### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, DEFENSE AGENCIES

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$1,068,800,000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	1,095,000,000
Recommended in the bill.....	1,074,600,000
Reduction.....	20,400,000

There have been no announced Department of Defense cutbacks in operating activities of the various Defense agencies. Recognizing that the operations of these agencies will be reduced as a result of announced operational cutbacks, the Committee applied a reduction of \$20,400,000.

The Committee reduced the overall request for civilian personnel and related costs by \$6,500,000. The operations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense was reduced \$2,500,000, being applied to the following activities:

<i>Activities</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Automatic data processing operations.....	\$400,000
Travel and per diem cost.....	270,000
Management studies.....	600,000
Public affairs, relations, and information.....	300,000
Other operating costs.....	930,000

## TRAVEL AND PER DIEM COST

For fiscal year 1970, the Office of the Secretary of Defense requested \$1,969,000 for travel cost. This was an increase of \$671,000 over the actual cost for fiscal year 1968, and \$124,000 over the revised estimate for fiscal year 1969.

The Committee believed that the increase requested over the actual cost for 1968 was excessive and therefore reduced the request by \$270,000.

## MANAGEMENT STUDIES FOR OSD

In reviewing the various management studies being conducted for the Department of Defense, the Committee noted with particular interest a study made by the Logistics Management Institute (LMI) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

In May 1968, LMI was directed to make a study of the interface between contract audit and contract administration in the Department of Defense. The Defense Contract Administration Service is a function of the Defense Supply Agency. This service has the responsibility for the day to day routine administration of contracts, including supervision of performance, inspection, quality control and other duties.

The Defense Contract Audit Agency is an independent agency in the Department of Defense. This Agency is charged with the responsibility for the audit of all Defense contracts.

The LMI report of March 1969 recommended that the administration and audit of Defense contracts be merged organizationally into one agency reporting to the Secretary of Defense.

The Committee questioned the Directors of the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Supply Agency on the feasibility of the recommendation. Both were opposed. The Defense Comptroller was of the opinion that the recommendation did not have merit. The Committee cannot understand why a study of this type was made in the first instance. The Committee has stated, on previous occasions, particularly in its report on the Department of Defense appropriation bill for fiscal year 1968, that—

It appears that it is too easy to order studies which are not really required. In addition, not all of the studies approved are well conceived or well executed.

It appears that this study was a complete waste of Government funds. Good management practice dictates that the responsibility for administration be divorced from the review or audit process.

The Committee does not think that this consolidation is either feasible or desirable. The Committee has always strongly believed that the effective audit of Defense contracts can be achieved only through audits made by organizations and individuals completely independent of the procurement process, including both the negotiation and administration. The Committee has, for this reason, continued to support the establishment of the Defense Contract Audit Agency as a completely independent agency.

The Committee understands that the LMI recommendation of March, 1969 is still under consideration in the Department of De-

fense. The Committee directs that no action be taken that would in any way compromise the independence of the contract audit in the Department of Defense.

The Committee has assigned a reduction of \$600,000 to OSD management studies.

#### OTHER REDUCTIONS

The request of the National Security Agency was reduced by \$800,000, and the request for Defense educational and informational activities by \$600,000.

The request for support service contract cost for the Joint Chiefs of Staff activities was reduced by \$700,000. The Committee applied a total reduction of \$3,200,000 to the operations of the Defense Supply Agency. This reduction was assigned as follows:

<i>Activities</i>	<i>Amount</i>
Automatic data processing operations.....	\$2, 000, 000
Project referral.....	975, 000
Other operating costs.....	225, 000

#### DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

The request of the Defense Communications Agency was reduced by \$2,000,000. This reduction was applied to: (1) service support contracts of the National Military Command System (\$1,350,000) and contracts of DCA (\$500,000) and, (2) other DCA operating costs (\$150,000).

#### DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Committee reduced the request of the Defense Intelligence Agency by \$4,100,000. This reduction was assigned to the following activities.

National Military Command System service support contracts.....	\$1, 600, 000
Other service support contracts.....	2, 100, 000
Other operational costs.....	400, 000

#### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$276, 164, 000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	306, 000, 000
Recommended in bill.....	300, 000, 000
Reduction.....	6, 000, 000

Logistics support operations of the Army National Guard was reduced by \$6,000,000 because the amount requested for depot maintenance of vehicles will not be required.

Various changes have been made in the language of this paragraph. These changes result from the enactment of the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-486). The appropriation wording has been changed to delete any reference to the rank of technicians or the number authorized to be employed, since those matters were covered by the Technicians Act. Also, the revised appropriation wording has been changed with the intention of per-

mitting the employment of additional technicians, subject to reimbursement from active service appropriations, over the number of 42,500 authorized by the National Guard Technician Act, when such technicians are performing services requested by the military departments in maintenance shops of the National Guard.

A similar change is also made in the language for Operation and Maintenance, Air National Guard.

#### OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$277, 800, 000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	342, 534, 000
Recommended in bill.....	330, 534, 000
Reduction.....	12, 000, 000

The Air National Guard requested an increase of \$8.3 million in aircraft fuel and oil. The Committee believed that this was entirely too high in proportion to the increased flying hour program. Therefore, a reduction of \$3.3 million was applied against this request.

The Guard also requested an increase of \$15.2 million for logistics support. Since a large number of the Guard's aircraft was recently overhauled, the Committee was of the opinion that this increased request was overstated. Therefore, a reduction of \$8,700,000 was applied against this request.

#### NATIONAL BOARD FOR THE PROMOTION OF RIFLE PRACTICE, ARMY

Appropriation, 1969.....	0
Revised estimate, 1970.....	0
Recommended in bill.....	\$52, 750
Increase.....	52, 750

The Committee reestablished this paragraph as a separate appropriation as it had been prior to fiscal year 1969. In that year the funds for support of this activity were incorporated in the request of the Army for operation and maintenance activities.

#### INTERNATIONAL SHOOTING MATCHES

In 1970 the International World Shooting Matches are to be held in the United States. The Committee believes it to be an honor for this country to be selected to host this competition. The Committee is mindful that the Department of Defense has assisted in conducting such events in the past. The Department should continue to provide the necessary assistance to make the event a success.

#### CLAIMS, DEFENSE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$38, 000, 000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	41, 000, 000
Recommended in bill.....	41, 000, 000

#### CONTINGENCIES, DEFENSE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$10, 000, 000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	10, 000, 000
Recommended in bill.....	5, 000, 000
Reduction.....	5, 000, 000

Very little of these funds have been used by the Department in the last four fiscal years. The largest amount used was \$2.7 million in fiscal year 1966. For fiscal year 1969, the Department obligated a little more than \$1.5 million. In this year of fiscal stringency, the Committee believes an appropriation of \$5 million should be sufficient.

### COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS, DEFENSE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$654, 000
Revised estimate, 1970.....	666, 000
Recommended in bill.....	666, 000

## TITLE IV PROCUREMENT

### ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY

The budget estimates for the procurement appropriations for fiscal year 1970 total \$20,886,800,000, which is \$267,300,000 more than the amount appropriated for this purpose in fiscal year 1969. The Committee recommends appropriations of \$18,092,148,000, a reduction of \$2,794,652,000 below the estimates and \$2,527,352,000 below the amounts appropriated for fiscal year 1969.

### GENERAL STATEMENT

Whether it is termed cost overrun, or cost growth, or cost increase, fiscal year 1969 can well be characterized as the "Year of the Cost Overrun". While the Committee has consistently inquired into cost overruns from year to year, no single year stands out in which inordinate escalations in costs for Defense weapon system developments and procurements have been surfaced to the extent they have been this year during the hearings. The Secretary of Defense testified that cost increases for certain specified weapon systems have totaled \$16,200,000,000 over a period of several years. This situation has greatly disturbed the Committee and it most certainly has an unfavorable impact upon the American taxpayer. Although general inflationary trends in recent years have been a factor in contributing to the problem of cost increases, economic changes accounted for only 11.4 percent of the total cost increases identified. It can be said that cost overruns in fact have contributed to inflation.

Changes made in weapon system programs are a major contributor to cost increases. Engineering changes, system performance changes, and schedule changes during both the development and production phases have accounted for 39.4 percent of the cost increases cited, according to figures provided by the Secretary of Defense. This practice points up the need for better definition of requirements. After such definition, "nice to have" or desirable changes cannot be made without pyramiding of cost increases. Engineering changes and system performance changes are not only costly in and of themselves, but they may well cause a slippage or change in schedule which also results in added costs.

The major reason for cost increases has been identified as revision of estimates, accounting for 49.2 percent of the identified cost growth. For many years, the Committee has been assured during hearings that cost estimates were the best that could be reasonably projected. Too often, this was found not to be the case. The submission to the top level planners in the executive branch and to Congress of overly optimistic weapon system cost estimates has been almost standard practice. Already, the cost estimate for the Air Force's F-15 air

superiority fighter aircraft has increased, and the competing contractors have yet to complete their contract definition for the aircraft. In the future, the Committee would expect to see more realistic cost estimates when weapon programs are presented to Congress.

There have been too many instances uncovered this year of cost overruns resulting from such laxities as improperly defined specifications, delays in delivering Government-furnished equipment, and too much concurrency between research and development and production. The pendulum has moved too far from the early concepts of "fly before buy" and competitive prototype development. Also in recent years, there has been a tendency to move too fast into production, even before development and testing is completed and, in some cases, prior to the time development and testing has reached the point where a reasonably intelligent decision to enter into production can be made. The result has been disastrous in such recent cases as the Sheridan armored vehicle and Choyenne helicopter, but there have been many other examples. Budgetary considerations based on fear of losing funding authority have often dictated such decisions rather than sound technical judgment. Premature production releases most often result in extensive and costly modification and retrofit programs which could be avoided by delaying production, possibly only a few months. The Committee applauds the Department of Defense in the creation of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council. The Committee believes, however, that acceptance testing by the military departments must be improved before realistic production decisions can be made.

The Committee is convinced also that contracting procedures must be improved and contract terms enforced. The inadequacy of Government inspection and review of the contractor's product before acceptance has been in evidence in several programs this year. No longer should the contractor be rewarded for poor workmanship or failure to meet contract specifications. Government funding of contractor's mistakes cannot be justified under any circumstances. The MINUTEMAN II program clearly portrays these shortcomings.

Subsequent to the hearings with Air Force officials on the MINUTEMAN program this year, the Committee directed its Surveys and Investigations Staff to review the procurement of guidance systems for the MINUTEMAN II missile. This review disclosed that the Air Force spent \$152,000,000 in buying more spares than originally planned and in correcting reliability deficiencies in an important component of the MINUTEMAN II guidance system. As a net result, the guidance system contractor earned more profit for failing to meet contract specifications than he would have received for meeting specifications.

The need for reliability improvement in the MINUTEMAN II guidance system was first recognized in 1966, but several hundred guidance sets were accepted by the Air Force as conforming to all contractual requirements before the reliability problems became acute. It later became obvious that the delivery test criteria had not been closely reviewed or studied until the reliability problems arose, and that the computations involved in designing the test criteria were not accurate. No legal action was taken against the guidance system contractor even though the contractor had completely failed to meet contract specifications.

Studies by the Air Force in 1966 and early 1967 concluded that certain component parts of the MINUTEMAN II guidance sets had extremely poor reliability, and that the guidance system contractor had failed to give sufficient attention to supervision and inspection procedures of the subcontractors and vendors who furnished the components. An Air Force team, after reviewing the entire MINUTEMAN program, in 1967, criticized the Air Force systems engineering contractor for failure to place emphasis on reliability as a major design and development objective. In addition, the Air Force team criticized the guidance system contractor, and also found that program direction by the Air Force was deficient and in need of reorganization.

In effect, a recovery program initiated in 1967 initially directed at tightening quality control and correcting design weaknesses in some of the component parts of the guidance set, placed the guidance system contractor in a position of earning greater profits as a result of having done a poor job. During Committee hearings, on June 24, 1969, page 651, Part 4, the Air Force provided information indicating that because a high reliability rate was not achieved on early MINUTEMAN II guidance and control units, the Air Force spent \$90,000,000 in additional spares, in on-line production improvements, and in retrofit changes to those sets already in the field. The Committee's investigative staff determined, however, that in fact approximately \$152,000,000 in extra costs could be attributed directly to the early failure of the MINUTEMAN II guidance system components to meet minimum reliability requirements set forth in the research and development and procurement contracts.

The Secretary of Defense testified that one-third, or about \$5,500,000,000, of the total identified cost growth of about \$16,200,000,000 will be funded through fiscal year 1970. The remaining two-thirds must be funded in future years. This means that less defense will be obtained for the same funds beyond fiscal year 1970. It has been stated by Defense officials that if mistakes were made in only one-tenth of one percent of the procurement transactions involved in the \$40,000,000,000 spent annually by the Department of Defense for military supplies and equipment, there would be over 10,000 miscues each year. Nevertheless, it only takes a few mistakes or mismanagement of a relatively small number of programs of the magnitude of those discussed to cause Congress and the American public to lose confidence in the military. The Defense budget reached a new high of approximately \$77,000,000,000 in fiscal year 1969. This was seven times the military budget for fiscal year 1948. A budget the size of that of the Defense Department demands management of the highest order. In the future, the Committee, the Congress, and the general public will expect to see significant improvements in the management of all aspects of Defense programs.

### COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT

For years, this Committee continually has emphasized the absolute necessity for the Department of Defense to increase its competitive procurement of supplies and services. Departmental witnesses have repeatedly assured the Committee this matter was receiving their utmost attention. They pointed to the procurement procedures and

techniques which have been developed to increase competition and greater efficiency. These procedures and techniques include two-step formal advertising, multi-year procurements, advance procurement planning, component breakout, and the spare parts breakout program. In addition, proposed advertised or negotiated procurements which may result in award in excess of \$10,000 for supplies and services in the United States, except for classified procurements and a few other specific situations, such as procurement of perishable subsistence commodities, are published in the Commerce Business Daily. It is intended that such publication of proposed procurements alert suppliers not only to the possibility of obtaining prime contract awards but also subcontract awards.

The procedures and techniques discussed above undoubtedly have had a favorable impact in increasing competitive procurement; however, the downward trend in competitive procurement in recent years indicates that they are less effective than anticipated or that too little attention has been given to the day-to-day administration of these efforts.

A review of Defense procurement history for the last seven fiscal years discloses that competitive procurement of military supplies and services reached its peak in fiscal year 1966, at which time 50 percent of a total military procurement of \$38,200,000,000 was awarded competitively. Since that time, competitive procurement has steadily declined. For fiscal year 1968, competitive procurement represented only 42.1 percent of a total military procurement amounting to \$43,800,000,000. Complete figures for fiscal year 1969 are not yet available to the Committee; however, testimony from military department officials indicate this downward trend probably continued during the last fiscal year.

Formally advertised procurement dropped from a high of 17.6 percent in fiscal year 1965 to only 11.5 percent in fiscal year 1968, the lowest in the past seven years, without knowing what it will be in fiscal year 1969. Conversely, one-source solicitations in fiscal year 1968 represented 39.9 percent of total military procurements, the highest it has ever been in the same time period. The Committee also notes with some considerable concern that the percentage of competitive procurements in the spare parts breakout program, one of the procedures and techniques developed to increase competition, has decreased yearly since fiscal year 1966.

Defense Department officials have stated over the years that experience has shown that savings of 25 percent and more can be realized through competitive procurement of military supplies and services. With a yearly military procurement program of over \$40,000,000,000, the savings resulting from competition and the attention that should be afforded this aspect of the Defense procurement effort is obvious. For this reason, the Secretary of Defense is requested to give this matter his personal consideration during fiscal year 1970 and the years beyond.

#### SMALL DOLLAR VALUE PURCHASES

In its report on the fiscal year 1969 Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, the Committee discussed the small dollar value purchases which are \$2,500 or less. The Committee expressed its concern over the

ever-increasing volume of procurements falling within this category and the ability of the Department of Defense to manage this important segment of the overall procurement program.

During fiscal year 1968, small purchase actions amounted to \$1,600,000,000, or 3.8 percent of the total value of military procurements. The volume of procurement actions however continued to increase during fiscal year 1968. They represented 69.3 percent of the total procurement actions, an increase of 1.3 percent over fiscal 1967.

Normally, it can be expected that most if not all small purchases should be awarded on a competitive basis, and all such actions were in fact counted as competitive purchases through fiscal year 1967. Beginning in fiscal year 1968, new criteria for classifying small purchases as competitive or non-competitive were established. Now, all small purchase offers must be solicited and received from at least two responsible offerors capable of satisfying the Government's requirements, and awards made based on lowest price, all other things being equal. This new definition had the effect of eliminating all purchases under \$250, which are usually handled by informal telephonic solicitations. For this reason, small purchases awarded on a competitive basis dropped from 4.2 percent of the total value of military procurements in fiscal year 1967 to only 2.1 percent in fiscal 1968.

The Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) has been changed to require contractors to furnish the basis for their pricing when a small purchase is made. If a contractor is unable to show that the price is based on a catalog or commercial market price, he is required to advise the Government of the rationale for the price. This new ASPR change should assist Government procurement officials in determining if prices are reasonable, particularly on non-competitive procurements.

The Committee recommends that small dollar value purchases be scrutinized on a continuing basis at all levels of the Department of Defense to assure that competitive procurements are increased to the maximum extent possible, and that prices paid for items bought in a non-competitive environment are fair and reasonable.

#### REPLENISHMENT SPARE PARTS

Last year, the Committee pointed to the need for greater competition in the procurement of replenishment spare parts, and in particular with respect to aeronautical spare parts. The Committee stated in its report the need for—

\* \* \* a realistic attitude and vigorous actions by all concerned with the management of this program from the principal officials of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military services to those responsible for inventory control at the individual military bases.

Unfortunately, the Committee's direction apparently went unheeded because competitive procurement of replenishment spare parts for the most part decreased during fiscal year 1969. As a matter of fact, officials of the Naval Air Systems Command testified that records are not even maintained by that Command on competitive procurement of replenishment spares and repair parts for missiles. This situation is dis-

couraging, to say the least, particularly after the Committee expressed its views on this matter last year. The Committee realizes that the decrease in competitive procurement of replenishment spare parts can be attributed in part to the change in reporting criteria for procurements of items of \$2,500 and less, as called for by a recent provision in ASPR. Nevertheless, the Committee expects that more attention will be devoted to this matter during fiscal year 1970, and in future years, in order that increased competitive procurement of replenishment spare parts will become a reality instead of a goal.

### MAJOR CONSTRUCTION FUNDED THROUGH CONTRACTORS

For years, the Committee has paid special attention to the construction of facilities with funds in O. & M., Procurement, and R.D.T. & E. accounts. In March 1969, the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a review of the acquisition of industrial real property at five Government-owned, contractor-operated industrial plants. This review disclosed that since 1966 the Air Force and Navy have spent several million dollars in acquiring major new industrial facilities at these five plants. The contractors operating these Government plants provided the funds for this construction and are recovering the costs by means of overhead charges to procurement and R.D.T. & E. contracts. These new facilities were built under the guise of being improvements to Government-owned property, and the construction of these major facilities was not disclosed to Congress in budget requests. During hearings, Navy officials admitted they have approved construction by contractors on Government-owned property to the extent of \$25,000,000 in the past 10 years in this same manner. In the case of the Air Force, total expenditures for construction funded in this way were even higher. At its plant at Fort Worth, Texas, alone, the Air Force acquired major new facilities costing \$23,000,000 in support of the F-111 program. This was done in spite of an Air Force policy that no facilities be provided by the Air Force for the F-111 program since the contractor's original proposal stated that the program would not require additional capital facilities.

Under military construction authorization acts, Congressional review and approval is necessary for each construction project exceeding \$25,000 in cost, except for urgently needed projects costing not more than \$200,000. There is no reason therefore why Congress should not have the opportunity of reviewing and approving construction projects funded either directly or indirectly with procurement and R.D.T. & E. appropriations. The Committee desires that in the future all proposed major improvements to and construction of Government-owned facilities funded in any manner with procurement and R.D.T. & E. appropriations be clearly identified in budget requests.

### PROCUREMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MISSILES, ARMY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$5, 671, 500, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	5, 069, 100, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	4, 281, 400, 000
Reduction.....	787, 700, 000

This appropriation provides funds for the major items of combat and support equipment for the Army, including aircraft, missiles, tracked combat vehicles, support vehicles, communications and electronic equipment, other support equipment, ammunition, and production base support. It also finances procurement of long lead-time items for weapon systems for which funding will be requested in fiscal year 1971.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$4,281,400,000, a reduction of \$787,700,000 below the budget estimate, and \$1,390,100,000 below the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

The reduction includes \$526,100,000 which failed authorization of the Congress, and an additional reduction of \$261,600,000 recommended by the Committee. The sum of \$86,000,000 is included in the bill for the procurement of 170 AH-1G Huey Cobra helicopters, which were authorized by Congress, to replace helicopter gunship losses in Southeast Asia and to fill the void caused by the cancellation of the AH-56A Cheyenne procurement contract.

The Committee recommendation includes a reduction of \$15,000,000 in the proposed buy of the U-21A utility aircraft. It is not believed that this item is of sufficiently high priority to fund the total buy requested by the Army. The reduction will permit the procurement of 22 aircraft instead of the 72 requested.

Funds for aircraft spares and repair parts were reduced \$1,000,000 as a result of the cut made in the U-21 aircraft program.

The Committee recommends a total reduction of \$23,400,000 for the Improved Hawk System, or \$14,200,000 in addition to the \$9,200,000 which failed authorization. The Improved Hawk Missile is still in the testing stage and the Committee does not share the optimism of Army procurement officials that we are ready to procure the system in significant quantities this fiscal year. The recommended slow-down in the procurement of the Improved Hawk will provide time to fully evaluate the test program and correct deficiencies before proceeding with full-scale production.

The Committee has several reservations about the \$135,400,000 requested for procurement of the Chaparral/Vulcan air defense system. The Chaparral missile and chassis, the Vulcan gun and chassis, and most of the Vulcan 20mm ammunition have yet to be type classified for service use. The Army is still experiencing problems with the Vulcan gun turret and the Chaparral system already procured will require some modification. Including the proposed Army fiscal year 1970 buy, still under limited production authorization, most of the total requirements for the Chaparral system will be fulfilled. The proposed Chaparral program for fiscal year 1970 was reduced \$13,500,000 because of the slippage in the Forward Area Alerting Radar program due to developmental problems. The Committee believes, however, that the Army should review the entire development program for this overall system in order to be assured that all major developmental problems are solved before proceeding with the fiscal year 1970 procurement and thereby reduce the need for costly retrofit and modifications in later years.

A reduction of \$5,100,000 is recommended in the Pershing Missile System. This amount was to be set aside to purchase modifications

which are determined necessary during the special test program. Since the test program will extend into fiscal year 1971, these funds should not be required this year.

The Committee reduced funds for missile spares and repair parts by \$9,700,000 because of reductions made in the HAWK and TOW missile programs.

The request for Communications and Electronics has been reduced \$50,900,000. The Committee has deleted \$6,500,000 for the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE). Because of the slippage in the TACFIRE development program, these procurement funds will not be required. A reduction of \$11,000,000 was made in the proposed procurement of the Corps-Army Area Medium and High Radio Relay Systems. Procurement of these systems can be delayed this year because the Army is still developing and testing other components of these systems, including the switch and technical control equipment. The Committee also recommends reductions in the proposed procurement of the AN/PRC-68 radio, a significant reduction in sensor equipment, and reductions in other communications and electronics equipment and systems.

The Committee recommends a reduction of \$92,800,000 in ammunition based primarily on reduced ammunition consumption. The proposed reduction includes \$11,100,000 for the planned procurement of ammunition for the production models of the Cheyenne helicopter, no longer required because of the cancellation of the Cheyenne production contract.

Under Production Base Support, \$5,400,000 of the amount requested for the MBT-70 failed authorization. The Committee recommends an additional reduction of \$25,000,000 in Production Base Support funds related to modernization of certain facilities and Army Ammunition Plants.

In addition, the Committee recommends a general reduction of \$34,400,000 over and above the matters discussed for various procurement items, to be applied by the Secretary of Defense against those items he deems appropriate.

Committee recommendations with respect to the MBT-70 program are discussed in the Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army, section of this report.

## PROCUREMENT OF AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES, NAVY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$2, 574, 300, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	3, 235, 500, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	2, 696, 600, 000
Reduction.....	538, 900, 000

This appropriation finances the procurement of aircraft, missiles, and associated support equipment for Navy forces and Marine Corps air wings. It also provides funds for in-service aircraft and missile modification necessary to eliminate safety hazards and enhance operational effectiveness. Drones and major flight and maintenance trainers are also included, as well as repairable spare and repair parts for all end items procured under this appropriation. In addition, funds are included to finance procurement of items in support of the planned subsequent year buy program. These equipments must be procured in advance due to production leadtime considerations.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$2,696,600,000, a reduction of \$538,900,000 below the budget estimate, and \$122,300,000 above the appropriation for fiscal year 1969. The recommended reduction includes \$18,000,000 which failed authorization of Congress.

The Committee is critical of the method used by the Navy in contracting for the F-14 aircraft. A significant amount of the cost overruns uncovered this year can be attributed directly to excessive concurrency between research and development and production, and the Navy contract for the F-14 aircraft tends to perpetuate this concept.

In a single year the Navy has requested R.D.T. & E. funds to complete the Lot I buy of six R.D.T. & E. aircraft and procurement funds to purchase six production aircraft in Lot II, also to be used in the research and development program. The rationale behind this method of funding is that the latter six aircraft are to be used later as operational aircraft. Under the terms of the contract, unless at least 3 aircraft in Lot II are funded, the production contract is subject to cancellation and the Navy is placed in a sole source situation in negotiating a new production contract with the airframe contractor.

The F-14 contract as written, therefore, provides Congress with limited options and little flexibility in deciding whether to fund the production portion of the contract this early in the development, or to slow down or stretch out the development program. After the experiences of the past and the early interest expressed by the appropriate Congressional committees in this aircraft, it should have been apparent to the Navy that the Congress would have wanted an effective voice in the matter of the F-14 aircraft development.

It is the considered judgment of the Committee that the Navy is moving too fast into production on the F-14 aircraft. The Committee does not share the optimism of Navy officials that the F-14 aircraft development represents a low risk program. The aircraft has a variable sweep wing and the Committee is reminded of the problems the Air Force has had with the carry-through wing box on the F-111 aircraft. In addition, there is the need to incorporate later a new advanced technology engine into an existing airframe, a technique that has been found difficult with other aircraft in previous years.

The Committee searched this year during hearings with Navy officials for an effective way to prevent the initiation of a premature procurement program on the F-14 aircraft. The Committee decision was based in part on the testimony of Vice Admiral T. F. Connolly, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air (appearing on pages 445-446 of Part 3 of the Subcommittee hearings on Department of Defense Appropriations for fiscal year 1970) set forth below:

#### CONTRACT TERMS FOR F-14 AIRCRAFT

"Mr. LIPSCOMB. Yesterday Admiral, when we were discussing the F-14A and there was some discussion about what would happen if we didn't go ahead with the six production models, I think it was testified this would have the effect of terminating the contract and that we would be placed in an unfavorable negotiating position with a sole-source contract. Why is that?

**“Admiral CONNOLLY.** Mr. Lipscomb, I think there was a misunderstanding of what was in your mind and what was in our mind.

**“The contract doesn't have to change, in my opinion. It doesn't have to change at all. If you feel, in the wisdom of this Committee that a larger portion of that money should be R.D.T. & E., that will not negate the contract and it will not change anything. We will be able to go right ahead with our work as we have it laid out. I think I explained that we divided it up between R.D.T. & E. and PAMN so as not to have the R.D.T. & E. which is the smaller appropriation for all the things it has to cover in the Navy, and we were running into some opposition from the standpoint of our airplane, F-14, and the new S-3 swallowing up a large part of R.D.T. & E. We used to buy airplanes entirely out of PAMN and didn't buy in R.D.T. & E. at all.**

**“This was a judgment laid on us by the Comptroller essentially, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.**

**“We are studying it now as a result of yield. I talked to Mr. Bowsher, our Assistant Secretary of the Navy; he has already talked to Dr. Frosch and Mr. Moot and if it worked better to have more in R.D.T. & E. and less in PAMN, there are certain things we feel we must be put in PAMN but the majority of it could be in R.D.T. & E. and it would not affect the contract.**

**“Mr. RHODES.** That is completely contrary to the testimony given by the project officer yesterday. You will remember, Admiral, that in response to my question you said that if we did not pick up the option on the 6 aircraft to be bought under PAMN, that the contract would be vitiated, would have to be renegotiated and probably could not be renegotiated at the same level as the present contract.

**“Now, what are the facts?**

#### NAVY CONTRACT TERMS COMMIT CONGRESS IN ADVANCE OF CONSIDERATION

**“Admiral CONNOLLY.** The facts are—I would like to say I am not a contracting expert. What I am telling you this morning is based on what I was able to determine after yesterday's discussion last night and this morning. But what I am trying to say is the contract with Grumman doesn't say 'You will get so many dollars out of the R.D.T. & E. part of the Government and you will get so many dollars out of PAMN.' The contract says, 'You will produce so many airplanes' and this 6 in lot 2 that Captain Ames is talking about is part of that contract. It would null and void the contract and we would have to renegotiate if we didn't exercise the option on that lot of 6—that now appears to be supported and paid for by PAMN. That is all I am saying.

**“Mr. RHODES.** All you are saying is you still have to buy 12 airplanes or the contract is null and void.

**“Admiral CONNOLLY.** Essentially that is right; however, to be completely accurate I must point out that the contract

permits us a 50 percent flexibility factor in exercising our options after lot 1. Thus, although six is the base quantity in the second lot, the contract is still effective even though we should decide on a number between three and nine for that lot. This would mean that the fiscal year 1970 R. & D./PAMN buy together could total between nine and 15 without vitiating the contract. The total 12 (six R. & D. and six PAMN) is the planned contract figure, based on a careful Navy and OSD analysis of the requirements and milestones necessary to maintain a balanced program. It must be realized in discussing this subject that any number less than 12 would cause proportionate delay in development and fleet introduction. It would increase the extended lag already experienced by the Navy in achieving an advanced fighter to meet the needs of the country in the near future.

"Mr. RHODES. It doesn't matter whether you buy it under R.D.T. & E. or PAMN.

"Admiral CONNOLLY. That is what I tried to say."

Accordingly, the Committee has eliminated \$275,000,000 for procurement of six production F-14 aircraft, and has added \$146,000,000 to the Navy R.D.T. & E. appropriation for three additional research and development models, for tooling and for test support. This action will not disturb the existing F-14 production contract options. The Committee would like to make it abundantly clear, however, that none of the funds provided are to be utilized for tooling beyond that needed for fabrication of the test aircraft.

The Committee is also concerned over the fact that by October 1, 1970, the Navy must exercise an option for Lot III involving a minimum of 15 production aircraft. The time of the option decision is at least three months prior to the flight of the first prototype aircraft. The Committee, of course, is not faced with a decision on this matter this year; however, it is expected that the development of the F-14 aircraft will receive sufficient attention at the highest levels of management in the Department of Defense. The Committee should be advised at the earliest practical time of any problems in the development program which may impact on the Lot III option.

The Committee has reduced the request for the RA-5C Vigilante reconnaissance aircraft by \$45,300,000. Losses of this aircraft have been minimal since the bombing halt of November 1968 and the Navy is requesting RDT & E funds in fiscal year 1970 to conduct tests of a newly developed configuration and modification to this aircraft. It is not believed this item is of sufficiently high priority and the recommended reduction will have the effect of eliminating the proposed fiscal year 1970 buy of these aircraft.

The Navy requested \$57,600,000 to buy new KA-6D Intruder tanker aircraft and \$4,800,000 for advance procurement leading to another procurement next year. The Navy also requested funds to modify four A-6A aircraft to the tanker configuration. The Committee has deleted the \$62,400,000 requested for the new aircraft, and recommends that the Navy modify additional A-6 aircraft to the tanker configuration in lieu of buying new aircraft.

The Committee has reduced by \$85,100,000 (including the \$18,000,000 which failed authorization) the funds requested for the CH-46

Sea Knight helicopter as well as the advance procurement money. Attrition rates do not support the proposed fiscal year 1970 buy of this helicopter. The remaining \$25,300,000 plus \$5,000,000 of prior year funds will provide \$30,300,000 for the procurement of 12 such aircraft.

The Committee also reduced the aircraft spares and repair parts request by \$41,900,000 to conform to the reductions recommended in the aircraft procurement program and to encourage in the Navy the need to increase competitive procurement of aeronautical spares and repair parts. A specific reduction of \$5,000,000 was made in the proposed fiscal year 1970 buy of spare engines. This is based on a General Accounting Office investigation which disclosed that the Navy and Air Force, in computing requirements for spare aircraft engines, included duplicate factors to provide quantities of engines for similar or identical contingencies.

The request for aircraft modifications has been reduced by \$12,800,000. None of the reduction is to be applied in the area of safety. The Committee is concerned over the significant sums spent each year for this purpose, a portion of which, it is believed, can be attributed to failures in the research and development program. The Committee will be reviewing this area during the coming months.

The Committee has reduced the request for the AIM-7F Sparrow III Missile by \$4,500,000. This reduction will have the effect of slowing production of this missile to the minimum sustaining rate until tests disclose that the deficiencies previously experienced have been corrected.

The Committee has eliminated the \$9,500,000 requested for the AGM-45A SHRIKE Missile. The present missile is not satisfactory and the Navy should improve the capability of this weapon before buying more. There are funds in the fiscal year 1970 R.D.T. & E. budget to continue development of an improved version of the SHRIKE missile.

Funds for missile spares and repair parts have been reduced by \$2,400,000 based on the cuts recommended in missile procurement.

## SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY

Appropriation, 1969 .....	\$820,700,000
Estimate, 1970 .....	2,631,400,000
Recommended in the bill .....	2,588,200,000
Reduction .....	43,200,000

This appropriation finances the construction of new ships and the conversion of existing ships, including all hull, mechanical and electrical equipment, electronics, guns, torpedo and missile launching systems, and communications systems. It also finances procurement of long leadtime items for ships for which authorization will be requested in the fiscal year 1971 program.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$2,588,200,000, a reduction of \$43,200,000 below the budget estimate, and \$1,767,500,000 above the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

The recommended amount will provide \$152,700,000 for a third SSN-688 class nuclear-powered high-speed submarine, which was authorized by Congress in addition to the two in the President's budget, and \$110 million in advanced procurement for five more. The

Committee did not fund the \$186,700,000 for the three Fast Deployment Logistic (FDL) ships and \$9,200,000 in SSN advance procurement funds which failed authorization.

The recommended program will fund a total of 14 new ships and conversion of 17 others. This compares with a revised fiscal year 1969 program of six new ships and 16 conversions.

Congress authorized a shipbuilding and conversion program which is \$351,800,000 over the President's budget. Except for the third SSN-688 class submarine and advanced procurement of a fifth such submarine, the Committee recommends against funding the add-on program this year. The Secretary of Defense has testified that he would not formally request appropriation of the additional program authorized and does not favor initiating a shipbuilding program beyond that included in the amended President's budget.

The Navy has testified that of the 886 ships in the fleet as of June 30, 1969, about 58 percent were 20 years of age and over. The Committee fully appreciates and supports the need for the Navy to modernize its aging fleet in order to meet the ever-increasing Soviet naval threat. From a purely practical standpoint, however, the age of the fleet is relative. A ship's age is based on the birthdate of the hull and the age remains the same regardless of the amount of modernization and conversion work done to the ship. For example, the carrier U. S. S. MIDWAY is presently undergoing extensive conversion work, which is estimated to cost \$204 million. Even after this costly modernization of the MIDWAY is completed, it will still be classified as a ship in the "20 years or older" category. The age of the fleet, therefore, is not always a true test of its capabilities because modernization and conversion add years to a ship's life and enhance its ability to meet new and changing threats.

Since World War II, the Navy has built or currently has under construction about 570 new ships plus conversion of some 360 ships. Of these totals, approximately 150 new ships and almost 50 conversions were still under construction as of early June 1969. In addition, there were four new ships and 13 conversions from the fiscal years 1968 and 1969 programs yet to be awarded at that point in time. As a result of ship inactivations subsequently announced and with the addition of new ships to the fleet by June 30, 1970, the Navy estimates the percentage of ships in the 20 years and older category will be reduced to 46.7 percent. As other new ships in the shipbuilding program for fiscal year 1970 and prior years enter the fleet, this percentage should be reduced even further.

In approaching the Navy's shipbuilding and conversion program for fiscal year 1970, therefore, and particularly in deciding not to fund the total Congressional add-on to the program, the Committee was mindful of the amount of shipbuilding and conversion work already underway and funded. The Committee was additionally influenced by the lateness of the date at which fiscal year 1970 funds will become available and by the need for fiscal restraint in spending. The Committee is also painfully aware of the deficit in the Navy shipbuilding and conversion program. This deficit, amounting to approximately \$850 million, with a potential of its being as much as \$1.2 billion, is an aggregate of cost overruns on shipbuilding and conversion programs over a period of several years. If these ships, which have

already been authorized and funded by Congress, are to be completed, these additional funds will be required.

In an effort to partially reduce the large deficit in the shipbuilding and conversion program, the Navy has had to eliminate the construction of new ships and conversion of others instead of adding these needed ships to the fleet. As to the reasons for the cost overruns, the Committee believes that it is imperative that planning and management of this important program be substantially improved. In the future, ships must be better planned and designed at the outset, changes kept to a bare minimum, and subsystems and equipment for these ships should be planned and developed in time to meet the ship construction schedule in order to prevent cost overruns in later years. The Committee intends to watch this program closely.

### OTHER PROCUREMENT, NAVY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$2, 505, 600, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	2, 022, 700, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	1, 461, 800, 000
Reduction.....	560, 900, 000

This appropriation funds the procurement of major weapons and equipment other than aircraft, missiles, and ships. Such equipments range from the latest electronic sensors and weapons to update naval forces, to trucks, training equipment, and spare parts. Also included is the cost associated with the installation of ship and shore equipment. Substantial quantities of expendable items, such as air- and ship-launched ordnance, are programed under this appropriation.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$1,461,800,000, a reduction of \$560,900,000 below the budget estimate, and \$1,043,800,000 below the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

The Ships Support Equipment request was reduced by \$46,400,000, including \$19,800,000 for ship alterations which will not be required because of the ship deactivations being made during this fiscal year. The amount recommended will cut back this budget activity to just under the fiscal year 1969 level.

The Committee recommends that Communications and Electronic Equipment be reduced by \$70,900,000, including \$4,200,000 for ship electronic modifications which will not be required due to ship inactivations. This action will make available \$245,800,000 for this budget activity.

The Aviation Support Equipment request was reduced a total of \$134,800,000. Significant reductions were made in ammunition and ordnance including Walleye, Snakeye, Zuni rockets, and CBU bombs and dispensers. Other cuts were made in the AN/PRC-90 survival radio, industrial plant equipment, and in Versatile Avionics Shop and Test equipment. A portion of the total reduction should be applied to the spares and replenishment parts support areas as an inducement for increased competitive procurement of such equipment. A total of \$578,200,000 is made available for this budget activity.

The Committee has recommended that Ordnance Support Equipment be reduced by \$240,200,000, of which \$75,700,000 was applied to the proposed procurement of two versions of the MK-48 torpedo, which is still being tested. The Navy has delayed a decision as to which model it will procure for the fleet. The test program should be slowed,

if necessary, to assure all deficiencies are noted and corrected before entering production on one of the versions of this torpedo. The Committee also reduced funding for the MK-46 torpedo, 5-inch and 16-inch ammunition, small arms ammunition, production facilities and support, and spares and repair parts. In addition, reductions can be made in proposed ordnance alternations to weapon systems on those ships to be deactivated this year. As a result of the Committee reduction, \$380,600,000 will be available for this budget activity.

Civil Engineering Support Equipment has been reduced by \$60,400,000. Reductions can be made in funds for Construction Battalion mobilization reserve stocks, road surfacing materials, various types of trucks, construction and handling equipment, and combat support equipment.

The Committee reduced Supply Support Equipment by \$2,300,000. This reduction involves various small items of equipment such as warehouse cranes, forklift trucks, automated materials handling systems, and items less than \$500,000.

The \$5,900,000 reduction in Personnel and Command Support Equipment is made up of several small items of equipment such as training equipment, simulators, and items under \$500,000.

The unspecified reductions are to be applied to those items identified by the Secretary of Defense as having a low enough priority to defer procurement to subsequent fiscal years.

## PROCUREMENT, MARINE CORPS

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$669, 500, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	650, 600, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	500, 848, 000
Reduction.....	149, 752, 000

This appropriation provides the Marine Corps with weapons, ammunition, and related equipments, most of which are for use by Marine general purpose forces such as Marine divisions and tank and amphibious battalions. Such military hardware and munitions equip the Marine Corps for the defense of advanced naval bases, for limited war landing operations, and for general land warfare.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$500,848,000, a reduction of \$149,752,000 below the budget estimates, and \$168,652,000 below the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

The \$16,700,000 for procurement of the Improved Hawk Missile System this year has been deleted. This system is still under test, and the Committee has recommended a slow-down in the Army procurement program until deficiencies in the development program have been corrected. The Marine Corps system was not scheduled for procurement until the second year buy.

Last year, \$8,400,000 was provided for the procurement of the AN/TPQ-28 radar. Because problems developed during the test of this equipment, the Army deferred the fiscal year 1969 Marine Corps buy. For this reason, the \$8,400,000 requested in fiscal year 1970 for this radar system, as well as the \$3,352,000 for spares and repair parts for this radar, was not provided by the Committee. The \$8,400,000 made available for procurement of this system last year can be used to offset other NOA requirements in fiscal year 1970.

A general reduction of \$121,300,000 is being made, including the \$8,400,000 offset mentioned above. Because of the proposed redeployment of Marine units from South Vietnam, significant reductions can be made in the proposed procurement of items such as ammunition and ordnance equipment.

### AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$3, 860, 000, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	3, 775, 200, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	3, 434, 700, 000
Reduction.....	340, 500, 000

The Committee recommends the appropriation of \$3,434,700,000 for the procurement of aircraft, associated ground equipment, spare parts, and other support items related to the procurement and modification of Air Force aircraft. The sum recommended is augmented by \$300,000,000 to be derived by transfer from the Air Force Stock Fund and \$25,000,000 from the Defense Stock Fund.

The recommended amount is \$425,300,000 less than the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

Language is recommended in the accompanying bill which would make possible the utilization of \$55,000,000 appropriated in the fiscal year 1968 Act only for the procurement of F-12 aircraft. The Defense Department did not procure the F-12 aircraft as contemplated by the Congress. Production of the related SR-71 aircraft has ended. The production capability no longer exists. If production of the F-12 were to be desired, the production capability would have to be provided anew. The Air Force does not plan to procure the F-12. Therefore, the Committee feels that the restriction on the use of the \$55,000,000 should be lifted and the funds utilized in lieu of new obligatory authority for items in the fiscal year 1970 program. The Committee is reluctant to abandon hope of production of the F-12, but must face the fact that such production is not likely. The amount of \$55,000,000 has been deleted from the fiscal year 1970 budget request for this appropriation account.

The Committee has deleted the \$52,000,000 requested for advance funding of long leadtime items associated with procurement of C-5A aircraft beyond the 81 aircraft which have been approved through the fiscal year 1970 program. The recently announced decision of the Secretary of the Air Force not to procure C-5A aircraft beyond those in the fiscal year 1970 program precludes the requirement for the funds requested for advance procurement. It is indeed unfortunate that cost increases have prevented the Air Force from acquiring the planned number of C-5A aircraft. As the usefulness of weapons systems is weighed against their cost, reductions in numbers of items placed in the inventory is the almost inevitable result of excessive increases in cost. The taxpayer obtains less defense for his dollars. This is the tragedy of cost overruns. It must be apparent that sound financial planning and accurate cost estimating are essential components of military planning.

The Committee recommends that \$28,000,000 of the funds appropriated for "Aircraft Procurement, Air Force" shall be available to initiate the procurement of a fighter aircraft to meet the needs of the free world forces in Southeast Asia. It is felt that the availability of

such an aircraft will contribute to our ability to withdraw United States military forces from Southeast Asia at the earliest possible date. Prior to the obligation of funds for this program, the Air Force shall conduct a competition for the aircraft to be selected based on the requirements stated by the Secretary of Defense in his letter of October 21, 1969, to the Chairman of the Committee that the aircraft selected should (1) have adequate capabilities to handle the existing threat, (2) be as inexpensive as feasible, and (3) be simple to maintain and operate. The Secretary stated, "I believe Congress would serve the national interest by authorizing and appropriating funds which would enable us to retain an option to go forward with such a proposal at an early date." The Committee has complied with the request of the Secretary on the terms set forth in his letter. No additional funds are recommended in the bill for this program. As was proposed in the authorizing legislation, the \$28,000,000 is to be accommodated within the funding levels approved.

The following reductions which were made by the authorizing legislation are concurred in by the Committee:

(1) a reduction of \$23,000,000 requested for procurement of A-37B attack aircraft and the associated spares;

(2) the deletion of \$21,500,000 and the denial of the proposed procurement of T-X navigation trainer aircraft;

(3) a reduction of \$40,000,000 in the sum requested for the modification of B-52 aircraft associated with the introduction of the Short Range Attack Missile;

(4) a reduction of \$50,000,000 in the sum requested for procurement of aircraft spares and repair parts made possible by slippage in the production schedule of the C-5A.

The Committee recommends a further decrease of \$10,700,000 in aircraft spares which includes deletion of funds for spares for the T-X and CX-3 aircraft which have been denied and \$6,000,000 for spares for the SR-71 aircraft.

The Committee recommends deletion of the RF-4C aircraft proposed for procurement in fiscal year 1970 at a saving of \$39,200,000; the deletion of the 12 CX-3 mission support aircraft funded in the fiscal year 1967 program, and which have been deferred ever since, at a saving of \$7,900,000; and deletion of the proposed fiscal year 1969 procurement of O-4 quiet aircraft at a saving of \$8,400,000.

Reductions are recommended in the amount of \$8,000,000 in industrial facilities related to the replacement of government-owned machine tools; \$6,000,000 in other production charges related to quick reaction capability projects; and \$13,300,000 in war consumables including such items as aircraft wing tanks and pylons.

The B-58 bomber force is being retired and the \$3,500,000 budgeted for modification of these aircraft has been deleted.

The \$42,000,000 requested for component improvement is reduced by \$2,000,000. Funds in this area are utilized to correct service-revealed problems in aircraft engines. The \$40,000,000 should be sufficient to accomplish the essential effort in this area in fiscal year 1970.

Funds are included in the approved program for combat aircraft such as the A-7D, F-4E, F/RF-5, F-111D, F-111A/E and the O-2.

The C-5A and the C-130E are the airlift aircraft included in the program. The T-38A and T-41 C/D trainer aircraft are included in the

program along with the UH-1H/N utility helicopter, the new HH-X search and rescue helicopter, and the CH-53C cargo helicopter.

As was discussed earlier in the report, the funds recommended are to be available for obligation until June 30, 1972, rather than available until expended as has been the case in recent years.

### MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$1, 720, 200, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	1, 486, 400, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	1, 431, 000, 000
Reduction.....	55, 400, 000

The \$1,431,000,000 approved by the Committee will provide \$289,200,000 less than the sum appropriated in fiscal year 1969 for the procurement of ballistic and air-launched missiles and associated ground equipment, modifications, spare parts, and other support items for the Air Force. Of the funds provided, \$447,000,000 is for the Minuteman II and III strategic intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Committee has deleted the \$23,500,000 requested for procurement of the Standard ARM anti-radiation missile. The unit cost of this missile is high and the inventory appears to be sufficient to provide for present needs.

The \$9,500,000 requested for procurement of SHRIKE anti-radar missiles is denied. This missile has serious deficiencies which should be overcome before further procurements are made. Similar action is recommended under "Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy" and is discussed further in that part of the report.

The requested \$20,400,000 appropriation for the initiation of procurement of the Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM) is denied. The Committee believes that further testing is necessary before there will be sufficient confidence in this missile to initiate production and that this will not be accomplished in fiscal year 1970. This is another example of the Committee's desire to avoid the costly procedure of initiating the production of complex items of military hardware before the development program has progressed sufficiently. The fiscal year 1970 request includes \$16,200,000 for tooling and \$4,200,000 for advance procurement of material.

The SRAM development program has encountered technical difficulties, especially in the area of the motor. The original cost estimate for research, development, testing, and evaluation was \$161,600,000. The estimate at the time of the hearings this year was \$413,400,000. Production costs may be two to two and one-half times the cost originally estimated. There is a total of about 21 months slippage in the program. In view of all of these considerations, the Committee feels that it would not be prudent to initiate procurement in fiscal year 1970.

A decrease of \$2,000,000 is recommended due to certain recoupments in excess of the amount estimated.

Language has been included in the bill making funds appropriated under this heading available until June 30, 1972 rather than until expended as has been provided heretofore.

## OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$2, 716, 000, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	1, 938, 300, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	1, 636, 000, 000
Reduction.....	302, 300, 000

The Committee recommends the appropriation of \$1,080,000,000 less than the sum appropriated in the previous fiscal year for the procurement of munitions, vehicles, electronics and telecommunications equipment, and organizational support equipment for the Air Force in fiscal year 1970. The recommended appropriation is \$302,300,000 less than the budget request. For the most part, the reductions are attributable to the decreased consumption of munitions and equipment in the war in Southeast Asia.

In the hearings, the Committee took note of the fact that the unobligated balances which have remained at the end of each fiscal year in this appropriation have been underestimated by from \$75,000,000 to \$413,000,000. In fiscal year 1968, the last year for which actual figures were available at the time of the hearings, the funds remaining at the end of the fiscal year were underestimated by about \$250,000,000. The rapid escalation of activity in Southeast Asia was a large factor in building up these balances. The provision of supplemental appropriations late in the fiscal year is another factor which had an impact on the problem. The Committee intends to provide only those funds required for obligation in the fiscal year for which they are appropriated. The unobligated balances in this area are a factor in the reductions recommended. The language recommended for the bill which would limit the availability of procurement appropriations to three years should help to reduce unobligated balances.

The request of \$1,294,300,000 for "Munitions and Associated Equipment" has been reduced by \$226,000,000 based on readjustments reflecting the latest estimates of consumption rates in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. As even more recent data becomes available, further reductions in this area may be made possible. It is the Committee's intention to provide for all of the ammunition and weapons required for the conduct of the war. It is believed that the reductions recommended are in accordance with this intention.

A reduction of \$7,400,000 is recommended in the \$74,100,000 requested for "Vehicular Equipment". Included is a reduction of \$2,900,000 in the procurement of firefighting equipment. As was discussed in the hearings, the funding of firefighting equipment has been rising at the rate of about \$2,000,000 annually in recent years. Firefighting equipment is not used frequently and with reasonable care should remain in good condition for many years. The \$5,700,000 remaining should provide the essential requirements in fiscal year 1970. Also included in the \$7,400,000 reduction for "Vehicular Equipment" is a \$2,800,000 reduction in the \$14,000,000 requested for "Materials Handling Equipment". A reduction of \$1,500,000 is to be applied to procurement of the 73,300 lb. loader associated with the C-5A aircraft. The hearings revealed that contrary to the impression conveyed in pictures, movies, and other information on the C-5A program, which emphasized the capability of the C-5A to load and unload in a "roll-on

roll-off" mode in which the ability of the aircraft to "kneel" would be utilized, special 55,000 lb. loaders were being developed and procured for use with the C-5A fleet. If the "roll-on roll-off" capability had not been emphasized as an important attribute of the C-5A, the Committee would not have felt that the information presented had been misleading. The requirement for these loaders should again be reviewed. The Committee had deleted only one-half of the funds requested for this item but is not convinced that there is any need for 55,000 lb. loaders.

The remainder of the reduction in the Vehicles area is in Base Maintenance Equipment and is directed to mechanized equipment for the Logistics Command depots, bases, and air terminals.

The Committee recommends a decrease of \$53,000,000 in Electronics and Telecommunications equipment for the Air Force including a \$9,000,000 reduction in the fiscal year 1969 program. The fiscal year 1970 program as presented to the Committee totaled \$488,500,000 as compared with \$378,600,000 provided for fiscal year 1969. The sum recommended will provide an increase of approximately \$57,000,000 more than was programmed for the previous fiscal year. Reductions are recommended in Spacetrack equipment, Strike Command equipment, equipment for integration with the FAA, and in support of the Defense Communications Planning Group. Other reductions are recommended in small amounts in a number of specific items which have been discussed with officials of the Department of Defense.

The Committee's views on the various problems in the field of military communications are set-out under "Operations and Maintenance". Aircrew survival radio equipment, on which the Committee directed that a special investigation be made, is discussed under "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation."

A reduction of \$15,900,000 is proposed in "Other Base Maintenance and Support Equipment" for which \$453,400,000 is requested. The reductions proposed are minimal and will provide \$18,700,000 more than was allocated for this purpose in the previous fiscal year.

In the examination of the estimates, the Committee found instances in which unit cost information presented in the justifications proved to be erroneous. An example is in the request for cargo nets in which Congress was requested to provide funds on the basis of a unit cost of \$237.00. Upon examination, it was found that the unit cost is actually \$151.00. The Committee expects that a more careful job will be done in preparing the justifications in support of the fiscal year 1971 budget request.

As is the case with the other procurement accounts, language has been included in the bill making the appropriation recommended available for obligation until June 30, 1972, rather than available until expended.

## PROCUREMENT, DEFENSE AGENCIES

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$81, 700, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	77, 600, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	61, 600, 000
Reduction.....	16, 000, 000

This appropriation provides for procurement of capital equipment for the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Supply Agency, and other Defensewide agencies. The fiscal year 1970 program includes automatic data processing equipment, communications equipment, materials handling equipment, and general and special purpose vehicular equipment.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$61,600,000, a reduction of \$16,000,000 below the budget estimate, and \$20,100,000 below the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

A reduction of \$1,000,000 in the Defense Communications Agency should be applied equally between procurement of equipment and engineering support contracts.

The Committee made general unspecified reductions of \$6,000,000 in the National Security Agency and \$500,000 in the Defense Intelligence Agency requests.

The Committee also reduced the Defense Supply Agency request by \$8,500,000. The reduction is to be applied to the proposed procurement of automatic data processing equipment for the Standard Automated Materiel Management System.

**TITLE V**  
**RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**  
**ESTIMATES AND APPROPRIATIONS SUMMARY**

The Committee recommends the appropriation of \$7,197,600,000 for the research, development, testing, and evaluation activities of the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1970. The recommended amount is \$1,024,800,000 less than the budget estimate of \$8,222,400,000 and \$352,228,000 less than the \$7,549,828,000 appropriated for fiscal year 1969.

**PROGRAM REVIEW**

The hearings held on the various research, development, test, and evaluation appropriations were more detailed than usual. In the report accompanying the appropriation bill for fiscal year 1969, the Committee expressed its deep concern over the effectiveness of the research and development programs of the Defense Department. The statement was made that, "The Committee feels that the number of new weapons systems and equipments being developed is not sufficiently large nor are the new items technologically advanced over previous weapons and equipments to the extent necessary to fully justify increased expenditures of the magnitude requested." The careful review made of the program this year has not caused the Committee to change this position.

The hearings on research, development, test, and evaluation are printed in two volumes with a total of 1,767 pages. Very detailed examinations, supported in most instances by Staff Investigative reports or reports by the General Accounting Office, were held on the Main Battle Tank, the Sheridan armored vehicle, Project Mallard and the Cheyenne helicopter programs of the Army; the F-14 aircraft program and the Phoenix missile program of the Navy; and the C-5A aircraft, F-111 aircraft, Mark II avionics system, Manned Orbiting Laboratory, Hard Rock Silo, Minuteman missile, and Short Range Attack Missile programs of the Air Force.

**WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY**

A matter of continuing concern to the Committee is the problem of the reliability of many new weapons systems. As weapons and equipments have become more complex, their reliability has decreased. This tends to reduce the overall combat effectiveness of our forces. The increased numbers of personnel, equipments, and logistics items in combat areas for the purpose of maintaining overly complicated and fragile equipment has been extremely costly. In addition, the low reliability of many present weapons systems has increased the vulnerability of U.S. forces to enemy action.

Since the early years of World War II, United States combat bases have been substantially free from significant enemy attack and interference. For the past twenty-five years, developments in U.S. tactical weapon systems have, for the most part, assumed the continuation of this condition. Our present weapons systems generally depend on unlimited supply support, elaborate facilities, and large numbers of skilled technical personnel to be adequately maintained in combat areas. Technical problems have been routinely solved by bringing factory, and even laboratory level, capabilities to the field along with the consequent support requirements and with the resultant vulnerabilities. In effect, dependence has been placed on the contractor maintainability of weapons rather than on the more fundamental factor of field reliability.

Designers have placed far more emphasis on high performance than on the need for durable and damage resistant equipment. A continuously high percentage of inoperable weapons has become accepted as routine. The specifications for new weapons too often call for the scientifically possible rather than the militarily practical. Excessive "goldplating" has too often been the practice under which the last five percent of the performance specified for a new weapon accounts for fifty percent of the complexity and cost of the weapon. Capabilities have been called for that, while desirable on a low percentage of missions or under unusual weather conditions, impose a heavy and continuous maintenance and logistic burden on all missions performed.

The Committee fears that low standards of system reliability have resulted in reduced effectiveness of our military forces. Weapons that require frequent repair, a high number of spares and repair parts, and elaborate testing and maintenance equipment may achieve high performance while in use, but, in total context, are as vulnerable as the weakest element of their exposed supporting systems. The Committee feels that advances in science and technology can be utilized to increase the reliability of weapons as well as improve weapon performance. Managers of weapon systems programs should place greater emphasis on system reliability. Contracts should emphasize this aspect of weapons development far more than has been the case in the past. It is vital that the Defense Department recognize the penalties of low reliability and establish a Department-wide system designed to achieve reliable performance. The absence of standards in this area has contributed to the situation in which weapons have been pushed into premature production. The Committee believes that weapons reliability is a weak link in our defense armor and feels that appropriate officials of the Defense Department and the military services must give appropriate attention to this very real problem.

#### COST GROWTH

The Congress has given much attention this year to the cost growths experienced in programs in the Department of Defense and in other areas. In a time in which economic inflation is a national problem, cost increases have become to be expected by Government planners as well as by housewives at the grocery store. Unfortunately, economic inflation is only one of the contributing factors to cost growth in the development of military weapons systems. Too frequently, true

costs have been obscured by those advocating new development programs in fear that the proposed programs might not be approved if true costs were revealed. Low estimates have been arbitrarily given in order to fit more programs into the financial plan of a given fiscal year. In some instances, costs have been forced to fit into annual fiscal patterns without regard for the adequacy of the funding required to perform the work planned for the time period. Technical difficulties and program stretch-outs have resulted in cost growth. Not all of the normal and recognized support items required, such as initial spares, have been included in costs given for proposed weapon systems.

As the Department is aware, inaccurate cost estimates have resulted in some loss of public confidence in military management. Steps are being taken by the Secretary to improve cost estimating and to provide more accurate cost estimates to the Congress. The Committee wishes to emphasize the importance of such actions. Considerable further attention to cost growth can be expected during the hearings on the fiscal year 1971 Budget.

#### FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

The Committee discussed a number of instances during the hearings in which funds which had been appropriated for the previous year had been reprogrammed from the programs for which they had been requested to other areas. It was found that in some instances there were no plans to spend funds requested for fiscal year 1970 for the programs for which the funds were requested. This often was the case in small programs or programs in which a number of small projects are included in a single line item. The Committee understands that R.D.T. & E. costs cannot be precisely predicted months in advance, but it appears that there are line items which do not reflect actual requirements but are in part "banks" in which funds are held for reprogramming purposes. Reductions have been recommended in a number of instances in which this seemed to be the case. The Emergency Fund is provided for the funding of unforeseen requirements. If contingency funds are required in the individual R.D.T. & E. accounts, the Committee would prefer to consider the provision of such funds on a straight-forward basis rather than under the guise of needed projects.

#### DUPLICATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

The hearings revealed instances in which two or more of the military services are pursuing duplicating development efforts. In other instances, a military service was found to be developing equipment to meet requirements which could have been met by the utilization of equipment already in the inventory of another service. Examples of areas of duplication are aircrew body armor, air-dropped mines, air-to-ground missiles, airdrop equipment, and aircrew survival radios.

The Committee's concern led to a request to the Surveys and Investigations Staff for a study in depth of the situation involving aircrew survival radios. The findings indicated that the Committee's concerns were well founded. Not only do duplicating development efforts waste funds in the R.D.T.&E. accounts, but procurement costs are needlessly increased over a period of several years.

The seeming inability of the services to coordinate the procurement of what should be common items is well illustrated by their experience with survival radios. These radios have the identical role in each service—assistance in rescuing downed airmen. It has been well-recognized throughout the Department of Defense that a standard survival radio is feasible and that the integrated procurement of such a set for all three services would save substantial sums simply through buying in larger quantities. Obtaining competition in these procurements would save even more.

The Surveys and Investigations Staff of the Committee found, however, that since the early 1960's, the services have gone their separate ways in attempting to fill their needs for these radios. As a result, rather than having a standard radio, the Department of Defense inventory of radios designed solely for use by downed airmen to assist in their rescues has grown to seven different types of sets with yet another one in research and development. Two of these radios were being used by all three services when this proliferation of sets began. Each of the others has been procured by only one service on a sole-source basis from the developing contractor. In October 1969, after the Committee's hearings, the Air Force did make a procurement of a Navy survival radio.

The urgent need for survival radios was the justification for the lack of competition in obtaining these five types of sets but, in seeking more elaborate capabilities than those of the existing sets, delays in deliveries, in some cases of more than a year, have resulted. Even to get the late deliveries when finally made, waivers of some of the more elaborate requirements have had to be made by the Government. Anticipated overruns of the target costs are also commonplace, ranging from about 15 percent to over 100 percent.

It would seem that if the same sense of urgency shown by the services in making these diverse procurements had been used in establishing a common survival radio for coordinated procurement, the common objective of the services would have been met more completely and efficiently and considerable monetary savings would have been possible.

The Committee believes that studies made in other areas in which duplication has been indicated would have similar findings. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering shall be prepared to report to the Committee in the hearings on the fiscal year 1971 Budget as to instances in which duplicating developments have been eliminated.

#### NAVIGATION AND COMMUNICATION SATELLITE DEVELOPMENTS

The Committee is concerned over the programmed parallel development of navigation and communication satellites. Both the Navy and the Air Force are developing navigation satellites. The Navy has TRANSIT and is working on TIMATION, and the Air Force is working on one of its own, stating it cannot use the Navy satellites. The Army is also interested in using navigation satellites. Not only should one communications satellite be used for both strategic and tactical purposes, thus eliminating duplicating and costly air, ground, and ship-board terminals, but it is technologically feasible to have a single

satellite for both communications and navigation purposes. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering is directed to thoroughly study this area, looking toward the feasibility of developing a single communications satellite for all the military services and the possibility of including therein navigation requirements.

#### REDUCTIONS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES AND ACTIVITIES

The reduction in R.D.T. & E. appropriations should have an impact on the level of effort supported at in-house research and development facilities and activities. Accordingly, reductions in personnel, both military and civilian, should be made to correspond with these funding decreases. In other words, not all of the reduction is to be applied to contractual effort. At the same time, decreases in personnel at in-house research and development activities and facilities are not to be offset by an increase in contracting for outside assistance.

The Committee has recommended decreased funding at certain military test ranges. We have in the last decade built up a vast storehouse of knowledge in missile and aerospace technology. Many of the early unknowns are now behind us. Consequently, much of the redundancy in facilities, technical equipment, and back-up systems can be phased out or consolidated and thereby provide considerable savings at little technical risk. No specific recommendations were made by the Committee in this regard. However, the Secretary of Defense is requested to study this matter in the coming months for the purpose of effecting these apparent savings.

#### RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, ARMY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$1, 521, 165, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	1, 849, 500, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	1, 575, 300, 000
Reduction.....	274, 200, 000

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$1,575,300,000, a reduction of \$274,200,000 below the budget estimate, and \$54,135,000 above the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

The Committee reduced Military Sciences by \$19,100,000 in consonance with the authorization.

Aircraft and Related Equipment was reduced by \$55,600,000, including those amounts which were not authorized by Congress for the Cheyenne gunship and the Heavy Lift Helicopter. The Committee recommended a reduction of \$11,000,000 for the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS) because the Army has not reached a decision on the optimum size for this proposed new helicopter and is not prepared to start contract definition. Some planning money was provided. However, the \$5,100,000 requested for the UTTAS engine was deleted because the size of the UTTAS helicopter will dictate the type of engine to be developed. Therefore, the engine funds will not be required this year. Aircraft Weaponization (advanced and exploratory development) was reduced because about 50 percent of the funds appropriated for this program element in the last three fiscal years have been reprogrammed for other uses. The Com-

mittee made available funds to initiate concept formulation only on the Selective Effects Armament System. Air Mobility was reduced \$6,000,000.

Missiles and Related Equipment was reduced a total of \$25,200,000. Missile Effectiveness Evaluation (engineering development) was cut \$1,500,000 because less than \$1,000,000 has been used for this purpose in each of the last two fiscal years. The AN/TSQ-73 Air Defense Control and Coordination System was reduced by \$3,000,000. Army officials have testified that the fiscal year 1969 funds reprogrammed to initiate the AN/TSQ-73 program had not been released for expenditure. For this reason, the total funds requested will not be required this year. The Committee also made a modest reduction of \$5,000,000 in the funds requested for the Lance Missile System.

Military Astronautics and Related Equipment was reduced \$4,000,000. A significant portion of this reduction is made in the communications and navigation satellite area. The Committee recommendations in this regard have been made earlier in this report. The reduction will maintain this program element at approximately the fiscal year 1969 level.

The Committee has reduced Ordnance, Combat Vehicles, and Related Equipment by \$27,500,000, including the \$14,900,000 which failed Congressional authorization with respect to the MBT-70 Main Battle Tank. In its present design, the MBT-70 tank is overly sophisticated, unnecessarily complex and too expensive for a main battle tank. The Committee feels strongly that when this program is reevaluated in December 1969 serious consideration should be given to the possibility of terminating the international aspect of this joint development program. The most prudent use of the funds provided for the MBT-70 this year could be for the U.S. to design a tank with far less sophistication, a tank that can be produced at about a third of the cost now estimated for the current design. Other reductions recommended for this budget activity includes \$5,600,000 in the caseless ammunition programs which are under study and may be changed, and \$7,000,000 in Infantry Supporting Weapons development.

The reduction recommended by the Committee for Other Equipment totals \$12,600,000 including the \$100,000 which was not authorized by Congress. The Committee has specified a reduction of \$5,000,000 for Project Mallard, an international joint development program involving the U.S. and three other countries. The Mallard project proposes to develop and produce a major tactical communications system for use by the field armies of the participating countries. It is estimated that Mallard will have a total program cost of well over \$1,000,000,000. It is inconceivable that the Department of Defense would embark on an international development program of this nature and magnitude when a militarywide tactical communications system has never been developed for the military services of the U.S. As a matter of fact, the DoD inventory is replete with communications equipment having a lack of commonality. Historically, joint international development programs are inherently turbulent and trouble-ridden. The most recent example is the MBT-70 development program involving only two countries; and Mallard involves four participating countries. For these reasons, the Committee recommends termination of the Project Mallard program. The Committee also reduced the Defense Communication Planning Group by \$2,500,-

000. A reduction of \$5,000,000 is recommended for testing activities because of the recommended cutback in the overall R.D.T. & E. program.

The Committee recommends that Programwide Management and Support be reduced by \$6,000,000. It would appear that as a result of the cutbacks in the Army R.D.T. & E. program, reductions can be made in military and civilian personnel at Army research and development facilities and activities.

In addition, the Committee has made a general reduction of \$124,200,000 to include the unspecified \$118,100,000 and the \$6,100,000 identified for chemical and biological warfare which failed authorization of Congress. Within the unspecified reduction, an additional sum of \$1,500,000 is to be applied against chemical and biological warfare efforts pursuant to the recent decision of the President on this matter.

As a result of actions taken in the authorizing legislation, a total reduction of \$2,705,000 was made in Federal Contract Research Centers. Some of these decreases have already been discussed under Military Sciences and other budget activities. The total reduction is distributed as follows:

Mathematics Research Center, University of Wisconsin.....	-\$175,000
Human Resources Research Office.....	-480,000
Center for Research in Social Sciences.....	-400,000
Aerospace Corp.....	-275,000
Lincoln Laboratory.....	-664,000
Research Analysis Corp.....	-580,000
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University.....	-125,000

## RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, NAVY

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$2,141,339,000
Estimate, 1970.....	2,211,500,000
Recommended in the bill.....	2,040,400,000
Reduction.....	171,100,000

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$2,040,400,000, a reduction of \$171,100,000 below the budget estimate, and \$100,939,000 below the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

The Military Sciences budget activity was reduced \$20,300,000 by Congress in the authorization bill. The Committee did not further reduce this activity.

The Committee reduced Aircraft and Related Equipment by a total of \$44,100,000, including the amount for the S-3A (VSX) antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft which was not authorized by Congress. The Committee reduced the funds for the Crane Heavy Lift Helicopter by \$3,000,000 leaving a modest amount of planning funds. It is the sense of the Committee that the Army and the Navy should develop a single Heavy Lift Helicopter to satisfy most of the needs of each service. To avoid the proposed separate costly development and production programs by the Army and the Navy on this vehicle, it is realized that compromises will have to be made. Other reductions were made in the TRIM/Combined Sensor Vehicle System, Airborne ASW Detection, Airborne Electronic Warfare, Target Development, Search and Rescue Systems, and Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance programs.

The Committee added \$146,000,000 to the Aircraft and Related Equipment budget activity for the F-14 aircraft. The funds added include \$90,000,000 for three additional research and development aircraft, \$36,000,000 for tooling, and \$20,000,000 for test support. The action of the Committee will retain the development of this aircraft in the R.D.T. & E. budget. None of the funds provided is to be utilized for tooling beyond that needed for fabrication of the test aircraft.

Missiles and Related Equipment was reduced by \$118,300,000, which includes the \$45,000,000 not authorized by Congress. The Committee recommended a reduction of \$20,900,000 for FBM command and control including \$15,000,000 for Project Sanguine. The Department of Defense has recently reoriented this program and the Committee believes that before proceeding with a deployment of this communications system the Navy should complete studies on soil erosion, electromagnetic radiation effects, electric shock thresholds, physiological and ecological effects, and other technical solutions to interference problems. In addition, the Office of the Secretary of Defense should, in the coming months, again review this project and, in particular, consider the type and length of messages to be sent over the system and the time it would take to transmit such traffic before approving further research and deployment of Sanguine.

The Committee has also denied the funds for the Condor air-launched air-to-surface stand-off missile system. The system includes the missile with electro-optical guidance, an aircraft mounted control pod, and a television display in the aircraft cockpit. Component changes necessary to overcome unexpected technical problems relating primarily to the propulsion system have caused the program to slip over three years and will probably result in the unit cost of this missile, originally estimated at less than \$100,000, almost to triple. Cost estimates for missile control pods and related aircraft modifications have similarly escalated. In addition to the technical problems and related cost increases, there is a serious question as to whether the size of the proposed Condor warhead is adequate to be effective against its assigned hard targets such as bridges and power plants. Further, the Condor missile is not now scheduled to replace any other weapon. It would appear that weapons already in the inventory and those under development may be more cost effective in the penetration and destruction of SAM-defended targets. Accordingly, the Committee recommends termination of the Condor program. Termination costs should be financed by using existing prior year unobligated balances.

Other reductions recommended by the Committee in the Missiles and Related Equipment budget activity include a reduction of \$21,100,000 in FBM System, \$5,000,000 in the Underwater Long-Range Missile System and minor reductions in Missile Propulsion, Strike Warfare, Advanced Sea Based Deterrent, 3T Improvement, and the Pacific Missile Range.

The Committee reduced Military Astronautics and Related Equipment by \$4,300,000, to include Astronautics and VLF Propagation Satellite, as well as the amount which failed Congressional authorization.

Ships, Small Craft, and Related Equipment was reduced a total of \$53,700,000, including the amount not authorized by Congress. The

Committee made specific reductions in Ship Contract Definition, New Ship Design, Advanced Sonar Development, Advanced Communications, Subsystem Reliability, Advanced Meteor Satellite Readout, Advanced Ship Sonar, Electronic Warfare, Submarine Silencing and SQS-26 Sonar.

The Committee reduced Ordnance, Combat Vehicles and Related Equipment by \$11,700,000, to include the amount which failed authorization. Specific Committee reductions were made in Advanced Mine Development, ASW Rockets, Undersens Warfare Weaponry, and Unguided Conventional Air-launched Weapons.

Other Equipment was reduced a total of \$27,100,000, including the amount which failed Congressional authorization. Committee reductions were made in Ocean Engineering System Development, Other Marine Corps Advanced Development, Ocean Engineering Technical Development, Defense Communication Planning Group, Materials and Components, Personnel Support, Surface/Aerospace Target Surveillance, Command and Control, and other unspecified program elements.

The Committee reduced Programwide Management and Support by \$10,000,000. With the reductions made in this budget, a corresponding reduction can be made in personnel, both military and civilian, at Navy research and development activities and facilities.

Congress failed to authorize \$1,000,000 for Chemical and Biological Weapons. The Committee did not specify the budget activity in which this cut is to be made.

In addition, the Committee made an unspecified reduction of \$26,000,000 to be allocated by the Secretary of Defense.

The authorizing legislation made reductions in Federal Contract Research Centers totaling \$5,842,000. A portion of these decreases have been discussed under Military Sciences and other budget activities. The distribution of the total reduction by Center follows:

Ordnance Research Laboratory.....	—\$813, 000
Applied Physics Laboratory University of Washington.....	—187, 000
Center for Naval Analyses.....	—1, 000, 000
Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University.....	—3, 842, 000

## RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$3, 364, 724, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	3, 561, 200, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	3, 056, 900, 000
Reduction.....	504, 300, 000

The recommended appropriation of \$3,056,900,000 is \$307,824,000 less than the \$3,364,724,000 appropriated for fiscal year 1969.

The largest single reduction made is in the funds requested for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program. The sum of \$525,300,000 was budgeted for the MOL. The program was terminated by the Department of Defense in June and a reduction of \$400,000,000 was made in the authorizing legislation, offset by an increase of \$100,000,000 in "Special Activities".

Other reductions made in the annual authorization act in which the Committee concurs include \$13,000,000 in the RF-111 aircraft program; \$1,000,000 in the Light Intratheatre Transport program; \$16,000,000 in the CONUS Air Defense interceptor program; \$9,600,-

000 in the SRAM missile program; \$3,000,000 in the Tactical air-to-ground missile X-3 program; \$20,000,000 in the Airborne Warning and Control System program; and \$4,000,000 in the A-X close ground support attack aircraft program.

Other authorization reductions include \$2,800,000 for chemical and biological warfare; \$22,300,000 in Military Sciences; \$3,700,000 in foreign research, social and behavioral sciences, and Project Themis; and an unspecified reduction of \$9,200,000.

As stated above, the A-X program amount was reduced by \$4,000,000 in the authorization act. The budget request for the initiation of the A-X aircraft development program totals \$12,000,000. The Committee recommends the deletion of the remaining \$8,000,000. There are a number of attack aircraft now in the active inventories of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force including the A-7, the A-6, the A-4, the A-37, the F-4, the F-100, the F-8, the A-1, the A-26, the B-57, and the T-28. The OV-10 was recently developed for close air support in limited war situations but is not being utilized by the Air Force in this role. It may be that an aircraft specifically designed for the close air support role would be superior in some ways to the aircraft currently available, but the Air Force has not demonstrated that the advantages gained would justify the development and procurement costs involved in the deployment of the proposed A-X. The Committee realizes the importance of the close air support role and expects that at some point in time a new aircraft for this role will be required. However, the Committee has approved the funding of the development of the F-15 fighter aircraft and the B-1 strategic bomber in the fiscal year 1970 program, both of which it considers to be of higher priority than the A-X. The fiscal stringencies of today preclude the funding of more new aircraft developments for the Air Force at this time.

The additional reductions proposed by the Committee, which total \$99,700,000, are discussed below.

The Committee proposes a reduction of \$1,000,000 in "Aircraft Propulsion Subsystem Integration" which would keep the program at the fiscal year 1969 level after allowing an adjustment for a change in funding procedure.

A reduction of \$2,000,000, the entire amount requested, is recommended in the "Hypersonic Vehicle Technology" program. This is a new contract effort on hypersonic vehicles which can be safely deferred.

The VTOL Engine development program is reduced by \$4,000,000. In past years, the program supported the engine development of the now terminated joint US/Federal Republic of Germany VTOL fighter aircraft. The current program includes funds for a US/United Kingdom lift engine, a classified project, and technology work supporting development of propeller-driven VTOL aircraft including effort on large diameter propellers, gear boxes, and sand/dirt separators. The reduction should be taken against this technology work.

The Committee recommends a reduction of \$7,100,000 in the funding of the Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy missile known as SCAD. The funds remaining will be adequate to fund the essential requirements for this program in fiscal year 1970.

A reduction of \$2,000,000 is recommended in the area of Rocket Propulsion. The Committee believes that the utilization of develop-

ments in this area in the other military services and NASA, along with the sum provided, will provide an adequate level of effort.

The Advanced Ballistic Re-Entry System program (ABRES) is reduced by \$14,400,000 from the \$121,400,000 requested. This large program is made up of many individual projects. The Committee feels that the most important projects can be accomplished with the \$107,000,000 provided.

The Hard Rock Silo Development program is recommended to be funded at the level of \$25,000,000 in fiscal year 1970, a reduction of \$25,000,000 in the budget request. The purpose of the program is to devise, construct, and test a missile silo in hard rock. A silo placed in hard rock would provide superior protection to the missile within from nearby nuclear blasts. The placing of a substantial part of our ICBM force in Hard Rock silos would be very costly. With the increasing degree of accuracy being attained with ICBMs, there is some doubt that the additional protection provided would be worth the cost involved. Further, there is doubt that the procedure contemplated for the testing of the Hard Rock concept using high explosive charges will provide the required information with which to adequately evaluate the program. The Committee has approved large sums to provide Anti-Ballistic Missile protection for a part of our missile force. There are other means of protecting ICBMs such as by placing them in submarines or by developing mobile land systems. The Committee feels that the basic concept of the Hard Rock Silo program should be studied further and that the \$25,000,000 recommended is the most that should be committed to this program at this time.

The Committee recommends reductions of \$5,000,000 each in the sums requested for the support of the Eastern and Western Test Ranges. For several years, the Committee has pointed to the increasing use of the Eastern Test Range by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the decreasing use by the Air Force and has indicated that a greater share of the cost of supporting the range should be assumed by NASA. Information supplied to the Committee in the hearings shows that the fiscal year 1970 Air Force support will increase by \$10,000,000 over that provided in fiscal year 1969 and that NASA's reimbursement would decrease by \$4,000,000 according to fiscal year 1970 Budget plans. The Committee calls on the Bureau of the Budget to more properly allocate the costs of supporting the range. Perhaps NASA should operate the range and the Air Force assume the role of a tenant and reimburse NASA for Air Force activity. The Defense Department should not be forced to divert funds needed for weapons developments to support of the civilian space program.

The sum provided for the Western Test Range is \$5,000,000 more than was provided in fiscal year 1969. The termination of the MOL program should make possible some reductions at the Western Test Range.

The Committee further believes that careful management can reduce costs at both Test Ranges. A general tightening of operations and a careful survey of on-going activities which might be eliminated are in order.

The amount requested for the Satellite Control Facility is reduced by \$1,000,000. This makes \$36,200,000 available, an increase of \$7,900,000 over the sum provided in fiscal year 1969. The Defense De-

partment should explore the joint utilization of space-tracking facilities with NASA. Most such facilities, whether funded by NASA or by the Air Force, are contractor operated and security reasons should not prevent such joint utilization. The cancellation of the MOL has an impact on the workload of the Satellite Control Facility, making a reduction possible.

The Committee recommends a reduction of \$4,000,000 in Aerospace Biotechnology. It is estimated that 15 to 20 percent of the effort included in this line item is related to the now terminated Manned Orbiting Laboratory program. The Committee feels strongly that since the Air Force now has no manned space program, the various programs in support of manned space flight in the Air Force should be terminated. Sufficient national effort in this area is being funded under the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Further reductions would have been recommended in this program, but it was testified that much of the program is in support of aeronautics rather than astronautics. This raises the question of how much of the program presented to Congress as the military space program is in reality associated more closely with aircraft or missiles. The fiscal year 1971 budget justifications should present a more accurate presentation of the "Military Astronautics" budget activity.

The Committee recommends a reduction of \$4,200,000 in "Aerospace Propulsion." A number of efforts on air-breathing engines are included in this program. It is felt that those of highest priority can be adequately funded within the remaining amount.

The \$4,100,000 reduction recommended in "Aerospace Avionics" will provide approximately the same level of funding that was provided in fiscal year 1969. The hearings revealed that the Air Force did not intend to proceed with all of the projects budgeted in this area. The effort in Bionics-cybernetics, for example, will not be funded. Again, the hearings revealed that the line item which is included in the "Military Astronautics" budget activity is, in large part, associated with aeronautical programs and is another area in which a more accurate designation is expected in fiscal year 1971.

In "Space Studies", a reduction of \$500,000 is recommended. The \$1,300,000 provided allows an increase of \$300,000 above the fiscal year 1969 allocation.

The Committee recommends the deletion of the \$5,000,000 requested for the Special Purpose Communications program and the termination of the program. The purpose of the program is to develop a very low-frequency communications system for aircraft and ground centers of the Strategic Air Command. The feasibility of the program as presented is very doubtful. Certain of the equipments required, including the very long trailing wire antenna, do not appear to be practical in military operations. There are several SAC communications systems available now. The urgency of need for an additional system is not sufficient to convince the Committee that the proposed new system should be funded at this time.

The \$1,000,000 requested for "National Military Command System-wide Support" is denied. The requested funds were for a data management system in connection with a change-over to third generation computers. This effort can be postponed along with reductions in the procurement of ADP equipment as discussed earlier in the report.

A reduction of \$1,500,000 is recommended in "Air Cargo Materials Handling". The proposed reduction is one-half of the requested amount. A number of relatively low priority items were included in the request such as the development of an advanced forklift and forklift tine development.

The Committee recommends a reduction of \$1,000,000, fifty percent of the sum requested, for development of an Advanced Airborne Command Post. It is envisioned by the Air Force that an airborne command post will be required utilizing aircraft the size of the C-5A and the 747. The Committee feels that this requirement should be carefully studied as to actual need for the capability that such a system would provide prior to initiating hardware development.

The \$2,500,000 requested for "Civil Engineering Technology" has been reduced by \$1,500,000. This is a new line item and the \$1,000,000 allowed should provide for the initiation of the required development efforts in this area which are unique to the Air Force.

The \$1,500,000 requested for "Improved Aircraft Firefighting Equipment" has been reduced by \$1,000,000. The needs of the Air Force are not sufficiently different from those of commercial aviation in this area to support a requirement for separate development effort. Savings can be realized in the Procurement account through the purchase of off-the-shelf rather than specially designed firefighting equipment. The advent of large capacity aircraft such as the 747 will require commercial airports to have firefighting equipment of very high capability.

As a result of actions taken in the authorizing legislation and the recommendations by the Committee, the following reductions are recommended in the base amounts provided for Air Force supported Federal Contract Research Centers:

Lincoln Laboratory from \$23,000,000 to \$20,500,000;  
 MITRE Corporation from \$12,500,000 to \$11,200,000;  
 Aerospace Corporation from \$24,700,000 to \$22,200,000;  
 Rand Corporation from \$15,600,000 to \$12,800,000; and  
 Analytic Services, Inc., from \$1,600,000 to \$1,500,000.

The Committee recommends a reduction of \$8,000,000 in the Budget Activity "Programwide Management and Support" for which \$309,400,000 was requested and \$290,800,000 was provided in fiscal year 1969. Of this amount, \$6,600,000 is specified by the Committee as a part of the unspecified reduction included in the authorization act.

Continued development and improvement will be made in the Minuteman ICBM missile force. The Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) will enter design competition in 1970. An airborne warning and control system will begin development in 1970. Contract definition for the F-15 tactical air superiority fighter will be completed and a development contract for this aircraft will be awarded this fiscal year. The C-5A transport aircraft will near the completion of its development as will the F-111 tactical aircraft. Funds are also provided for the continued development of the Maverick air-to-surface missile, a tactical interdiction missile system. Efforts in the area of Advanced ICBM Technology will continue so that when necessary, the technology to support deployment of a new, advanced land based ICBM will be available.

Under astronautics, the Defense Communication Satellite System and various space and aeronautical support programs continue.

The Committee feels that the \$3,056,900,000 program presented is austere, but that it will provide the essential weapons developments required.

## RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION, DEFENSE AGENCIES

Appropriation, 1969.....	\$472, 600, 000
Estimate, 1970.....	500, 200, 000
Recommended in the bill.....	450, 000, 000
Reduction.....	50, 200, 000

This appropriation provides funds to cover the expenses of activities and agencies of the Department of Defense, other than those of the Military departments, for basic and applied research and for such advanced research projects as may be determined and designated by the Secretary of Defense.

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$450,000,000, a reduction of \$50,200,000 below the budget estimate, and \$22,600,000 below the appropriation for fiscal year 1969.

Funds requested for studies and analyses have been reduced by \$1,500,000.

The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) request has been reduced by \$1,700,000. A portion of the reduction in DCA funds is to be applied to planned and on-going systems engineering contracts. Because of the establishment of the DCA Systems Engineering Facility, most, if not all, of the systems engineering work will be done in-house by DCA. An unspecified portion of the reduction is to be made in the computer-related projects of the National Military Command System Support Center. Computer projects such as war gaming and computer models are not R.D.T. & E. effort and in future years, funds for such work are to be requested in the Operation and Maintenance budget.

The Committee has reduced the request for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) by \$26,000,000. A significant portion of the reduction should be applied against the Overseas Defense Research Program. The General Accounting Office has been conducting a review of this program and preliminary analysis has indicated that a number of study projects have not been Defense-related, have been of doubtful value, and in a few cases, useless and wasteful. Some studies in foreign countries raise the question as to whether or not they should be funded under the Foreign Assistance Program rather than in the Defense budget. Additionally, ARPA has made no attempt to have participating countries share in the cost of such projects. The Director of Defense Research and Engineering is requested to review the matters discussed as well as the Overseas Defense Research Program mission statement, which is all encompassing and permits almost any type of study effort, with a view of reducing it in scope and clearly delineating the purpose of this program.

The Committee additionally reduced the Defense Atomic Support Agency request by \$12,000,000, the National Security Agency request by \$8,000,000, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) request by \$1,000,000. The reduction in DIA funds should be applied against service support contracts and the Intelligence Experimentation Research Facility. The Committee does not favor the proposed establishment of this new facility.

Reductions made in the authorizing legislation resulted in a decrease of \$3,524,000 in Defense Agencies' funds for Federal Contract Research Centers. This total reduction is distributed as follows:

MITRE Corp.....	-\$700,000
Aerospace Corp.....	-100,000
Lincoln Laboratory.....	-600,000
Institute for Defense Analyses.....	-1,174,000
Rand Corp.....	-800,000
Research Analysis Corp.....	-150,000

### EMERGENCY FUND, DEFENSE

Appropriations, 1969.....	\$50,000,000
Estimate, 1970.....	100,000,000
Recommended in the bill.....	75,000,000
Reduction.....	25,000,000

The Committee recommends an appropriation of \$75,000,000 for the Emergency Fund, the total amount authorized by Congress and \$25,000,000 more than was available in fiscal year 1969.

In addition, language is retained in the bill making \$150,000,000 available for transfer by the Secretary of Defense from appropriations available for obligation during the current fiscal year.

## TITLE VI

### GENERAL PROVISIONS

The bill contains general provisions, the vast majority of which have been carried in connection with defense appropriation bills in previous years.

A proviso formerly carried in Section 503 prohibiting the use of funds for the professional training of clerks, stenographers, and so forth has been deleted as requested in the budget proposal.

A new proviso has been added to Section 606, as proposed in the President's Budget, making appropriations in this bill available to pay certain personnel assigned to International Military Headquarters at the rates specified and previously paid in connection with military assistance authorities and funds.

Sections 639 and 640 which were carried in the Defense Appropriation Act, 1969, as Sections 539 and 540 have been continued by way of emphasis although it is recognized they are somewhat repetitive of other, permanent, law.

The new general provision, Section 641, provides for limiting the availability of previously appropriated funds in the various procurement and RDT&E accounts to the same time period for which funds appropriated in the respective paragraphs of the accompanying bill are limited.

### LIMITATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

The following limitations and legislative provisions not heretofore carried in connection with any appropriation bill are recommended:

On page 12, beginning on line 20, in connection with "Operation and Maintenance, Air National Guard":

*—services of personnel necessary to provide reimbursable services for the military departments—*

On page 15, beginning on line 7, in connection with "Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army":

*—to remain available for obligation until June 30, 1972.*

Note.—The above limitation on obligational availability until June 30, 1972 appears in connection with other appropriation paragraphs on pages 15, 17, 18, 19, and 20.

On page 16, beginning on line 10, in connection with "Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy":

*— to remain available for obligation until June 30, 1974 —*

On page 18, beginning on line 16, in connection with "Aircraft Procurement, Air Force":

*— Provided, That funds available under this heading shall be available to the extent of \$55,000,000 without regard to prior provisions relating to the F-12 aircraft program —*

On page 21, beginning on line 1, in connection with "Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army":

— *to remain available for obligation until June 30, 1971.*

Note.—The above limitation on obligational availability until June 30, 1971 appears in connection with other appropriation paragraphs on pages 21 and 22.

On page 26, beginning on line 19, in connection with "General Provisions":

— *pay and allowances of not to exceed nine persons, including personnel detailed to International Military Headquarters and Organizations, at rates provided for under section 625(d)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended*

On page 43, beginning on line 8, in connection with "General Provisions":

**SEC. 641.** *Appropriations heretofore made available for Procurement of Equipment and Missiles, Army; Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy; Other Procurement, Navy; Procurement, Marine Corps; Aircraft Procurement, Air Force; Missile Procurement, Air Force; Other Procurement, Air Force; and Procurement, Defense Agencies shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1972. Appropriations heretofore made available for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1974. Appropriations heretofore made available under the headings Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy; Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Air Force; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense Agencies shall not be available for obligation after June 30, 1971.*

## SEPARATE VIEWS ON THE SAFEGUARD ABM

As is stated on page 11 of the report,

The bill includes a total of \$779.4 million for Safeguard—\$400.9 million for RDT&E, \$345.5 million for Procurement, \$23.2 million for Operations and Maintenance, and \$9.8 million for Military Personnel.

We favor the appropriation of \$400.9 million for RDT&E. We are opposed to the appropriations for procurement, operations and maintenance and personnel, all of which total \$359.5 million and all of which are related to deployment of the Safeguard. The controversy over the ABM has raged for more than a year now and there is little that can be added to the technical and strategic arguments that have been so exhaustively outlined already. It is, however, important to point out that this bill also contains more than \$400 million for continued research and development, which we favor, on the Safeguard system.

It is the concurrency of research and development and deployment that has caused so much of the waste in military spending, as is pointed out so well in the committee report at page 48 as follows:

There have been too many instances uncovered this year of cost overruns resulting from such laxities as improperly defined specifications, delays in delivering Government-furnished equipment, and *too much concurrency between research and development and production.* [italic ours.] The pendulum has moved too far from the early concepts of "fly before buy" and competitive prototype development. Also in recent years, there has been a tendency to move too fast into production, even before development and testing is completed and, in some cases, prior to the time development and testing has reached the point where a reasonably intelligent decision to enter into production can be made. The result has been disastrous in such recent cases as the Sheridan armored vehicle and Cheyenne helicopter, but there have been many other examples. Budgetary considerations based on fear of losing funding authority have often dictated such decisions rather than sound technical judgment. Premature production releases most often result in extensive and costly modification and retrofit programs which could have been avoided by delaying production, possibly only a few months.

Those principles certainly apply to the Safeguard ABM.

There are still hundreds of millions of dollars of research and development questions to be answered before deployment of an ABM system should be allowed to proceed. To proceed with deployment now will increase the risk of huge overruns in the ABM program, which already costs out at more than \$8 billion.

The Secretary of Defense testified during this year's hearings that cost increases for certain specified weapons systems have totaled \$16,200,000,000 over the last several years. It would surely be more prudent to wait until the research and development are completed and the technology is in hand before committing hundreds of millions of dollars to deployment.

CLARENCE D. LONG.  
 ROBERT N. GIAIMO.  
 DAVID R. OBEY.  
 JEFFERY COHELAN.  
 EDWARD P. BOLAND.  
 DONALD W. REIGLE, JR.  
 HOWARD W. ROBISON.  
 SILVIO O. CONTE.  
 FRANK E. EVANS.  
 SIDNEY R. YATES.

## THE APPROPRIATIONS BUSINESS OF THE SESSION

Congress does not act annually on all of the appropriations or new budget (obligational) authority requests. Something in excess of \$81,000,000,000 of the grand total currently estimated in the total federal budget for fiscal 1970 arises from previous permanent-type legislation that does not require action in bills this session (interest, social security, other trust funds, etc.).

About \$133,200,000,000 of the 1970 total is presently involved in the form of specific budget requests in connection with the 13 regular annual appropriation bills—\$54.2 billion in the 11 bills already passed by the House; \$75.3 billion in the accompanying Defense bill; and \$3.7 billion in the Foreign Assistance bill to be reported next week.

There will also be a closing supplemental bill reported shortly, involving a number of late requests presently totaling \$290 million in new budget (obligational) authority. In addition, the request of \$2,048 million for the Office of Economic Opportunity remains to be disposed of.

Another major part of the total is a \$3,000,000,000 allowance in the budget totals for the July 1, 1969, civilian and military pay increase, the details of which have not yet been submitted to Congress.

The gross total in the April 15 budget revision by the new administration, relating to fiscal 1970, was \$219,600,000,000. The Summer Review of the Budget, issued September 17, reflects many changes in details and identifies several of them, but does not include a new grand total. However, the total remains in this vicinity. Periodic "scorekeeping" reports of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures—distributed to all Members—supply more details.

## APPROPRIATION BILLS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970

### HOUSE ACTIONS

The House has already acted on 11 of the 13 regular appropriation bills for 1970. These 11 bills involved consideration of \$53,776,000,000 in new budget authority requests. Against this total the Committee on Appropriations recommended \$53,070,000,000, a net reduction of \$706,000,000.

However, through floor actions on these 11 bills, the House voted net additions of \$726,000,000 to the Committee recommendations, with the result that these 11 bills—as finally voted in the House—are above the related budget requests by some \$20,000,000. The principal floor additions occurred on the Labor-HEW bill, increased \$922,000,000 above the total recommended by the Committee.

The accompanying Defense bill involves budget requests of \$75,278,200,000 for which the Committee recommends \$69,960,048,000, a reduction of \$5,318,152,000.

*Counting in the accompanying Defense bill as reported*, the House will have considered \$129,054,000,000 of budget requests for new budget (obligational) authority; approved \$123,756,000,000; a net reduction of \$5,298,000,000 below the related budget requests.

The Committee on Appropriations plans to report the Foreign Assistance bill next week. This will be the last of the 13 regular appropriation bills for fiscal year 1970.

The Committee is presently considering 1970 supplemental budget requests submitted to the Congress last week, which appear in House Document 91-199. A supplemental bill will be reported next week.

### SENATE ACTIONS

The Senate has passed 7 of the regular appropriation bills for fiscal 1970—Treasury-Post Office; Agriculture; Interior; Legislative; State-Justice-Commerce-Judiciary; Independent Offices-H.U.D.; and Public Works-A.E.C. These bills involve \$33,508 million of new budget (obligational) authority requests, against which the Senate voted \$34,009 million, a net increase of \$501 million above the budget.

### FINAL ACTIONS

Four regular appropriation bills for fiscal 1970 have cleared Congress—Treasury-Post Office, Interior, Independent Offices-Housing and Urban Development, and Agriculture. These bills, on a net

basis, appropriate \$26,257 million of new budget (obligational) authority, a reduction of about \$199 million from the related budget requests.

On a *gross* basis, that is, including estimated postal revenues, the amount of the Treasury-Post Office bill is \$8,783 million. However, on the *net* basis used in the budget, that is, counting estimated postal revenues as offsets to postal appropriations rather than as budget receipts, the amount enacted in the Treasury-Post Office bill is \$2,276 million. This does not take into account the revised estimate for postal revenues projected in the summer review of the 1970 budget, released September 17; that review now assumes enactment of new postal rate legislation effective January 1, 1970, valued at \$315 million, and makes a slight refinement of the estimate otherwise.

The amount of the Interior bill is \$1,380 million.

The Independent Offices-H.U.D. bill appropriates \$15,112 million.

The total of the Agriculture bill is \$7,489 million.

#### FISCAL YEAR 1969 SUPPLEMENTALS

In respect to fiscal year 1969 supplementals during this session, budget requests for new budget (obligational) authority totaled nearly \$5.9 billion. Congress approved amounts totaling \$5.4 billion, a reduction of nearly a half billion dollars—\$461.9 million—from the budget requests.

#### APPROPRIATION AND LEGISLATIVE BILLS IN RELATION TO THE BUDGET (A MORE COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE)

Folding in the various spending actions in legislative bills that bear on the budget with those in the appropriation bills for fiscal 1970, the latest (November 21) budget "scorekeeping" report of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures projects a more comprehensive picture of congressional actions, or inactions, thus far on the budget. These reports are designed to keep tabs, currently, on what is happening in the legislative process to the budget recommendations of the President, both appropriation-wise and expenditure-wise, and on the revenue recommendations, and not only from actions in the revenue and appropriation bills, but also in legislative bills that affect budget authority and expenditures (back-door bills, bills that mandate expenditures, and so on).

On this more comprehensive comparison the picture of congressional actions in relation to the 1970 budget is somewhat different than it is when using appropriation bills alone.

The November 21 "scorekeeping" report indicates that the House was, as of that date, *above* the 1970 estimates for budget authority by \$2,690,000,000 and *above* the 1970 estimate for outlays (expenditures) by \$1,361,000,000.

These figures, of course, do not include the accompanying Defense bill. If the Committee's recommendations in the Defense bill are sustained by the House, the "scorekeeping" report—with this one

adjustment alone—would reflect a reduction by the House of \$2,628,000,000 from the 1970 budget estimates for budget authority and a reduction of \$1,639,000,000 from the 1970 estimate for expenditure outlays.

The November 21 "scorekeeping" report also indicates that the Senate was, as of that date, *above* the 1970 estimates for budget authority by \$4,520,000,000 and *above* the 1970 estimate for expenditure outlays by \$912,000,000.

The following Supporting Table No. 1, from the November 21 "scorekeeping" report of the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures, supplies details on individual appropriation and legislative bills affecting budget authority and expenditure outlays as of that date:

**Supporting Table No. 1.—Actions on individual bills affecting budget authority and outlays (expenditures)  
(as of November 21, 1969)**

[In thousands of dollars]

Items acted upon	Congressional actions on budget authority (changes from the revised budget) <sup>1</sup>			Congressional actions on budget outlays (changes from the revised budget) <sup>1</sup>		
	House (1)	Senate (2)	Enacted (3)	House (4)	Senate (5)	Enacted (6)
<b>Fiscal year 1970:</b>						
<i>Appropriation bills</i> (changes from the revised budget):						
Treasury, Post Office, and Executive Office (H.R. 11582, Public Law 91-74) ..	-42,382	-34,519	-38,482	-37,000	-30,600	-34,000
Agriculture and related agencies (H.R. 11612) .....	-160,907	+405,236	††+251,341	<sup>2</sup> +53,000	+294,000	††+135,000
Second supplemental, 1969 (H.R. 11400) .....				-92,700	-64,700	-75,000
Section 401 outlay ceiling <sup>3</sup> .....					(-1,900,000)	(-1,000,000)
Independent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development (H.R. 12307) .....	-471,325	* -177,521	†† -226,099	-61,000	-25,900	†† -55,000
Interior and related agencies (H.R. 12781) .....	-15,810	-8,090	-10,481	-15,300	-11,800	<sup>4</sup> -7,800
State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and related agencies (H.R. 12964) .....	* -130,070	* -83,350		-71,000	-40,600	
Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare and related agencies (H.R. 13111) ..	+1,078,365			+521,000		

8

Legislative Branch (H.R. 13763) .....	-26,850	-29,842		-7,900	-8,800	
---------------------------------------	---------	---------	--	--------	--------	--

Legislative Branch (H.R. 13763)-----	-26, 850	-29, 842		-7, 900	-8, 800	
Public Works (H.R. 14159)-----	+301, 469	+789, 451		+10, 500	+67, 400	
Military Construction (H.R. 14751)-----	-466, 741			-37, 000		
Transportation (H.R. 14794)-----	+34, 546			-172, 000		
District of Columbia (H.R. 14916)-----	†-40, 151			†-14, 000		
Subtotal, appropriation bills-----	+60, 144	+861, 365	-23, 721	+76, 600	+179, 000	-36, 800
<i>Legislative bills with spending authorizations (changes from the revised budget):</i>						
Civil service retirement benefits (Public Law 91-93)-----	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	+86, 100	+94, 700	+94, 700
Defense: overseas mailing privileges (H.R. 8434)-----	+8, 900			+8, 900		
Veterans readjustment benefits (Public Law 91-22)-----	+1, 362	+1, 362	+1, 362	+3, 952	+3, 952	§ +2, 300
Veterans hospital care for 70-year-olds (H.R. 693)-----	+16, 225	+16, 225		+16, 225	+16, 225	
Veterans care in State homes (H.R. 9334)-----	+2, 803	+2, 803		+2, 803	+2, 803	
Veterans care in community nursing homes (H.R. 692)-----	+5, 954			+5, 954		
Veterans outpatient care (Public Law 91-102)-----	+8, 000	+8, 000	§ +4, 000	+8, 000	+8, 000	§ +4, 000
Veterans nursing home care (service-connected) (Public Law 91-101)-----	+1, 500	+1, 500	§ +750	+1, 500	+1, 500	§ +750
Veterans non-service-connected benefits (H.R. 372)-----	+8, 538			+8, 538		

See footnotes at end of table, p. 94.

Supporting Table No. 1.—Actions on individual bills affecting budget authority and outlays (expenditures)  
(as of November 21, 1969)—Continued

[In thousands of dollars]

Items acted upon	Congressional actions on budget authority (changes from the revised budget) <sup>1</sup>			Congressional actions on budget outlays (changes from the revised budget) <sup>1</sup>		
	House (1)	Senate (2)	Enacted (3)	House (4)	Senate (5)	Enacted (6)
<b>Fiscal year 1970:—Continued</b>						
<i>Legislative bills with spending authorizations—continued</i>						
Additional district judges (S. 952)-----		+1, 473			+1, 473	
Additional clerks for House Members (H. Res. 357)-----	+3, 600		+3, 600	+3, 600		+3, 600
Appalachian highways (H.R. 4018)-----	+20, 000					
Food for needy children (H.R. 11651)-----				+100, 000		
Veterans education assistance (H.R. 11959)-----	+206, 500	†+383, 000		+206, 500	†+380, 000	
Veterans Vietnam insurance (S. 2003)-----		+1, 700			+1, 700	
Veterans additional \$5,000 insurance (S. 1479)-----		+45, 000			+45, 000	
Veterans double indemnity insurance (S. 1650)-----		+100, 000			+100, 000	
Veterans dismemberment insurance (S. 2186)-----		+10, 000			+10, 000	
Veterans increased dependency and in- demnity compensation (Public Law 91-96)-----	+61, 565	+52, 840	<sup>5</sup> +31, 300	+61, 565	+52, 840	<sup>5</sup> +31, 300

Navajo Indian Road (S. 404).....		+5, 000				
Travel per diem (Public Law 91-114).....		+13, 000	+13, 000		+13, 000	+13, 000
Federal salary comparability (H.R. 13000).....	* +750, 000			* +750, 000		
Public Health Service retirement (S. 2452).....		+110			+110	
Prisoner-of-war medical care (S. 1279).....		+1, 017			+1, 017	
Military lawyers retention (H.R. 4296).....	†+7, 000			†+7, 000		
Judges' 20-year retirement (S. 1508).....		+636			+636	
Housing and Urban Development Act (H.R. 13827).....	+1, 500, 000			N.A.		
Outdoor advertising control (S. 1442).....		+15, 000				
Expanding mortgage market (S. 2577).....		+3, 000, 000			N.A.	
Adjustment of military retired pay (H.R. 14227).....	†+14, 000			†+14, 000		
Unemployment trust fund (H.R. 14705).....	+14, 000					
Subtotal, legislative bills.....	+2, 629, 947	+3, 658, 666	+54, 012	+1, 284, 637	+732, 956	+149, 650
Total, fiscal year 1970.....	+2, 690, 091	+4, 520, 031	+30, 291	+1, 361, 237	+911, 956	+112, 850
<b>Fiscal year 1969:</b> <i>Appropriation bills</i> (changes from the budget): Second supplemental, 1969 (H.R. 11400).....	-580, 794	-354, 636	-461, 948	-464, 000	-254, 600	-325, 000

See footnotes at end of table, p. 94.

<sup>1</sup> The budget figures to which these adjustments apply are the April 15 estimates as amended. Accurate estimates of the cost impact of congressional actions on mandatory spending legislation are frequently difficult to obtain—especially for outlays. Cost estimates are obtained from various sources, including Committee reports, floor debates, government agencies and informal staff contacts. Sometimes cost estimates on new legislation are not available. What is reflected in this Congressional action table is the best that the staff has been able to put together. Occasionally it is necessary to revise an estimate as more current information becomes available.

<sup>2</sup> Reflects floor action increasing milk funds by \$120 million, but does not reflect effect of \$20,000 limitation on subsidy payments adopted by House. The Appropriations Committee assumed a reduction in P.L. 480 spending which if not realized will result in higher spending than estimated.

<sup>3</sup> The Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1969, carried an overall expenditure limitation for fiscal 1970 which was different in all three versions. The House-passed version set the ceiling at the April 15 budget figure of \$192.9 billion with provision for increases or decreases depending upon actions or inactions of the Congress affecting the budget. The Senate version made a flat reduction of \$1.9 billion in the overall ceiling but

exempted certain items from the ceiling. The enacted version made a flat reduction of \$1 billion, provided for increases or decreases depending upon action or inaction of Congress affecting the budget, and granted up to \$2 billion of flexibility in the ceiling to the President for certain uncontrollable items.

<sup>4</sup> Reported by Budget Bureau to be an increase of \$5 million.

<sup>5</sup> Revised estimate based on late enactment.

<sup>6</sup> As amended on House Floor costs could vary between \$500 million and \$1 billion.

†Committee action.

††Pending signature.

N.A.—Not available.

\*Figures posted for scorekeeping purposes for these items vary from Appropriations Committee reports as follows: \$175 million in contract authority provided in basic legislation for Appalachian development in lieu of appropriation as requested and reflected in Committee reports on HUD-Independent Bill; and \$10 million in 1971 advance appropriation for census eliminated and shown as 1970 reduction in Committee reports on State-Justice-Commerce-Bill.

**COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1969 AND THE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1970**

**PERMANENT NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY—FEDERAL FUNDS**

[Becomes available automatically under earlier, or "permanent" law without further, or annual, action by the Congress. Thus, these amounts are not included in the accompanying bill]

Agency and item  (1)	New budget (obligational) authority, 1969  (2)	Budget estimate of new (obligational) authority, 1970  (3)	Increase (+) or decrease (-)  (4)
Department of Defense:			
Wildlife conservation, etc., military reservations (permanent, indefinite)-----	\$282, 000	\$282, 000	-----
Total, permanent new budget (obligational) authority, Federal funds-----	282, 000	282, 000	-----

**COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1969 AND THE BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR 1970**

**PERMANENT NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY—TRUST FUNDS**

[Becomes available automatically under earlier, or "permanent" law without further, or annual, action by the Congress. Thus, these amounts are not included in the accompanying bill]

Agency and item  (1)	New budget (obligational) authority, 1969  (2)	Budget estimate of new (obligational) authority, 1970  (3)	Increase (+) or decrease (-)  (4)
Department of Defense:			
Department of the Army.....	\$50,000	\$50,000	
Department of the Navy.....	7,372,000	7,372,000	
Department of the Air Force general gift fund.....	7,000	7,000	
Total, permanent new budget (obligational) authority, trust funds..	7,429,000	7,429,000	

**COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1969 AND BUDGET ESTIMATES  
AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL FOR 1970**

**TITLE I—MILITARY PERSONNEL**

[Note—All amounts are in the form of "appropriations" unless otherwise indicated.]

Item  (1)	New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (2)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (3)	New budget (obligational) authority recommended in the bill  (4)	Bill compared with—	
				New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (5)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (6)
Military personnel, Army.....	\$8,409,969,223 <sup>1</sup>	\$8,551,700,000 <sup>2</sup>	\$8,312,000,000	-\$97,969,223	-\$239,700,000
Military personnel, Navy.....	4,455,200,000 <sup>1</sup>	4,508,500,000 <sup>2</sup>	4,370,000,000	-85,200,000	-138,500,000
Military personnel, Marine Corps.....	1,534,734,204 <sup>1</sup>	1,577,000,000 <sup>2</sup>	1,518,000,000	-16,734,204	-59,000,000
Military personnel, Air Force.....	6,093,600,000	5,952,800,000 <sup>2</sup>	5,835,300,000	-258,300,000	-117,500,000
Reserve personnel, Army.....	287,200,000	311,000,000	308,000,000	+20,800,000	-3,000,000
Reserve personnel, Navy.....	129,150,000	140,400,000 <sup>2</sup>	131,400,000	+2,250,000	-9,000,000
Reserve personnel, Marine Corps.....	36,550,000	45,700,000	45,000,000	+8,450,000	-700,000
Reserve personnel, Air Force.....	71,800,000	88,200,000 <sup>2</sup>	83,400,000	+11,600,000	-4,800,000
National Guard personnel, Army.....	320,900,000	363,500,000	356,800,000	+35,900,000	-6,700,000
National Guard personnel, Air Force.....	88,000,000	103,100,000 <sup>2</sup>	97,300,000	+9,300,000	-5,800,000
Retired pay, Defense.....	2,450,000,000	2,735,000,000	-----	-2,450,000,000	-2,735,000,000
<b>Total, title I—Military personnel..</b>	<b>23,877,103,427<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>24,376,900,000</b>	<b>21,057,200,000</b>	<b>-2,819,903,427</b>	<b>-3,319,700,000</b>

<sup>1</sup> Includes amounts warranted by Treasury Department pursuant to P.L. 91-31.

<sup>2</sup> January 1969 budget, as amended in H. Doc. 91-100.

**COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1969 AND BUDGET ESTIMATES  
AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL FOR 1970—Continued**

**TITLE II—RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL**

[Note—All amounts are in the form of "appropriations" unless otherwise indicated.]

Item  (1)	New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (2)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (3)	New budget (obligational) authority recommended in the bill  (4)	Bill compared with—	
				New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (5)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (6)
Retired pay, Defense.....			2, 735, 000, 000	+2, 735, 000, 000	+2, 735, 000, 000

**TITLE III—OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE**

[Note—All amounts are in the form of "appropriations" unless otherwise indicated.]

Operation and maintenance, Army.....	\$7, 986, 310, 000	\$7, 504, 500, 000 <sup>1</sup>	\$7, 214, 447, 250	—\$771, 862, 750	—\$290, 052, 750
<i>Operation and maintenance, Army, 1966 (appropriation to liquidate contract authorization)</i> .....		(142, 165, 000)			(—142, 165, 000)
Operation and maintenance, Navy.....	5, 376, 200, 000	5, 323, 700, 000 <sup>1</sup>	5, 037, 300, 000	—338, 900, 000	—286, 400, 000
<i>Operation and maintenance, Navy, 1966 (appropriation to liquidate contract authorization)</i> .....		(66, 000, 000)			(—66, 000, 000)
Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps.....	455, 190, 000	457, 000, 000	420, 000, 000	—35, 190, 000	—37, 000, 000

<i>Operation and maintenance, Marine Corps, 1966 (appropriation to liquidate contract authorization)</i> .....		(2,500,000)			(-2,500,000)
Operation and maintenance, Air Force.....	6,866,700,000	6,711,700,000 <sup>1</sup>	6,454,500,000	-412,200,000	-257,200,000
Operation and maintenance, Defense Agencies.....	1,068,800,000	1,095,000,000 <sup>1</sup>	1,074,600,000	+5,800,000	-20,400,000
Operation and maintenance, Army National Guard.....	276,164,000	306,000,000	300,000,000	+23,836,000	-6,000,000
Operation and maintenance, Air National Guard.....	277,800,000	342,534,000 <sup>1</sup>	330,534,000	+52,734,000	-12,000,000
National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, Army.....			52,750	+52,750	+52,750
Claims, Defense.....	38,000,000	41,000,000	41,000,000	+3,000,000	
Contingencies, Defense.....	10,000,000	10,000,000	5,000,000	-5,000,000	-5,000,000
Court of Military Appeals, Defense.....	654,000	666,000	666,000	+12,000	
<b>Total, Title III—Operation and maintenance</b> .....	<b>22,355,818,000</b>	<b>21,792,100,000</b>	<b>20,878,100,000</b>	<b>-1,477,718,000</b>	<b>-914,000,000</b>

<sup>1</sup> January 1969 budget, as amended in H. Doc. 91-100.

**COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1969 AND BUDGET ESTIMATES  
AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL FOR 1970—Continued**

**TITLE IV—PROCUREMENT**

[Note—All amounts are in the form of “appropriations” unless otherwise indicated.]

Item  (1)	New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (2)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (3)	New budget (obligational) authority recommended in the bill  (4)	Bill compared with—	
				New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (5)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (6)
Procurement of equipment and missiles, Army-----	\$5, 671, 500, 000	\$5, 069, 100, 000	\$4, 281, 400, 000	-\$1, 390, 100, 000	-\$787, 700, 000
Transfer from stock funds-----	(510, 000, 000)	(50, 000, 000)	(50, 000, 000)	(-460, 000, 000)	-----
Procurement of aircraft and missiles, Navy-----	2, 574, 300, 000	3, 235, 500, 000	2, 696, 600, 000	+122, 300, 000	-538, 900, 000
Transfer from stock funds-----	(440, 000, 000)	(25, 000, 000)	(25, 000, 000)	(-415, 000, 000)	-----

Shipbuilding and conversion, Navy-----	820,700,000	2,631,400,000 <sup>1</sup>	2,588,200,000	+1,767,500,000	-43,200,000
Other procurement, Navy-----	2,505,600,000	2,022,700,000 <sup>1</sup>	1,461,800,000	-1,043,800,000	-560,900,000
Procurement, Marine Corps-----	669,500,000	650,600,000	500,848,000	-168,652,000	-149,752,000
Aircraft procurement, Air Force-----	3,860,000,000	3,775,200,000 <sup>1</sup>	3,434,700,000	-425,300,000	-340,500,000
Transfer from stock funds-----	(600,000,000)	(325,000,000)	(325,000,000)	(-275,000,000)	-----
Missile procurement, Air Force-----	1,720,200,000	1,486,400,000 <sup>1</sup>	1,431,000,000	-289,200,000	-55,400,000
Other procurement, Air Force-----	2,716,000,000	1,938,300,000 <sup>1</sup>	1,636,000,000	-1,080,000,000	-302,300,000
Procurement, Defense Agencies-----	81,700,000	77,600,000 <sup>1</sup>	61,600,000	-20,100,000	-16,000,000
Total, Title IV—Procurement-----	20,619,500,000	20,886,800,000	18,092,148,000	-2,527,352,000	-2,794,652,000

<sup>1</sup> January 1969 budget, as amended in H. Doc. 91-100.

**COMPARATIVE STATEMENT OF NEW BUDGET (OBLIGATIONAL) AUTHORITY FOR 1969 AND BUDGET ESTIMATES  
AND AMOUNTS RECOMMENDED IN THE BILL FOR 1970—Continued**

**TITLE V—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION**

[Note—All amounts are in the form of "appropriations" unless otherwise indicated.]

Item  (1)	New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (2)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (3)	New budget (obligational) authority recommended in the bill  (4)	Bill compared with—	
				New budget (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1969  (5)	Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1970  (6)
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Army-----	\$1, 521, 165, 000	\$1, 849, 500, 000 <sup>1</sup>	\$1, 575, 300, 000	+ \$54, 135, 000	-\$274, 200, 000
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Navy-----	2, 141, 339, 000	2, 211, 500, 000 <sup>1</sup>	2, 040, 400, 000	- 100, 939, 000	- 171, 100, 000
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Air Force-----	3, 364, 724, 000	3, 561, 200, 000 <sup>1</sup>	3, 056, 900, 000	- 307, 824, 000	- 504, 300, 000
Research, development, test, and evaluation, Defense agencies-----	472, 600, 000	500, 200, 000	450, 000, 000	- 22, 600, 000	- 50, 200, 000
Emergency fund, Defense-----	50, 000, 000	100, 000, 000 <sup>1</sup>	75, 000, 000	+ 25, 000, 000	- 25, 000, 000
Total, title V—Research, development, test, and evaluation-----	7, 549, 828, 000	8, 222, 400, 000	7, 197, 600, 000	- 352, 228, 000	- 1, 024, 800, 000
Grand total-----	74, 402, 249, 427	75, 278, 200, 000	69, 960, 048, 000	- 4, 442, 201, 427	- 5, 318, 152, 000
Memoranda:					
Appropriations to liquidate contract authorizations-----		(210, 665, 000)			(- 210, 665, 000)

<sup>1</sup> January 1969 budget, as amended in H. Doc. 91-100.



# DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 1970

---

---

0-166-

## HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS FIRST SESSION

---

### SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

**GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, *Chairman***

**ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida**  
**JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi**  
**GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama**  
**DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania**  
**JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia**  
**JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York**

**GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California**  
**WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio**  
**JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona**  
**GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin**

**R. L. MICHAELS, RALPH PRESTON, JOHN GARRITY, PETER MURPHY, ROBERT NICHOLAS,**  
**ROBERT FOSTER, *Staff Assistants***

*H.R. 15090*

### PART 1 MILITARY PERSONNEL

---

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1969

## COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, *Chairman*

MICHAEL J. KIRWAN, Ohio  
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi  
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama  
JOHN J. ROONEY, New York  
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida  
OTTO E. PASSMAN, Louisiana  
JOE L. EVINS, Tennessee  
EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts  
WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky  
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania  
TOM STEED, Oklahoma  
GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois  
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia  
JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia  
NEAL SMITH, Iowa  
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut  
JULIA BUTLER HANSEN, Washington  
CHARLES S. JOELSON, New Jersey  
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York  
JOHN J. McFALL, California  
W. B. HULL, Jr., Missouri  
JEFFERY COHELAN, California  
EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey  
CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland  
JOHN O. MARSH, Jr., Virginia  
SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois  
BOB CASEY, Texas  
DAVID PRYOR, Arkansas  
FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado

FRANK T. BOW, Ohio  
CHARLES R. JONAS, North Carolina  
ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan  
GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California  
JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona  
WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio  
ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois  
SILVIO O. CONTE, Massachusetts  
ODIN LANGEN, Minnesota  
BEN REIFEL, South Dakota  
GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin  
HOWARD W. ROBISON, New York  
GARNER E. SHRIVER, Kansas  
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania  
MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota  
LOUIS C. WYMAN, New Hampshire  
BURT L. TALCOTT, California  
CHARLOTTE T. REID, Illinois  
DONALD W. RIEGLE, Jr., Michigan  
WENDELL WYATT, Oregon  
JACK EDWARDS, Alabama

KENNETH SPRANKLE, *Clerk and Staff Director*  
PAUL M. WILSON, *Assistant Clerk and Staff Director*

---

## SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, *Chairman*

ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida  
JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi  
GEORGE W. ANDREWS, Alabama  
DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania  
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia  
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York

GLENARD P. LIPSCOMB, California  
WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, Ohio  
JOHN J. RHODES, Arizona  
GLENN R. DAVIS, Wisconsin

R. L. MICHAELS, RALPH PRESTON, JOHN GARRITY, PETER MURPHY, ROBERT NICHOLAS,  
ROBERT FOSTER, *Staff Assistants*

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970**

---

**TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 1969.**

**MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY**

**WITNESSES**

**LT. GEN. A. O. CONNER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL**  
**LT. GEN. L. D. HEATON, SURGEON GENERAL**  
**MAJ. GEN. P. F. CASSIDY, CHIEF OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS**  
**MAJ. GEN. L. B. TAYLOR, DIRECTOR OF ARMY BUDGET, OFFICE,**  
**COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY**  
**BRIG. GEN. L. E. MANESS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF ARMY BUDGET,**  
**OFFICE, COMPTROLLER OF THE ARMY**  
**COL. F. S. CONATY, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSON-**  
**NEL POLICIES, OFFICE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL**  
**COL. E. P. HOISINGTON, DIRECTOR, WOMEN'S ARMY CORPS, OFFICE,**  
**DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL**  
**LT. COL. J. F. BELLOCHI, SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION DIVISION,**  
**OFFICE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL**  
**B. M. HUTCHISON, CHIEF, MILITARY PERSONNEL ARMY BRANCH,**  
**BUDGET DIVISION, OFFICE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PER-**  
**SONNEL**  
**G. B. NUTT, CHIEF, SUBSISTENCE AND CLOTHING SECTION, BUDGET**  
**DIVISION, OFFICE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY  
PROGRAM AND FINANCING (In thousands of dollars)

	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<b>Program by activities:</b>			
<b>Direct program:</b>			
1. Pay and allowances of officers .....	1,562,835	1,805,209	1,833,378
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted .....	4,706,705	5,107,770	5,139,641
3. Pay and allowances of cadets .....	8,365	9,628	9,999
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel .....	749,228	738,967	729,832
5. Permanent change of station travel .....	699,402	739,177	735,087
6. Other military personnel costs .....	93,572	90,249	87,063
<b>Total direct program .....</b>	<b>7,820,207</b>	<b>8,491,000</b>	<b>8,535,000</b>
<b>Reimbursable program:</b>			
1. Pay and allowances of officers .....	6,600	7,927	7,927
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted .....	3,816	4,857	4,857
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel .....	91,830	81,400	89,400
5. Permanent change of station travel .....	55	50	50
6. Other military personnel costs .....	400	400	400
<b>Total reimbursable program .....</b>	<b>102,701</b>	<b>94,634</b>	<b>102,634</b>
<b>Total obligations .....</b>	<b>7,922,908</b>	<b>8,585,634</b>	<b>8,637,634</b>
<b>Financing:</b>			
<b>Receipts and reimbursements from:</b>			
Federal funds (—) .....	-47,856	-43,827	-51,827
Non-Federal sources (—) <sup>1</sup> .....	-54,845	-50,807	-50,807
Unobligated balance lapsing .....	5,093		
<b>Budget authority .....</b>	<b>7,825,300</b>	<b>8,491,000</b>	<b>8,535,000</b>
<b>Budget authority:</b>			
Appropriation .....	7,825,300	8,000,000	8,535,000
Proposed supplemental for Southeast Asia .....		160,000	
Proposed supplemental for military Pay Act increases .....		331,000	
<b>Relation of obligations to outlays:</b>			
Obligations incurred, net .....	7,820,207	8,491,000	8,535,000
Obligated balance, start of year .....	332,957	343,187	517,187
Obligated balance, end of year (—) .....	-343,187	-517,187	-590,187
Adjustments in expired accounts .....	-44,881		
<b>Outlays excluding pay increases and Southeast Asia supplementals .....</b>	<b>7,765,096</b>	<b>7,831,400</b>	<b>8,456,600</b>
Outlays from Southeast Asia supplemental .....		154,600	5,400
Outlays from military Pay Act supplemental .....		331,000	

OBJECT CLASSIFICATION

<b>Direct obligations:</b>			
Personnel compensation: Military personnel .....	4,971,687	5,594,109	5,644,109
Personnel benefits: Military personnel .....	1,331,761	1,359,194	1,376,815
Travel and transportation of persons .....	459,434	470,180	457,581
Transportation of things .....	192,829	220,570	212,958
Other services .....	79,121	77,728	71,953
Supplies and materials .....	750,192	733,994	733,014
Grants, subsidies, and contributions .....	520	379	400
Insurance claims and indemnities .....	25,195	24,620	26,252
Interest and dividends .....	9,468	10,226	11,918
<b>Total direct obligations .....</b>	<b>7,820,207</b>	<b>8,491,000</b>	<b>8,535,000</b>
<b>Reimbursable obligations:</b>			
Personnel compensation: Military personnel .....	5,892	6,998	6,998
Personnel benefits: Military personnel .....	1,608	1,786	1,786
Travel and transportation of persons .....	380	376	376
Transportation of things .....	11	10	10
Other services .....	227		
Supplies and materials .....	94,519	85,400	93,400
Grants, subsidies, and contributions .....	64	64	64
<b>Total reimbursable obligations .....</b>	<b>102,701</b>	<b>94,634</b>	<b>102,634</b>
<b>Total obligations .....</b>	<b>7,922,908</b>	<b>8,585,634</b>	<b>8,637,634</b>

<sup>1</sup> Reimbursements from non-Federal sources are derived from sale of meals and clothing to service members (10 U.S.C. 4621).

## MILITARY PERSONNEL, ARMY FISCAL YEAR 1970

## SECTION 1—LANGUAGE

For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses of temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for members of the Army on active duty (except members of reserve components provided for elsewhere); [\$8,000,000,000] \$8,535,000,000.

## SECTION 2—EXPLANATION OF LANGUAGE CHANGES

## (1) Change in amounts.

## JUSTIFICATION

Additional funds are required due to increased support of Southeast Asia and the cost of the military pay raise effective July 1, 1968.

## MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH SUMMARY

	Fiscal year 1968 actual		Fiscal year 1969 planned		Fiscal year 1970 planned	
	Average number	End strength June 30, 1968	Average number	End strength June 30, 1969	Average number	End strength June 30, 1970
<b>Direct program:</b>						
Officers.....	157,783	165,569	168,563	170,734	168,998	171,157
Enlisted.....	1,325,062	1,401,702	1,345,545	1,359,391	1,343,435	1,332,375
Academy cadets.....	3,209	2,443	3,467	3,350	3,642	3,643
Subtotal.....	1,486,054	1,569,714	1,517,575	1,533,475	1,516,075	1,507,175
<b>Reimbursable program:<sup>1</sup></b>						
Officers.....	487	447	554	554	554	554
Enlisted.....	171	25	171	171	171	171
Subtotal.....	658	472	725	725	725	725
<b>Total program:</b>						
Officers.....	158,270	166,016	169,117	171,288	169,552	171,711
Enlisted.....	1,325,233	1,401,727	1,345,716	1,359,562	1,343,606	1,332,546
Academy cadets.....	3,209	2,443	3,467	3,350	3,642	3,643
Total.....	1,486,712	1,570,186	1,518,300	1,534,200	1,516,800	1,507,90

<sup>1</sup> Military personnel assigned to agencies outside of Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 3230.

## AVERAGE STRENGTH (MAN-YEARS) BY TYPE OF PERSONNEL

	Actual, fiscal year 1968	Estimate, fiscal year 1969	Estimate, fiscal year 1970
Officer (male).....	133,516	140,309	138,261
Officers (Women's Army Corps—WAC).....	838	1,000	1,100
Nurses.....	4,825	4,778	5,027
Army Medical Specialist Corps.....	533	580	589
Total—Commissioned officers.....	139,712	146,667	144,977
Warrant officers (male).....	18,034	21,856	23,981
Warrant officers (WAC).....	37	40	40
Total—Warrant officers.....	18,071	21,896	24,021
Total—Officer personnel.....	157,783	168,563	168,998
Enlisted (male).....	1,314,836	1,333,545	1,331,035
Enlisted (WAC).....	10,226	12,000	12,400
Total—Enlisted personnel.....	1,325,062	1,345,545	1,343,435
Subtotal.....	1,482,845	1,514,108	1,512,433
Cadets, U.S. Military Academy.....	3,209	3,467	3,642
Grand total.....	1,486,054	1,517,575	1,516,075

## STRENGTH, GAINS, AND LOSSES, BY IDENTITY

	Male and WAC officers	NAMS	Warrant officers	Enlisted personnel	Cadets, USMA	Total
<b>A. Actual, fiscal year 1968:</b>						
Begin.....	121,900	5,000	16,100	1,296,400	2,400	1,441,800
Gains.....	36,500	1,500	5,700	660,900	1,000	705,600
Losses.....	18,400	1,100	1,600	555,600	1,000	577,700
End.....	140,000	5,400	20,200	1,401,700	2,400	1,569,700
Average.....	134,300	5,400	18,100	1,325,100	3,200	1,486,100
<b>B. Estimate, fiscal year 1969:</b>						
Begin.....	140,000	5,400	20,200	1,401,700	2,400	1,569,700
Gains.....	31,200	1,400	6,100	569,300	1,200	609,200
Losses.....	30,000	1,200	2,400	611,600	200	645,400
End.....	141,200	5,600	23,900	1,359,400	3,400	1,533,500
Average.....	141,400	5,300	21,900	1,345,500	3,500	1,517,600
<b>C. Estimate, fiscal year 1970:</b>						
Begin.....	141,200	5,600	23,900	1,359,400	3,400	1,533,500
Gains.....	31,100	1,300	2,900	581,000	1,300	617,600
Losses.....	30,500	1,200	3,100	608,000	1,100	643,900
End.....	141,800	5,700	23,700	1,332,400	3,600	1,507,200
Average.....	139,200	5,600	24,200	1,343,500	3,600	1,516,100

## GRADE STRUCTURE, BEGINNING, END, AND MAN-YEAR STRENGTHS BY IDENTITY

	June 30, 1966	June 30, 1969	June 30, 1970	Man-years, fiscal year 1969	Man-years, fiscal year 1970
<b>Commissioned officers:</b>					
General of the Army.....	1	1	1	1	1
General.....	15	16	16	16	16
Lieutenant General.....	42	41	41	41	41
Major General.....	195	195	194	195	195
Brigadier General.....	248	248	247	248	247
Colonel.....	6,032	6,334	6,340	6,186	6,338
Lieutenant Colonel.....	16,176	16,461	16,609	16,376	16,536
Major.....	22,814	24,588	25,568	23,627	24,978
Captain.....	35,133	38,400	43,200	36,237	40,800
1st Lieutenant.....	29,307	29,438	27,647	33,653	26,575
2d Lieutenant.....	35,436	31,062	27,737	30,087	29,250
Subtotal.....	145,399	146,784	147,400	146,667	144,977
<b>Warrant officers:</b>					
CWO W-4.....	1,758	1,790	1,790	1,755	1,790
CWO W-3.....	3,052	3,327	3,330	3,142	3,330
CWO W-2.....	9,014	11,982	12,012	10,564	12,164
WO W-1.....	6,346	6,851	6,625	6,435	6,737
Subtotal.....	20,170	23,950	23,757	21,896	24,021
Total officer personnel.....	165,569	170,734	171,157	168,563	168,998
<b>Enlisted personnel:</b>					
E-9.....	5,437	5,576	5,375	5,452	5,477
E-8.....	17,406	18,154	18,684	17,784	18,419
E-7.....	54,830	57,096	57,096	56,049	57,096
E-6.....	109,002	108,820	113,566	108,487	111,193
E-5.....	224,151	218,360	227,828	217,455	223,094
E-4.....	368,918	367,827	370,425	367,054	369,125
E-3.....	234,431	242,158	238,831	234,415	226,902
E-2.....	138,129	148,900	135,600	153,393	148,754
E-1.....	249,338	192,500	165,000	185,455	183,375
Total enlisted personnel.....	1,401,702	1,359,391	1,332,375	1,345,545	1,343,435
Total.....	1,567,271	1,530,125	1,503,532	1,514,108	1,512,433
Cadets, U.S. Military Academy.....	2,443	3,350	3,643	3,467	3,642
Grand total.....	1,563,714	1,533,475	1,507,175	1,517,575	1,516,075

## OPENING REMARKS

Mr. MAHON. Today we begin consideration of the Department of Defense budget for the fiscal year 1970. As you gentlemen know, we usually begin these hearings with the appearance of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, followed, respectively, by the service Secretaries and the Chief of Staff of each service. However, due to the fact that Secretary Laird and General Wheeler are just returning from Vietnam, and since we want to start these hearings, we decided to begin the hearings with the request for

military personnel, followed by operation and maintenance. We shall hear from Secretary Laird and General Wheeler and other appropriate witnesses at a later time.

As usual, we begin our hearing with the Department of the Army. For this appropriation the Army is requesting \$8.535 billion, an increase of \$44 million over the current estimate for the fiscal year 1969.

We are pleased to have with us this morning to discuss this military request, Lieutenant General Connor, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lieutenant General Heaton, the Surgeon General, and Major General Taylor, the Budget Officer. We welcome you gentlemen and all of your supporting witnesses.

Are these figures the budget submitted by the previous administration?

General TAYLOR. Yes; Mr. Chairman, they are.

Mr. MAHON. In other words, these figures are subject to amendment by the new administration.

General TAYLOR. Very possibly, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Do you think it practical for us to proceed with hearing the testimony, or do you think that the budget amendments will be so drastic and numerous that it would make this hearing today more or less futile?

General CONNOR. Mr. Chairman, I do not foresee any great changes as a result of the new administration's review. I think it would be worthwhile to proceed.

Mr. MAHON. I think when the new administration has had more time to study the budget, it will want to submit modifications, however, we can have a brief hearing on the modifications, and we will have made some progress by proceeding at this time.

General CONNOR. As far as military personnel is concerned, there is only so much leeway.

Mr. MAHON. That is right.

#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

General Connor, since I believe this is your first appearance before the committee in your present position, we will at this point in the record insert your biographical sketch.

(The sketch follows:)

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF LT. GEN. ALBERT O. CONNOR, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF  
FOR PERSONNEL**

Albert O. Connor was born in Helena, Mont., on August 28, 1914. He was graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in June 1937, and received his commission as a second lieutenant of field artillery. Prior to World War II, he served successively as an executive officer, battery commander, Battalion S-3, and Division Artillery S-3, of the 3d Infantry Division, Artillery.

During World War II he landed in North Africa with the 3d Infantry Division and later served as Division G-3 in Sicily, Italy, and France. During this period his service included division task force planning responsibilities for and participation in four major assault landings, North Africa, Sicily, Anzio, and southern France. In November of 1944 he was appointed as G-3 of the VI Corps and served in this capacity through the end of the war and into the early days of the occupation. Following attendance at the 1st Command Course, Command and General Staff College in 1945-46, he moved to Fort Benning, Ga., to serve as an instructor in the infantry school. He transferred from artillery to infantry in August 1947, completed parachute training and was subsequently assigned as a battalion commander in the 187th Airborne Infantry, 11th Airborne Division at then Camp Campbell, Ky. In December 1949 he became G-3 of the division and in January 1951 activated and assumed command of the 503d Airborne Infantry Regiment at Fort Campbell. After completing the course at the Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., in 1952, he served in the Korean war as regimental commander of the 27th Infantry (Wolfhounds) and later as deputy chief of staff of the X Corps.

In the fall of 1953 he returned to Carlisle Barracks where he joined the faculty of the Army War College until June 1956, when he moved to Heidelberg, Germany, as chief, plans branch, USAREUR, and later deputy chief of staff, G-3, for USAREUR and Central Army Group.

General Connor returned to the United States in July 1958 to be assigned as deputy commandant of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy, where he remained until March of 1961, when he became deputy commanding general at Fort Dix, N.J.

In June 1962 he received assignment as secretary of the staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and then became commanding general, 3d Infantry Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe in May 1964.

He returned to the United States in April 1966 and was assigned as deputy chief, Office of Personnel Operations, Washington, D.C., until August 1966 at which time he became chief, Office of Personnel Operations. In March 1967, General Connor received assignment as Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C. On July 1, 1967, General Connor became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

**GENERAL STATEMENT**

Mr. MAHON. I note that you have a prepared statement. You may proceed without interruption.

General CONNOR.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is my honor to appear before you this year to present the Department of the Army requirements for the Military Personnel, Army Appropriation.

The budget estimate before you provides the funds necessary to place and maintain the required number of trained and motivated Army men and women as planned in our FY 1970 manpower program.

The first part of my statement will be a review of the changes which have taken place in our FY 1969 manpower program followed by a review of the FY 1970 manpower program. I will then comment on personnel matters believed to be of general interest to the committee and close by highlighting in general terms the significant changes in our dollar requirements for FY 1970.

The FY 1969 manpower program has been revised upward from that presented last year due to increased support of Southeast Asia. The changes in end strength are indicated in this table.

#### Military Manpower Program for Fiscal Year 1969

Category	Presented in FY 1969 Pres Budget	Force Level Supported by FY 1969 Appn	FY 1969 Revised in FY 1970 Pres Budget	Net Change
Officers	170,535	169,359	170,734	1,375
Enlisted	1,333,683	1,318,471	1,359,391	40,920
Cadets	3,350	3,350	3,350	0
Total	1,507,568	1,491,180	1,533,475	42,295

The first column shows the end strength projections presented last year of 1,507,600. The second column shows the end strength approved in the FY 1969 Appropriation. The decreases reflect the FY 1969 Appropriation manpower reductions of 16,400 primarily associated with the decision not to activate the 6th Infantry division and the deactivation of 23 NIKK-Hercules firing sites. The third column shows the current projection of 1,533,500 for FY 1969 which is the beginning strength for the FY 70 budget. The increase in end strength is due to the call to active duty of 20,000 reserve forces in May 1968 and the 22,300 related support personnel required to support an increase in the strength authorized for deployment to Southeast Asia of 17,400 by end of FY 1969. The last column reflects the net increase in end strength of 42,300 over the number approved in the FY 1969 Appropriation. The Army has requested a supplemental appropriation of \$160.0 million to finance this increase. I will now discuss our FY 1970 Manpower Program.

#### Military Manpower Program for FY 1970

##### Year-end Strengths, Direct Program

	1969 planned	1970 planned	Net Change
Officers -----	170,734	171,157	+ 423
Enlisted -----	1,359,391	1,332,375	- 27,016
Cadets -----	3,350	3,643	+ 293
Total -----	1,533,475	1,507,175	- 26,300

##### Average Strengths, Direct Program

	1969 planned	1970 planned	Net Change
Officers -----	168,563	168,998	+ 435
Enlisted -----	1,345,545	1,343,435	- 2,110
Cadets -----	3,467	3,642	+ 175
Total -----	1,517,575	1,516,075	- 1,500

The planned FY 1970 end strength is 26,300 less than the planned FY 1969 end strength. The planned FY 1970 average strength is 1,500 less than FY 1969.

Our personnel objective is to have the right number of trained soldiers in their units when they are needed. When temporary shortages or skill imbalances prevent us from fully achieving that objective, we try to fill units with men who have substitutable skills similar to those that the units are authorized. The statistics that most accurately reflect our capability to meet this objective are those pertaining to our planned FY 1970 end trained strength of \_\_\_\_\_. Our trained strength excludes trainees in the training base. Although the FY 1970

enlisted end strength is 27,000 less than FY 1969, trained strength decreases by only 8,000 thereby increasing the proportion of trained strength to total strength. The Army can maintain its currently computed requirement for trained strength. However, this will not eliminate shortages and imbalances in certain skills and levels of experience.

In FY 1969 we will gain approximately 16,400 new officers from ROTC and 8,000 from OCS. In FY 1970 we expect to gain approximately 17,000 from ROTC and 8,000 from OCS. The Army's FY 1970 authorization for officers is 171,157, an increase of 400 over FY 1969. This figure includes 23,757 warrant officers.

As of 31 December 1968, the Army strength in South Vietnam totaled 359,300. In comparison, the strength last year on the same date was 319,600 and two years ago was 244,000. Based on an approved Vietnam tour of one year, we must furnish approximately \_\_\_\_\_ replacements during calendar year 1969 and we will return about \_\_\_\_\_ from that area. The forces in Vietnam will represent about \_\_\_\_\_ of our average total Army strength during FY 1970.

Sustaining our deployments in Korea, Vietnam, Thailand and other short tour areas is one of the most significant problems faced by the Army. In this context, sustainment means meeting our short tour replacement requirements with individuals in the proper grade and skill while maintaining a one-year tour policy for short tour areas, supporting a goal of 25 months in the base (CONUS plus long tour areas) between repetitive short tours for our career soldiers, and achieving a level of personnel turbulence which will allow the conduct of progressive training and the attainment of readiness goals.

Sustainment is a problem because the Army's short tour deployments total approximately \_\_\_\_\_ -- over \_\_\_\_\_ of the Army's total trained strength. These high short tour deployments have caused a structure imbalance between the short tour areas and the remaining tour areas. Because of this, we have not been able to meet completely the 25 month base tour objective. During FY 68, 2600 personnel were returned to short tour areas involuntarily with less than the base tour objective. In the first half of FY 69, almost twice that many have been returned and we expect the numbers to continue to increase.

The Army's strength has increased by over 50% since 1965, comprised almost completely of untrained draftees and enlistees who stay in the Army for only two or three years. For example, about 50% of the officers and warrant officers and 66% of the enlisted men have less than two years of service. This has resulted in a continuing and chronic shortage of experienced personnel in the middle grades for enlisted men, officers, and warrant officers.

The large short tour replacement requirement also has caused a high level of personnel turbulence. The large in and out movement of replacements is superimposed on the normal gains and losses to the Army. With this high personnel turnover, many Army units in CONUS have difficulty in achieving readiness goals.

The Army has taken several steps to insure our ability to sustain short tour deployments. Some of these measures required monetary support while others were achieved through more intensive management.

First, we have supported our Vietnam unit deployments by reducing the level of personnel fill in lower priority commands. As readiness in CONUS and Europe became a matter of greater concern, we raised their levels.

Second, we made all soldiers in CONUS and other long tour areas available for assignment to short tour areas in an effort to meet the objective of two years between short tours.

Third, we began an accelerated training program called the Skill Development Base (SDB) to provide grade E5 and E6 replacements to the short tour areas. This program provides selected Advanced Individual Training (AIT) graduates with 3-5 months additional training. The SDB graduates are promoted to E5 and sent to the short tour area. Our output under this program has been increasing from 4500 in FY 68 to approximately 12,000 in FY 69, and in FY 70 we project a need for approximately 40,000 SDB graduates to meet our sustainment goals. Reports from Vietnam indicate that our SDB graduates have performed well.

Fourth, we have increased the number of individuals trained in skills critical to Vietnam to insure that we can always meet short tour replacement requirements. For example, we will train 9,100 more riflemen and 2,800 more aviation mechanics in FY 69 than would ordinarily be trained in order to have an adequate number of deployable men in these skills. However, to do this we must reduce the number of people trained in other skills not critical to Vietnam. These skills must then be filled by infantrymen and aviation mechanics returning from Vietnam who cannot be used in their primary skill.

Fifth, we have extended the Early Release Policy from 90 to 150 days for short tour enlisted returnees. This serves several purposes. It encourages men to extend in Vietnam in order that they may return within 150 days of their normal release from service. This reduces our replacement requirement. It also eliminates short terminal assignments for men who are planning to get out of the Army. This reduces personnel turnover.

Sixth, we are continuing to encourage personnel to voluntarily extend their tour of duty in a combat area. These personnel are authorized an additional 30 days of leave for extending. As of 31 December 1968, 1,753 officers and 59,206 enlisted men had taken advantage of this provision since this program began in November 1966.

We are catching up with the aviator requirements increase reported to you last year. The growth of our aviator inventory has been dramatic. As a result of our increased training output of 610 aviators per month, beginning in July 1968, the Army will have approximately 22,300 aviators by 30 June 1969. This is an increase of over 33% in one year. However, over 8,000 of our aviators will be serving in Vietnam on other unaccompanied tour areas. Despite our growing aviator inventory, the interval between tours in Vietnam for aviators in critical grades will remain at about 21 months. This interval is about the same as that experienced by our non-flying Infantry, Engineer, Transportation and Intelligence captains. As long as the war continues, it is doubtful that we will ever reach a point where we can assure 25 months in the sustaining base for aviators as well as a number of other career fields.

The key to our medical service in Vietnam is the helicopter, the medical air ambulance, commonly referred to as "Dust Off." Without "Dust Off" and radio communication we simply would not get our patients evacuated. We have \_\_\_\_\_ helicopter ambulances strategically located throughout the country. Because of the speed of evacuation by helicopter, a number of seriously wounded soldiers who formerly would have died on the battlefield, now reach medical facilities alive. It is paradoxical that some of them would not have survived in any case and now count against medical survival rates, as they die in medical facilities. Nevertheless, never before in history has a wounded soldier had such a high chance of survival.

Wounding agents vary in this conflict from previous wars. During the Korean War 27 per cent of non-fatal wounds were caused by small arms and 4 per cent were caused by booby traps and mines. In Vietnam 19 per cent of non-fatal wounds were caused by small arms and 11 per cent were caused by booby traps and mines. Early in the conflict the incidence of Punji Stick wounds was 5 per cent, but recently it has become an infrequent wound. In many respects, the wounds are more severe than in Korea because of a higher incidence of injuries due to mines and booby traps. Because of the close proximity of the explosion to the body in mines and booby traps, there is severe local destruction and tremendous amounts of dirt and other debris are hurled into the tissues. During the period January 1965 through December 1968, of the hospitalized wounded, about 76 per cent have been returned to duty; 45 per cent in Vietnam, 23 per cent in the United States, and 8 per cent in the Pacific area. Approximately 11 per cent remain hospitalized, 6.7 per cent have been medically separated and 3.2 per cent have died. Of the wounded admitted to all medical treatment facilities (not just hospitals) 2.5 per cent have died.

The retention of junior officers beyond their two year tour obligation has shown slight improvement although the problem remains. For FY 68, 2,813 or 24% stayed on active duty compared with 22% for FY 67. During the first half of FY 69 the rate of retention has been 23%. The need to retain additional officers from the three and four year obligators (doctors, lawyers, pilots) is as much a requirement today as ever before.

We have recently completed a study which investigated in detail the reasons for junior officers leaving the Army. As a result of this study several ideas and recommendations have emerged which we feel will help us in our retention endeavors. Our concept in attacking this problem will hinge on the Army competing for the junior officer in those areas where we can compete. These include job satisfaction, variety, security, advancement, prestige, equal opportunity and the like. In other words, concentrate our efforts towards our most salable features.

Of prime concern to the Army is the acquisition and retention of medical personnel.

The shortage of professional nurses which the United States has experienced over the past several years gives little indication of being alleviated. Competition from civilian sources is becoming increasingly keen. United States Army

Recruiting Command is having difficulty in meeting its objectives of obtaining a sufficient number of professional nurses for the Army Nurse Corps. The Department of the Army subsidy programs for nursing students now account for over 65% of the total yearly accessions to the Army Nurse Corps.

The Continuation Pay Program, during its first year, has received considerable response from medical officers. Although it is too early to tell, we hope that in time, this program will improve the retention rate for medical officers.

As a result of Public Law 90-228, the Army has promoted 186 Medical Corps lieutenant colonels to the grade of colonel. This represents a significant and much needed increase in Medical Corps colonels. Promotion boards have also met and selected majors and lieutenant colonels under new promotion criteria.

Although total reenlistments have remained relatively constant, at approximately 80,000 annually for the past five years, an expending Army and a decline in reenlistments in the lower grades have resulted in a shortage in the intermediate NCO grades. Causes most frequently mentioned by those electing not to remain in the Army include: pay, housing, fringe benefits, family considerations, job and assignment satisfaction, prestige and assignment to Vietnam.

Due to the termination of deferments for college graduates, the number of college graduates in our enlisted force is increasing. Since retention rates of these personnel are low, the base from which we draw most of our reenlistments is shrinking. The chart on the next page graphically shows that as the number of college graduates and the number of Category IV and new Mental Standards personnel increase, the group from which the Army obtains most of its career force decreases.

In addition, a large number of middle-grade NCOs (E-5 and E-6) are now AUS personnel, due to rapid promotion opportunities. The low rate of reenlistment peculiar to AUS personnel results in reduced retention in these grades.

We have taken a hard look at our enlisted career compensation incentives, which has resulted in considerably improved Proficiency Pay and Variable Reenlistment Bonus programs. A number of Military Occupational Specialties were upgraded and we incorporated a new \$150.00 proficiency pay rate for a few specialties on an experimental basis to determine the impact on retention. The programs meet the criteria specified in Department of Defense directives and were developed in close cooperation with that agency.

As one means of attracting and retaining trained career enlisted men, we have adopted this year a program of centralized promotions to the grades of E-8 and E-9. Boards composed of officers and NCOs convened at Headquarters, Department of the Army, select for advancement the best qualified from total Army resources within established zones.

As I previously mentioned, college graduates are being inducted and enlisted at a greater rate than before. Previously, college graduates have comprised from 5% to 8% of annual accessions; during the first six months of this fiscal year, some 26,000, or 14% of total accessions, have been college graduates. We estimate that this percentage will increase to 17% in the next six months.


In previous years, most college graduates have entered Officer Candidate School or served as scientific and engineering assistants, but these assignments are limited. Sizable numbers of these men are now assigned to duties which, in the past, have had but token representation of college graduates.

Although most enlisted skills do not require men with a college education, a great many of these jobs will more than challenge their abilities. The Infantry squad leader is a good example.

The Army's objective in utilizing these men is to gain the maximum benefit from their education, experience, and training while maintaining equitable treatment of all other personnel.

Normally men attend the Basic Combat and Advanced Individual Training courses. An exception is made for those college graduates and others who have acquired civilian skills, or have an education that can be used by the Army without further training. These men go directly from Basic Combat Training to duty stations or on-the-job training. During attendance at Basic Combat and Advanced Individual Courses, college graduates are given maximum opportunity to act as leaders and assistant instructors. For men attending Service Schools after Basic Combat and Advanced Individual Training, accelerated training in some 60 courses is available to all qualified personnel and many college graduates are participating. To date, over 28% of the college graduates have been accepted in the Officer Candidate School Program and an increasing number of them are volunteering for the Non-Commissioned Officers Candidate Courses.

# ACCESSIONS BY CATEGORY FY66 - FY69



5

12

With few exceptions, the collegemen are mature, intelligent, cooperative, and well-disciplined. They actively seek responsibility. In short, they are outstanding soldiers and the Army makes every effort to insure their assignment to positions which challenge their capabilities.

One of the Army's personnel objectives is to attain the highest possible rate of enlistments. To attain this goal, we have instituted a number of programs. For example, we are making every effort to obtain additional highly qualified recruiters who are the real key to a successful recruiting program. Evidence of their importance to recruiting is reflected in the success achieved during FY 68 when 209,000 enlistees were recruited to the Active Army. This achievement is the highest number of enlistments procured over the past twenty years. Special teams are assigned to the Oakland Army Terminal and to Fort Lewis, Washington, with the mission of obtaining volunteers for recruiting duty from among qualified Vietnam and Korea returnees. Letters signed by the Commanding General, United States Army Recruiting Command are being mailed to qualified enlisted personnel in grades E-5 through E-7 who have had previous recruiting experience, inviting them to apply for assignment to the recruiting command.

One of our efforts designed to attract enlistees to the Army is the Army Publicity Program. The theme of this program, which utilizes all communications media, is to reflect the true image of the Army -- an Army which is one of dignity, one of fair treatment to all concerned, regardless of race, color or creed, an image of equal opportunity, and an image of competence and ability being the factors that guarantee success.

As a measure to alleviate the unemployment problem in areas of concentrated unemployment, the Army under Department of Defense sponsorship, and in coordination with the other services, began an intensified recruitment program in 3 cities selected for pilot programs in March 1968, and has since expanded the program to 43 cities and the Navajo Indian Reservation. This program has proven to be very successful. By 31 December 1968, 8,135 enlistees were recruited from these areas.

Beginning in October 1966, the Army began accepting men with low mental aptitudes who, prior to that date, would have been disqualified for induction and placed in the Selective 1-Y pool. Since then, over 120,000 such men have been accepted into the Army and approximately 100,000 are still serving. Present plans are to maintain the program at approximately this level.

Naturally the Army has been most interested in determining the effectiveness of such individuals and to this end has collected considerable data and conducted several studies, 3 of which were specifically reported to you last year.

One of our first significant findings was that the trainability of these personnel was hampered primarily by their low reading ability. Experiments in programs to correct this deficiency were undertaken, resulting in the establishment in April 1968 of a program entitled: "Army Preparatory Training", designed primarily to remedy this low reading ability. This is accomplished by the separation of such individuals at the time of their entry into basic training into special training companies and their attendance at Army preparatory training until such time as they reach a 5th grade reading level. This is normally 3 to 6 weeks. Between 1 April and 30 November 1968, over 5,000 successfully completed the course, representing 83 percent of the participants. Following their successful achievement of the 5th grade reading level, these individuals are placed into basic combat training along with other soldiers and not further identified throughout the remainder of their service, following the same training and selection pattern as any other soldier.

With respect to the trainability and utilization of such individuals, we have found that they can be trained and serve effectively in approximately 170 of the 237 MOS skills for which we conduct training. Their attrition rate in undergoing this training is, as might be expected, slightly higher than for others, but not remarkably so. Their performance has been favorably reported on by commanders.

As might be expected, statistics gathered so far show that attrition, disciplinary, and discharge rates are slightly higher than for other individuals. Again these rates are not remarkably higher and can be associated with factors other than merely low mental aptitude. For example, failure to finish high school has been found to be a more pronounced indicator with respect to disciplinary problems. An individual in mental Group I who has not finished high school is 3 times more likely to become an Army prisoner than a mental Group I man who has completed high school. The same is also true with respect to the mental Group IV man who has and who has not completed high school. 6

As I have indicated, we are continually evaluating the effectiveness of lower mental group personnel and attempting to determine any special problems or requirements which they might have and to provide reasonable and effective solutions where possible. As more of Project 100,000 personnel reach the completion of their service obligation, we will be in a better position to more conclusively assess their overall performance, retention potential and contribution to the Army. A final evaluation will then be possible and appropriate Army recommendations made to the Secretary of Defense regarding the future utilization of such personnel.

Since 1965, indicators of discipline such as rising AWOL and desertion rates have been cause for concern. Additionally, there have been desertions to foreign countries, increases in drug abuse, isolated instances of anti-war agitation within the Army, and instances of organizations openly claiming to inspire such agitation and resistance to discipline.

While much of this can be attributed to nation-wide attitudes and changes in the national social order, the potential for undermining discipline is most critical for the military establishment.

I would like now to briefly summarize the dollars required to support the manpower program I have discussed. Our estimate for FY 1970 is \$8 billion, 535 million, an increase of \$44 million over the FY 1969 estimate. This increase is primarily due to increases in the grades of Major, Captain, and the top six enlisted grades. This increase is partially offset by a projected decrease in average length of service.

The requirements comprise 6 major budget programs:

Pay and Allowances of Officers	\$1 billion, 833.4 million
Pay and Allowances of Enlisted Personnel	5 billion, 139.6 million
Pay and Allowances of Cadets	10.0 million
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel	729.8 million
Permanent Change of Station Travel	735.1 million
Other Military Personnel Costs	87.1 million

These funds will support a beginning strength of 1,533,475 and an end strength of 1,507,175 with an average strength of 1,516,075.

In closing, I'm sure you are interested in some of our more significant accomplishments during calendar year 1968.

The table below shows these accomplishments as compared to 1967.

<u>Accomplishments</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Officer and Enlisted Accessions	463,000	523,000
Basic and Advanced Training	562,000	551,000
Specialized Training	356,000	368,000
Moved to Vietnam	335,000	403,000
Returned from Vietnam	255,000	360,000
Sick and Wounded Treated and Restored to Duty	131,000	151,000
Promotions in Top Six Grades	700,000	720,000

In order to continue our operations in FY 1970, the amount requested is necessary to support the military manpower program I have discussed, including essential military personnel requirements for Southeast Asia.

Sir, this concludes my opening statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you, General.

We realize the course of the war is unpredictable, and recognize that personnel figures and costs are subject to change.

#### REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL STRENGTH

The schedule on page 2 of your statement indicates that the Army is projecting a decrease of 1,500 man-years in the average strength of your direct program. How did the Army determine that a reduction in both end strength and average strength was feasible at this time?

General CONNOR. It was basically because of the relation of trained strength to end strength, sir. The change is primarily in trainees, some 18,300. There are some reductions in Europe brought about by the REDCOSTE program, a reduction effort to reduce the gold flow in Europe. Certain economies have been effected. There are some personnel economies in that package, some—

Mr. MAHON. It seems to me that it was thought we could make some modest changes in personnel strength by bringing home from Europe about 30,000 men of the Armed Forces. I am a little hazy as to what that plan was and the extent to which the Army participated in it.

General CONNOR. That is known as the reforger plan, sir; in which two-thirds of a division plus some support from the 24th Division was returned to Fort Riley, Kans. This did not affect end strength, however, because the division had to be retained at a reasonable degree of readiness for redeployment if necessary.

As we now stand, we have a brigade of that division in Europe. We have two brigades plus support at Fort Riley and other stations throughout the continental United States. We have recently conducted an exercise deploying to Europe in January to test the feasibility of this. They have now returned to the States.

Mr. MAHON. To what extent did that reduce our military strength in Europe?

General CONNOR. As I recall the figure, about 30,000.

#### DETERMINATION OF PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

Mr. MAHON. Can you explain how you determined the requirement for the number of military personnel you have budgeted for in the fiscal year 1970? You are budgeting for about 1.5 million. Why do you not need 2 million? Why can you not do with 1.2 million or 1 million? What generally are the basic factors involved here?

General CONNOR. The basic requirements come to us in the form of spaces that have to be filled. These spaces are determined by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development in conjunction with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations.

It all starts with the strategic planning and the requirements for military forces. This, in turn, is translated into types of units. After the types of units have been determined, we can determine from those types precisely what skills, numbers, and grades are required. Once this has been determined, we identify a trained strength requirement.

Then, by projecting our need for trained strength in the months ahead, based on knowing who we have in the Army now and at what time they will leave, we identify the numbers of accessions that have

to enter the Army. Once the accessions are worked off against the trained strength, we come to an end strength as of the end of the fiscal year.

Given the beginning end strength and the final end strength, we determine the man-years in between the two and ask for money to support that strength.

**Mr. MAHON.** Do the Joint Chiefs bring to bear any composite judgment of the Joint Chiefs and the administration on these figures?

**General CONNOR.** Very definitely, sir, through strategic requirements. Our Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations derives his operational requirements from Joint Chiefs' decisions. Of course, these are all subject to review by the Secretary of Defense and his office.

#### OFFICER AND ENLISTED ACCESSIONS

**Mr. MAHON.** How many accessions does the Army estimate for fiscal 1969 and 1970, and of this number, how many will be officers and how many will be enlisted men?

You may insert that for the record.

(The information follows:)

The planned officer accessions for fiscal year 1969 and fiscal year 1970 are 88,700 and 85,800 respectively. The enlisted untrained accessions (draft and first enlistments) planned for the same periods are 453,000 and 462,400.

**Mr. MAHON.** On page 3 of your statement you state that the Army plans a trained end strength for fiscal year 1970 of ———. Comparing this against your total end strength of 1.5 million-plus, there will be at the end of fiscal year 1970, ——— men in training. Can you tell the committee how many of the ——— will be officers and how many enlisted?

**General CONNOR.** I can break it down. About 11 percent of those will be officers.

**Mr. MAHON.** You may supply that for the record.

**General CONNOR.** I will supply the specific figures for the record.

(The information provided the committee is classified.)

#### JUSTIFICATION OF TOTAL INCREASE

**Mr. MAHON.** For Military personnel, Army, you are requesting \$8.535 billion. This is an increase of \$535 million over the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1969. Can you give us an explanation of the reason for this increase of more than half a billion dollars? What is the basic explanation?

**General CONNOR.** Pay raises, basically; \$340.1 million of that is for pay raises. There is some increase in the top level NCO grades; \$53.3 million is attributed to those two figures, enlisted grade structure and the officer structure, which includes more captains and majors than we budgeted for in fiscal year 1969.

**Mr. MAHON.** You may amplify that.

(The information follows:)

*Major changes between the fiscal year 1969 appropriated amount and the fiscal year 1970 budget estimate*

(In millions of dollars)

Fiscal year 1969 appropriation.....	<u>\$8,000.0</u>
July 1, 1968, pay increase.....	+331.0
Fiscal year 1969 Southeast Asia supplemental.....	+160.0
Increase in grade structure (officer and enlisted).....	+53.3
Estimated decrease in longevity.....	-26.6
Increased officer man-years.....	+10.9
Continuation pay for Medical Corps officers.....	+1.5
Officer flight pay.....	+6.4
Parachute pay—Enlisted.....	-2.6
Reenlistment bonus.....	+10.6
Clothing allowance—Enlisted.....	-5.2
Separation payments.....	-9.8
Subsistence.....	-9.1
Permanent change of station travel.....	-4.1
Servicemen's group life insurance.....	-4.2
Special pay and station allowances.....	+13.2
Increased salary base for social security.....	+8.4
Miscellaneous changes.....	+1.2
Fiscal year 1970 budget estimate.....	<u>8,535.0</u>

#### DETERMINATION OF GRADE STRUCTURE

Mr. MAHON. The funds being requested for fiscal 1970 are to support an average strength of 1.5 million-plus, as we have stated. The average strength is broken out by grade on page 9 of the justification. How did the Army arrive at the estimated average strength per grade for fiscal year 1970? Supply that for the record.

(The information follows:)

The average strength by grade was computed from the monthly end strengths resulting from estimated monthly individual gains and losses by grade and planned promotion schedule to attain the approved end strengths contained in the budget.

Mr. MAHON. On page 11 of the justification book there is an increase of 2,125 warrant officer man-years. Yet when you compare the end strength for 1969 with that for 1970, there is a decrease of 193. How did you have 2,125 more man-years in 1970 when you are predicting that you will have 193 fewer warrant officers at June 30, 1970?

General CONNOR. Basically, it is a question of retention, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Is there any science used in determining the average strength of officers and enlisted men? Is this based on experience, or what is your approach?

General CONNOR. Basically, it is experience factors, which are changed from time to time as the experience changes. We have different factors creeping in, such as the Vietnam war itself, which change these factors. We are attempting to do this more scientifically through the use of computers. We have a number of programs under development at this point which we believe will give us better forecasting results.

Mr. MAHON. On page 12 of your justification, it is estimated that in 1969 the Army will have an average strength of 23,200 officers in flying

pay status at a cost of \$43 million. In 1970, you are increasing the number of officers in flying pay status to 27,800 at a cost of \$52 million. How do you develop your estimates as to the number of officers who receive flying pay?

General CONNOR. Basically, it is qualified aviators who are occupying aviation positions, who are qualified for flight pay for that reason.

Mr. MAHON. In 1969, you estimated that the Army will have an average of 99,200 officers drawing basic allowance for quarters at an annual cost of \$150 million. For 1970, it is estimated that an average strength of 103,500 officers will be drawing basic allowances for quarters at an annual cost of \$157 million. How do you approach accuracy in this kind of estimate?

General CONNOR. We know that the number of officers qualified for this particular allowance will increase. That is based on our estimated increases in numbers of officers entitled to this particular allowance, and additional funds were requested.

Mr. MAHON. Why does the average number of officers drawing basic allowance for quarters increase by 4,300 in 1970 at a cost of \$7 million, when the average number of officers in the Army increases by only 435?

General CONNOR. The mix changes, sir. We are increasing the number of captains and majors and decreasing the number of lieutenants.

Mr. MAHON. Why is the Army increasing the number of captains and majors?

General CONNOR. Because we are just moving into the period when the large numbers of OCS graduates become available for promotion to the grade of captain. It is the officer candidate graduate who has the highest rate of retention in career status. Prior to the war they were running some 72 percent. Right now they are running about 34 percent. We are optimistic in the respect that we will keep a number of these young men and they will accept promotion to the grade of captain and, by accepting promotion to the grade of captain, they incur another year's obligation.

#### QUALITY OF RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS PROGRAM

Mr. MAHON. I assume, then, you feel that Reserve officer training in colleges is worthwhile from the standpoint of the Army.

General CONNOR. Very definitely, yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. You are having some difficulty with some of the students, as I understand it.

General CONNOR. That is true. There is a lot of agitation on some campuses to eliminate ROTC, or at least to remove it from any form of academic credit.

Mr. MAHON. Will this situation significantly affect your program?

General CONNOR. No, sir, because we do not really feel that it has gotten to a serious stage yet. We have some counteractions underway which I will be happy to discuss at this point, or it can be raised during the ROTC hearing. We are moving toward more accommodation with the universities in the form of the program itself, putting more academic-type subjects in to make it more palatable. There are more and more demands on a young man's time in college today. The subjects are getting harder. He has to take more. He just cannot afford nonproductive-type work.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What part of the ROTC program do you feel is non-productive?

General CONNOR. Perhaps some of the drills. We feel that this could be moved to the summertime. Greater emphasis in the summer on military training would permit more academic subjects during the time in college, at the same time retaining the unit, retaining the PMS in his status as a professor, retaining the semblance of organization we have now, but perhaps downgrading some of the objectionable features that are being criticized.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does it take student activation to make the military realize this?

General CONNOR. No, sir. We have been moving in this direction for some time. Last year we came up with a so-called track C, which consisted of greater academic requirements. We have moved this way at the Military Academy very definitely over the last 10 years.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For those of us who have supported the ROTC program, your testimony does not sound very encouraging at this point.

General CONNOR. I would not want to give that impression, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I would not like to think that I have been supporting a nonproductive program over all these years.

General CONNOR. It certainly has not been nonproductive. It has been extremely productive, and it has provided the bulk of the Army's officers.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I mean a nonproductive program while they are in school. I had thought the ROTC was upgrading its program over all these years, making it better with improvements.

General CONNOR. I think we are, sir. We feel that this may be a useful additional step. We certainly are not about to downgrade ROTC or to infer that there is not a tremendous requirement for ROTC. It is simply a means of bringing the curriculum into focus with modern requirements.

#### OBJECTIONS TO ROTC PROGRAM

Mr. LIPSCOMB. At this point, where you say you are moving toward more accommodations, is that because a few people are raising Cain? Making accommodation does not sound quite right to me.

General CONNOR. The accommodation is not to the people who are raising Cain. The accommodation is to the students who want to take ROTC but find it difficult to do so in the light of their other academic requirements. Hopefully, we will be able to offer them a program which will make ROTC attractive to them and which will insure college credits for the subjects they are taking.

Mr. MAHON. What universities have been balking somewhat on ROTC programs?

General CONNOR. The eastern universities. We have had experience at Yale, Harvard, Princeton, Dartmouth.

Mr. MAHON. Have they canceled the program, or are they just talking about canceling it?

General CONNOR. There has not been final action taken by any university. There is intensive discussion going on at Stanford and some others. No formal proposals have been made by any university. They are still being debated by the higher councils.

Mr. MAHON. Do you think something worthwhile will probably come from this discussion? Do you think the program may be upgraded as a result of these discussions?

General CONNOR. It is too early to say yet, sir, what will come from it. There are some very intense feelings on some campuses, I feel brought about basically by young professors who have had no military experience and who are encouraging an antimilitary stance among their students.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is your recommendation, General, to overcome this feeling?

General CONNOR. We hope to go into each school and determine what sort of program will best fit the environment of that school. Each school is different. Each faculty is different. Some schools today support a very strong ROTC program and the faculty are totally behind it. We want to retain our presence at the big universities. We do not want to be run off the campus.

Mr. MINSHALL. You have been run off the campus at a university in Texas, have you not?

General CONNOR. No sir. Some colleges have recently reduced or eliminated academic credit for ROTC, but none in Texas. No ROTC unit has been removed from a campus in the last few years.

Mr. MINSHALL. There would not be any incentive for a young man to take ROTC training, necessarily, unless he could get academic credit. At least, one of the incentives would be taken away.

General CONNOR. There are schools that for some time have not given academic credits that have produced very fine graduates.

Mr. MINSHALL. How many schools now have Army ROTC training?

General CONNOR. 268.

Mr. MAHON. You state the Army expects to gain 16,400 officers from the ROTC in 1969, and 17,000 in 1970. To what extent will the recent problems at some of the colleges and universities have on this estimate?

General CONNOR. We do not believe it will have any impact at this time. As I say, we have not really canceled out any programs yet. We do have a large number of schools that are seeking ROTC programs, but we do not have the money to support them right now. We feel that we will be able to produce the ROTC graduates we need, sir.

#### REENLISTMENT BONUSES

Mr. MAHON. On page 17 of the justifications, you show a cost for reenlistment bonuses in fiscal 1969 of \$91,667,000, and for fiscal 1970 an estimated cost of \$102,240,000. This is a significant increase. You also show an increase in the number to receive reenlistment bonuses of 11,183 to a new total of 113,875. How can you project increases of this magnitude when in fact, in your statement, you refer to the fact that total reenlistments have remained relatively constant at approximately 80,000 annually for the past 5 years?

General CONNOR. The funding for the reenlistment bonus is considerably less than it was in 1968. It is slightly over what it was in 1969. We find from our 1969 experience that through January we are, on a straight line projection, running slightly over our budgeted program. We are right now at 59 percent, on a straight line basis, of our program for this fiscal year. A straight line would be 58.3 percent.

With that background, we feel we have a sound basis for the reenlistment bonus figure that we are asking for this year.

On the variable reenlistment bonus, we have 6,405 additional payments programed for fiscal year 1970, less 1,618 new payments. We have an increase of 2,234 lump sum payments and 5,789 anniversary payments. Since the anniversary payments, of course, are increasing in this program, and this brings about a gradual increase in the money each year.

Mr. GARRITY. On page 17, you show a decrease of 5,000 in the number of enlisted personnel receiving proficiency pay in 1970. In view of the fact that proficiency pay is designed to promote reenlistments, and since you are showing an increase in reenlistment bonuses, does not the increase in one and the decrease in the other seem to be contradictory?

General CONNOR. We are readjusting our proficiency pay in this budget. I mentioned in my opening statement that we are attempting a \$150-a-month P-3 payment for the first time in five MOS's that are experimental. At the same time, we have decreased substantially the number of P-1 payments. We have increased the number of P-2 and P-3 payments.

Our studies over the last 2 or 3 years, coupled with studies by Defense, have indicated to us that the P-1 benefit was not really bringing the return that we felt it should. So, we are moving to more payments in the higher categories to see what effect this will have as far as reenlistments are concerned.

Mr. GARRITY. Is this a continuous study?

General CONNOR. Yes, done in conjunction with studies that are going on in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower). He has had a great deal of interest in this area.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In view of that explanation, General, why does your estimate for 1970 go up if your reenlistment proficiency pay bonuses go down?

General CONNOR. As I recall, sir; it was a very small change, a very small increase.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The numbers reenlisting go down, and the amount of money you are requesting goes up.

General CONNOR. The number of reenlistment bonuses estimated is 59,203 in 1969, whereas we estimate 63,981 for 1970.

## CLOTHING ALLOWANCES FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

Mr. GARRITY. General, the committee notes that the clothing allowance for enlisted personnel seems to fluctuate a great deal from year to year. The Army's 1968 estimate for this account was \$277 million. Yet your actual obligations were only \$226 million. In other words, your estimate was overstated by some \$51 million.

In 1969, you estimated a need for \$237 million, which you have now revised to \$220 million, for a decrease of \$17 million.

In 1970, you are estimating \$215 million, a further decrease of \$5 million from your latest 1969 figure.

Since the costs associated with enlistment clothing allowances are to a large degree related to the average enlisted strength, how do you explain this wide variance within the year and from year to year?

General CONNOR. It has been a problem of price changes, basically, sir; plus the introduction of the 150-day early release program this year, which has enabled us to decrease costs.

In other words, the clothing bag itself is reduced in cost and the fact that we don't have to fill the bag up when the man comes back from Vietnam because he is being discharged has enabled us to cut back on our requirements.

## BUDGETARY CONTROL BY THE ARMY

Mr. GARRITY. How do you control the appropriation for military personnel?

General CONNOR. I will let the Budget man address that, if I may.

General TAYLOR. Sir, if I may, the military personnel program and fund control are centralized or centrally located in the headquarters, Department of Army. In other words, it is not the same as other appropriations where funds are allotted to the field. Obligations incurred are compared each month against an approved operating budget or obligation plan, and program and funding adjustments are made as required.

Mr. GARRITY. General, what is the open allotment procedure and how does it operate?

General TAYLOR. The open allotment procedure in essence means that all funds are retained centrally—field commands do not receive any funds—but cite the appropriate central account numbers to incur obligations. These, of course, are related to expenditures which take place at a later date to determine whether or not adjustments should be made in the obligations previously posted.

Mr. GARRITY. Do you set aside specific funds for the various activities within a budget program? For instance, for pay and allowance of enlisted personnel you are requesting this year \$5,139,641,000. Do you break that down in your open allotment ledger by the various budget activities, for such accounts as basic pay, incentive pay, special pay, proficiency pay, and so forth?

General TAYLOR. This we do.

Mr. GARRITY. Are the charges to this open allotment ledger on an obligation basis or on an expenditure basis?

General TAYLOR. It is on an obligation basis originally and then, as expenditures take place, they are related back to those obligations that were made.

Mr. GARRITY. What is the extent of reprogramming within the military personnel appropriation for the Army?

General TAYLOR. For this fiscal year?

Mr. GARRITY. Generally speaking, what is the percentage of reprogramming activity within the appropriation?

Mr. HUTCHISON. Within the various accounts, like pay and allowances of enlisted personnel and officers?

Mr. GARRITY. And the various subaccounts.

Mr. HUTCHISON. The subaccounts within, say, the enlisted area we reprogram as necessary since our controls from the Congress and OSD are at the budget program level, for pay and allowances of enlisted. But the extent of reprogramming I would say would approximate 2 to 3 percent on an average basis.

Mr. GARRITY. Will you prepare for the record a schedule showing the amounts requested and the actual expenses incurred over the last 3 years by budget activity broken down into the various budget program accounts?

Mr. HUTCHISON. Yes.

(The information follows:)

Amounts Requested and Actual Expenses  
(in thousands of dollars)

Budget Project Account	TITLE	FY 1966		FY 1967		FY 1968	
		Requested	Actual	Requested	Actual	Requested	Actual
1-A	Basic Pay	\$ 838,912	\$ 825,831	\$ 955,828	\$ 943,357	\$1,150,877	\$1,132,331
1-B	Incentive Pay	30,701	29,269	31,975	32,334	39,754	41,259
1-C	Special Pay	24,927	26,659	37,821	39,643	45,877	46,336
1-D	Basic Allowance for Quarters	88,971	95,773	100,419	115,272	134,451	146,925
1-E	Basic Allowance for Subsistence	66,289	64,677	73,170	73,284	90,551	90,668
1-F	Station Allowances Overseas	9,776	12,325	23,409	20,874	16,593	16,710
1-G	Uniform Allowances	7,376	5,729	10,763	10,339	10,694	10,166
1-H	Family Separation Allowances	8,753	5,448	10,597	10,937	12,197	12,119
1-I	Separation Payments	16,122	16,611	21,589	19,791	23,335	23,707
1-J	Social Security Tax-Employer's Contribution	22,773	22,588	32,840	32,579	40,955	42,714
1	Pay and Allowances of Officers	1,114,600	1,104,910	1,298,411	1,298,410	1,565,284	1,562,935
2-A	Basic Pay	2,129,107	2,156,584	2,937,940	2,765,148	3,139,028	3,123,394
2-B	Incentive Pay	36,148	35,520	38,770	43,556	43,272	46,122
2-C	Special Pay	107,929	107,783	210,256	224,323	317,827	327,778
2-D	Proficiency Pay	48,841	48,626	52,121	52,332	54,727	57,946
2-E	Reenlistment Bonus	55,602	56,749	83,311	55,091	76,203	78,606
2-F	Basic Allowance for Quarters	373,315	363,529	435,828	434,883	467,582	502,881
2-G	Station Allowances Overseas	14,519	21,921	41,630	44,613	51,424	54,845
2-H	Clothing Allowances	137,700	118,171	223,192	201,631	276,862	225,843
2-I	Family Separation Allowances	34,841	23,935	34,330	24,917	37,595	42,568
2-J	Separation Payments	75,975	65,677	69,863	94,147	134,707	104,466
2-K	Social Security Tax-Employer's Contribution	82,914	84,222	126,328	71,269	137,924	142,256
2	Pay and Allowances of Enlisted Personnel	3,096,891	3,082,717	4,253,569	4,011,910 <sup>3/</sup>	4,737,151	4,706,705
3-B	Academy Cadets	6,700	6,925	7,644	7,641	8,439	8,365
3	Pay and Allowances of Cadets	6,700	6,925	7,644	7,641	8,439	8,365
4-A	Basic Allowance for Subsistence	143,332	146,600	205,214	175,895	186,346	175,389
4-B	Subsistence in Kind	250,768	275,745	435,967	552,477	550,059	573,839
4	Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel	394,100	422,345	641,181	728,372 <sup>3/</sup>	736,405	749,228

Budget Project Account	TITLE	FY 1966		FY 1967		FY 1968	
		Requested	Actual	Requested	Actual	Requested	Actual
5-A	Accession Travel	\$ 50,104	\$ 48,972	\$ 65,690	\$ 65,229	\$ 71,873	\$ 54,835
5-B	Training Travel	13,542	12,169	14,549	12,082	9,326	9,517
5-C	Operational Travel, Between Stations (within CONUS and within Overseas)	46,864	33,181	40,244	34,675	33,857	40,723
5-D	Rotational Travel to and from Overseas	355,068	312,263	400,790	415,088	523,310	485,718
5-E	Separation Travel	42,402	45,321	40,922	41,401	68,608	66,382
5-F	Travel of Organized Units	44,020	60,320	79,955	73,673	50,762	42,227
5	Permanent Change of Station Travel	552,000	512,226	642,150	642,148	757,736	699,402
6-A	Apprehension of Military Deserters, Absentees and Escaped Military Prisoners	810	600	1,369	1,950	2,092	2,847
6-B	Interest on Uniformed Service Savings Deposits	1,100	600	5,125	950	2,612	9,468
6-C	Death Gratuities	9,890	9,120	20,222	14,000	21,342	25,195
6-D	Servicemen's Group Life Insurance	1,900	9,542	27,893	27,826	44,654	56,062
6	Other Military Personnel Costs	13,700	19,862	54,609	44,726	70,700	93,572
GRAND TOTAL - MPA		\$5,177,991 <sup>1/</sup>	\$5,148,985	\$6,897,564 <sup>2/</sup>	\$6,733,207 <sup>3/</sup>	\$7,875,715 <sup>4/</sup>	\$7,820,207

<sup>1/</sup> Includes initially appropriated sum and supplemental appropriations for FY 1966. Also, includes \$30 million transfer from AIF of which only \$100 thousand was transferred into this appropriation.

<sup>2/</sup> Includes initially appropriated sum and supplemental appropriations for FY 1967. Also, includes \$4.164 thousand transfer from Military Personnel, Navy.

<sup>3/</sup> Funds from a transfer of prior year collections to be used in lieu of direct funds in the following amounts:

Pay and Allowances of Enlisted Personnel	\$49,137,000
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel	21,500,000
	\$70,627,000

Also, funds in the amount of \$76.5 million were transferred to OMA appropriation.

<sup>4/</sup> Includes initially appropriated sum and pay raise supplemental appropriation for FY 1968. Final amount appropriated for FY 68 was \$7,825.3 thousands.

## OFFICER-ENLISTED RATIO IN VIETNAM

Mr. GARRITY. General, you state that as of December 31, 1968 the Army strength in South Vietnam totaled 359,300. Of this strength, how many officers are there and how many are enlisted personnel?

General CONNOR. We have about 40,000 officers out there, sir. I can give you the exact figure for the record, if you prefer. It is very close to 40,000.

(The information requested follows:)

<i>Strength in South Vietnam (as of Dec. 31, 1968)</i>	
Officers -----	36, 582
Enlisted -----	322, 718
Total -----	359, 300

## SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How much is included in this request before us for support of free world military forces?

General CONNOR. \$116,353,000.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What country forces are being supported and in what amounts?

General CONNOR. We have the ARVN, \_\_\_\_\_ million; ROK, Republic of Korea, \_\_\_\_\_ million; the Thais, \_\_\_\_\_; the Republic of Philippines, \_\_\_\_\_; others, some \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What forces are being supported with these amounts, the numbers?

General CONNOR. ROK, some \_\_\_\_\_; Thais; Republic of Philippines, \_\_\_\_\_; other forces, some \_\_\_\_\_ Chinese \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What do the other forces amount to, what are they?

General CONNOR. \_\_\_\_\_. I don't have the numbers on the Vietnamese, of course.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For the record, would you supply a schedule showing the various types of assistance being provided the country forces being supported?

General CONNOR. Be happy to; yes.

(Classified information has been furnished separately to the committee.)

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## OFFICER-ENLISTED MEN RATIO

Mr. GARRITY. General, for the record, would you provide a schedule showing the ratio of the total between officers and enlisted men in Vietnam, and also the officer-enlisted ratio for the Army in total?

(The information follows:)

<i>Ratio of officers and enlisted personnel in Vietnam (as of Dec. 31, 1968)</i>	
Officers -----	36, 582
Enlisted -----	322, 718
Ratio -----	1 : 8. 8

<i>Ratio of officers and enlisted, total Army (as of Dec. 31, 1968)</i>	
Officers -----	169, 410
Enlisted -----	1, 289, 216
Ratio -----	1 : 7. 6

Mr. GARRITY. What are the total deployment figures to Vietnam on which the total fiscal year 1970 Army budget is projected?

General CONNOR. ———— sir, in fiscal year 1970.

Mr. GARRITY. What is that increase over fiscal 1969?

General CONNOR. It is ———— in fiscal 1969, so we have a differential of about ————.

#### NEW FOOD ITEM PROGRAM

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman.

I would like to refer back to where we were discussing the free world forces. On page 24 of the justification sheets there is an item entitled "New Food Item Program." Could you explain that program?

General CONNOR. I would like to ask Mr. Nutt to address that.

Mr. NUTT. That program does not relate to the free world military assistance forces, Mr. Lipscomb. It primarily represents the introduction into the military system of a proposed new type of operational ration, new types of foods which are being production tested to determine the capability of industry to produce these items. It has no relationship to the FWMAF program.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What causes the increase in that program from \$217,000 to \$1,571,000?

Mr. NUTT. In 1970 we propose to production-test a new item called "Meal, uncooked, 25-man," which is scheduled for ultimate replacement of the B ration. In order to make an adequate test because of the large number of items that are in this particular proposed ration, we have to procure 1 million rations of the item or the 3 million meals. Because of that it does cost a little extra money.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For the record, could you tell us more about that program and what it amounts to?

Mr. NUTT. Yes, sir.

(The information requested appears on page 28.)

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is this program completely funded by the Army Personnel account?

Mr. NUTT. This particular one is, yes.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How many of these programs are going on in the military?

Mr. NUTT. This is the only one wherein the item that is production-tested is then fed to the troops. The primary purpose of the program is to determine the capability of industry to produce the item, and this is the only program of that sort that is going on in this particular appropriation.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Do you know of any programs that are going on, and being paid for by other appropriations such as R.D.T. & E?

Mr. NUTT. The effort to produce the end item is funded through the research and development program, sir, but they do not fund the feeding of the item to the troops.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This amount of money is just for the feeding?

Mr. NUTT. Yes, sir; that is right.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So the program itself has been financed through R.D.T. & E.?

Mr. NUTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For your analysis in the record will you show the total cost, then, including the R.D.T. & E. funds and any other funds that may be involved?

Mr. NUTT. Very well, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you.  
(The information follows:)

#### NEW FOOD ITEM PROGRAM

The new food item program is participated in by all of the military services with participation generally varying to the extent of the interest of each department in the specific item being tested.

A point is reached in the development of each item when it is necessary to determine the capability of commercial industry to produce a product meeting acceptable standards. At that time, the minimum quantity of the item which industry can be expected to bid on is determined. Concurrently, each military service decides the amount of the total quantity it will accept for troop feeding. The Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pa., procures the item(s) which are then shipped to the military services in the requested quantities. Each service substitutes the test item for an item in the standard menu and enters the net additional cost, if any, in their military personnel budget estimates.

The new and significantly improved subsistence items emerging from research and development generally offer overall savings or other major benefits to the taxpayer. The edible yield of the items may be markedly greater than that of the same quantity of standard product, thus reducing requirements for shipping and storage space and facilities, labor in preparing meals, and requirements for freezer and refrigeration facilities. There may also be a reduction in related logistical support requirements such as fuel, maintenance and manpower as well as a contribution to operational capabilities which could not be achieved without subsistence in proper forms.

Seldom are these advantages reflected in procurement costs however. Initial procurement cost of a new food product will generally exceed that of the less satisfactory standard counterpart. Use of processing innovations, new equipment and greater control in production may be entailed. There is also the problem of giving industry the incentive to undertake the risk of producing without assurance of a continuing market. These factors lead to initially high procurement costs.

The new food item program accordingly provides the mechanisms whereby the military services can plan and budget for integration into the supply system of required new and technically improved items. This program also assures proper phasing of such related actions as specification preparation, specification production testing, budgeting for procurement differentials, procurement, military service consumer-type testing, final standardization decisions, and phase out of items to be replaced. As one result of this program, freeze-dried foods—for which a production base was virtually nonexistent a decade ago—are now standard items and are entering the commercial market.

The cost of the new food item program was determined in the following manner:

Production test item	Quantity	Estimated total cost	Cost "A" ration item	Net cost
Pineapple juice, dehydrated instant (pounds).....	44,800	\$37,096	\$15,456	\$21,640
Cherries, RSP, freeze-dried compressed (pounds).....	2,000	10,000	4,980	5,020
Peas, freeze-dried, cooked compressed (pounds).....	1,500	6,000	792	5,208
Meal, uncooked, 25-man (ration).....	1,000,000	2,870,000	1,330,000	1,540,000
Total net cost.....				1,571,868

Research and development costs relating to the meal, uncooked, 25-man approximate \$2,269,000 through February 28, 1969.

## INVOLUNTARY REASSIGNMENT TO VIETNAM

Mr. GARRITY. General Connor, on page 5 of your statement you discuss the Army's base tour objectives and short-tour objectives. You state that during fiscal year 1968, 2,600 personnel were returned to short-tour areas involuntarily with less than the base tour objectives. And in the first half of 1969 almost twice that many had been returned to short-tour areas. You expect that number to continue to increase. In your statement you also discuss retention policies and programs. What effect does this involuntary reassignment to short tour areas have on your retention programs?

General CONNOR. We feel it has had a very substantial effect on retention. Large numbers of captains are going back to Vietnam at this time for a second tour. While these young men are perfectly willing to do what their country wants them to, once they get out there they perform admirably and are particularly useful because they are all combat experienced, but it is hard on their families. The young wives are not very happy about it.

Mr. GARRITY. Do you have any statistics to indicate what this effect is?

General CONNOR. We know what happened to our retention rate in the last 3 or 4 years. We attribute this largely to the Vietnam situation, the second tour requirement. The statistics have dropped from some 33.8 percent in 1962 to 24.2 percent in 1968. We project 28 percent this year. We project an increase for the reasons I mentioned earlier, because of the number of OCS graduates who are coming in qualified for promotion to captain at this time, in the second half of fiscal year 1969.

## READINESS OF ARMY UNITS IN EUROPE

Mr. GARRITY. You also discuss on page 5 of your statement the effect of short-tour replacement requirements and high personnel turnover on achievement readiness goals in CONUS. What effect does this short-tour replacement requirements for Vietnam have on your readiness goals for the Army units deployed in Europe?

General CONNOR. ———. As the committee knows, we had to withdraw from Europe at the beginning of the buildup rather sizable numbers of skilled noncommissioned officers and junior officers to expand the training base. We have replaced those skilled personnel in Europe by people of shorter service and lower skills.

Mr. GARRITY. What percentage is your readiness in Europe?

General CONNOR. It is running about ——— right now.

Mr. GARRITY. What is that equivalent to, the ——— percent, ——— percent?

General CONNOR. Between ——— percent.

Mr. GARRITY. Regarding Army units in CONUS, what is the current percentage of their readiness?

General CONNOR. ——— is at least ——— percent; yes.

The goals, as I recall, for 1st and 2d Armored Divisions are \_\_\_\_\_ for the 5th Mechanized Division \_\_\_\_\_. The 82d Airborne Division \_\_\_\_\_; the 82d Airborne Division is now at \_\_\_\_\_. The two armored divisions are \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, specifically what does C-1 and C-2 mean?

General CONNOR. C-1 means that it is at 100 percent of its wartime authorized personnel strength, sir, not less than 95 percent of its table or organization and equipment strength and not less than 86 percent of its MOS qualified personnel.

C-2 drops down to 90 percent of authorized strength, not less than 85 percent of full T. O. & E., strength, and 77 percent of its MOS qualified personnel.

However, in determining this readiness in one of these categories, the lowest of the categories determines the readiness for the unit. It might be at 100 percent personnel and only C-3 in equipment. If that were the case it would be at a readiness condition of C-3.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You have said that forces in Western Europe are \_\_\_\_\_?

General CONNOR. Yes. \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does that include the forces that have been returned and are committed to NATO, that are presently in the United States?

General CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are they \_\_\_\_\_?

General CONNOR. No, sir. They are \_\_\_\_\_ right now. The strength indicator of the brigade of the 24th, which is still over there, is \_\_\_\_\_; the 3d Armored Division at \_\_\_\_\_; 4th Armored Division, \_\_\_\_\_; 3d Infantry Division, \_\_\_\_\_; 8th Infantry Division, \_\_\_\_\_; 2d Armored Cavalry, \_\_\_\_\_; 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, \_\_\_\_\_, and the Berlin Brigade is \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does the \_\_\_\_\_ classification in Western Europe give you cause for concern?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir, indeed it does.

#### CAPABILITY TO IMPROVE READINESS GOALS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What should we be doing to correct this?

General CONNOR. I believe that within the political framework and the resources framework that we are under today, sir, we are doing everything we can at the moment.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What are we doing? And I am asking this question with the full knowledge that we have budgetary problems within the United States. The question is, what comes first: the security of our country? What are we doing at this moment?

General CONNOR. This gets into an area that the DCSPER really is not competent to address, sir. I don't get into the strategic discussions or the adequacy of forces for a given situation.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You do have a responsibility for making it known, is that correct?

General CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is this known to the authorities that do make these decisions? Has aggressive effort been made with respect to information and facts; have information and facts gone to the proper people?

General CONNOR. I am sure they have; yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This is not your responsibility, either?

General CONNOR. I inform, yes, as far as the personnel situation is concerned. As a matter of fact, the commanders inform what their situation is through command channels coming back to the Department of the Army. That is where the criteria derive from. I might say, however, that these criteria are the Army's own criteria and they are extremely restrictive and critical. While we might talk about a unit being at ——— condition it doesn't mean it cannot go out and fight. It means that it is probably short certain skilled personnel. They would not appear on the battlefield in full T.O. & E. configuration but, nevertheless, they are still a pretty effective military force. When we send a rifle company out in Vietnam they don't always go out at full strength. Even if they did, they would shortly be at considerably less than full strength because of casualties.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is it not a fact that your highest skills and most experienced personnel have been withdrawn from many of your units in Western Europe?

General CONNOR. This has been a decision, on the part of those in authority, sir, to take this step. We do have reserve forces. I might say we have an enormous training base in existence where we could generate troops very quickly if we had to. I think one of the things we tend to forget——

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It is our responsibility, too, General, to see to it that if we are short —— it is up to us to not just sit with our eyes closed, blind to the fact. Should we be doing something about it?

General CONNOR. No, sir. I think the committee is doing exactly what they should be doing and have done exactly what they should be doing.

#### DOD REDUCTION IN MILITARY PERSONNEL REQUEST

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Maybe I can ask this, then: Was the military personnel account reduced in the formulation of the budget from your original request?

General CONNOR. Our initial request was \$8,754,261,000. Approved was \$8,535,000,000, as you know. The difference is \$219,261,000. The end strength requested was 1,552,477. It was reduced some 44,577.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did the reduction of \$219 million affect any requests that you had in for Western Europe forces?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. We have some REDCOSTE in there. I mentioned earlier the REDCOSTE was the gold flow program. —— people are involved in that program.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Actually, on the basis of percentages, the reduction in the military personnel request was not a real great amount this time.

General CONNOR. No, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Was your request at the level that you originally put in because of the recognition of the budgetary problems that we have facing us in our country?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir, it was. We have submitted a personnel budget which we felt was just as tight as we could make it, given the resource problem that we are facing.

## EFFECT OF VIETNAM ON TROOP STRENGTH IN EUROPE

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In our study trip in Western Europe last fall, members of this committee, were led to believe that ———.

General CONNOR. ———.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am under the impression right now that this shape which we are in is not endangering the security of our country and the free world, that we can get by.

General CONNOR. This is not a judgment for me to make, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will the gentleman yield?

General Connor, you say we are not as good as we could be in Europe, that is the substance of your testimony. What effect has the activity in Vietnam had on our situation in Europe?

General CONNOR. Well, it has ——— effect, sir, because it has taken skilled personnel the Army has and placed them in that area which we consider of higher priority at the time.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the whole problem; is it not?

General CONNOR. Yes. I do want to call attention to the fact, though, that we have in existence a tremendous training base today and that we are flowing through the Army an awful lot of men, going in and out, but I think that just a simple step of holding people in the service, if a real emergency came about that would require this, our buildup capability is fantastic.

## STATUS OF FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask you about a division down in South Vietnam, the 1st Cavalry division. That was one of the first to go into South Vietnam, if I remember correctly. I am sure during the approximately 3 years that they have been down there, that you have had a lot of changes in the makeup of the division. Percentagewise, how is that division today as compared to what it was when it first went into South Vietnam?

General CONNOR. With respect to combat effectiveness, sir?

Mr. ANDREWS. I was thinking about personnel. What percentage of the men in the division today were with them when they went into South Vietnam?

General CONNOR. I doubt if there is a single man there today that went in with them. The change in the division is about 110 percent per year, 110 to 120 percent per year; 100 percent because of our 1-year tour policy and 20 percent because of casualties or other moves of people in country.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has that affected the combat effectiveness of the division?

General CONNOR. No, sir; it has not, because we have been sending into the division the skills and numbers of people needed to retain their combat capability.

I visited that division in January. They are in just as good a shape today as they were 2 years ago.

Mr. ANDREWS. How about the division from the standpoint of equipment and weapons? Would you say it is C-1?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the same thing true of the other divisions we have in Vietnam?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would think that it would have to be in C-1 classification or they would not be down there. Is that correct?

General CONNOR. Yes.

#### INCREASE IN DESERTION RATE

Mr. MINSHALL. Would the gentleman yield?

General, what is the general morale of the Army personnel at home and overseas, specifically with respect to Vietnam?

General CONNOR. Well, the morale in Vietnam is fabulous. I see no change whatsoever. I was over there in January and early February. The soldiers are proud, competent, and the leaders believe in what they are doing, they are proud of their outfits.

Mr. MINSHALL. How do you account, then, for the desertion rate, the A.W.O.L. rate, having increased by a third over last year?

General CONNOR. We are getting more kooks into the Army, for one thing. We are getting more young men who are coming in undisciplined, the product of a society that trains them to resist authority.

Mr. MINSHALL. Does your Army training overcome this, it would seem that it should?

General CONNOR. Most of the desertions take place very early in the man's training. We do not experience this sort of thing in the trained soldier to any great extent.

Mr. MINSHALL. Will you supply the rate for the record?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### COMPARATIVE AWOL AND DROPPED FROM ROLLS AS DESERTER (DFR) NUMBER PER 1,000 AVERAGE ENLISTED STRENGTH

Year	AWOL <sup>1</sup>	Monthly average AWOL	DFR <sup>2</sup>	Monthly average DFR
Fiscal year:				
1967.....	78.0	6.5	21.4	1.8
1968.....	89.7	7.5	29.1	2.4
1969.....	44.6	8.9	16.6	3.3

<sup>1</sup> Morning report entries showing number of AWOL's (does not indicate individual offenders, but number of individual offenses).

<sup>2</sup> Morning report entries showing dropped from the rolls (does not indicate individual offenders, but number of individual offenses). AWOL's over 29 days are dropped from rolls as deserters.

<sup>3</sup> Number per 1,000 July-November 1968.

#### COMPARATIVE DESERTION RATES

General CONNOR. Our desertion rate right now is running just a little over 29 per thousand.

Mr. MINSHALL. How do you consider that figure? Is it high?

General CONNOR. Yes; much higher than we would like to see it.

Mr. MINSHALL. What was the rate during World War II or earlier in the Vietnam campaign?

General CONNOR. At the height of Korea it ran 20 per thousand. I do not have the World War II figure here, but they were much higher—I am told it was about 63.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** In World War II?

**General CONNOR.** The latter part of World War II we had a very high desertion rate.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** What concerns me is the one-third increase in the last year.

**General CONNOR.** Yes, sir. It is concerning us, too.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** What are you doing about it?

**General CONNOR.** We have issued a number of suggestions to commanders, and cautions to commanders. The Chief of Staff has personally brought this matter to their attention. We have produced a couple of films on the consequences of desertion, which are for instructional purposes to show to the young soldier. We are pointing up in more troop topic type programs and whatnot the seriousness of this situation.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** Do most of these desertions occur stateside?

**General CONNOR.** Yes. We have a little over 500 who deserted to foreign countries, but considering that we have had over 190,000 men volunteer for Vietnam, again you have to weigh this.

**Mr. MAHON.** Elaborate on the 190,000 men volunteering for Vietnam, if you will, please.

**General CONNOR.** These are individuals who have sought service in Vietnam, sir, to serve their country.

**Mr. MAHON.** Over what period of time?

**General CONNOR.** Over the period of the war.

**Mr. MAHON.** That would indicate a high degree of dedication to the country, I would assume.

**General CONNOR.** Absolutely, sir. We do not have to be too concerned about our youth. The vast majority of them are doing their job and doing it beautifully.

#### FEASIBILITY OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

**Mr. MAHON.** What are your feelings, then, General, about a Volunteer army?

**General CONNOR.** The Army has always asked for a Volunteer army. We only use the draft when we cannot get the Volunteers.

**Mr. MAHON.** I mean, an all-Volunteer army as has been mentioned recently, how do you feel about that?

**General CONNOR.** We would be happy to have an all-Volunteer army.

**Mr. MAHON.** Do you think it is feasible?

**General CONNOR.** We don't know. We are studying it at this time to see just what steps can be taken to make it feasible, including costs and other incentives that might bring a man to the point where he wants to serve his country.

**Mr. MAHON.** What are your feelings about the present draft system? Do you think it is adequate to get the kind of personnel that you wish?

**General CONNOR.** We feel that there are some considerable inequities in the draft as it now exists. It does hold a Sword of Damocles over a man's head for a considerable period of time. It keeps him from really knowing where he is going to go next year and the year after.

**Mr. MAHON.** Have you discussed these problems with the powers that be, including General Hershey?

General CONNOR. No, sir; I have not discussed it with General Hershey.

Mr. MAHON. Why not?

General CONNOR. The draft is a national policy. It is not an Army policy.

Mr. MAHON. Have you discussed it with the people who are in charge of our national policy? You are vitally concerned in your job with this policy; are you not?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. We have offered our own position on what we would like to see, but there are other considerations here.

Mr. MAHON. Supply the Army's position on the draft for the record, would you please, whatever you think might be appropriate?

General CONNOR. Yes.

(The information follows:)

#### ARMY POSITION ON THE DRAFT

It has always been the firm policy of the Army and Department of Defense to meet its manpower requirements, to the maximum extent possible, through voluntary enlistments and to rely on the draft for only the residual numbers required. This policy was reaffirmed in DA pamphlet 600-12, dated September 28, 1967, and in the statement of Mr. Morris, former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower), on June 30, 1968 when he reported to the House Committee on Armed Services on the Department of Defense Study of the Draft.

The problem is that since 1951 the Army has been unable to meet its manpower requirements without resorting to a request for inductions. During the period 1951-68 nearly half of the enlisted requirements were supplied through the draft. During fiscal year 1968, 62.7 percent of our total accessions were inductees and this figure will continue to exceed 50 percent for fiscal year 1969.

In its purist form, there is much to be gained from an all-volunteer army. However, the problem of acquiring and sustaining an all-volunteer army is not a simple one. It is a complex problem which covers a broad spectrum, although it can be reduced to four fundamental issues. These are quantity, quality, cost, and social implications.

Quantitatively, we recognize that under current conditions and incentives, without the draft and draft motivated enlistments, the end strength of the Army would fall dangerously below that required to support national defense policy. Associated with the question of quantity is the issue of flexibility. Without the continued registration of draft-liable males and the authority to request inductions, the Army would be tied to a relatively fixed level. It would be hard pressed to meet sudden demands for increased numbers of active duty personnel.

With regard to quality, it is clear that the draft not only affects quantity, it also raises the quality composition of the Army. When the World War II draft law was allowed to expire in March 1947, we returned to the all-volunteer Army concept. The result was a significant drop not only in enlistments but also in quality of personnel. The average mental level dropped and courts-martial rates rose. As a result, the 1948 Selective Service Act was passed and although it was almost immediately placed on a standby basis, the result was a stimulation of volunteers and a rise in the quality composition of the Army.

From the standpoint of cost, estimates for attaining and sustaining an all-volunteer army force have ranged from \$4 to \$17 billion in additional annual expenditures. We do not know what it will cost but there are indications that the cost might rise above any realistic cost level.

Aside from the possible separation of the military from the mainstream of American society, the major factor as far as the social implications are concerned is the question of draft inequities. Although the Army recognizes that the draft is national not Army policy, it is in sympathy with those who advocate a more equitable selection and deferral process. If the Army can obtain the quantity and quality of personnel needed from a more equitable draft when inductions are required, then we believe it is to the advantage of the Nation and the Army to modify the existing selective service procedures to provide that equity.

To sum up the Army position, we believe that the draft must be continued to provide the quantity and quality of personnel required during periods of low enlistments, sudden manpower expansion or national emergency. However, the existing procedures should be modified to provide more equitable selection of inductees when required. In the interim, we are studying the feasibility of an all-volunteer army by examining all possible programs and policies which will reduce, to the maximum extent possible, reliance on the draft. In this regard, the Army supports a post-Vietnam reduction in draft calls but that reduction must be contingent upon our ability to attract by voluntary means the numbers and quality of personnel needed.

#### USE OF DRUGS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

**Mr. MINSHALL.** Another matter that concerns me, General, is the reports I read in the news releases about the use of drugs; namely, marihuana in South Vietnam. What has caused this and what is the Army doing about it?

**General CONNOR.** The cause is the sort of thing that is going on with our youth today in high schools, where these boys come from. They can get marihuana very easily in Vietnam. It is easily obtainable. Our rates have gone up.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** What are the rates, please?

**General CONNOR.** We have 8.9 per 1,000 for Vietnam for calendar year 1968 compared to 5.2 worldwide. Perhaps General Heaton could address this point.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** We are always glad to hear from General Heaton.

**General HEATON.** We feel that the incidence of the use of marihuana in South Vietnam by our troops is certainly no higher than a comparable civilian population and certainly the use of marihuana in Vietnam has not compromised the combat effectiveness to any degree whatsoever.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** There has been a great deal of discussion about the use of marihuana, pro and con; harmful or not harmful. Do you have any comments on that?

**General HEATON.** Well, any drug like that is harmful, producing symptoms of long usage inevitably detrimental to the human mechanism; yes, sir.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** Aside from that, do you think one of the biggest dangers is that it is a first step toward the use of stronger and more dangerous drugs?

**General HEATON.** I think it certainly is; you are certainly right about that. It would lead into heroin and things like that. It could very well do it.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** How about LSD?

**General HEATON.** LSD and the amphetamines are always pathways to heroin and morphine and things like that, and opium.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

**Mr. MINSHALL.** Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### RETENTION OF JUNIOR OFFICERS

**Mr. RHODES.** Mr. Chairman.

General, I note that on page 9 you talk about the retention of junior officers beyond their 2-year tour of obligation and that it has shown slight improvement. I want to give you a case, and I hope this is not

a typical case. Anyway, I will relate it and you can tell me whether it is or not. I know the facts are correct.

I know of a boy who was called to active duty as a first lieutenant and given the MOS of counterintelligence. He was supposed to go to Fort Benning, then to Holabird, then to Kalamazoo, Mich., and in October to Vietnam.

He reported to active duty at Fort Benning. After having been there for a while a major stationed at the Pentagon called the officers together who were in this category of counterintelligence and told them that if they did not extend their tours of duty indefinitely that their MOS would be taken away from them and they would be put into combat intelligence. Some of them did decide to extend indefinitely, some of them did not and they were put into combat intelligence. Their schedule was changed. They are now at Holabird and then in April they will go to Vietnam.

Now, to me, this is reprehensible. These boys were brought into the ROTC program, on the basis that they must serve for 2 years on active duty. They were given a certain MOS. It was taken away not because they were not qualified for it—he is a graduate, most of these boys were graduates of graduate school, not only college. But yet this was done. Now, most of these young men came into the Army, with enthusiasm for the Army. They now feel that they want to get out just as rapidly as possible.

So if you are really trying to retain them, I think instances like this are very counter-productive.

General CONNOR. I couldn't agree with you more, Mr. Rhodes. If that happened, I intend to investigate it.

Mr. RHODES. I assure you it happened. I can give you the name of the officer from the Pentagon and I can give you affidavits and anything else that you may want.

General CONNOR. He certainly was not acting within the area of policy.

Mr. RHODES. Thank you. That is all.

#### VOLUNTARY EXTENSIONS IN COMBAT AREAS

Mr. GARRITY. General, you state that one of the steps the Army is taking to insure its ability to sustain short tour deployments is to encourage personnel to volunteer for extended tours of duty in combat areas. You further state that as of December 31, 1968, 1,753 officers and 59,206 enlisted men have extended since the program began in November 1966. What percentage would these numbers be to total deployments to combat areas since July 1966? Can you furnish that for the record?

(The information follows:)

#### PERCENTAGE OF VOLUNTARY EXTENSIONS

During the period July 1, 1966 through December 31, 1968, 74,000 officers and 694,000 enlisted men deployed to Vietnam. A comparison of the above number of deployments with the voluntary extensions during the period November 1966 through December 1968 reflects an extension rate of 2.4 percent for officers and 8.5 percent for enlisted men. This rate includes ineligibles (i.e. KIA and medically

evacuated personnel) and attempts to correlate an arrival quantity and time frame with a different departure quantity and time frame.

A more valid statistic may be obtained by comparing the total number of personnel eligible for rotation from the command with the number of voluntary tour extensions during a like time period. During the period November 1968 through December 1968, 48,810 officers and 518,196 enlisted men became eligible for rotation. Of this number, 1,753 officers, 3.6 percent, and 59,206 enlisted men, 11.4 percent, voluntarily extended their tours for a period of 6 months.

Mr. GARRITY. Regarding your voluntary extensions for tours of duty in combat areas, do you feel this program is as successful as you seem to imply?

General CONNOR. Yes; we feel it has been quite successful. I think the numbers speak for themselves in this case.

Mr. GARRITY. The numbers seem to be quite low compared to the numbers that have actually been sent to Vietnam. Would you elaborate a little bit?

General CONNOR. Well, almost 60,000 men, that represents two divisions, troops plus their support. I consider that a significant number of people. I agree that in terms of the people that have been in and out of Vietnam it may sound small but, nevertheless, it is almost 60,000 people we did not have to send over there earlier.

#### REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINED AVIATORS

Mr. GARRITY. On page 7 of your statement, General, you discuss your aviation requirements and shortages. You state that despite growing aviation inventory the intervals between tours in Vietnam for aviators and critical grades will remain at 19 months. Since you are increasing the training output of aviators by 610 per month, why is this short tour duty still in effect?

General CONNOR. Our figures, I think, have been revised to 21 months instead of 19.

One of the things that we face here is the requirement—and we have imposed this on ourselves—to keep 25 percent of our aviators there as combat-experience people. This, then, means a second tour for people that otherwise would not go because of training base output that might become available. Because of the 25-percent requirement and the desirability of giving ground duty orientation assignments periodically now that we have more aviators available, we will retain the 21-month turnaround time. Colonel Bellocchi, do you have anything to add?

Colonel BELLOCHI. I couldn't add anything more to that, sir.

Mr. GARRITY. What is the shortage of trained aviators at the current time?

Colonel BELLOCHI. In Vietnam, sir, or worldwide?

Mr. GARRITY. Worldwide.

Colonel BELLOCHI. We have authorized at the end of 1969, 23,876 aviators. We will have onboard 22,254. So there is a slight shortage in aviators or there will be at the end of 1969.

Mr. GARRITY. What is the shortage in Vietnam?

Colonel BELLOCHI. As of the end of 1969 again, sir, we are authorized 8,745 and we will have ——— or about a ——— shortage. This is a manageable shortage and it compares with other branches throughout the Army.

Mr. GARRITY. You state you have increased your aviators by over 40 percent during fiscal year 1969. Since most of these aviators are short-term enlistments, what will be the effect in a couple of years when these aviators all become eligible for discharge at one time?

General CONNOR. Obviously, this will have its impact, sir. On the other hand, we find that with the increased numbers of aviators and the better turnaround time to Vietnam, we expect the retention of aviators to improve. Further, we have a program underway now to commission some of the promising young warrant officer aviators as a means of retaining them on duty. We expect to get some response from this that will help the retention rate.

Mr. GARRITY. Will you have to continue your large aviator training program?

General CONNOR. For the foreseeable future we will.

Mr. GARRITY. Is there any chance of cutting back on the 610 per month production?

Colonel BELLOCHI. We are examining the fiscal year 1971 training rate to see if there is a possibility of cutbacks due to the Vietnamese modernization and improvement program, that will train additional Vietnamese pilots. If this comes about we possibly can reduce the training rate, but it doesn't look like much. The training rate is driven by short tour requirements in Vietnam and in other areas. So we produce, as the general mentioned, the 25/75 percent ratio. The 75 percent of the short tour requirements is basically what determines the training rate.

Mr. GARRITY. Considering the Army 5-year force structure, what do you foresee?

Colonel BELLOCHI. The base line force, as best I can remember, runs about 20,000 aviators, roughly. This includes what OSD refers to as a supplement. This will be aviators above the base line force that will allow meeting contingencies that may develop, similar to Vietnam. This is under study right now.

#### QUALITY OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE HELICOPTER PILOTS

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you yield?

Who trained these South Vietnamese chopper pilots?

Colonel BELLOCHI. We are training some right now.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where?

Colonel BELLOCHI. At Fort Rucker, Ala.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long is the training period?

Colonel BELLOCHI. A total of 52 weeks.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of pilots do they develop into?

Colonel BELLOCHI. Helicopter pilots, HU-1 or CH-34.

Mr. ANDREWS. I mean, are they good ones?

Colonel BELLOCHI. Yes, sir. They are adequate, with a little in-country training. There is a little language difficulty. They are not as good as ours because of the language difficulty.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any now who are actually piloting choppers in combat in South Vietnam?

Colonel BELLOCHI. Yes, sir: The Vietnamese have, I believe, about

— helicopter squadrons at the present time.

Mr. ANDREWS. We furnish the choppers?

Colonel BELLOCHI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Train the pilots?

Colonel BELLOCHI. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you foresee a time that the South Vietnamese pilots will lessen the need for our pilots there?

Colonel BELLOCHI. Yes, sir. The Vietnamese modernization and improvement program is directed toward that goal, portions of it anyway.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is all.

Mr. GARRITY. Will you provide for the record a breakdown of the number of aviators in Vietnam by primary mission assignments? For example, the number flying forward air control, gunships, transports, air evacuation, and attack helicopters?

(The information furnished the committee is classified.)

#### EARLY RELEASE POLICY

Mr. GARRITY. Regarding your early release policy, you mentioned that the Army has extended this program from 90 to 150 days for short-tour enlisted returnees. Would you explain this and give us more information on the policy?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. This was an effort to cut down on our turbulence and to increase really our deployable assets. Once a man has done a Vietnam tour, if he is a 2-year man he comes home and he has a very short period of service to do when he comes home. We have found that by moving him into a unit, that he was there such a short period of time that it just created a great deal of turbulence and training problem for the unit he was going to, as well as making him a little unhappy. We found by releasing him when he came home we could then bring in somebody and train in that space and have somebody we could send to Vietnam. At the same time, we hope that this would cause individuals to extend in Vietnam up to the point where they could get their early discharge when they get back. This has worked out. So it has cut down in effect our requirements for deploying people. It has been quite a successful program. It is expensive in terms of training requirements, however. It means we have to train more people and we are not going to have them in as long.

Mr. GARRITY. Are most of these draftees that are returning from Vietnam that are under this early release program?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. The 3-year enlistee still has a year to do, for the most part, so he goes on to a CONUS assignment or even to Germany.

Mr. GARRITY. If a draftee is not eligible under current policy for early release would it not be feasible to discharge him anyhow, rather than reassigning him for a short tour to a CONUS base?

General CONNOR. Well, that is 5 months of service and you can say, well, why not 6 months? This was just a judgment factor that we arrived at, 5 months as a cutoff point. If a man has 6 months to do he can still provide some useful soldiering in a stateside billet.

Mr. GARRITY. Under your early release policy does the returnee have to indicate that he is going to school, or something like that, in order to be released?

General CONNOR. No.

Mr. GARRITY. Are you releasing everyone now?

General CONNOR. Releasing everyone who wants to get out. If he asks for early release and he has done a tour in Vietnam, then he is releasable.

#### MEDICAL SERVICES IN VIETNAM

Mr. GARRITY. Regarding your medical services in Vietnam, you state that 19 percent of the nonfatal wounds were caused by small arms and 11 percent were caused by boobytraps and mines. What are the other 70 percent of the nonfatal wounds caused by?

General HEATON. Fragments.

Mr. GARRITY. On page 9 of General Connor's statement we note that 3.2 percent of those wounded in Vietnam have died in medical facilities. The statement is also made on page 8 that—

It is paradoxical that some of them would not have survived in any case and now count against medical survival rates.

Will you explain the meaning of this statement?

General HEATON. We have, as I stated here last year, received many of these casualties in our hospitals who would have been DOA's in any other war, dead on arrival; due to the swift evacuation by the air ambulances from the receipt of the injury to our hospital to which they were directed. No wounded individual over there is more than 30 to 60 minutes from the operating table which testifies to the speed and efficiency of the recovery and transport of this individual to the proper facility. That is the reason that our statistics are much higher than they would be normally.

In the medical facilities in Vietnam the percentage of deaths is 2.5 percent. Now, that is exactly what it was in Korea. It was 4.5 in World War II and 8.1 in World War I. A more meaningful assessment, however, of the efficiency of the surgery in Vietnam today is a comparison of the deaths to the total hits. In other words, in World War II, 27 percent of those hit died immediately of their wounds or subsequently of those wounds. In Korea it was 22 percent. In South Vietnam only 17 percent have died of their wounds immediately or subsequent to the receipt of the wounding. This then brings into proper perspective the impact of that very rapid recovery and transport by the helicopter ambulance.

Mr. MAHON. General, would the method of warfare, the techniques and weapons being used, have any impact on that statistic?

General HEATON. I don't think so, sir. It is the early recovery of these that is giving us such astounding figures over there; something that we have never experienced before.

Mr. GARRITY. General, are you keeping these statistics just so you can compare your casualties from one war to another? What is the real meaning of such detailed statistics?

General HEATON. The real meaning, translated to a civilian community, is what you can do right here in Washington. Our system in Vietnam is being studied very carefully here in the civilian population of Washington, also Baltimore, and San Francisco.

The secret of the successful treatment of trauma is early recovery and early resuscitation and early definitive treatment. That is what we are proving today in Vietnam.

Mr. MAHON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

## SHORTAGE OF TRAINED NURSES

Mr. GARRITY. The statement is made that the Army subsidy program for nursing students now accounts for over 65 percent of the total yearly accessions to the Army Nurse Corps. Do you believe this program will have to continue for an indefinite period?

General HEATON. I think it should. Yes, sir, I do; I think it should.

We had 866 of these young ladies in this calendar year 1968 come into our nursing service. We are reaping fine dividends from it.

Mr. GARRITY. Do you think you will have to expand the program in order to build up your nursing capability?

General HEATON. As you know, in this country across the whole population we are over 125,000 nurses short. As of today we are short around 724 nurses, considering all of our demands on us worldwide; which, related to the civilian population is not too bad a figure.

Mr. GARRITY. Do you have any other plans to alleviate this shortage?

General HEATON. Recruitment, direct commissioning, increasing the graduates at Walter Reed School of Nursing. We graduated 58 last year. We are going up to 80 this year, 90 next year, 100 in 1971. We are expanding our Army Student Nurse program in as many schools as we possibly can. I feel, given the base of the tremendous shortage as it is in this country, that the Army is doing very well.

Mr. MAHON. All right, gentlemen; let us resume at 2 o'clock.

## AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. MAHON. We will resume the hearing.

## REQUIREMENTS FOR DOCTORS AND DENTISTS

Mr. GARRITY. General Heaton, at the close of this morning's session we were discussing the Nurse Corps. Can you give us some information on the situation of your doctors at the present time?

General HEATON. Yes, sir. As of June 30, 1969, we will have a requirement for 7,109 doctors. That means that through this fiscal year we will have taken in, to maintain that requirement, about 2,261 doctors. Our draft call this year to help us obtain that figure will be 1,126 doctors. The rest are filled with Berry Plan candidates and our own graduates in the residency training system. We are not short of doctors.

Mr. GARRITY. Will you provide for the record a statement of how many doctors you had in fiscal year 1968 and at present, and supply the same information for dentists?

General HEATON. Doctors and dentists, 1968 and 1969, yes, sir.

Mr. GARRITY. And projected for 1970.

General HEATON. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

	Requirements, all years	Actual, June 30, 1968	Program, June 30, 1969	Program, June 30, 1970
Medical Corps.....	7,822	6,251	7,109	7,144
Dental Corps.....	3,008	2,748	2,842	2,853

## WOMENS ARMY CORPS

Mr. GARRITY. Colonel Hoisington, what is the planned strength for the WAC's in the 1970 budget?

Colonel HOISINGTON. The same strength is programed for both fiscal years 1969 and 1970. This end strength is 13,540 officers and enlisted women.

Mr. GARRITY. How many of these are in the United States and how many are assigned overseas?

Colonel HOISINGTON. Right now, the actual strength of the corps is about 12,000. On December 31, 1968, we had close to 1,000 assigned to overseas locations.

Mr. GARRITY. Has your reenlistment rate improved any over the last year?

Colonel HOISINGTON. We went down slightly in fiscal year 1968. For the first 9 months in fiscal year 1969, our reenlistment rate was 38.9 percent compared with 44.3 percent for the same period in fiscal year 1968.

Mr. GARRITY. What are you doing to improve the reenlistment situation?

Colonel HOISINGTON. One program we are planning is a CONUS reenlistment option for WAC personnel. This option would permit our women to reenlist for another CONUS station after having served a stabilized tour of perhaps 4 years at a particular post. The women think that after they have completed an enlistment at one place, they would like to move on to another location.

Mr. GARRITY. Are the WAC's eligible for reenlistment bonuses and proficiency pay, the same as the male members of the Army?

Colonel HOISINGTON. Exactly like the men.

Mr. GARRITY. How many are now serving in Vietnam?

Colonel HOISINGTON. At the end of calendar year 1968 there were about 160.

Mr. GARRITY. What is your projected figure for the end of fiscal year 1969 in Vietnam?

Colonel HOISINGTON. Not only in Vietnam but throughout the Army, we do not limit the number of women assigned to a particular command. When personnel requisitions come to the Pentagon either men or women can fill them depending on the military occupation specialty required by the job. So, I cannot tell you exactly how many women we would have assigned in Vietnam at any particular time in the future.

Mr. GARRITY. Do you have a planned strength in Vietnam for fiscal year 1970?

Colonel HOISINGTON. No, sir; no planned assigned strength. We will be filling the requisitions with our WAC volunteers as they come in. I imagine the strength will be very much like the strength we have right now, which is close to 160 enlisted women.

Mr. GARRITY. Since you really do not have any planned strength, does this have any effect on the budget?

Colonel HOISINGTON. No, it does not cost any more to send women to Vietnam and maintain them there than soldiers performing the same work.

Mr. GARRITY. It is built into the regular PCS travel cost?

Colonel HOISINGTON. That is right. It would not affect that. They have the same tour. Everything would be exactly the same.

Mr. GARRITY. What kind of duties are they performing in Vietnam?

Colonel HOISINGTON. Mostly clerical duties. At the MACV Headquarters, they are stenographers. At Long Binh, they are clerk-typists.

Mr. GARRITY. Does the Russian Army have a women's corps similar to ours?

Colonel HOISINGTON. I am afraid I cannot answer that but I will be happy to provide the information for the record.

Mr. GARRITY. If you have any idea of the strength, I would also appreciate your putting that in the record.

Colonel HOISINGTON. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The women in the Russian Army appear to be primarily doctors, nurses, and communication, electronic, signal, and quartermaster technicians. They are integrated into the officer and enlisted ranks of the active and reserve forces. They do not have a separate corps comparable to our Women's Army Corps. It is estimated that there are between 600 and 1,000 women on active duty. The total numbers in the reserve are not known. Under their Universal Military Service Law of 1967, article 16, women "10 to 40 who have medical or other specialized training can be taken into military service in peacetime, recruited for refresher training periods, or admitted as volunteers for active duty. In wartime women can be drafted into USSR Armed Forces by decision of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers to perform auxiliary or specialized service."

#### TRAINING OF WAC OFFICERS

Mr. GARRITY. Since there are relatively few officers entering the four services' women's corps each year, would it be feasible to combine their basic training and thus save substantial training costs? For instance, in the Army you estimate there will be 251 officer accessions in 1970, the Navy will have 148, the Marine Corps 75, and the Air Force 125, for a total of about 600 officer accessions. Would it be feasible to combine their basic training?

Colonel HOISINGTON. It might be feasible, but I do not think it would be very desirable.

Mr. GARRITY. Why?

Colonel HOISINGTON. Because the Army trains us to fit well into our own service and as with the men emphasizes certain training peculiar to the Army. To combine the training for the women would be similar to combining the three service academies and their different requirements.

Mr. GARRITY. Could you not all take the same basic training and subsequently obtain specialized training related to the operations of the Service in which the individual enlisted?

Colonel HOISINGTON. I do not think you would save any money that way. Fundamentally, there are a lot of things we would all learn, but I do not think you would save any money by dividing the training.

Mr. GARRITY. Thank you.

#### EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RETENTION RATES

General Connor, you make the statement that reenlistments have remained relatively constant at approximately 80,000 annually for the past 5 years.

On page 5 of your statement you also refer to the fact that the Army has increased in strength by over 50 percent since 1965. Does it not appear that even with all the emphasis on proficiency pay and reenlistment bonuses, you have not been producing the reenlistments that had been anticipated by these programs?

General CONNOR. We did not really know what to anticipate for these programs. We feel that the programs have had a definite impact on increasing reenlistments. Without these programs we are certain our reenlistment rate would be lower than it is now. In polls we have taken of our enlisted men, the reenlistment bonus is definitely indicated as a reason for reenlisting.

Mr. GARRITY. These may be incentives for reenlisting, but are they producing the desired effect in the first instance?

General CONNOR. We are not reenlisting the numbers that we would like to reenlist, that is true. We feel there are many reasons for this besides money.

Mr. GARRITY. Maybe the money should go into some other program, rather than reenlistment bonus.

General CONNOR. We do, definitely. As a matter of fact, the pay modernization act is one factor which we hope will improve reenlistments and make the service career more desirable in the eyes of the young soldier.

Mr. GARRITY. How do you plan to make it more desirable?

General CONNOR. We hope to increase his pay. We hope to improve on his living conditions. We hope to improve on his image in the eyes of the public. We hope to make him feel that there is something worthwhile in wearing the uniform for his country, that he will pursue this sort of life as a satisfying experience for him.

These are all things that we consider and are constantly examining to see how we can do it better or what we can do that will attract the young soldier to a military career.

Mr. GARRITY. How many studies do you currently have underway in regard to finding ways to induce young men to stay in the service?

General CONNOR. We have just completed one study on the retention of junior officers. It was a contract study done by the Franklin Institute.

We are currently examining the all-volunteer Army and what it means in terms of money, in terms of inducements, in terms of what it would take to generate the numbers and forces that are needed to fulfill our force structure requirements. These are the only two studies, to my knowledge, other than the normal, routine, daily staff actions that concern themselves with increased retention.

Mr. GARRITY. Do you think an all-volunteer Army is desirable?

General CONNOR. The position of the Department of the Army is that we would gladly accept an all-volunteer Army, and we only use the draft at the present time to make up the shortfall. I can only speak personally in this regard. I do not necessarily feel that an all-volunteer Army is desirable. I feel it begins to separate the Army from the mainstream of the country. I feel young men get a great deal out of military service. I feel each of our young men has an obligation to serve. I cannot see an all-professional Army doing much more than separating away from the people. This is purely a personal view.

(Discussion off the record.)

## ARMY PERSONNEL ON WELFARE

Mr. ANDREWS. I saw a unique story in the paper a few weeks ago about Army people at Fort Dix. It stated that many of them were qualifying for welfare payments. Did you see that?

General CONNOR. Yes; I saw that, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. I had never heard of that before; had you? If everybody else is getting it, I hope they can get it. That is the way I feel about it. I hope every one of them gets it.

General CONNOR. Their pay as a private E-1, if they are married, with dependents, is low enough to qualify for welfare payments according to the local scale.

Mr. ANDREWS. I hope they get it.

## PROJECT ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

Mr. GARRITY. Would you bring us up to date on Project 100,000?

## OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM

General CONNOR. This project, as you know, was started in the latter part of 1966 with a view toward determining to what extent the services could make use of lower mental category people who, while qualified for general mobilization, were not qualified under the draft and enlistment standards at that time. These were people who were then in the I-Y pool or would become a member of the I-Y pool.

The thought was to bring 100,000 into the three services and determine just how effective they could be and to what extent they could be utilized. The Army had the bulk of these people.

We proceeded through the draft to bring them aboard. There were two categories—one, the mental category; and, second, the remedial physical category. There were certain minor physical disqualifications that could be corrected. They were brought on as well.

We have had fairly good success. About 95 percent are still on board, compared to a control group that has some 97 percent on board.

The biggest problem with these particular young men is the fact that they could not read. Some 36 percent of them lacked a fifth-grade reading skill. It was after analyzing that problem that we started our remedial reading programs to bring these people along up to a fifth or possibly sixth grade level.

Here again, we have had some success, amazing success, I feel, when you consider the fact that a lot of these young men are high school graduates and still have not been able to reach a fifth-grade reading level.

In any case, in a period of 5 or 6 weeks we have brought them to that and beyond in some 85 percent of the cases.

They have gone then just to do duty like everybody else in the MOS that they are trained in. We have been training them in a variety of MOS's. We do find we cannot train them in the more sophisticated MOS's. Their learning rate is too slow. Nevertheless, in terms of numbers, for the most part they are usable soldiers and are finding a new role in life for themselves, a new confidence and a new status.

## REMEDIAL READING PROGRAM

**Mr. GARRITY.** How do you determine which trainees will receive this remedial training prior to their assignment to basic training units?

**General CONNOR.** It is basically on the judgment of the local commanders as to who possesses the most potential to meet the requirements. The local commander determines this.

**Mr. GARRITY.** How does the local commander determine this? Has he a selection program or a testing program or something like that, which indicates those who need help and those who do not?

**General CONNOR.** I cannot answer that question specifically, Mr. Garrity.

**Colonel Conaty,** can you discuss that?

**Colonel CONATY.** They have a testing program, and those people who cannot read or comprehend above the fifth grade level go into the program. This program started in April and, as the General said, we have put over 6,000 people in it. Next year about 20,000 will go into it who are Project 100,000, and about 8,000 non-Project 100,000 who are also category IV will probably go to the program.

**General CONNOR.** Your question really is directed at which of the categories are permitted to take the remedial reading training. We will have to provide the answer to that. Not all of them are taking it because the program is not big enough as yet. We have not been able to give it that much support.

(The information follows:)

Selection of personnel for reading training is based on the reading levels of individuals tested. Those personnel who attain the lowest scores on the U.S. Armed Forces Institute Intermediate achievement test are accorded priority.

## COST OF PROGRAM

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** In your statement, General, you say these men are separated from others for this training until they reach the 5th grade reading level. Can you explain how they are separated for this training?

**General CONNOR.** They are barracked together, sir. They actually go to a classroom as a group.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** And where is this done?

**General CONNOR.** Right in the basic training center.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** How many of these training centers are there for remedial reading, for instance?

**General CONNOR.** We have the program underway at all our training centers that have basic training.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Can you tell us what the total cost of this preparatory training is estimated to be for fiscal year 1970 or what it was in 1969?

**General CONNOR.** In 1969, the remedial training program as related to Project 100,000 was \$6,469,000. The total cost of the remedial training program is \$7,422,095.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** The reading program itself?

**General CONNOR.** Yes. In 1970, the program as related to Project 100,000 is estimated at \$8,177,000 and the total cost of the program is \$11,357,000.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That is an increase of \$2 million for 1970 as related to Project 100,000?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir, not quite \$2 million as related to Project 100,000 and \$4 million for the overall remedial training program.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How many do you estimate you will put through the remedial training program in fiscal year 1969?

General CONNOR. 12,000 in fiscal year 1969 and 28,000 in fiscal year 1970.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had any sit-ins or demonstrations in your schools, General?

General CONNOR. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. None of them tried to take over?

General CONNOR. No, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That is pretty expensive, is it not?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. It is primarily for hiring teachers and for trainers. It also includes pay and allowances for the trainees.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Do the figures which you are estimating for the committee include military and civilian personnel?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How many are in the program now, and how many are planned?

General CONNOR. Military and civilian?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Yes.

General CONNOR. We have 339 trainers, sir, but they do not teach reading. May I insert that figure in the record?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Yes.

(The information follows:)

As of March 1, 1969, there were 100 military trainers in the program; 339 are planned under full expansion of the reading training program. Approximately 1,000 trainees are receiving reading training monthly; 2,300 will take reading training when the program is fully expanded. There are 20 full-time direct hire civilians who are currently teaching only reading training.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What is the total cost now to the Army of Project 100,000, and what is the estimated amount of personnel which you now have in this program?

General CONNOR. For fiscal year 1970, the total cost estimate is \$12,776,076. This includes \$7,794,719 MPA, \$4,631,357 O. & M., \$350,000 R.D.T. & E. The total number in the program at this time is 123,992.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does the figure you just gave us include military pay?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The figure you just gave us includes the remedial reading program?

General CONNOR. It does; yes, sir.

#### PROJECT EVALUATION STUDIES

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In your statement on page 14 you mentioned several studies which are being conducted. Last year we discussed three specifically: Project Utility, the stockades study, and one other. What additional studies are you conducting over and beyond the three that were mentioned here last year?

General CONNOR. None that I am aware of, sir. We do have a study going on in Vietnam which is simply a local command study to come up with some statistics on combat performance, but that is an in-house study.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Your statement says you collected considerable data and conducted several studies, three of which were specifically reported to you last year.

General CONNOR. Yes; on the Army staff level we are collecting data on these men from the day they come into the Army until the day they are discharged.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is that Project Utility?

General CONNOR. Do you have the name of that?

Colonel CONATY. There are actually four R.D.T. & E. studies which deal with low category IV people which are a part of Project 100,000. They are all conducted under the auspices of our Director of Personnel Studies and Research.

Utility, which is one that you mentioned, conducted by the Human Resources Research Office (HUMRRO), is to compare the job performance of men in mental category IV with all other higher mental categories, to determine how selection and classification procedures can be improved.

Project Realistic, also conducted by HUMRRO, is to determine the level of reading and arithmetic and listening skill required for a variety of MOSs.

Apstrat, again by HUMRRO, is the application of laboratory-developed training techniques to field training used to determine the most efficient methods of training when there is a wide variety of trainee ability in the group.

The last one is Optimum Mental Distribution, which is conducted by the Army's Behavioral Science Research Laboratories. This is to identify the minimum personnel qualifications that can be accepted in a small unit without degrading small unit performance.

These are four research-type studies being conducted.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did you mention Project 100,000, Characteristic and Performance—New Standards?

Colonel CONATY. That is not a study per se, Mr. Lipscomb. That is a collection of data on these people in comparison with a control group to determine how they perform. It is an in-house activity done in our office in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are all of these costs for these studies included in the figure that you gave?

Colonel CONATY. Yes, sir; they are.

#### COST OF PROJECT EVALUATION STUDIES

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What is the cost of these studies, including this ongoing Project 100,000, Characteristic and Performance—New Standards?

Colonel CONATY. The research for Army and OSD funds for fiscal year 1970 on Project 100,000 that I mentioned is \$350,000. I will have to check this. The data processing, which essentially is what we are talking about on collecting the data, is \$187,550 in 1969, and \$178,750 in 1970. That is primarily the use of data processing equipment to follow these people by name.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So, how much in total are you spending in 1970?

Colonel CONATY. In 1970, that would be \$528,750.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How much did you spend in 1969, or do you estimate spending in 1969?

Colonel CONATY. In 1969, it is \$688,550.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. A year ago before this committee, it was indicated that \$500,000 would be spent.

Colonel CONATY. The \$500,000 is R.D.T. & E. The other is data processing time. It is not a study per se, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How many people do you estimate you have, both military and civilian, making studies for Project 100,000?

Colonel CONATY. I do not know how many, but I will insert that for the record. We have two people in our office who are responsible for Project 100,000 and the data collection effort.

(The information follows:)

The U.S. Army Behavioral Science Research Laboratory (BESRL) has seven professional civil service personnel conducting the study Optimum Mental Distribution.

The Human Resources Research Office (HUMRRO) has 11 professional contract personnel and five military personnel conducting the studies REALISTIC, UTILITY, and APSTRAT.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Could you for the record insert the findings to date, at least a summary of findings to date, on these three studies or, if you do not have a summary, indicate the status of the studies?

Colonel CONATY. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

## PROJECT 100,000—SUMMARY OF CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE

There is no research study entitled "Project One Hundred Thousand." Items of information pertaining to characteristics and performance are gathered on men accepted under this program and statistics derived from the information are continuously evaluated by the Army staff. A summary of the data to December 31, 1968, follows:

## CHARACTERISTICS

	Project 100,000 men	Control group
1. Average age (years).....	20.9	20.4
2. Non-Caucasian (percent).....	43.5	8.0
3. High school graduates (percent).....	42.2	73.0
4. Number of school grades completed (average).....	10.5	12.1
5. Reading ability (median grade).....	5.9	10.9
6. Percent with prior civil court convictions (percent).....	9.1	9.5

## PERFORMANCE (IN PERCENT)

Training (percent successfully completing):		
Basic training.....	97.0	97.9
Advanced individual training (combat).....	97.5	98.2
Advanced individual training (support).....	86.0	94.8
Promotion (12 to 15 months' service):		
Grade:		
E-3.....	60.8	50.2
E-4.....	38.5	45.3
E-5.....	.7	4.5
Discipline (12 to 15 months' service):		
Court-martial convictions.....	2.2	.9
Nonjudicial punishments.....	12.1	4.6
Efficiency ratings:		
Excellent.....	93.8	97.4
Good.....	3.5	1.6
Fair.....	1.0	.3
Unsatisfactory.....	1.7	.7
Conduct ratings:		
Excellent.....	94.4	98.1
Good.....	2.8	.9
Fair.....	.9	.3
Unsatisfactory.....	1.9	.7

## Study of Men in Lower Mental Categories: Job Performance and the Identification of Potentially Successful Men

### STATUS REPORT—PROJECT UTILITY

#### *Objective*

Using selected MOS's, to determine how men in mental category IV and men in other mental categories compare both in the performance of their jobs and in their overall suitability for military service; to identify characteristics of men in category IV that are associated with successful performance on the job; and to determine what background and other nonintellectual measures might prove useful in screening, classifying, and assigning such men.

#### *Data collection*

Data collection involves obtaining descriptor, predictor, and criteria (e.g., job sample and job knowledge testing) data for 180 men from mental category IV and 180 men in mental categories I-III in each of five military occupational specialties (MOS). These MOS are armored crewman (11E), general vehicle repairman (63C), unit and organization supply specialist (76Y), medical specialist (94B), and cook (94B).

Data collection has been conducted and completed at Fort Hood and Fort Ord. Currently data is being collected at Fort Carson and various general hospitals in continental United States. The final site, U.S. Army, Europe, will be entered soon and all collection is expected to be complete by spring/early summer 1969.

#### *Projection on project completion*

Data collected at Forts Hood and Ord have been processed, coded, and forwarded to HumRRO Central Office for key punching. New data is being processed as rapidly as it is obtained. Assuming that no further delays occur, data will be complete by the end of fiscal year 1969. Analysis of the data and reports of findings are anticipated by the third quarter, fiscal year 1970.

### Analysis of Relation of U.S. Army Enlistment Standards to Prisoner Population (Stockade Study)

(This study applies to all men and not primarily to Project One Hundred Thousand)

#### SUMMARY OF STUDY

This study focused on relative rates for stockade accessions among various groups of first term Army enlisted men. Undoubtedly, none of these groups represents more stockade cases than men with clean discipline records. However, the relative rates help identify the groups more likely to contribute discipline problems.

The overall data, based on approximately 10,000 stockade cases and 35,000 control sample cases, show:

1. Very young soldiers, just meeting minimum age standards, were found about two and a half times (2.6) as often in the stockade cases as in the control sample. These 17- and 18-year-olds were 14 percent of first tour Army strength, but they amounted to 36 percent of prisoners under approved sentences.

2. High school dropouts were found about twice (2.2) as often in the stockade cases as in the control sample. These men with less than 12 full years of education were 33 percent of first tour Army strength, but they amounted to 73 percent of prisoners under approved sentences.

3. Men in the lowest acceptable mental category were found about one and a half times (1.6) as often in the stockade cases as in the control sample. These men in Armed Forces Qualification Test Category IV were 23 percent of first tour Army strength, but they amounted to 36 percent of prisoners under approved sentences.

4. Regular Army volunteers were found about one and a half times (1.4) as often in the stockade cases as in the control sample. The volunteers were 46 percent of first tour Army strength, but they amounted to 64 percent of prisoners under approved sentences.

## REMEDIAL READING TRAINING

Mr. DAVIS. Colonel, is this reading training course prebasic training, or are they taking some basic training coincidentally with their remedial reading training?

Colonel CONATY. It is prebasic, but there are trainers with them who make military men out of them at the same time. They look like soldiers. They move to and from classes together.

Mr. DAVIS. After they have completed this reading upgrading, then they go right into the same basic training?

Colonel CONATY. Yes, sir, and right in with all the other men.

Mr. DAVIS. I believe you said you were able to get 85 percent of them up to the 5th grade level.

Colonel CONATY. That is right.

Mr. DAVIS. What happens to the 15 percent that you cannot get up to that level?

Colonel CONATY. They go into the basic training course and they continue on. They probably will end up in infantry units.

Mr. DAVIS. The 15 percent that you cannot get up to the 5th grade reading level?

Colonel CONATY. That is right.

Mr. DAVIS. The same as the 85 percent?

Colonel CONATY. Not necessarily, but they probably would be in the combat arms.

General CASSIDY. They will be used as general-duty soldiers, where a low-skill level is required.

Colonel CONATY. But they are not tossed out of the Army because they do not get up to the 5th grade level.

Mr. DAVIS. Basically, how long is this reading course?

Colonel CONATY. Three to 6 weeks. Some of them come up faster than others, but 6 weeks is the length of the course.

Mr. DAVIS. If they do not make it in 6 weeks, you just figure there is no hope for them and you put them right in the general-duty forces, is that about it?

Colonel CONATY. Yes, sir. They come up very well.

Mr. GARRITY. Colonel, we were under the impression they were recycled through this course if they did not reach the standard within 6 weeks. Is that correct?

Colonel CONATY. I am not aware of that.

General CONNOR. I think this could well be done at the local level, sir, without our being aware of it.

Colonel CONATY. We recycle, of course, in basic training.

Mr. GARRITY. But this remedial reading is given prior to their assignment to a basic training unit.

Colonel CONATY. That is right, sir.

Mr. GARRITY. We were of the impression that if a man did not come up to the fifth-grade level within the 6-week period, he was recycled through for another 3 or 4 weeks. Will you check that, please, and see if that is correct?

Colonel CONATY. Very well, sir.

(The information follows:)

The maximum length of time a student may remain in reading training is 6 weeks. Students who do not achieve fifth grade reading level in 6 weeks are not recycled, but assigned to basic combat training.

General CONNOR. When this program was initiated, Mr. McNamara indicated he was willing to take as much as 3 months' additional training time to bring them to a satisfactory level. It has been with this guidance that we have been willing to spend more time with them.

Mr. DAVIS. The entire cost of the time they are spending in this course, then, is charged to this program in the figures that you gave?

General CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. Even though they might be taking some basic training coincidentally with it?

General CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

#### COST OF PROJECT BY SERVICE

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Would it be possible, Mr. Sinclair, at this point in the record to insert answers to the questions on Project 100,000 that apply to all three services, because Project 100,000 runs through all three services. Perhaps if we got it all at one place it would be better, giving the total cost, the personnel, and what is going into this program.

Mr. SINCLAIR. Yes; we can do that.

(The information follows:)

Estimated Army cost data and personnel requirements for the program are as follows:

#### SUMMARY OF PROJECT 100,000 COSTS

	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970
<b>Fixed costs:</b>			
Research and development.....	\$407,000	\$501,000	\$350,000
Data processing.....	268,800	187,550	178,750
Administration.....	35,223	35,223	35,223
Remedial reading.....	231,560	6,469,142	8,177,040
<b>Total fixed costs.....</b>	<b>942,583</b>	<b>7,192,915</b>	<b>8,741,013</b>
<b>Variable costs:</b>			
Additional training.....	3,715,860	3,417,975	3,531,316
Medical remedial.....	272,705	340,706	340,706
Procurement.....	212,503	165,192	163,041
<b>Total variable costs.....</b>	<b>4,201,068</b>	<b>3,923,873</b>	<b>4,035,063</b>
<b>Total cost estimate (fixed and variable).....</b>	<b>5,143,651</b>	<b>11,116,788</b>	<b>12,776,076</b>
MPA.....	3,088,947	4,773,098	7,794,719
O. & M.A.....	1,647,704	5,842,690	4,631,357
R.D.T. & E.....	407,000	501,000	350,000

*Additional personnel requirements: Administration, 3 officers; training, 330 trainers.*

PROJECT 100,000  
(Dollar amounts in thousands)

	Support personnel		Cost		
	Military strength	Civilian strength	O. & M.	Military personnel	R.D.T. & E.
<b>1968</b>					
Army.....	3	339	\$1,648	\$3,089	\$407
Navy.....	22		1,141	1,013	162
Marine Corps.....			65		
Air Force.....	352	34	616	1,976	
Defense agencies.....			23		515
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>377</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>2,493</b>	<b>6,078</b>	<b>1,084</b>
<b>1969</b>					
Army.....	3	339	5,843	4,773	501
Navy.....	30		1,319	1,074	35
Marine Corps.....			60		
Air Force.....	473	31	498	2,649	
Defense agencies.....			18		515
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>506</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>7,738</b>	<b>8,496</b>	<b>1,051</b>
<b>1970</b>					
Army.....	3	339	4,631	7,795	350
Navy.....	30		1,291	1,141	12
Marine Corps.....			60		
Air Force.....	475	30	495	2,664	
Defense agencies.....					515
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>508</b>	<b>369</b>	<b>6,477</b>	<b>11,600</b>	<b>877</b>

DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, you know considerable about this program. Would you want to discuss any disciplinary problems in regard to people in the 100,000 program and/or discharge rates from Project 100,000?

General CONNOR. The rates have been slightly higher than that of the control group, sir. I have the statistics here. They have not been abnormally high. We do not feel they have been so high as to cause concern about the program itself. There has been enough good come out of it that it is worth the bad that has gone along with it.

Our attrition rate is 3 percent, compared to 2.1 percent in the control group; 2.5 percent are attrited from combat AIT, compared to 1.8 percent in the control group; 14 percent are attrited from non-combat AIT, compared to 5.2 percent in the control group. These are some courses that are a little more technical.

Interestingly enough, in civil court convictions prior to service, we have had 90.9 percent with none, compared to 90.5 percent in the control group. One or more civil convictions, 9.1 percent in Project

100,000 people, 9.5 percent in the control group; 56.5 percent of these people are Caucasian, 43.5 non-Caucasian. In the control group, 92 percent are Caucasian and 8 percent non-Caucasian.

The high school graduate level is about half what it is in the control group, 42.2 percent compared to 73 percent. There are 36 percent who are below the fifth-grade reading level, compared to 3.3 percent in the control group.

The control group, of course, are people arbitrarily picked up to measure Project 100,000 against 10 percent of the samplings of all accessions.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Are the costs of the higher discharge rate and the costs of the additional disciplinary actions that are taken included in the cost of Project 100,000?

**General CONNOR.** I am informed that they include the higher discharge rates, Mr. Lipscomb.

#### MISSION OF PROJECT 100,000

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** General, in your professional judgment, do you think that Project 100,000 has increased the efficiency and quality of the U.S. Army?

**General CONNOR.** No, sir; we cannot say that, and did not ever expect to. That was not the mission.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What was the mission, sir?

**General CONNOR.** The mission was to raise the potential, the expectation level of a group of men who otherwise would have been denied this opportunity. It was to offer military service to some people who otherwise would not have been eligible to serve.

It has not increased the efficiency or the effectiveness of the Army. The Army has been able to bring these men up to standards that they have never achieved before. In that light, it has been most worthwhile. In terms of measuring military efficiency, it has taken resources and trainers and effort that we would have preferred to put other places.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Have you had an opportunity to give any thought to whether these men could well be trained by the massive programs we have going in other agencies of our Government, such as the different vocational education programs, the Job Corps, and things of this sort?

**General CONNOR.** We feel definitely they could be trained there. I do not think they would be trained as well. I think we are pretty much experts at training in this area. The Army did not volunteer for this mission, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** I am just trying to get the rationale. We know we are short of skilled personnel. It takes a skilled person to make these people qualify so you can use them in the Army. We have the problem in our civilian categories, and yet we are diverting these assets for programs that should be taken care of by other Government agencies.

**General CONNOR.** At the same time, we are putting into uniform men who otherwise would not be there, which keeps somebody else out of uniform.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, will you provide the committee with some statistics on the number of personnel accepted by the Army in each category since the start of Project 100,000, and compare these statistics with the year prior to the initiation of the project, similar to the chart on page 91 of last year's hearings on Military Personnel?

General CONNOR. We will do that, sir.

(The information follows:)

Summary of accessions for the periods indicated:

*Oct. 1, 1966, to Feb. 28, 1968 (29 months)*

Category I.....	66,469
Category II.....	316,257
Category III.....	433,215
Category IV, other than Project 100,000.....	188,457
Category IV, Project 100,000.....	123,992
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>1,128,390</b>

*Fiscal year 1966 (12 months)*

Category I.....	27,444
Category II.....	139,285
Category III.....	207,669
Category IV.....	114,675
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>489,073</b>

**PROJECT TRANSITION**

**PERSONNEL ASSIGNED**

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I noticed in your statement which you presented to the committee that you failed to mention Project Transition.

Along the same lines of the past questions, could you coordinate with the other services and DOD and provide a table showing the number of civilian and military personnel who are required either full time or part time to support Project Transition?

(Information provided on page 58.)

**COST OF PROJECT TRANSITION**

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What are the estimated costs to the Army for Project Transition for fiscal year 1969 and fiscal year 1970?

(The information follows:)

The estimated costs of Project Transition are as follows:

	<i>In thousands</i>
Fiscal year 1969.....	\$8,819
Fiscal year 1970.....	10,719

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Also for the record provide the complete cost to each service and OSD for Project Transition in fiscal year 1968, and the estimated cost for 1969 and 1970. There were similar charts put in the record last year.

(The information follows:)

PROJECT TRANSITION  
 (Dollar amounts in thousands)

	Support personnel		Cost		
	Military strength	Civilian strength	O. & M.	Military personnel	R.D. & E
<b>1968</b>					
Army.....			\$4,700	\$100	
Navy.....	31	22	105	13	
Marine Corps.....	27		74	221	
Air Force.....			1,800		
Defense agencies.....			1		
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>6,680</b>	<b>334</b>	
<b>1969</b>					
Army.....		391	8,819		
Navy.....	59	82	500	500	
Marine Corps.....	27	38	1,035	239	
Air Force.....	453	178	2,600	1,500	
Defense agencies.....		46	371		\$96
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>735</b>	<b>13,325</b>	<b>2,239</b>	<b>96</b>
<b>1970</b>					
Army.....		497	10,719		
Navy.....	59	82	1,270	500	
Marine Corps.....	27	38	1,035	239	
Air Force.....	400	178	1,400	2,700	
Defense agencies.....		50	1,152		95
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>486</b>	<b>845</b>	<b>15,576</b>	<b>3,439</b>	<b>95</b>

OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM

Mr. GARRITY. General, would you bring us up to date on Project Transition?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. We have recently specified the priorities of training in Project Transition. Our first priority goes to the physically handicapped as a result of service-connected disability. Our second priority goes to those individuals who have no marketable skill, who cannot reenlist in the Army but if they left the Army would be unable to get a job because of lack of a skill. Our third priority goes to those individuals in the combat arms who have not picked up a marketable civilian skill while in uniform. We allow a certain amount of on-duty transition training for people in these categories.

Basically, what we are trying to do is to improve their educational level. That is where the bulk of the effort is, although there is some type of technical training primarily under the auspices of civilian industry, set up either on or immediately adjacent to our major installations.

Mr. GARRITY. Would you give us an example of the type of training programs you now have underway?

General CONNOR. There is a vast variety of programs. Several of the oil companies have come in with programs teaching soldiers how to run filling stations. Many local industries, some of them quite small, running from a Dairy Queen on up to maybe a supermarket, will have little training programs for one or two or three individuals a couple or 3 hours a day.

Mr. GARRITY. We have heard that your biggest training program is with the Post Office Department.

General CONNOR. That is one; yes, sir.

Mr. GARRITY. Have you any idea how many you are running through that training program?

General CONNOR. I will furnish the number for the record, sir. I do not have it.

(The information follows:)

The number of personnel who participated in Project Transition training with the U.S. Post Office in calendar year 1968 is 11,331.

Mr. ANDREWS. General, does the Army encourage that type of training?

General CONNOR. For the Post Office Department?

Mr. ANDREWS. Any of these outside jobs.

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. Among the categories that I enumerated. We have many other soldiers who have a marketable skill and would like to get off duty a half day each day to go down and work off the post. We do not encourage this sort of thing.

#### OFF-DUTY PRACTICE BY ARMY DOCTORS

Mr. ANDREWS. General, do you have any rules against Army doctors practicing on a limited scale in nearby small towns?

General HEATON. We certainly do; yes, sir. They are in the service, and they are supposed to be responsive to the Army 24 hours a day. In any emergency, of course, we all go out and help; but, by and large, they do not go out and practice adjacent to their assignment.

I am speaking of doctors. You are speaking now of doctors?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes; that is what I had reference to.

General HEATON. Our enlisted men can do this moonlighting business on occasion. I know that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are your doctors subject to call 24 hours a day, 7 days a week?

General HEATON. Yes, sir. They get time off, you know.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are the occasions when they have time off on the weekends, Saturdays and Sundays?

General HEATON. Weekends. They may get an afternoon off during the week. It depends upon the local hospital and the needs of that hospital.

Mr. ANDREWS. There is a little town in my district about 30 miles from Fort Benning. A part of Fort Benning is in my district. Several years ago two young men, doctors, went to that small town and rendered a great service to that little town, which did not have a doctor. They were transferred for some reason, and they have not been able to get anybody else to go down there.

I was just wondering if you had any policy that would restrict a doctor from serving in that capacity on his time off, if he had any.

General HEATON. As I said, in an extreme emergency, that can be done, Mr. Andrews, but by and large, the civilian professional people bitterly resent it.

In many instances, our doctors who are assigned to Benning in that category may not have a license to practice in the State of Georgia, you see. They are very strict about things like that in our profession.

We have so much to do ourselves, I do not see how they would have time or energy to go out like that.

Mr. ANDREWS. This town of about 2,000 people does not have a doctor, and they are in serious need of one. You cannot get a doctor to go to these small towns if there is not a hospital. This town is not big enough to have a hospital.

I would hope that you could work out some plan to let the doctors do a little moonlighting on their own time.

General HEATON. We will look into that.

Mr. ANDREWS. They would render a great service. I am sure there are many places like that near big Army installations.

General HEATON. I will look into it.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. GARRITY. Will you provide for the record a schedule showing the number of personnel in Project Transition and their length of service?

General CONNOR. We will.

(The information follows:)

Thirty thousand eight hundred twenty personnel completed transition training during calendar year 1968. The length of service of these personnel is as follows:

	<i>Percent</i>
2 to 4 years.....	87
5 to 10 years.....	4.7
10 to 19 years.....	.8
20 years and over.....	7.5

#### MEDICAL SERVICE IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us something about your situation in Vietnam. Do you need anything? Have you got all you need?

General HEATON. The American soldier in Vietnam today, Mr. Andrews, is getting better care than we have ever provided in any previous war. It is of unparalleled excellence and unprecedented sophistication.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have enough hospital beds?

General HEATON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is your system there of transferring wounded patients?

General HEATON. In-country?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

General HEATON. To serve that country we have 11 evacuation hospitals, seven surgical hospitals, and five field hospitals, over 6,000 beds, from Quang Tri on the north to Can Tho on the south. They are amply staffed. The equipment is excellent and they are performing in magnificent fashion.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you move your field hospitals from time to time to follow the action?

General HEATON. We move surgical hospitals. They are 60-bed hospitals, as you know. We will move them to follow the action but, by and large, our hospitals are more stable over there than in previous combat environments. They are more stable in their location.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the Army using a hospital ship?

General HEATON. No, sir; that is Navy.

Mr. ANDREWS. Did you suffer any damage during the Tet offensive?

General HEATON. We suffered damage all along, particularly in our inflatable hospitals down in the Delta, so much so that in months gone by we would almost be forced to bring out the wounded, in the evening into our Third Field Hospital in Saigon because of the rocketing in there through the night. But we don't have to do that any more. This sort of goes on all the time. Also, the hospital at Cu Chi, the 12th Evacuation Hospital, where the 25th Division is, suffers from these rockets. The 71st Evacuation Hospital at Pleiku and the 45th Surgical Unit at Tay Ninh are, by and large, the ones that are taking the brunt of this rocketing.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think those rocket hits are deliberate or miscalculated shots?

General HEATON. I wouldn't know about that, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I assume your hospitals are well identified?

General HEATON. They were well identified. They are all sandbagged very effectively with bunkers, of course, for the staff and the ambulatory patients. They are well bunkered also for the bed patients who during this rocketing are all placed under the bed.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have a sufficient number of nurses, technicians and doctors?

General HEATON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. And you know of nothing that your department needs for Southeast Asia which is covered by this budget?

General HEATON. Not over there; no, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the Air Force have exclusive jurisdiction over transferring the wounded patients?

General HEATON. From Vietnam to Japan, and Japan to the United States; yes sir. We have our own helicopters in Vietnam, our own medical helicopters, our own crewmen, and our own radio network.

Mr. ANDREWS. They bring the wounded patients out of there?

General HEATON. Out of there, yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. How about the impact on your continental hospitals, do you have ample facilities to take care of the wounded?

General HEATON. We have ample facilities. You might be interested to know that we averaged in 1967 around 1,000 per month Vietnamese casualties coming back to the United States. In 1968 we averaged over 2,200 per month back to this country.

Mr. ANDREWS. That speaks well for your department, but it is a sad escalation of casualties.

General HEATON. Very bad.

Mr. ANDREWS. The television and radio have reported that, approximately 2,000 were wounded last week and 1,100 of them required hospital treatment. Does that mean the more severely wounded?

General HEATON. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. General Connor, does this budget project the present level of the war throughout fiscal 1970?

General CONNOR. Yes. It contemplates no change in our Vietnamese situation as we see it right now, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. General Heaton, on page 62 of last year's record there was a table showing deaths of U.S. Army personnel. I wish you would update that table.

General HEATON. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

DEATHS OF U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL

	Calendar year 1967			Calendar year 1968			Calendar year 1969 <sup>1</sup>		
	Host	Non-host	Total	Host	Non-host	Total	Host	Non-host	Total
RVN.....	5,441	1,002	6,443	9,305	1,255	10,560	1,497	263	1,760
Korea.....	16	54	70	17	75	92	-----	13	13
Worldwide.....	-----	2,114	2,114	-----	2,117	2,117	-----	399	399
Aggregate.....	5,457	3,170	8,627	9,322	3,447	12,769	1,497	675	2,172

<sup>1</sup> Through 2400 hours Mar. 11, 1969.

*Vietnam casualties (Jan. 1, 1961 to Mar. 11, 1969)*

Hostile deaths.....	20,394
Nonhostile deaths.....	3,415
Hostile wounded <sup>1</sup> .....	{ <sup>2</sup> 61,112
Nonhostile wounded.....	{ <sup>2</sup> 64,593
Current hostile missing.....	1,955
Current nonhostile missing.....	202
Current captured/interned.....	84
	40

<sup>1</sup> Wounded data as of Mar. 8, 1969.

<sup>2</sup> Hospital care required.

<sup>3</sup> Hospital care not required.

INCREASE IN A.W.O.L. AND DESERTIONS

Mr. ANDREWS. General Connor, this morning you discussed briefly the big increase in the rate of A.W.O.L. cases. Do you think that most of those who have gone A.W.O.L. or deserted were in that category of misfits that you spoke about? I believe that is the way you described it.

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. I think the great increase that we are experiencing is due primarily to that category of people. I won't say that this is the reason all of them have gone. We have young fellows who because they cannot get satisfaction from their commander on the ground or because the commander is not far enough along in his development to be able to handle their problems, who will take off and go A.W.O.L. We have a large number of these young soldiers who feel—whom we feel can be rehabilitated, so to speak. We have opened up a training facility at Fort Riley, Kans. This is a rehabilitation-type facility where we are having pretty good luck in taking a young man who has gone A.W.O.L. two or three times, put him under the right kind of leadership and right kind of trainers, and we have turned them into useful soldiers.

In this group that are deserting to foreign countries it runs the gamut from the extreme pacifist to the no-good drug addict who is just trying to escape detention.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about the rate in South Vietnam, is it increasing or is it stable?

General CONNOR. I am not aware of any changes. I will furnish statistics for the record, if that is satisfactory.

(The information follows:)

OFFENSES, U.S. ARMY, VIETNAM

(Numbers per thousand)

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS AND PROPERTY <sup>1</sup>

	1st quarter	2d quarter	3d quarter	4th quarter
Fiscal year 1968.....	3.74	2.87	3.27	2.84
Fiscal year 1969.....	3.76	4.03		

MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSES <sup>2</sup>

Fiscal year 1968.....	3.59	3.33	3.21	3.59
Fiscal year 1969.....	5.07	6.19		

MILITARY OFFENSES <sup>3</sup>

Fiscal year 1968.....	22.99	28.22	23.65	25.42
Fiscal year 1969.....	24.56	24.31		

AWOL AND DROPPED FROM ROLLS AS DESERTER (DFR); U.S. ARMY, VIETNAM, NUMBER PER 1,000 AVERAGE ENLISTED STRENGTH <sup>4</sup>

	AWOL	Monthly average	DFR	Monthly average
Fiscal year 1967.....	24.6	2.05	5.9	0.49
Fiscal year 1968.....	25.2	2.10	4.5	.37
Fiscal year 1969.....	13.9	2.78	2.3	.46

<sup>1</sup> Includes murder, manslaughter, rape, carnal knowledge, aggravated assault, simple assault, robbery, burglary, larceny over \$50, larceny \$50 or less, wrongful appropriation, fraud and other.

<sup>2</sup> Includes disorderly conduct, drunkenness, narcotics, nonnarcotic abuse drugs, black market activities, homosexuality, sexual offenses, and other.

<sup>3</sup> Includes AWOL, pass violations, off limits, violations of regulations or procedures, and other.

<sup>4</sup> The data source for AWOL and DFR is different than that for the offenses displayed above. Number is computed from strength accounting records. They are based on average enlisted rather than average total strength and reflect the number of individual offenses.

<sup>5</sup> Number per thousand, July–November 1968.

General CONNOR. As far as I am able to judge from the reports I get, we are experiencing about the same level of disciplinary problems as we have right along, over there.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Addabbo.

USE OF MARIHUANA IN VIETNAM

Mr. ADDABBO. General, has there been any increase in the known use of drugs, marihuana for example, in Vietnam?

General CONNOR. Last year we began experiencing what we consider to be an increase in the use of marihuana. We find our statistics are up basically because we have improved our detection methods, because people are more conscious of the symptoms, because we have got better means of finding the stuff, and so on. Our violations in Vietnam as a result of marihuana and drug violations, and this is general court-martial convictions—we had 11 in 1966, 9 in 1967, and 16 in 1968. With respect to marihuana, the number of suspects 1 January through

31 December, 2,956 marihuana, 118 hard narcotics, 41 dangerous drugs.

Mr. ADDABBO. Do you have any program going on either here or in Vietnam relative to the education of servicemen as to the harms and the ills with respect to the use of drugs?

General CONNOR. Indeed we do, sir, including a very excellent pamphlet that has been put together by the Defense Department.

Mr. ADDABBO. Will you supply that for the record?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Information requested is included in the insert on page 88.

#### EFFECT OF PAY INCREASES ON REENLISTMENT RATE

Mr. ADDABBO. With the several increases in salary and other increases in the increments of the servicemen's pay over the last few years, has there been any increase in reenlistments or in volunteers? Let us say over the past 2 years, have there been any increases in either of these areas?

General CONNOR. Our reenlistment rate is dropping off, although the number is remaining level. That is, the rate is dropping off because the size of the Army has increased.

We cannot say that the pay increases have not helped, because there are undoubtedly men who have reenlisted because of the pay increases. On the other hand, there have been other factors influencing the service in the last 2 or 3 years that have mitigated against a high reenlistment rate; repetitive tours in Vietnam being among the major factors.

Mr. ADDABBO. There has been no appreciable increase in reenlistments or volunteers since the new salaries?

General CONNOR. No, sir.

#### PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS

Mr. ADDABBO. Has there been any directive or order from your office relative to participation in any demonstrations, peace or otherwise, as far as the enlisted man or officer is concerned?

General CONNOR. We have had scattered incidents of dissidence on Army posts. There have been one or two incidents down at Fort Jackson. We have, of course, the well-documented problem in the stockade out in San Francisco. Now, the participants there are now under trial. We have coffeehouses that have grown up around some of our installations, Fort Hood, Fort Jackson, Fort Lewis. Now, they are encouraging dissident-type activities among young soldiers. Many of these came into the Army for this purpose, we feel; but, for the most part we have kept it under control, or we think we have it under control, at least we are fully knowledgeable about what is going on.

Mr. ADDABBO. Have there been any restrictions or other orders issued relative to participation in demonstrations of one type or another, issued by the Pentagon?

General CONNOR. No, sir. We have had standing instructions on this right along, that it is contrary to Army regulation to participate in this type activity when in uniform.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** There has been discussion here on Capitol Hill and in the newspapers relative to the penalties imposed. I believe one of those convicted as being guilty got a sentence of 14 years at hard labor. Now, is this commensurate with the crime? Is there precedent for this type of sentence? Is this one of the methods being used to try to quell participation in demonstrations of one sort or another?

**General CONNOR.** I am not sure—are you talking about the conviction in the stockade at San Francisco?

**Mr. ADDABBO.** Yes.

**General CONNOR.** Well, I think it would be improper for me to comment on that before the case has been reviewed.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** I believe one of them has been sentenced to 14 years at hard labor.

**General CONNOR.** Yes; but his case is still under review. Final sentence is still to be determined.

#### REASSIGNMENT WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE

**Mr. ADDABBO.** General, I have before me a particular case relative to compassionate reassignment. A boy was granted compassionate reassignment, but one of the provisos was subject to a slot or a position being open in and around his area, the New York area. Now, what are the general rules as far as compassionate reassignment, once they have been granted?

**General CONNOR.** We try to be as liberal as possible in placing individuals where they want to serve. This is not always possible, as you can well imagine, because frequently there is no need for the particular skills the man has in that particular area. For example, somebody might want to serve at Fort Meade who is a combat engineer. There is no job for a combat engineer at Fort Meade. Now, I use that as an example.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** Around the New York area we have many installations; is that correct?

**General CONNOR.** We have Fort Dix. I think maybe General Cassidy can enlarge on this. He is pretty active in reassignments.

**General CASSIDY.** I have talked to you on the phone several times.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** Yes.

**General CASSIDY.** I think we have taken care of most of your cases satisfactorily.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** And I appreciate it.

**General CASSIDY.** Generally, a soldier puts a request for a specific location on his preference card. We look at that to see if we can give him his preference.

**Mr. FLOOD.** Does anybody in the Army believe that?

**General CASSIDY.** Yes, sir. They are encouraged to put in their preference cards.

**Mr. FLOOD.** Yes, I know, but do they believe it?

**General CASSIDY.** Do the soldiers believe it?

**Mr. ADDABBO.** Not the soldiers; the one who reads the preference cards.

**General CASSIDY.** Yes; we would rather put a man in a place where he wants to go if we have a requirement there.

**Mr. FLOOD.** Do the soldiers believe it? Do you think so? What do the troops think? What do you think?

**General CASSIDY.** Sir, we have here a former director of enlisted personnel who gave the enlisted men their preference, General Johnson. He is now in a different position, but I think he will back me up when I say that our soldiers do believe it, the bulk of them. Unfortunately, some of our young soldiers like to write letters. They think they can get better answers by writing to me. I get a lot of letters personally.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** And Congressmen also.

**General CASSIDY.** Congressman, the Chief of Staff, General Connor; when actually if they would go to the company commander and put it on the preference sheet, we will do the same thing for them. It is our desire to do the best we can for them. At present, we are able to fill about 16 percent of the requests.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** Is it not a fact that Fort Hood has been undermanned and in order to bring it up to strength you have been assigning everybody to Fort Hood, regardless of their individual preference?

**General CASSIDY.** Generally, because of the requirement, because of the MOC, because we are bringing it up to requirement. ———. We are trying to bring the units at Fort Hood to a higher readiness condition.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** And that takes precedence over the soldier's individual preference.

**General CASSIDY.** Yes, sir; because that is a military requirement, sir.

#### DRAFTING OF MEDICALLY HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUALS

**Mr. ADDABBO.** General Heaton, we have run into many situations—and I believe we have discussed this before—where we find that a boy is drafted who should never have been drafted in the first place. Several of those matters have been brought to your attention. Has any new regulation or order or directive been issued to try to correct this situation?

**General HEATON.** Well, I know nothing new except the fact that those cases come to our attention, as you know, and we do our very best to right a wrong that has been committed in the original drafting of this individual and the original medical survey of him at the AFEES station.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** One of the questions propounded by Mr. Andrews was "Do you have enough doctors?" I believe your answer was "Yes."

In one of our previous discussions one of the reasons that sometimes these individuals were missed was because you did not have enough doctors on hand, and the examination was not as complete as it should be.

**General HEATON.** They have enough doctors at the AFEES station, if that is what you are addressing yourself to, but sometimes an influx will preclude a thorough examination as should have been undertaken, you see. That accounts in part for the missing of some of these obvious disabilities.

**Mr. ADDABBO.** Has any thought been given to permitting the Draft Board to look into the question of medical deferments? Right now I understand the Draft Board does not have jurisdiction over a medical

deferment, it has to be passed on by the Surgeon General's Office or a physical given after the person has been drafted. Has anything been discussed or investigated so far as that is concerned?

General HEATON. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you. No further questions.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Flood.

Mr. FLOOD. Along that same line, Skipper, of recent months there are people who are coming in who should not be in, and their number is becoming legion. We probably should create a special battalion for these poor fellows as they did in the Foreign Legion. Nobody knows how they got there, nobody wants them, and you get stuck with all the headaches. Is there some way, administratively or otherwise, or a conversation between you and General Hershey, to cut off this unnecessary influx of these patently obvious misfits. These individuals who are accompanied to the induction center with hospital records, analyses of all kinds where even the elevator operator knows the guy should not be in the service. But it is the old World War I story: "Poke him. If he is hot, he is in."

Now, following up my friend's question, what can we do about this? Can you help us? Can we help you?

General HEATON. We absolutely agree with you, Mr. Flood. We are monitoring that all the time because, as you know, that makes an awful lot of work for us.

Mr. FLOOD. Yes; I know.

General HEATON. You also know there is an injustice done there. We certainly try to get them out. We have people going around—the various Army surgeons of the six areas go to the AFES stations trying to get this message across to those doctors there in the stations, to exercise more and more and more care in the examination of these individuals.

Mr. FLOOD. From what we hear, it is very bad. Here is a guy with a foot one and one-half inches short and they say "Don't worry about that, Mike. We will put you in noncombat duty." Or in another case, a kid with a silver plate in his head, all the records are there before the town doctor. Now, it embarrasses the military people there because they know the kid should not be taken in but they are all NCO's, so what can they say? These medics will pass them. Why do you think they do that? They know better.

General HEATON. I don't know why they do it, really. I wish I could answer that question. As I say, it is a continual problem, and a continual monitoring problem by the Chief Surgeons of the various Armies in this country on a day-by-day basis. God knows, I wish we had a more effective way.

Mr. FLOOD. I believe that. It makes us all look silly beginning with the induction center back home, the Congressman, you, the Army, the Government. It becomes a town joke when this guy is taken in.

There is a second point, of course, but this is not your problem, or is it? If you fellows keep him more than 90 days then we are stuck with him for life and the Veterans' Administration and all its manifold emoluments—

General HEATON. That is right.

Mr. FLOOD. Just 90 days. This poor fellow should never have left town. Now, they hide him for 90 days because somebody is after him,

maybe you, and then he goes out and we are stuck with him for life. That is a very, very big problem and it is getting worse. I do not know what to do about it.

General HEATON. You can be sure that we have done and are doing all we possibly can to cut down on this.—

Mr. FLOOD. I know this.

General HEATON (continuing). And stimulating the local doctors, which is the first point of contact, and the most effective point, at the various AFEEES stations in this country. It is not a very desirable job, you know. There are some that like those jobs because they are nearer their homes, you see. We try to place them where they want to go, also. You can be assured we will do our very best to ride herd on them.

Mr. FLOOD. I am just repeating it for the purpose of emphasis. I have been at it since the War between the States and I have gotten no place yet. But I still try.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will the gentleman yield?

Years ago I was on the Independent Officers Committee and General Hershey came before our committee with his Selective Service request. We had no war going on at that time—one of the very few years since I have been here that we did not. He told us that they wanted to be doubly sure that a man was physically fit before they took him in. He said, any man over 40 can prove something is wrong with him and he is going to put the Government to a lot of expense after he gets out. If he served the 90 days and got in through Selective Service, he will be a disgruntled citizen the rest of his life if the Government does not take care of him through the VA.

So I am glad to see my colleagues here impress upon you the necessity to be sure that they do not slip by with some physical defect and then later say "Well, it was service-connected" and you have a big bill on your hands.

Mr. FLOOD. That is not just the Surgeon General's problem, that is the problem of the entire Department of Defense. We have the same thing in all branches of the service. They are getting saddled for life with these 90-day fellows who should not have been in. It is not their fault. They should not have been there in the first place. This is a very, very, very bad taxpayers' problem.

#### ARMY MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

Now, the Army gave birth in 1968 to a standing morale and discipline committee, General, to better analyze threats to the morale and the discipline of the Army.

Now, I know most of these statements are written by amateur O. Henrys out there. I know you did not write this one. But what about this standing committee of 1968? Will that go down in history as a great saviour and defender of Army morale and discipline? We have heard nothing about it since.

General CONNOR. No, sir; it is in existence and meets regularly. All it does is bring together the various people who are concerned with this problem. By that I mean the legal people, the Provost Marshal, the surgeon, the chaplains, representatives in the Department of the Deputy Chief of Staff—personnel who have to monitor these matters, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. It is simply a working group brought together to trade information, keep every agency abreast of developments. This enables us to keep commanders at vari-

ous echelons aware of all available information on the subject, particularly cleared and evaluated information.

Mr. FLOOD. Have these problems in direct ratio to the lowering of standards become more of a problem either with you and Dr. Heaton or the Department? Doctor, do you have psychiatric or psychological problems because of these lower IQ's? Do you fellows in personnel have trouble putting these square pegs into round holes, this personnel, as a result primarily of the lowering of standards for these different groups?

General CONNOR. No, sir; they are not the people who are causing the problem. The people who are causing these type problems are a little smarter.

Mr. FLOOD. The guardhouse lawyers are still on board; is that it?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Say something about that.

General CONNOR. Well, we have put our finger on a number of young individuals who are dissident, who are in the Army for the avowed purpose of upsetting the system, creating dissension.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you think there are people who actually join the Army or go along with the draft simply to be activists and stir up dissension?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. You do?

General CONNOR. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Do you have that kind of information?

General CONNOR. Yes; and we have them pretty well spotted. We know just about who they are.

Mr. FLOOD. Now, there you are; you have them spotted there, there, and there. Now, what do you do? Just spot them?

General CONNOR. No, sir. We try to prevent their activities from being detrimental to the Army's mission.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that all? You just try to restrict their activities? Here is a known dissident and your Intelligence people put your finger on him. What do you do?

General CONNOR. There are only certain legal things we can do, sir. As long as he is outwardly soldiering he has to be given the same consideration as any other soldier. When he steps over the bounds and can be arraigned and tried, this will happen. We are not about to let the Army fall apart with these people, I can assure you.

Mr. FLOOD. No, but I do not see why the Army after a couple of hundred years of taking care of people like this, and I never knew an outfit worthy of the name that could not take care of some goldbrick like that. There are ways, at least, there were. Are you afraid of them? You do not like your name in the newspaper?

General CONNOR. No. The lawyers have been more active in this area of late, sir. We don't have the same freedom we used to exercise in this area.

Mr. FLOOD. It is a tough war, isn't it? Lawyers; is that it?

#### VENEREAL DISEASE IN VIETNAM

How are the VD rates in Saigon this weekend?

General HEATON. They are doing better.

Mr. FLOOD. I am glad to hear that for a change. I think I know what you mean, but I am not sure which way. More or less?

General HEATON. We hit a peak in Vietnam per thousand of average strength per year, of 334.9 in 1963; 333.4 in 1964; 233.9 in 1967, and 193.2 in 1968.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that good or bad?

General HEATON. That is good.

Mr. FLOOD. Is it?

General HEATON. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. It shows that—

General HEATON. Well, it may be that they have been kept busier over there, perhaps. We must remember the South Vietnamese Government has absolutely no program whatsoever for these ladies. We have initiated several at AID, our State Department, I understand. Still, our people will tell you that these young ladies are difficult to find, difficult to follow, even though they are identified, because, as they say, they go in a hole and pull the hole in after them.

Mr. FLOOD. What about the record worldwide for all troops?

General HEATON. Worldwide, it is 85.0.

Mr. FLOOD. Is that good?

General HEATON. That is very good. It is down. The United States is holding its own at 32.1. Korea is not very good.

Mr. FLOOD. It never was, was it?

General HEATON. No, sir. It is 369.2.

#### ASSIGNMENT OF MEDICAL SPECIALISTS

Mr. FLOOD. What about doctors and M.D.'s themselves, do you still have to draft them?

General HEATON. Yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. Do we do pretty well in putting specialists, the real hot shots, where they belong?

General HEATON. Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. FLOOD. You make a point of that, do you?

General HEATON. Yes, sir. That is the reason we are having such excellent results in our care.

Mr. FLOOD. You used to have a bad record on that. You might find some long-haired specialists in a shell hole some night, but now I understand you make a point of this, the specialists, the real outstanding people are placed where they could do their best?

General HEATON. He is fittingly assigned; yes, sir.

Mr. FLOOD. I found out that for a change the troops think this too.

General HEATON. The troops in Vietnam know that they are going to be well taken care of because they know that over there we are sending the flower of the Army Medical Corps. Make no mistake about that. As I say, our results certainly attest to that.

Mr. FLOOD. Is the record still good on moving a wounded man out of the line back to a base or a ship?

General HEATON. Yes.

Mr. FLOOD. Still good, is it?

General HEATON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## ARMY TRAINED STRENGTH

Several questions have occurred as we have gone along here. They refer to a number of different things, General.

Your statement included estimates of your trained strength. I would assume that trained strength would include all of your on-board people except for those who are in basic training? That is essentially correct, is it?

General CONNOR. And advanced individual training. Once he is given an MOS, which he attains in AIT or on-the-job training because of a civilian-acquired skill that he brought on board with him, once he acquires an MOS he becomes a trained soldier. Now, he has a variety of skill levels but he is trained.

Mr. DAVIS. In determining your estimated trained strength, I assume that is going to depend heavily upon your reenlistment rate, is it not?

General CONNOR. And the draft.

Mr. DAVIS. Are you going to have a substantial number of people coming in by the draft who will, during the course of the year, achieve what you call the trained status?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir; you see, he achieves this status after 8 weeks of AIT, 8 weeks of BCT, a total of 16 weeks of training. Normally, after 4 months he is a trained soldier.

## IMPROVEMENTS IN THE REENLISTMENT RATE

Mr. DAVIS. I gathered from your statement that you have assumed in estimating your trained strength that the reenlistment rate is going to remain substantially stable and comparable to what it has been over the past few years.

General CONNOR. We are looking for a little improvement in it, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. When you give us a trained strength figure, then, this assumes there is going to be some improvement over the past in your reenlistment rate, does it?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I understood you to say this morning that in spite of all the incentives to reenlistment that had been provided there were other mitigating factors that were pulling in the other direction so that you were estimating about the same reenlistment rate as you had been having. Did I hear you correctly at that time?

General CONNOR. If I said that, I don't recall that specific statement, sir. I do say that we are having difficulty and our reenlistment rate had been dropping. It had actually leveled off in numbers by the rate had been dropping. We are looking for a little increase in the enlistment rate this year. For that reason we have raised our requirements on the reenlistment bonus.

Mr. DAVIS. You are clear, I am asking about reenlistment, not enlistment but reenlistment.

General CONNOR. It is the first reenlistment where the man picks up his variable reenlistment bonus. We are asking for slightly higher funds, \$52 million as opposed to \$50 million last year for this area.

Mr. DAVIS. How many reenlistees are you anticipating in your estimates?

General CONNOR. It is 84,800 within 90 days; over 90 days an additional 5,200; first term, 212,000. Now, I have a total here which includes draftees. Draftees will be 250,400 and the Reserve and National Guard accessions 2,400, 26,200 other gains giving us a grand total of 581,000.

Mr. DAVIS. You would not class all of those as reenlistees, would you?

General CONNOR. No, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. That is what I was trying to get at.

General CONNOR. Reenlistments are 84,800 in one category, and 5,200 in the category of over 90 days. You see, if he comes in within 90 days he reenlists in grade. If it is over 90 days he drops in grade.

Mr. DAVIS. This is something under 90,000 then, compared to the average over the past 5 years of about 80,000?

General CONNOR. In 1969 the figure was 76,100 within 90 days. In 1968 it was 81,000. So, as I say, we are a little optimistic. Of course, the forthcoming pay raise which is a substantial one, we feel is going to play a part in this.

#### OFFICER-ENLISTED RATIO

Mr. DAVIS. How do you account for the fact that in your projections of a lesser overall strength you contemplate having a greater number of officers?

General CONNOR. Our officers are allocated to us on the basis of numbers, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This in turn is tied in to validated officer spaces within the force structure. One place that is eating up officers as opposed to enlisted men is the military assistance teams, the advisory teams that we are putting into Vietnam with the popular forces. The ratio of that team, for example, is two officers to three enlisted men, a team of five men. We have a very large number of these teams operating out there. This in turn raises the officer-enlisted ratio. In terms of force structure, force requirements of this nature, we have more officer spaces than we had previously. Actually, our ratio has been running, in 1969, 11.13 percent, that is, officers per 100 enlisted men; in 1970 we project it at 11.35 percent. In 1960-61, for example, it was 11.5 percent. So our ratio is down from what it had been previously, although it is higher than it was in 1967.

Mr. DAVIS. In round numbers, about how many officers would be required by reason of the special circumstance to which you referred?

General CONNOR. About 400.

#### CONTINUATION PROGRAM FOR MEDICAL OFFICERS

Mr. DAVIS. Expand a little bit on that program which is called the continuation program, which relates to medical officers. This is probably familiar to my colleagues but it is not to me.

General HEATON. That is a mechanism whereby we have tried to hold key individuals in the Medical Corps by giving them, particularly in the upper brackets of rank, increased pay. For instance, a man who has attained the peak of efficiency at, say, 20 years, if he signs up for another year he will draw, in two increments, 4 months' pay in cash, which is around \$4,000 or \$5,000. That means a lot to that family in the education of the children. Then it goes on down in various ranks

to 2 months, 3 months. But in these upper ranks and that is the one we are concerned about because there are very competent surgeons, very competent internists, people like that. We have in that rank group a 90 percent take-on net. Now, getting down to the lower ranks and the lesser years of service, you run around 50 to 60 percent who are signing each year for that increment of pay. But it has been a great stimulus toward the retention of medical officers. We are very pleased with it.

Mr. DAVIS. Would that apply, then, to each additional year that he might agree to stay on?

General HEATON. That is right; yes, sir.

#### ACCELERATED PROMOTION IN THE MEDICAL CORPS

Mr. DAVIS. Would you give me the same explanation with respect to Public Law 90-228 which relates apparently to either temporary or accelerated promotion to the rank of colonel in the Medical Corps? What is that program?

General HEATON. That program calls for so many years in grade and so many years of professional training—here it is. From captain to major, in grade 3 years or 8 years professional training; major to lieutenant colonel in grade 5 years or 13 years professional training; lieutenant colonel to colonel in grade 7 years, or 20 years professional training.

Mr. DAVIS. Is that what it is, basically, then, an accelerated promotion program?

General HEATON. Yes, sir; an acceleration.

#### INCREASE IN VIETNAM TROOP STRENGTH

Mr. DAVIS. Now, General Connor, am I correct in interpreting the figure that at the end of calendar year 1969 there were 43,000 more Army personnel in Vietnam than there were at the beginning of that year?

General CONNOR. That sounds about right, sir. We had 319,600 in Vietnam in December of 1967 and 359,300 in December of 1968.

Mr. DAVIS. I think I took my figure of 43,000 as the difference between those who were assigned there and those that had been brought back. Would the other 3,000 be enroute or on leave, or something like that?

General CONNOR. It could be casualties and extensions, people who stay more than a year.

#### ACCURACY OF 1970 ESTIMATES

Mr. DAVIS. Last week in the hearings that we had on the supplemental appropriations we were asked for additional funds on the basis of an overall underestimate of the amount required for basic allowance and quarters. Has that underestimate been brought to your attention so that the revisions are reflected in the figures that we now have before us for fiscal 1970?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. Actually, what you are speaking of is the supplemental funding that took place as a result of basically the call-up of the Reserves which was not in the initial 1969 program. There

was additional funding required—this was one area—as a result of additional people being brought on duty. Starting with the new 1969 base, we are projecting an increase in BAQ because of the additional people who are qualified to draw these payments, more captains and majors.

Mr. DAVIS. I asked that specifically because in response to a question by Mr. Lipscomb last week, we were told that the preparation for fiscal 1970 estimates—and I am not sure was in this specific area—but preparation of the 1970 estimates had predated the information brought to our attention in the supplemental appropriation bill. So I wanted to be sure that this has not occurred here, that the experience that you have had with respect to basic allowances for quarters has been cranked into the figures that we now have before us for the 1970 fiscal year.

Mr. HUTCHISON. Yes, sir; that is true. We have updated our factors based on the underestimate that we talked about last week and we have the current factors in this budget request for 1970.

#### SPECIAL PAY ALLOWANCE

Mr. DAVIS. If I interpret page 16 of the justifications correctly, it would appear that 852,000 people in the Army are receiving special pay in some category or other. Is that correct? Meaning that something over half of the people in the Army are receiving special pay for some reason or other?

General CONNOR. That is correct, sir. Every man in Vietnam, for example, draws special pay. Some of them draw two, such as aviators, parachutists, demolition people, divers.

Mr. DAVIS. That would account for what you have listed in categories I and II, sea duty and duty at certain places.

Then there is a category V, 376,000, that is simply listed as other. What would that be?

General CONNOR. That is hostile fire pay, sir.

Mr. HUTCHISON. Due to classification, sir, we call it "other." It is hostile fire pay for those people in Vietnam and DMZ in Korea. Every one of the people in Vietnam and Korea also draws duty at certain locations pay. So, they are in both line 1B and in line 5 in the justifications. They are in there twice because they draw both of those pays. Duty at certain locations due to being separated from their family, and hostile fire pay because they are in a hostile zone.

Mr. DAVIS. We are not talking, then, about 852,000 individuals.

Mr. HUTCHISON. No, sir. We are talking about 852,000 payments. All the individuals in Vietnam and Korea get two payments.

We are talking about a maximum of 476,000 people, really. You see, duty at certain locations on that line.

#### APPOINTMENTS TO WEST POINT

Mr. DAVIS. What are the sources of your West Point cadets? I can account for about 660 of them through congressional appointments. Your freshman classes are running what—1,200 or 1,300, something like that?

General CONNOR. They are running about 1,300 now. We are building up to the 4,417, I believe, that the Academy is authorized.

The sources, other than congressional and senatorial appointments, are: The Vice President has five; the District of Columbia Commissioner has five; Canal Zone Governor, one; Puerto Rican Resident Commissioner or Governor, six; Presidential, annual, 100; Regular Army, annual, enlisted only, 85; Reserve Components, 85; honor military and honor naval schools, 20; sons of winners of the Congressional Medal of Honor, unlimited; and congressional-qualified alternates, ranked in order of merit by the Academic Board, 150 annually.

That is essentially the total number, sir.

#### OFFICERS IN GRADES HIGHER THAN PERMANENT RANK

Mr. DAVIS. How many officers do you have who are serving in and being paid for in grades above their permanent rank?

General CONNOR. Practically all. The only ones who are not are second lieutenants. Our temporary promotions precede the permanent promotions in practically all cases except the second lieutenants and certain general officers of the brigadier general and major general category, relatively few. About half of our generals are in permanent grades. All others, for the most part, are in temporary grades, although we have some permanent colonels in the latter years of their service where their permanent promotion has caught up with their temporary promotion, and they retire as permanent colonels.

Mr. DAVIS. Is there any substantial number who are serving in and being paid for grades more than one above their permanent rank?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir; lieutenant colonel and colonel and brigadier general in some cases.

Mr. DAVIS. Where their permanent rank would be captain or major?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Would you supply for the record the total number of overall commissioned officers who are serving two grades above their permanent rank?

(The information follows:)

The total number of Regular Army officers who are serving one to two or more grades above their permanent grade is as follows:

Grade	Permanent grade (Regular Army) number	Temporary grade (Army, United States)	
		1 grade higher	2 or more grades higher
General officers.....	279	165	21
Colonel.....	2,657	207	8
Lieutenant colonel.....	4,035	2,802	18
Major.....	10,450	9,381	661
Captain.....	13,591	12,656	635
First lieutenant.....	6,014	4,690	1,262
Second lieutenant.....	7,842	1,996	3,860
Total.....	44,868	31,897	6,465

#### CLOTHING AND UNIFORM ALLOWANCES FOR OFFICERS

Mr. DAVIS. What are the rules for eligibility for officers receiving—I assume these are National Guard and Reserve officers—individual clothing and uniform gratuities?

General CONNOR. They are Reserve officers while on duty. Certain categories of Reserve and National Guard officers, when they come on duty, are authorized initial uniform allowance. I will have to give you the specifics for the record. I cannot answer that precisely now.

Mr. DAVIS. If you will do that for the record.

General CONNOR. ROTC graduates get an initial allowance. (The information follows:)

#### UNIFORM ALLOWANCES FOR OFFICERS

The allowances for other officers vary in amounts based on the source from which they enter on active duty. The following table shows these amounts by source:

	0	Initial \$200	Initial \$100	Additional \$100 <sup>1</sup>
USMA.....	X			
ROTC.....		X		X
OCS.....			X	X
Voluntary active duty.....				X
Direct appointment.....		X		X
Medical officers.....		X		X
Nurses and medical specialists.....		X		X
Warrant officers.....			X	X

<sup>1</sup> Additional active duty uniform allowance to pay for additional uniforms required while on active duty or active duty for training. This allowance is payable each time of entry or reentry on active duty for more than 90 days, unless the officer has received an initial allowance of more than \$200 during his current tour of active duty or within a period of 2 years before entering on that tour.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, gentlemen. It has been a pleasure to have you with us.

We will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1969.

Mr. MAHON. The committee will come to order. We will continue, this morning, our discussion of "Military personnel, Army."

When we left off last evening Mr. Davis had just completed some questions. We will begin this morning with Mr. Lipscomb. Mr. Lipscomb.

#### OPERATIONAL RATIONS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, yesterday in response to a question regarding the new food item program on page 24 of the justification sheets it was stated that the increase of \$1,355,000 was for the procurement of a new type of rationing for testing. It was also stated that these funds would provide approximately 3 million meals, yet under "Operational rations" on page 23 we find no appreciable decrease in the number of meals. Should there be a decrease in the meals on page 23 of the justification book?

General CONNOR. I would like to have Mr. Nutt address that.

Mr. NUTT. Mr. Lipscomb, the additional cost of \$1,500,000 is the net additional cost, and by that I mean that we have taken the total cost of almost \$3 million for the item and subtracted from it value of the A rations that would be replaced and netted it out to \$1,500,000, net additional cost.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are these meals combat, individual?

Mr. NUTT. No, sir. These are meals that would be served in groups, 25-man modules of dehydrated packages that would be fed to 25 men or multiples thereof as a group rather than on an individual man basis, such as the meal, combat, individual.

This requires preparation in the sense that these items must be rehydrated and cooked.

#### MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO OTHER ACTIVITIES

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, would you have a chart similar to the one found on page 3, part 5, of the fiscal year 1969 hearings prepared for this record?

General CONNOR. Be happy to.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It has to do with military personnel authorized to activities outside the military departments.

On last year's chart there was a category entitled "Other" for which 7,244 personnel were authorized as of June 30, 1969. Would you try to have this broken down into a little more detail when you update the information?

General CONNOR. We will provide that for the record, sir.  
(The information follows:)

#### MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS, JUNE 30, 1970

	Department of the Army		Department of the Navy		Department of the Air Force		Total DOD		Total
	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	Officers	Enlisted	
Office, Secretary of Defense.....	281	82	205	69	224	81	710	232	942
Joint Chiefs of Staff.....	347	218	335	220	328	225	1,010	663	1,673
Military assistance groups.....	5,883	8,247	276	306	382	585	6,541	9,139	15,679
Missions and attaché staffs.....	197	162	51	23	203	153	451	338	789
Unified and specified commands.....	685	1,443	1,364	1,586	1,853	2,864	4,002	5,893	9,895
International military activities.....	201	547	284	654	482	1,207	967	2,408	3,375
Defense Atomic Support Agency.....	378	876	236	251	276	892	890	2,019	2,909
Defense Communications Agency.....	253	576	180	280	175	316	608	1,172	1,780
Defense Intelligence Agency.....	450	217	423	329	472	486	1,345	1,032	2,377
Defense Supply Agency.....	359	74	381	50	360	36	1,100	160	1,260
Joint defense colleges.....	56	21	185	450	66	44	307	515	822
Other military departments.....	427	315	213	163	211	79	851	557	1,408
Atomic Energy Commission.....	10	1	1	.....	20	1	31	2	33
Federal Aviation Administration.....	5	.....	11	.....	24	14	40	14	54
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.....	124	3	37	.....	299	417	460	420	880
Selective Service System.....	304	.....	17	.....	41	.....	362	.....	362
Veterans' Administration.....	.....	.....	24	149	.....	.....	24	149	173
Other Government agencies and activities.....	554	1,640	278	2,384	596	2,975	1,428	6,999	8,427
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>10,514</b>	<b>14,422</b>	<b>4,501</b>	<b>6,914</b>	<b>6,112</b>	<b>10,375</b>	<b>21,127</b>	<b>31,711</b>	<b>52,838</b>

## ANALYSIS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND ACTIVITIES

	Officers	Enlisted
Department of the Army:		
Department of the Navy:		
Pacific Missile Range.....	154	710
State Department.....	22	1,111
Other.....	67	71
Navy total.....		
Department of the Air Force:		
Army/Air Force Exchange Service.....	53	205
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.....	33	34
Armed Forces Radio, Press, and Television.....	25	553
Armed Forces Police.....	12	243
Heavy Sand.....	109	230
Other.....	153	102
Air Force total.....		
Total other Government agencies and activities.....	1,428	6,999

## PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How many Army personnel, and of what grades, have been detailed or assigned to duty in support of the Office of Economic Opportunity activities, such as the Job Corps?

General CONNOR. The program calls for three officers and one enlisted man, for a total of four in the Office of Economic Opportunity, Mr. Lipscomb. I do not have their grades. I will provide that for the record.

(The information follows:)

The grades of the personnel programed for the OEO are two colonels, one lieutenant colonel, and one E-9.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What about out in the field?

General CONNOR. That is the total.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That is the total assignment?

General CONNOR. Yes. This is reimbursable. Now, we do have a pilot program going on in coordination with the Office of Economic Opportunity in which we have five teams of officers and enlisted men working in five major cities, utilizing the National Guard armories, and supervising activities of children from ages 11 through 18.

This pilot program started last year. We have not reached any conclusions as yet as to whether it should be continued or not. They are not assigned to the Office of Economic Opportunity, although some of the funding for this program does come from that Office.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For the record, would you try to be as complete as as possible in itemizing all of the programs that you are participating in which are related and attached to the Office of Economic Opportunity, with the personnel involved, and their grades.

General CONNOR. We will do that.

(The information follows:)

## PILOT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM

The pilot program, U.S. sponsored civic program using Army National Guard and Army Reserve facilities, is the only program which is related to the Office of Economic Opportunity. The personnel involved, and their grades, follow:

Lieutenant colonel.....	1
Major .....	5
Captain .....	3
1st lieutenant.....	4
2d lieutenant.....	1
Sergeant 1st class (E-7).....	1
Staff sergeant (E-6).....	10
Sergeant (E-5).....	6
Corporal (E-4).....	1
Private 1st class (E-3).....	1

## PERSONNEL IN SUPPORT OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. LIPSCOMB. How many Army personnel, and in what grades, have been assigned or detailed to duty with the Disarmament Agency during fiscal year 1969, and how many are planned for use in fiscal year 1970?

General CONNOR. We have four officers authorized to that Agency, sir, and that is the plan as of now for 1970. This is also reimbursable.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does this include the personnel which may be assigned to field exercises and other activities away from the Office of the Disarmament Agency?

General CONNOR. I would say "No," sir. If there were any persons in that category, I would assume they would be assigned on special duty or temporary duty basis for field exercise-type matters.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did the Army participate in the test called Exercise First Look in the United Kingdom?

General CONNOR. I am not familiar with that, sir. I will provide it for the record.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Would you check this out for the record?

(The information follows:)

Operation First Look is a British code name. The U.S. name for this exercise is the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Field Test 15 (FT 15). A total of 218 officers and enlisted men of all services participated in this exercise. Approximately one-third of these were Army personnel. The period of the exercise was June 24-September 27, 1968.

All DOD support of the test was on a 100-percentage reimbursable basis. Reimbursable costs billed by the Army consisting of temporary duty travel and per diem, salaries, and film productions total \$201,178.74.

## ARMY PRISONER POPULATION AND FACILITIES

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Information provided last year stated that the effective operating capacity of the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks was 1,500 prisoners and that as of May 5, 1968 there were 1,417 prisoners. What are the comparable figures today?

General CONNOR. They are higher today, sir. Actually, at the disciplinary barracks the figure is lower although the total is higher for all facilities. We have 1,082 prisoners at the disciplinary barracks as of the end of December, the end of the second quarter of fiscal year 1969. The big gain really has been in the correctional training facility at Fort Riley, Kans., where we have added 1,037 prisoners, where none were programed in 1968.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What is your population as of this time?

**General CONNOR.** Our total population, sir, is 8,114 in all facilities. That is broken down as follows: 5,858 in Army installation facilities, stockades, major installations; 1,082 at our disciplinary barracks; 75 in other Federal and military facilities; 62 in foreign penal institutions; and 1,037 in our correctional training facility.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What is the situation now with regard to the barracks and facilities where you have these people? Are they overcrowded?

**General CONNOR.** Yes, sir, they are. In most cases we are reduced below the desirable space of 70 square feet per man.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Do you know of any plans to correct this?

**General CONNOR.** Yes, sir. We have minor construction projects underway, hopefully, to correct this situation as best we can. We have a project at Fort Ord for expanding the stockade, \$120,500, and we have a project at Fort Lewis, \$166,100, as two examples. I don't have the specifics, but I know there is some work being done on the stockade at San Francisco.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Will the gentleman yield?

**General,** do you work all these prisoners?

**General CONNOR.** Yes.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You keep them pretty well occupied?

**General CONNOR.** They are worked on a daily work schedule, yes.

Now, the personnel at the correctional training facility actually train, just as they do in BCT & AIT, formal military training that they are undergoing.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Thank you.

#### DESERTERS

**Mr. MINSHALL.** May I ask a question at this point?

We discussed briefly yesterday, General, the A.W.O.L.'s and the deserters. How many desertions have you had since the Vietnam war started?

**General CONNOR.** In fiscal year 1965 we had 13,177 entries reported on morning reports as dropped from the rolls. In fiscal year 1966 we had 14,244. In fiscal year 1967 we had 26,782. In fiscal year 1968, 39,234. First quarter of fiscal year 1969, 12,548.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** That is a sizable number of deserters, General. How many of these have been apprehended?

**General CONNOR.** Mr. Minshall, I want to make it clear that the numbers I have just mentioned are incidents and not individuals. One man may contribute to a number of incidents. The Department of the Army does not maintain data on absentee apprehensions per se. As of January 31, 1969, there remain 19,313 individuals in a dropped from the rolls status.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** What is the average sentence or penalty once you catch up with them?

**General CONNOR.** This varies with the individual courts and the individual circumstances, sir. It has been running from a period of a few months to several years, depending on the decision of the court.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** Thank you.

Will you furnish a breakdown of the 90,000 figure as to number of A.W.O.L.'s, deserters, et cetera.

(The information follows:)

Ninety thousand is the approximate number of incidents in which individuals were dropped from the rolls for desertion on strength accounting records as deserters after an absence of 30 days during the period fiscal year 1965 through fiscal year 1968. This figure does not include A.W.O.L. incidents for an absence of less than 30 days.

#### CONFINEMENT FACILITIES

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, you mentioned that to relieve the overcrowded situation you have a small construction program going on?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir; they are modification programs basically.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Do you have a rehabilitation program going on?

General CONNOR. There is an effort being made to upgrade all of our confinement facilities. The Provost Marshal General has been deeply involved in this over a period of the last 2 months. This, of course, basically is the responsibility of the local commander to request the funds and assure that the projects are undertaken. However, he has been given considerable assistance and attention from the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

#### COST OF APPREHENDING PRISONERS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Minshall was discussing with you the apprehension of military deserters and absentees and escaped military prisoners.

According to the justification sheets you have programed \$2,741,000 in this area. There has been, according to your testimony, an increase in the number of deserters and absentees and escaped military prisoners, and yet your estimates have been going down. In fiscal year 1968 it was \$2.8 million, in fiscal year 1969, \$2.7 million, and the estimate for fiscal year 1970 is slightly lower. How do you calculate the estimate of the amount required?

General CONNOR. Mr. Hutchison, will you address that question?

Mr. HUTCHISON. Yes, sir, we get reports from the field as to the actual costs of what is spent on the apprehension of deserters. We determine the rate and make our estimate in that way. Now, in fiscal year 1969 in our original budget request, we had \$2.1 million. We do have \$600,000 more in fiscal year 1969 now than we had in our original request. This is due to the increased activity.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That testimony is confusing. The fact of the matter is you were low last year; you added \$600,000 more.

Mr. HUTCHISON. Right, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This year you are requesting about the same amount, and yet at the same time the testimony shows the problem and requirements are increasing. Do you have any reason to believe that you will have fewer deserters, absentees, and escaped military prisoners in fiscal 1970?

Mr. HUTCHISON. No, sir. But we have revised our 1969 estimate and have increased it by \$600,000 from our original estimate due to the increase.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You have not increased it one bit from your required funds for fiscal year 1969.

Mr. HUTCHISON. We have increased it from that which we requested originally.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. But your original estimates for fiscal year 1969 have proved to be incorrect.

Mr. HUTCHISON. Right, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Now, where does your estimate stand today? How do you calculate it?

Mr. HUTCHISON. We calculate it on past experience, sir, and that is the reason we have reprogramed \$800,000 more into the account in fiscal year 1969 from our original estimate.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So you estimate the level will be about the same?

Mr. HUTCHISON. Right, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What is the method by which you return the prisoners to wherever you intern them?

General CONNOR. Once a deserter is returned to military duty he is assigned to a unit at the installation where he is first picked up. In that way he gets on the strength of the Army as an accession. He has been dropped from the rolls once. As soon as he is reported at a military installation he is assigned to a "morning report" unit.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am talking about the method. Do you send one or two men out to pick him up? What happens when you pick up a prisoner?

General CONNOR. It is frequently done by sending out an armed guard to pick him up and return him to military control, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Or two armed guards?

General CONNOR. One, sir, normally. It depends also on the prisoner. If the prisoner is willing to return on his own, no armed guard is sent. He frequently turns himself in and indicates a desire to return to military control. In this event, there is no purpose sending a guard out after him.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Depending on the location, he returns by rail, auto, or air?

General CONNOR. Or bus.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If he travels by train or air does he go first class?

General CONNOR. No, sir.

#### ARMY MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

Mr. LIPSCOMB. On page 16 of your statement you discuss threats to Army morale and discipline, and you say there is no conclusive evidence of the existence of central motivation. What do you mean in your statement by "conclusive"? Could you tell us something about the type of evidence that you have?

General CONNOR. We have under supervision, sir, a number of various dissident groups that are agitating.

\_\_\_\_\_ in the military. We find to some extent these groups are fighting amongst themselves for control or for a favored position. I discussed this with Mr. Flood yesterday.

(Clerks note: See page 68 for earlier discussion.)

Many of them have the same purpose, that is, to disrupt the activity, to provide a threat to law and order, to provide a threat to discipline. But they have not been working in true coordination with one another. There has been a divisiveness among them. They are essentially the same groups that we find working in the universities and elsewhere.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Last year, in discussing this kind of a problem, the committee was informed that at that time there were 23 organizations in seven countries that had been definitely linked with deserter-inducement programs. That was on May 6, 1968. How many such organizations now have been identified by you and could you, for the record, provide a list of those organizations?

General CONNOR. I will, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### DESERTER-INDUCEMENT PROGRAMS

Twenty-one organizations located in 8 countries have been linked with deserter-inducement programs.

Name	Country
Church	England.
Peace Pledge Union	Do.
Vietnam Information Group	Do.
War Resisters International	Do.
American Students for a Democratic Society, West Berlin	Germany.
Association of Conscientious Objectors	Do.
Campaign for Democracy and Disarmament	Do.
German War Resisters International	Do.
Socialist German Students League	Do.
Japan Council for Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs	Japan.
Japan Peace for Vietnam Committee	Do.
National Students Self-Government Federation-Zengakuren	Do.
General Dutch Peace Action	Netherlands.
Provos	Do.
Socialist Youth	Do.
Aberdeen Youth for Peace in Vietnam	Scotland.
Scots Against War	Do.
Youth Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament	Do.
American Deserters Committee	Sweden.
War Resisters League	United States.
South Vietnamese People's Committee for Solidarity with the American People	Vietnam.

#### MARIHUANA AND OTHER DRUG USE

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, in following the marihuana problem in the military, I believe I have found there has been an active effort by the Department of Defense and the Army to try to do something about it.

General CONNOR. This is correct, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Also, there has been concern throughout the country about the so-called coffee houses that are springing up around military bases.

For the record, I think people would like to read and see for themselves the active program that is being carried on by the military to try to do something about this problem. Could you see that that is put in the record at this point?

General CONNOR. I will, sir.

(The information follows:)

The directives which have been issued by OSD and the Army pertaining to the use of drugs are cited below.

In addition to these directives, the Army has also initiated several programs and measures which deal with the disciplinary and drug problem. Following is a brief description of these:

1. Close coordination has been conducted with the FBI, local police and sheriffs' offices in order to keep abreast of coffeehouse activity and the amount of support

received from active duty soldiers. The coffeehouse program has not developed into a serious problem for the Army. Restrictive measures are available to installation commanders to deal with the coffeehouses, if and when they pose a problem to the maintenance of discipline.

2. Within the past year the Army has increased training of criminal investigators in specialized courses in drug abuse and detection; distributed command information materials, including films, on drugs and drug abuse; and initiated a pilot program to train dogs in the detection of narcotics. Army chaplains have been provided with educational material on the moral and spiritual implications of drug abuse, and workshops have been conducted to orient and assist chaplains on ways of dealing with the drug problem. Close cooperation and liaison is maintained with the FBI, U.S. Customs Bureau, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and civil police agencies. These measures provide flexibility in altering outdated approaches or instituting new programs as deemed necessary.

3. A pilot speaker's program using recently returned personnel from Vietnam has proven successful in countering anti-Vietnam publicity. This program is being continued and expanded.

4. The Army has a continuing program to determine and examine reasons that soldiers go AWOL and to objectively assess procedures in dealing with returned absentees.

5. In December 1968, presentations were made on the subject of morale and discipline during the Army Commanders' and Command Sergeants' Major Conferences. Specific areas of attention in the presentations were AWOL and desertion, equal opportunity, the enlisted promotion system, and proper use and treatment of soldiers.

6. Guidance has been issued as to legal ways of dealing with nonmilitary personnel who desire to distribute handbills, pamphlets and leaflets on Army installations.

7. In January 1969, guidance was provided concerning commanders' authority to restrict dissemination of subversive and quasi-subversive publications on Army posts, which had been reported as a key issue troubling commanders.

8. The Army Information Office has prepared a number of pamphlets, posters and articles designed to accent positive aspects of the Army and its personnel, to include military elan, tradition and prestige. Installation commanders have been encouraged to modify recreational activities and facilities to make them more appealing and competitive with outside activities such as coffeehouses.

9. Commanders are kept advised of any subversive activities which may impact adversely upon the discipline of their command.

In summary, discipline and disciplinary problems are not new subjects to the Army. Ways and means for developing self-control, orderliness and efficiency of all members of the military are constantly being sought. The Army has found no panacea-type of solution to improve discipline. It has been found desirable to avoid "overguiding" field commanders. The diversity of command approaches to discipline problems based on the local situation tends to place offenders off balance and, in the case of dissident elements, to make it more difficult for them to concentrate efforts in finding means to exploit their ends. At Headquarters, Department of the Army, our effort is directed toward assisting field commanders by delineating their authority, issuing guidance, and providing assistance when requested. Appropriate authority exists in the hands of field commanders to deal with disciplinary problems. This authority, complemented by an Army-wide sharing of workable ideas and procedures which are relayed to commanders through various informational media, is in accordance with the Army's traditional concept of leadership and decentralized command prerogatives.

FEBRUARY 2, 1968.

Number 1300.11.  
ASD (M. & R.A.).

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE—ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER USE OF DRUGS BY  
MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This directive announces Department of Defense policies for preventing and eliminating drug abuse by members of the armed forces and assigns responsibilities for carrying out its provisions worldwide.

## II. APPLICABILITY

The provisions of this directive apply to all components of the Department of Defense.

## III. DEFINITIONS

A. *Narcotics*.—Any opiates or cocaine.

B. *Marijuana*.—The intoxicating products of the hemp plant, *cannabis sativa*.

C. *Dangerous drugs*.—Those nonnarcotic drugs that are habit forming or have a potential for abuse because of their stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect, as determined by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

D. *Drug abuse*.—The illegal, wrongful, or improper use of any narcotic substance, marijuana, or dangerous drug, or the illegal or wrongful possession or sale of the same. When such drugs have been prescribed by competent medical personnel for medical purposes their proper use by the patient prescribed for is not drug abuse.

## IV. POLICY

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to prevent and eliminate drug abuse within the Armed Forces. The illegal or improper use of drugs by a member of the Armed Forces may have a seriously damaging effect on his health and mind, may jeopardize his safety and the safety of his fellows, may lead to criminal prosecution and to discharge under other than honorable conditions and is altogether incompatible with military service or subsequent civilian pursuits. The Department acknowledges a particular responsibility for counselling and protecting members of the Armed Forces against drug abuse, and for disciplining members who use or promote the use of drugs in an illegal or improper manner.

## V. RESPONSIBILITIES

### A. Overall program

1. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), or his designee, advised by two representatives of each service upon their designation by the Secretary concerned, and such additional advisers as the ASD (M. & R.A.) shall deem appropriate and designate, shall have overall responsibility for the development and monitoring of a coordinated program in accordance with the provisions of this directive.

2. The ASD (M. & R.A.), or his designee, shall provide for the procurement and development of materials, including films (see list attached, enclosure 1) and pamphlets, for the orientation and continuing education of all persons in the Armed Forces on the dangers of illegal or improper drug use.

(a) Materials developed shall—

(1) Emphasize the physiological and psychological dangers inherent in the use of such drugs;

(2) Stress the inconsistency of their use with military responsibility and national security and the implications of such behavior in security determinations and administrative discharge actions; and

(3) Contain an explanation of disciplinary actions which can be taken for drug abuse.

(b) Informational materials developed shall be made available to the Secretaries of the military departments and Directors of defense agencies for distribution to military personnel.

3. In addition, the A.S.D. (M. & R.A.), or his designee, shall—

(a) Review existing programs of the military departments concerning drug abuse.

(b) Recommend new policies for more effective control of drug abuse.

(c) Prepare a quarterly evaluation of drug abuse incidents by military personnel which shall be forwarded to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

(d) At his discretion, require DOD components to submit such information as is deemed useful in the matter of drug abuse and methods employed to combat it, for collation and dissemination to other DOD components for their information and guidance.

(e) Obtain reports and recommendations from DOD components assigned responsibility for the programs described in subsections V.A.4., B, and C, herein, and direct specific improvements.

(f) Take action to:

(1) keep abreast of the activities of other agencies of the Federal Government and private organizations in examining and combating drug

abuse and the treatment of drug users, including a continuing effort to keep DOD components informed of research projects being conducted by other governmental and private organizations, and

(2) where appropriate, recommend additional research.

4. The Secretaries of the military departments and Directors of defense agencies shall:

(a) Arrange for the dissemination of informational material to military personnel under their cognizance;

(b) Devise orientation, refresher training, and supplemental information programs for military personnel;

(c) Insure that military commanders take appropriate action for providing orientation programs to military personnel before their departure to overseas areas; and that military commanders provide refresher training, as well as other supplementation of this informational material, on a regular basis to members already in overseas areas (particularly areas where drugs may be illicitly obtained with relative ease).

#### *B. Program for the control of smuggling*

Each military department shall—

1. Develop additional procedures to prevent illicit trafficking and shipping of drugs by members of the Armed Forces;

2. Devote special attention to the possibly of illicit drugs being transported by members traveling from one country to another, and develop procedures to prevent the same.

3. Maintain cooperation with the Post Office Department and the United States Treasury Department's Bureau of Customs and Bureau of Narcotics.

#### *C. Quarantine areas program*

The military departments shall develop implementing instructions designed to identify areas and business establishments located in areas within their jurisdiction which should be declared "off-limits" by local commanders because of the availability of narcotics, marijuana or other dangerous drugs in that area or at that establishment. In foreign countries, the military commander shall additionally be required to inform the appropriate local authorities and attempt to formulate coordinated law enforcement procedures.

### VI. EFFECTIVE DATE AND IMPLEMENTATION

This directive is effective immediately. Each military department shall issue or revise existing regulations to carry out the policies set forth in this directive. Two copies of the implementing instructions shall be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) within 45 days for approval prior to promulgation.

PAUL H. NITZE,  
*Deputy Secretary of Defense.*

Enclosure: Films on Drugs and Narcotics.

#### FILMS ON DRUGS AND NARCOTICS

The following is a list of motion picture films currently available and being being produced:

Navy:

MN 10507—"LSD."

MC 7962—"Drug Addiction, Trip to Where" (being produced).

Air Force:

SFP—"Pots and Pills" (being produced).

SFP—"Narcotics, Why Not."

SFP—"LSD" (Navy adaption).

o  
y  
.  
y  
m  
o-  
o  
.  
e  
ng  
ed  
28  
ed  
28.  
ed  
dr  
ise  
nt  
all  
apt  
or  
wo  
re-  
val  
2.  
ing

Army

"Narcotics."

Narcotics—A Challenge to Youth.

Monkey on the Back.

CBS Reports—The Business of Heroin.

The Dangerous Drugs.

Investigation of Narcotics Offense.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington, D.C., April 9, 1968.

AGAM-P (M) (9 Apr. 1968) PMGS-C.

Subject: Illegal or Improper Use of Drugs.

1. Continuing reports regarding real or alleged illegal or improper use of narcotics, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs by members of the U.S. Army are a matter of grave concern. Drug abuse, or the illegal or improper use of narcotics, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs, is inconsistent with the traditions of military service; poses a serious threat to the health and safety of the user; and may seriously jeopardize the mission of the individual soldier or that of his unit.

2. The Department of Defense recently announced a policy to prevent and eliminate drug abuse within the Armed Forces. Each military department is responsible for executing this policy and insuring that an aggressive program is conducted to combat the threat of drug abuse. Success of this program will depend on the active support of commanders at every level of command.

3. Existing directives provide sufficient means, including administrative and disciplinary action, to enable commanders to control drug abuse by members of their commands. Commanders must give renewed and continuing emphasis to counseling military personnel and protecting them against drug abuse. During the coming months, additional guidance and informational material will be distributed to assist commanders in their educational programs.

4. Pending publication of further guidance by the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army, commanders will:

(a) Insure that the dangers of drug abuse are included, on a regular basis, in existing orientation and supplemental information programs. This is particularly important for personnel destined for, or already in, overseas areas where narcotics, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs may be obtained with relative ease.

(b) Emphasize the importance of prompt reporting to the military police, for subsequent investigation, known or suspected drug abuses.

(c) Develop procedures necessary to prevent illicit trafficking and shipping of narcotics, marihuana, and other dangerous drugs to include strengthening Customs activities and the force structure required to accomplish the Customs control mission.

(d) Insure that off-limits procedures are considered in areas and business establishments where the availability of narcotics, marihuana, or abuse drugs pose a potential threat. Overseas commanders will establish procedures which will insure that local authorities are informed of actual or contemplated off-limits actions.

(e) Stress close cooperation and coordination with appropriate civil law enforcement agencies in drug abuse matters.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM,  
Major General, USA,  
The Adjutant General.

## DESCRIPTION OF ARMY DRUG LITERATURE

General CONNOR. I mentioned yesterday a particularly well prepared pamphlet that is issued by the Department of Defense. It is an educational-type pamphlet. There are other materials, including films and lectures. I will put a description of those in the record, also.

(The information follows:)

Within the past year, Department of the Army and Department of Defense have produced a variety of educational materials describing the medical, moral, and legal aspects involved in the use and abuse of narcotics, dangerous drugs, and marihuana. Following is a brief description of the materials that have been produced:

1. **Drug Abuse: "Game Without Winners."** A basic handbook for commanders. (DOD GEN-33, DA Pam 360-530, NAVPERS 15234, AFP 34-2, NAVMC 2020, CG-173).

This 80-page indexed handbook is one of the most comprehensive publications ever produced on drug abuse. It was developed with the assistance of pharmaceutical laboratories, and many other experts in the executive branch of the Government.

Designed to help fill the information vacuum on drug abuse, the handbook's aim is to help commanders understand, prevent, and combat drug abuse problems.

This handbook sets out a brief historical view of drug abuse. In addition, it describes various drugs and nondrug products susceptible to abuse. The drug abuser is discussed as are methods of therapy, educational approaches, problems of abuser identification, identification of drugs, what to do when drug abuse is suspected, procedures for drug abuse prevention, and the overall command relationship to drug abuse matters.

Prevention is stressed. The handbook points out that "The illegal use of drugs by members of the Armed Forces is a matter of concern that requires intensive, coordinated departmental effort for its control and elimination. The heavy responsibilities of members of the Armed Forces make drug abuse by any member a matter of serious concern which dictates intensive effort to eliminate it. The Department of Defense acknowledges particular responsibility for protecting the young, impressionable members of the Armed Forces overseas against the dangers of using drugs which may have a seriously damaging effect on their health and welfare." A copy of this handbook is provided all commanders in the Army.

2. **"Drugs and You"** (DOD FS-51, DA Pam 360-602).

This publication, developed by the DOD Drug Abuse Control Committee, is a 12-panel folder designed for distribution to, and use by, the individual. It briefly describes the five basics of drug abuse—opiates (heroin), marihuana, hallucinogens, depressants, and stimulants.

The folder deals with the question "What does drug abuse have to do with me?" Pointing out that drug abuse is a losing proposition, the publication talks about the military penalties, the possible loss of valuable veterans benefits and the stigma attached to and faced by a drug abuser when seeking civilian employment. It is written at a level that every man, whether he has an eighth grade education or is a college graduate, will understand.

It is recommended that where possible the folder be used in conjunction with the handbook, "Drug Abuse: Game Without Winners." A copy is provided every enlisted man in the Army.

3. **"Things Could be Worse, We Could Be Hung Up on Drugs"** (DOD P-55).

This 11- by 18-inch poster shows two men hanging by their wrists in a dungeon with one saying, "Things could be worse—we could be hung up on drugs." Although the poster has a humorous approach, it gets the point across. The poster is easily adaptable for display on bulletin boards or other appropriate places.

4. **"LSD."** This 30-minute color film presents Lt. Comdr. Walt Minor, Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, discussing the perils of LSD and its known effects. It is a standup lecture film expertly presented. Copies of this film are available for use by Army personnel.

5. **"Trip to Where"** (AFIF-177). This dramatic 50-minute color presentation dwells on all aspects of drug abuse, with particular stress on the impact of LSD

and the consequences of its use, illustrated by the experiences of three seamen. It was produced by the Bureau of Medicine, Department of the Navy. The Army has purchased 300 copies of this film.

6. The "Pentagon Forum" is a 30-minute video tape panel discussion on drug abuse, featuring Mr. Frank A. Bartimo, chairman of the DOD Drug Abuse Control Committee and Capt. Ralph L. Christy, Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, who answer questions put to them by a panel of enlisted personnel. Copies are available through the Director, Office of Information for the Armed Forces, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20301.

7. The "Hang-Up." An Air Force film dealing primarily with the problems of LSD and marihuana. One hundred and eighty copies of this film have been purchased for use by the Army.

Additionally, the Department of Defense Drug Abuse Control Committee has programed an additional film for distribution throughout the Armed Forces which will deal specifically with the marihuana problem. This film will be completed and distributed before the end of calendar year 1969.

Locally developed and produced educational materials are used in a variety of educational programs throughout the world. These programs include articles in command information newspapers, locally designed posters and pamphlets, and use of films and materials produced by civilian organizations involved in drug abuse education.

#### PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION TRAVEL

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In the area of permanent change of station travel, page 25 of the justification sheets, the Army estimates for 1968 were \$758 million, and the actual amount was \$699 million, for a surplus of \$59 million. The Army's original estimate for 1969 was \$784 million and the revised estimate is now \$739 million, a reduction of \$45 million. For 1970 the estimate is \$735 million. Even with all the increases in troop strength, it appears that the Army personnel is continually overstating their requirements. Since we are dealing in a magnitude of nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars per year, we should examine this.

The largest single item within this activity is rotational travel to and from overseas, and this is where most of the overestimates occur. Could you explain how these estimates are developed and what causes it to be continually overstated in the requirements?

General CONNOR. Would you care to address that question?

Mr. HUTCHISON. Yes, sir. The moves that we project are based on the overseas deployment strengths to the various commands. Applied to these strengths are the average tour lengths in each one of the commands. In that manner it is determined how many people we would have to move to each command and how many people we would bring home based on these tour lengths. The average cost of these moves is determined by applying average rates to each move. The way we get our average cost rates is that, at Indianapolis, the Army Finance Center, we have a team of some 25 who visually audit the PCS vouchers to determine the entitlements people exercise when they do make their PCS moves. The Finance Center gives us a 12-month moving average of what it cost to move members, what it cost to move their dependents, their baggage and household goods, dislocation allowance, and trailer allowances.

Since members can elect whether to move their family or not, naturally these rates are influenced by what the members elect to do when they make their move.

We have found out in the last 2 years that, generally, when the member is moving overseas he tends not to move his family because if he is going to Vietnam, he knows he is coming back within a year and then he would have to move his family again.

So to some extent they are leaving their families where they are when they go to Vietnam. So this has brought down the average cost rates of our moves to and from overseas, and we are now reflecting these decreased rates in our estimates.

#### EXCESS TRANSPORTATION COST

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Referring to the justification sheets, on pages 28 and 29 it is noted that the transportation by MAC averages approximately \$150 per military member. Yet the MSTs rate for an officer rate is \$600, and for enlisted members \$10,000. How can it possibly cost \$10,000 for each enlisted member? That is on page 29 of the justification sheet.

**Mr. HUTCHISON.** \$10,000?

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Yes, it is under 2-G, Transportation by MSTs, military member, 555, at a cost of \$5,688,000. That is for 1969.

**Mr. HUTCHISON.** Yes. This is movement by ship, MSTs.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Yes.

**Mr. HUTCHISON.** In the appropriation language each year there is a limitation that we must spend so much money by American-flag vessels. We move these people by American-flag vessels due to that limitation, sir, and it is quite expensive moving the person from New York to Europe by the American-flag vessels. That is what this rate reflects.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** That is \$10,000 per person?

**Mr. HUTCHISON.** \$10,000.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** That doesn't provide an adequate explanation. The military could still use MSTs.

**Mr. HUTCHISON.** Right, sir.

**General CONNOR.** Mr. Chairman, may we research that point and furnish it for the record since this appears to be overstated?

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** If you would, please.

(The information follows:)

The average cost for transportation of military members by MSTs appears high as the estimated cost of transporting Free World Military Assistance Forces is included in the dollar amount requested. (Additional classified information has been furnished separately to the committee.)

#### TRANSPORT OF PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** In 1970 the Army will ship almost 35,000 privately owned vehicles by MSTs at a cost of \$10.4 million. The average cost based on the figures is \$285 for an officer's automobile and \$315 for an enlisted man's automobile. Is there any reason for this difference?

**Mr. HUTCHISON.** It would be based on experience, sir. I will have to research and see—if they are moving a heavier automobile, the enlisted men, that would be about the only thing I could say offhand.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are these rates higher than the commercial rates?  
Mr. HUTCHISON. I don't know. I would have to look that up and furnish it for the record. I would assume they are not.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If you find a difference here will you explain it here, too?

Mr. HUTCHISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. We would be glad to handle any reductions.

Mr. HUTCHISON. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You know, the reason we concentrate on these estimates is because we are dealing with substantial amounts of money, and even though the individual items and amounts that we are picking at are relatively small, when you add them up in volume they come to millions and millions of dollars. The experience rate just in the fiscal year 1969 with regard to these estimates has been very noticeable.

Mr. HUTCHISON. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The fund requirements were determined as follows:

FISCAL YEAR 1969									
OFFICERS				ENLISTED					
POV's	X	Rate	=	Requirement	POV's	X	Rate	=	Requirement
14,590	X	\$262.61	=	\$3,831,516	19,968	X	\$207.00	=	\$5,331,570
2,991	X	1111.00	=	332,000	9,009	X	1111.00	=	1,000,000
17,581		236.82		4,163,516	28,977		218.60		6,331,570

FISCAL YEAR 1970									
OFFICERS				ENLISTED					
POV's	X	Rate	=	Requirement	POV's	X	Rate	=	Requirement
14,504	X	\$281.24	=	\$3,789,010	20,179	X	\$263.28	=	\$5,312,760
2,991	X	1111.00	=	332,000	9,009	X	1111.00	=	1,000,000
17,495		235.55		4,121,010	29,188		216.28		6,312,760

<sup>1</sup> During the past few years all privately owned vehicle shipments to CONUS from Europe of foreign-made cars were financed by the member as the DOD policy prohibited the return at Government expense. The member ordinarily arranged for shipment on foreign-owned vessels which had an adverse effect on the balance of payments. The revised policy will encourage members to ship foreign-made privately owned vehicles on MSTs ships. Since the cost of shipping privately owned vehicles by MSTs is higher than the prevailing rate on foreign ships, the member will be required only to reimburse the Government for the amount which he would have paid had he utilized foreign commercial shipping. The differential cost will be borne by the Government. The following estimates, including port handling charges, were used to determine the cost to the Government:

MSTs cost.....	\$282
Foreign-vessel commercial cost.....	151
Cost to Government.....	111

Excluding the cost of shipping foreign-made cars from Europe (see footnote), the average cost of shipping privately owned vehicles is slightly higher for enlisted personnel as a higher percentage of their cars are being shipped to and returned from more distant points from CONUS.

MSTs rates for movement of privately owned vehicles are comparable to American-flag vessel commercial rates. However, MSTs and American-flag vessel rates are higher than foreign-flag vessel rates. For example, the cost of shipping an average size automobile via MSTs or American-flag vessel from CONUS to Europe is estimated at \$880, including port handling charges. The comparable cost on a foreign-flag vessel is estimated at \$215.

## MILITARY PAY INCREASE

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** We have heard through the press and other media that the new administration hopes to include a recommendation on the military compensation system as one part of the budget review now being conducted. At the time this budget was sent to Congress there was Public Law 90-207 enacted a year previous to the new budget and it requires an across-the-board increase in the pay of all military personnel, effective July 1, 1969. Now, do I understand correctly that the July 1, 1969, pay increase is not included in the \$8.5 billion request for military personnel?

**General CONNOR.** That is correct, sir; is it not.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** At this point could you provide an estimate as to what the Army's additional funding requirements will be for a full fiscal year 1969 to take care of the pay increase which as of now is required, effective July 1, 1969?

**General CONNOR.** Our figures show that this would require an additional \$667,500,000, sir, based on a 12.6-percent increase. We, of course, do not know precisely how that increase is going to be applied as yet. There have been a number of different proposals.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** By proposals, you don't mean new legislation?

**General CONNOR.** No, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Well, then, what do you mean when you say you don't know "how it going to be applied"?

**General CONNOR.** Whether it would be applied evenly across the board, whether it would be applied at various increments for different grades to bring the military pay more in line with the civilian level.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** The law that is on the books now does not specify that.

**General CONNOR.** I don't believe it does, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Does that \$600 million figure, General, apply to fiscal 1969 or is it for fiscal 1970?

**General CONNOR.** It is fiscal 1970, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What is the last practical date that you have to know the details of how any pay increase is going to be applied so that you can effectively operate?

**General CONNOR.** General Maness.

**General MANESS.** General Taylor is in Chicago today and extends his regrets for not being here. I would say we should know at least 20 to 30 days before. We probably could get by with 15 days, but we would like to have around 30 days' notice because we have a lot of pay vouchers to change. In 15 days we could probably do it, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Fifteen days prior to the July 1 date?

**General MANESS.** Yes.

## SUPPLEMENTAL FOR COST OF PAY INCREASE

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What has been the experience to date on the way we have been funding military personnel pay in recent years? We have a supplemental going through right now. It has been the practice for the last number of years not to fund increases in personnel pay which were known to be required and also not to fund adequate appropriations for the numbers in the service. What has happened? How have you gotten by? Has it been a burden to the military?

General MANESS. Sir, this appropriation, MPA appropriation, can spend anywhere in the neighborhood of \$21 to \$22 million per day. When we know there are going to be increases such as for the pay raise this year where we have a supplemental in for 1969, we have to pay the people by month so we compute the runout date when we think our funds will run out at the end of the year.

That is what we have been doing in the past, not only for the MPA appropriation but also for the O. & M. appropriation where we have civilian pay involved. I think the question was asked General Taylor the other day when would he need the supplemental in 1969 for the O. & M., including civilian, and we computed that we would have to have the money about the 15th of June of this year.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are you spending fourth quarter funds already?

General MANESS. Sir, we won't have to spend fourth quarter funds yet, but we will have to spend them at some point in time. We can compute the date when we will have to spend fourth quarter funds.

## EXCLUSION OF PAY INCREASE COST FROM BUDGET

Mr. ANDREWS. Will the gentleman yield? Who will determine what the correct figure will be for pay increase?

General MANESS. Determination of the final Army total cost figure for the military pay raise scheduled for July 1, 1969 will be made by Headquarters, Department of the Army, subject to approval by OSD and the Bureau of the Budget.

Mr. ANDREWS. You know there is going to be a pay increase on the first of July. I cannot for the life of me see why you don't ask for the money in the 1970 budget. You know it has to be paid.

General MANESS. Sir, I think this is a decision of the Secretary of Defense, where they made the determination not to include it in our budget. As General Connor and Mr. Hutchison say, it is not in here.

Mr. ANDREWS. But you have a request before us for \$8 billion-plus to be paid.

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. It should be, in my opinion, added to your 1970 budget request.

General MANESS. It is in the President's budget for 1970 at \$2.8 billion as a summary estimate for the entire Government. When the precise rates and amounts are determined, special appropriation requests will have to be made. Mr. Hutchison said the Army's portion of this would be about \$667 million.

General CONNOR. We don't know what action, for example, the Congress will take on the Pay Modernization Act, which could change these figures substantially.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If you will yield, that is not what we are trying to get to. You are going to have a pay increase whether Congress acts on a new Pay Modernization Act or not. You are going to have to have a pay increase.

Mr. ANDREWS. Any new legislation would add to the amount.

General CONNOR. We operate on the budget guidance given to us by the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. But what we are discussing here now is the fact that it has been the practice not to include in the budget the known quantity, that is, a pay increase, when the budget is submitted. It has made the budget reflect a lower figure than was actually necessary for that fiscal year.

Mr. ANDREWS. And makes a supplemental necessary.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This is not a decision of the Secretary of Defense, as was indicated. This is a high-level policy decision by the Bureau of the Budget and the President, because it is Government-wide policy, not related just to the military. This is a decision they make. They decided not to submit it as a part of the request of the various departments. It shows up as a one-line item in the overall budget.

General MANESS. As General Connor says, we have to go by the guidance that comes down to us from the Secretary of Defense. The guidance on personnel was that the pay raise which was effective last July, not this July, would be in our budget and we could not budget for the pay raise that will be coming up on July 1 of this year.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The fact is that there is going to be one. Either the size of the one that we know is in the law today or an additional pay increase that may be recommended in a very short time from now. So we have to meet it.

General MANESS. We will have to meet the pay increase.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The question is, Shall we meet it in the fiscal year 1970 budget as submitted, or shall we wait for a supplemental? That is our problem.

General MANESS. That is right; yes.

#### IMPROVEMENTS IN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In the committee report that accompanied the fiscal year 1969 budget we were concerned with military personnel and we made some suggestions. For instance, we said in certain areas generally better management of military personnel could be made and appear reasonable, that headquarters staff could very well be reduced by 5 percent with no loss in efficiency or in essential direct support of the war in Vietnam; other areas would appear to be actions to reduce the numbers of personnel assigned to public affairs, public relations, and public information activities. We also made the suggestion that per-

haps Project Transition could be transferred to another more appropriate agency. We made other suggestions also in our committee report.

Is it possible for anyone before the committee today to tell us if any actions or any considerations have been given to the suggestions made in this committee's report on the fiscal year 1969 appropriation bill?

General CONNOR. With regard to reducing the size of headquarters, sir; there had been some considerable reductions made in the Continental Army Operating Forces which includes headquarters basically.

With regard to Project Transition, it has been the decision of the Secretary of Defense to continue this program as it is now set up on about the same scale.

With regard to increases or decreases in information-type activities, I am not prepared to address that particular subject.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For the record, would you have somebody take a look again at our committee recommendations and give their opinions as to why the recommendations either have not been followed or are not practical?

General CONNOR. I am aware of the feeling of the committee on excess moves. This is something that has been bothering the Army itself for a long time. But under the present circumstances we have been unable to support our commitment in Vietnam without a great deal of turbulence and a great deal of movement on the part of military personnel, averaging actually about one move per year. That is a mathematical problem, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, maybe you could look at these and go to the point, for instance, of rotational policy of military personnel. Now there are all kinds of studies going on throughout DOD and maybe the Army could provide assurance that after the war in Vietnam that it could effect some of these recommendations of the committee—

General CONNOR. We certainly feel strongly that people are moving too often. We would prefer to leave an individual on station for 3 years, normally.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Or longer.

General CONNOR. Or longer; yes, sir. In many cases 5 years. But there are constraints here. It is a function of the size of the base, so to speak, versus the deployments. If we do have large short-tour commitments, then this is going to influence the length of time we can leave people in the base. That is what is happening to us today.

Now, again, as I say, as an objective we want to cut down on moves. We find that this is one reason that people leave the military, because of frequent moves. I think we could save a lot of money in this area.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I realize that these are times of stress because of the war in Vietnam and other emergencies throughout the world, but I wish that we could at least have a look at our committee recommendations of last year and see if we cannot give them some consideration. Some of these recommendations have been made over a number of

years. We ought to at least be trying to modernize some of the policies that have been in existence, at least took a look at our personnel.

(The information follows:)

The following are the Army comments with respect to the committee recommendations concerning military personnel in the committee report of the Department of Defense appropriation bill, 1969.

#### 1. ROTATION OF DUTY AND FREQUENCY OF PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION

The frequent rotation of duty and permanent changes of station are largely due to the present commitment to Vietnam. Recent efforts to curb personnel turbulences worldwide have been pointed at minimizing the problems directly attributable to this commitment. Two programs to a degree have been successful:

(a) Incentives are offered to personnel to extend their tours of duty in Vietnam. In general, these relate to improved opportunities for promotion and pay. The Department of the Army has instituted additional incentives to include special leave for those extending for 6 months and an additional rest and recuperation leave for personnel who extend their tours for 90 days or more.

(b) The extended early release program was initiated on August 1, 1968, to permit separation of short-tour returnees with 150 days or less service remaining. The objective is to eliminate tag-end assignments in the continental United States and the associated turbulence.

In spite of the above actions, there is little likelihood that the current frequency of moves will be substantially reduced as long as there is a requirement to sustain a significant Army force in SEA. The Department of the Army continues to strongly indorse the 12-month tour in Vietnam because of its morale value. While the Department of the Army does not advocate any change in this policy, the 12-month tour in Vietnam is recognized as one of the principal reasons for frequent changes of station worldwide. The current troop level in Vietnam requires that the Army provide approximately ——— replacements to that country annually. The effect upon the frequency of worldwide permanent changes of station of this statistic alone, to say nothing of the other oversea force requirements and the large number of accessions annually, is dramatic. In addition, the Army must continue to move personnel for reasons associated with career development and equity. The current environment has not lessened Army requirements to move personnel because of schooling, promotions, and changes in type of duty. We must also continue to provide equity to all personnel by minimizing the number of undesirable assignments for the individual.

The Army is looking ahead to the time when the Vietnam commitment is reduced and assignment policies can be based on the pre-Vietnam sustaining base. In a more stabilized environment, the Army plans to institute policies which will provide improved management of permanent change of station moves. Under these policies, Army personnel will be permitted to serve an extended tour of duty in the continental United States, or areas of residence (such as Hawaii or Alaska), between tours of duty oversea. Army oversea requirements for personnel to serve tours where dependents cannot accompany sponsors will be reduced considerably. The frequency of permanent changes of station should be reduced accordingly.

#### 2. ASSIGNMENTS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL TO NON-MILITARY DUTIES (INCLUDES USE OF MILITARY OFFICERS AS PROCUREMENT OFFICERS, BUDGET OFFICERS, AND ACCOUNTING OFFICERS)

Table of organization and equipment (TOE) units; e.g., the fighting units and those units that provide their most immediate support, are staffed with all military personnel. Some of these support-type units, such as transportation units in port operation, are designed to be staffed with minimum command, supervisory technical and maintenance personnel.

Positions most likely to call for civilian occupancy are those contained in table of distribution and allowance (TDA) units, which include most of the training, support, and headquarters elements of the Army.

The primary consideration in delineating positions for military or civilian occupancy in TDA units is the successful execution of military operational sup-

port missions in an efficient manner. Within this consideration, it is Army policy to delineate for military occupancy only those TDA positions which require military incumbents for reasons of law, security, or maintenance or morale and discipline; which require the application of knowledge and/or skills that could be acquired and maintained only through extensive and continuing military training and experience; or which are traditionally occupied by military personnel. All other positions are normally delineated for civilian occupancy.

Although a position is identified for military or civilian occupancy, the requirements of rotation base, space, and/or fund limitation, or nonavailability of civilian skills at some locations, may necessitate staffing other than that which has been delineated.

During the period January 1, 1966, through June 30, 1968, the Army participated in the Department of Defense-directed civilianization program. A total of 1,273 officer and 33,863 enlisted positions of all types were converted to civilian positions. In selecting positions to be converted, primary consideration was given to those positions which could be said to require relatively civilian capacities. It must be pointed out that any attempt by the Army to delineate additional spaces for civilian occupancy could not be implemented because of section 201 of Public Law 90-364.

### 3. OFFICER CAREER PLANNING

The Army's officer career planning program has been established basically to provide a career pattern which, through progressive levels of schooling and duty assignments, will develop an officer to achieve his greatest potential. The advancement of an officer to the highest levels of training for which he is capable is dependent to a large degree on his duty assignments. To be totally effective, the career planning program must provide for:

Formal education and training in military and civilian schools.

Rotation of assignments in varied types of duty.

Development of capacity by performance in progressively higher levels of responsibility.

To achieve these essentials, assignments on a permanent change of station (PCS) basis are necessary. The frequency of such PCS moves, by policy, is to minimize turbulence and cost and normally provides a stabilization period for officers of from 24 to 36 months. However, reassignment of an officer is not made automatically upon completion of any fixed period of time except for foreign service tours. Requirements will dictate when officers must be reassigned prior to completing the minimum length of a normal tour. Requirements may also dictate that an officer remain at his current station and duty assignment for an extended period.

In the absence of a Vietnam-type situation, the career planning program would significantly reduce the number of PCS moves required. However, Vietnam requirements and the necessity to maintain adequate force readiness in other short tour and long tour areas have caused a significant modification of our assignment policy. Vietnam war notwithstanding, our objectives remain to—

Achieve reasonable job tenure.

Advance career development.

Maintain a corps of highly motivated and competent officers which results in a more efficient and proficient Army.

Within this framework and the Vietnam situation, there are continuing efforts on the part of the Army to reduce turbulence and costs by minimizing PCS move requirements. Examples of such policy efforts are:

Army regulations and JTR prohibit two PCS moves of an individual during one fiscal year. Exceptional cases are authorized only by authority retained at Department of the Army level.

CONUS officer requisitions are filled to the maximum extent by officers returning from overseas assignments.

All officer intra-CONUSPCS moves require DA approval on an individual basis and in accordance with current regulations.

### 4. REDUCTION OF HEADQUARTERS STAFF

Reduction in military strengths as suggested by the proposed 5 percent reduction of headquarters staffs would be detrimental to the Army and should be avoided. The various Army commands, worldwide, are already manned on an

austere basis and should not be assessed any reductions particularly in view of the reductions in the civilian work force now taking place.

#### 5. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS, PUBLIC RELATIONS, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES

An overall reduction of 3 percent in military man-years in support of public information has been realized in the Office of the Chief of Information, Department of the Army and its support activities during the past year. As reported in a December 6, 1968, memorandum to the Assistant Director, Surveys and Investigations Staff, House Appropriations Committee, a reduction from 199 man-years to 193 has been made despite recognized increased personnel requirements for long-range information planning.

Personnel ceilings in headquarters, Department of the Army are subject to periodic manpower surveys to determine that personnel authorizations are appropriate for the workload functions performed. In the survey completed last year, workload data justified the manpower used in information activities at departmental level.

#### 6. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES

[The following actions relating to communications services which occurred during fiscal year 1969 have resulted in a decrease in military personnel:

(a) Close-down of the communications facility. \_\_\_\_\_.

(b) Phase-out of high frequency facilities \_\_\_\_\_.

(c) \_\_\_\_\_.

(d) Across-the-board reduction for communications facilities in fiscal year 1969—2,050 personnel.

(e) Reorganization of the \_\_\_\_\_ has been approved by Department of the Army and is in the process of being accomplished. This reorganization will result in better utilization of military personnel and will reduce contractor support personnel.

Currently studies are underway that could result in realignment in the communications area and possibly result in further reductions of personnel.]

#### 7. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

The fiscal year 1970 budget submission shows a decrease of \_\_\_\_\_ military spaces in intelligence activities compared with the figures in effect at the time of the fiscal year 1969 hearings. There was no compensating increase in civilian spaces associated with this reduction.

Reductions were brought about by implementing the recommendations of routine and specifically directed survey and inspection teams. During the past year, measures have been taken to more effectively manage intelligence activities. Included in such measures were:

(a) A detailed study resulting in the reorganization of the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

(b) Reorganization of the U.S. Army Intelligence Command which reduced region headquarters and relocated activities.

(c) Establishment of the U.S. Army Topographic Command which will provide more effective management of topographic resources and improve responsiveness to commanders.

(d) \_\_\_\_\_

#### 8. PROJECT TRANSITION

The Army expanded Project Transition operations in CONUS from the initial 42 to 55 installations in fiscal year 1969. This expansion was accomplished within the fiscal year 1969 budget (\$8.819 million) and prior to the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee budgetary restriction placed upon the program.

There has been an increasing interest and demand expressed for transition services by the enlisted man; \$10,719 million is in the fiscal year 1970 program to meet the increasing demand for transition services.

The Army has not planned an expansion of the transition program to overseas areas because of the considerable increase in resources required, and the nature of the operational missions. The Army is placing controls on the cur-

rent program to minimize the loss of manpower for unit operational mission requirements.

The Army is emphasizing off-duty Project Transition training. In the majority of cases where duty time is authorized for training, it is "on-the-job" in support of the military mission in skills closely related to the Army mission and the civilian job market. Close liaison is maintained at the local level between Project Transition directors and public sector program managers to insure that duplication of effort does not occur.

#### 9. SUBSISTENCE COLLECTIONS

The policy of collecting from officer patients, including those in an air evacuation status, is in accordance with section 1075, title 10, United States Code, which provides that an officer of a uniformed service, who is hospitalized in a uniformed services hospital, will pay an amount that is attributable to the subsistence provided. Collection procedures established in support of this policy permit patients either to pay for the meals when served or by deferred collection action.

Collection and waiver alternatives have been explored objectively and exhaustively in an effort to remove the need for collecting meal charges from officer patients. There is simply no way to accomplish this, short of proposed legislation which would grant authority to waive such charges under certain conditions.

Proposed legislation dealing with this area of concern is currently being considered.

#### UNNECESSARY ROTATION OF ARMY PERSONNEL

Mr. ANDREWS. Will the gentleman yield? I just want to say I have been on this committee 23 years and we have been discussing the same matter for nearly a quarter of a century. I know that in time of war you have got to move these people frequently, but in peacetime—if we ever have any such time as that again—where you have a mechanic, say, at a base, why not leave him there for awhile?

General CONNOR. We have computer programs under development which we hope will give us an insight into how to solve this problem. In other words, it will tell us eventually the most efficient and effective assignment policy and procedure, given the requirements and the resources that we have at the time. I think this will pay off in due course. At least, we can then say we are doing it in the most efficient way possible because this sort of thing lends itself to computer application very nicely.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. You mentioned, General, the installation of these computers to assist you in personnel management. Can you give us any encouragement as to how these have been helpful to you?

General CONNOR. Yes, sir; I can. Two years ago we developed a computerized methodology for assigning individuals from BCT to AIT. This was based on the individual's aptitude scores, his own personal preferences as to what sort of skill he wanted to be trained in. It was based on the shortest move to put him from one installation to another. It was based on the requirements in the individual skills. So that we could then through the use of computers match these things out and come up with the most desirable mix assignment at the cheapest cost. We found, for example, we were saving about \$3 million a year just by this particular application. We were giving about 85 percent of our soldiers the sort of training that they wanted.

Now, prior to this where it had been a hand-match operation we

couldn't come anywhere near that efficiency. This is one dramatic example.

Mr. DAVIS. One, yes. What about the overall assignments of personnel, have the computers been of substantial help to you in that regard?

General CONNOR. It has made it possible to handle this operation at the Department of Army level. The volume and enormity really of this personnel operation today really staggers the imagination. Every individual that moves, moves with a set of individual orders. He moves at his place in line, so to speak. In other words, if he hasn't been to Vietnam and somebody else has, he goes. All this is done by means of computers.

We are expanding our capabilities, particularly in the forecasting areas, in the management areas.

Mr. DAVIS. Just a few matters of detail.

#### STATION ALLOWANCES OVERSEAS

On page 13 of your justification, the cost of living under station allowances overseas has been increased by something over three-quarters of a million dollars. Is this an arbitrary increase factor that you have applied, or what can you tell us about that?

General CONNOR. It is for the support of the increased ———. Do you want to elaborate on that?

Mr. HUTCHISON. ———. We have some ——— more man-years in 1970 for the ———. That is what this \$700,000 increase is for.

General CONNOR. There have been ———, as you know, from last year.

#### TERMINAL LEAVE PAYMENTS FOR OFFICERS

Mr. DAVIS. On the next page, 14, there is a request for \$33.2 million for terminal leave payments for officers. Let us take the case of an officer who might have 60 days' leave coming. So he goes on leave the 1st of May with his effective retirement on the 1st of July. Is this considered a terminal leave situation so that it would affect the average strength tabulation which you show on page 11?

General CONNOR. He is still carried in operating strength, even though he is on terminal leave. He is still on the books of his parent organization in its operating strength.

Mr. DAVIS. Do we have a duplication here, then? That is what I am getting at.

Mr. HUTCHISON. Sir, this is lump-sum payments of leave, once his terminal leave is over. In other words, he elects to take so much leave before he goes off the roll and then he gets a lump-sum payment for that leave he has accrued that he has not used up. That is what this \$33 million is for, that lump-sum payment that he gets on the day he is discharged. He is in our average strength until the day he is discharged. If he is on terminal leave then he is still on basic pay. Then the day he is discharged, that leave that he has not used up he gets a lump-sum payment for. That is the \$33 million that is here.

If he has accrued 60 days and elects 30 days' terminal leave, then the

day he is discharged he gets a lump-sum payment for the other 30 days.

Mr. DAVIS. This is lump-sum payment, then. It would not be available to him if he were using it all up at the time it would occur, the 1st of July.

Mr. HUTCHISON. That is correct.

#### COST-OF-LIVING ALLOWANCES ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Mr. DAVIS. On page 17 there is an increase of about \$4.8 million in cost-of-living allowances for enlisted personnel. Can you tell us the basis for this increase?

Mr. HUTCHISON. Sir, it is, once again, the enlisted cost of the \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. DAVIS. Give us a little more backup on that, will you, Mr. Hutchison? \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. HUTCHISON. \_\_\_\_\_. That is the reason for the increase.

#### ABSENTEE AND RATION RATES

Mr. DAVIS. On page 23, there are two figures that need to be explained. One of them is an adjustment downward in absenteeism from 10.64 to 10.59 percent. Then, while it is relatively small, there is an increase in the yearly rate from \$475.11 to \$475.20. If you take those two adjustments and run them together, it amounts to something in the neighborhood of \$300,000. So, I think we ought to have an explanation of those two adjustments.

General CONNOR. Mr. Nutt, can you address that question?

Mr. NUTT. First, in regard to the absentee rate, the absentee rate is directly affected by the location of the man. As the men are assigned to oversea areas such as Vietnam, where they have little chance to be absent from their messes, the absentee rate decreases. Therefore, the decrease in absentee rate reflects the additional average strength in Vietnam in 1970 over that experienced in 1969. The same is true in reverse of the yearly ration rate. The cost of feeding a man is higher in an oversea area than in CONUS. Therefore, as more men go overseas, the average yearly ration rate goes higher.

#### OVERSEA STATION ALLOWANCES

Mr. DAVIS. In last year's hearings, on pages 84 and 85 there was a tabulation showing the oversea station allowances. Would you please insert, with the chairman's permission, a schedule similar to that which appeared in last year's hearings?

General CONNOR. Yes.

(The material follows:)

The cost-of-living allowance rates are prescribed for officer and enlisted men with and without dependents and they vary by grade and number of dependents in each country and locality within the country where authorized. This allowance represents the difference between all living costs, except housing, in the United States and similar costs of oversea stations. The U.S. base is determined from data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the military services. The oversea base is determined from State Department price information wherever possible. The rates are established after comparing prices of selected goods and services, purchased at oversea stations, with prices prevailing in the United States. These rates are constantly reviewed and revised by the Per Diem,

Travel, and Transportation Allowance Committee, based on changing economic conditions in the oversea areas. Therefore, detailed reports reflecting numbers and allowances at any specific time do not constitute a valid basis for projecting future requirements. The estimated requirements for U.S. Army Forces reflected in this budget estimate are based on actual amounts expended during the latest period prior to submission of the budget estimate, updated in accordance with known strength changes in the countries or localities affected. Examples of cost-of-living allowances currently authorized in different countries are as follows:

## DAILY COST-OF-LIVING ALLOWANCES—CAPTAIN O-3

	Without dependents	Number of dependents				
		1	2	3	4	5 or more
Afghanistan.....	\$2.60	\$3.10	\$3.25	\$3.45	\$3.65	\$3.85
Juneau, Alaska.....	6.30	7.55	8.00	8.45	8.90	9.40
Nome, Alaska.....	6.90	8.25	8.70	9.20	9.70	10.30
Algeria, Algiers.....	4.90	5.85	6.15	6.50	6.90	7.30
Melbourne, Australia.....	.85	1.05	1.10	1.15	1.20	1.30
Vienna, Austria.....	2.30	2.75	2.90	3.05	3.25	3.45
Quebec City, Canada.....	1.15	1.35	1.45	1.55	1.60	1.70
Bombay, India.....	.30	.35	.35	.40	.40	.45
Norway.....	1.45	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.05	2.15
Karachi, Pakistan.....	1.45	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.05	2.15
Switzerland.....	4.60	5.50	5.80	6.15	6.50	6.85
Venezuela.....	4.30	5.15	5.45	5.75	6.10	6.40
St. Thomas, V.I.....	2.85	3.45	3.65	3.85	4.05	4.30

## DAILY COST-OF-LIVING ALLOWANCES—E-4

Afghanistan.....	\$1.50	\$1.75	\$1.90	\$2.00	\$2.10	\$2.20
Juneau, Alaska.....	3.65	4.30	4.65	4.90	5.15	5.40
Nome, Alaska.....	4.00	4.70	5.05	5.35	5.60	5.90
Algeria, Algiers.....	2.85	3.35	3.60	3.80	4.00	4.15
Melbourne, Australia.....	.50	.60	.65	.65	.70	.75
Vienna, Austria.....	1.35	1.55	1.70	1.80	1.85	1.95
Quebec City, Canada.....	.65	.80	.85	.90	.95	1.00
Bombay, India.....	.15	.20	.20	.20	.25	.25
Norway.....	.85	1.00	1.05	1.10	1.15	1.25
Karachi, Pakistan.....	.85	1.00	1.05	1.10	1.15	1.25
Switzerland.....	2.65	3.15	3.35	3.55	3.75	3.95
Venezuela.....	2.50	2.95	3.15	3.35	3.50	3.70
St. Thomas, V.I.....	1.65	1.95	2.10	2.25	2.35	2.45

Note: Additional classified information has been furnished separately to the committee.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

## OFFICER AND ENLISTED PROCUREMENT BY SOURCE

Mr. ANDREWS. General Connor, would you provide for the record (1) a table indicating your estimate for fiscal year 1970 in the area of officer and enlisted procurement by source, and compare this with the estimate for fiscal 1969 and the actual for 1968?

General CONNOR. We will, sir.

(The material follows:)

COMPARISON OF PROCUREMENT BY SOURCE, FISCAL YEARS 1968, 1969, 1970  
OFFICER

	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970
Service academies.....	675	725	700
ROTC.....	10,846	16,415	17,232
OCS.....	18,355	8,149	8,355
Voluntary active duty <sup>1</sup> .....	964	794	982
JAG, CHAP, WAC, MSC <sup>2</sup> .....	1,464	1,114	875
MC, DC, VC.....	3,261	3,902	2,827
RA appointments (from civil life).....	39	30	30
Miscellaneous <sup>3</sup> .....	100	50	50
<b>Total male and WAC.....</b>	<b>35,704</b>	<b>31,179</b>	<b>31,051</b>
Nurses and Army medical specialists.....	1,472	1,433	1,338
Warrant officers.....	5,686	6,128	2,921
Involuntary active duty (Reserve).....	809		
<b>Grand total.....</b>	<b>43,671</b>	<b>38,740</b>	<b>35,310</b>

<sup>1</sup> Includes interservice transfer and direct appointments with concurrent call to active duty except for professional branches.

<sup>2</sup> Includes both voluntary active duty and direct appointments with concurrent active duty. Does not include ROTC.

<sup>3</sup> Includes administrative gains, such as recall from retired lists, order to AD for 90 days or less, and order to AD of Reserves and ARNGUS officers for duty with Army staff and NGB.

ENLISTED  
(In thousands)

Source	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970
Draftees.....	334.2	237.3	250.4
Reserve and National Guard.....	18.9	3.4	2.4
Regular Army 1st enlistees.....	198.9	215.7	212.0
Reenlistments within 90 days.....	81.0	76.1	84.8
Reenlistments over 90 days.....	3.8	5.3	5.2
Other enlisted gains.....	24.1	31.5	26.2
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>660.9</b>	<b>569.3</b>	<b>581.0</b>

RECRUITMENT COSTS

Mr. ANDREWS. Second, the actual amount to be expended for the recruitment program for fiscal year 1968, and the estimate for fiscal year 1969 and 1970.

General CONNOR. Yes, sir.  
(The material follows:)

COST OF ARMY RECRUITMENT PROGRAM  
(In millions of dollars)

	MPA	OMA	Total
<b>Fiscal year 1968 (actual):</b>			
Personnel.....	18.8	3.4	22.2
Advertising.....		3.0	3.0
Related expenses.....		5.5	5.5
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>18.8</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>30.7</b>
<b>Fiscal year 1969 (estimate):</b>			
Personnel.....	19.9	3.2	23.1
Advertising.....		3.0	3.0
Related expenses.....		5.9	5.9
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>12.1</b>	<b>32.0</b>
<b>Fiscal year 1970 (estimate):</b>			
Personnel.....	19.3	2.9	22.2
Advertising.....		3.0	3.0
Related expenses.....		5.6	5.6
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>19.3</b>	<b>11.5</b>	<b>30.8</b>

## OFFICER RATIOS TO TOTAL STRENGTH

Mr. ANDREWS. Third, officer ratios to total strength by fiscal year, similar to the one furnished on page 70 of part 5 of last year's hearings. (The material follows:)

Officer ratio to total strengths (authorized officer ratio).

Fiscal year:	Percent
1970	11.35
1969	11.13
1968	10.55
1967	9.82
1966	10.02
1965	11.47
1964	11.50
1963	11.50
1962	11.50
1961	11.50
1960	11.50

## ARMY STRENGTH BY PRIMARY MISSIONS—ACTUAL STRENGTH OF OFFICERS BY GRADES

Mr. ANDREWS. Fourth, an update of the table dealing with the disbursement of Army strength by primary missions, and the actual strength of officers, by grades, since 1961.

General CONNOR. Yes, sir. We will be happy to provide that. (The material follows:)

## DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY STRENGTH BY PRIMARY MISSION (ACCOUNTABLE)

	Fiscal year 1968	Percent
Division Forces.....	659,275	42.0
Special Mission Forces.....	163,951	10.4
General Support Forces.....	252,061	16.1
Training establishment.....	(112,961)	(7.2)
Support establishment.....	(95,717)	(6.1)
Other.....	(43,383)	(2.8)
Individuals.....	494,427	31.5
Transients.....	(159,330)	(10.1)
Patients.....	(21,204)	(1.3)
Trainees.....	(224,619)	(14.3)
Students.....	(85,649)	(5.4)
Others.....	(3,625)	(0.4)
Total Army.....	1,569,714	100.0

## DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY STRENGTH BY PRIMARY MISSION (PROGRAMED)

	Fiscal year 1969	Percent	Fiscal year 1970	Percent
Division Forces.....	} Deleted			
Special Mission and General Support Forces.....				
Other.....				
Total Army.....	1,533,475		1,507,175	

† Includes individuals.

## OFFICERS BY GRADE SINCE 1961—ACTUAL STRENGTHS

	June 30, 1961	June 30, 1962 <sup>1</sup>	June 30, 1963	June 30, 1964	June 30, 1965
General.....	458	493	483	484	484
Colonel.....	4,724	5,094	5,000	5,022	5,053
Lieutenant colonel.....	11,209	12,642	12,235	12,243	12,285
Major.....	15,389	17,775	17,035	17,026	17,105
Captain.....	29,345	31,081	29,432	30,013	29,964
Lieutenant.....	28,489	37,673	33,907	35,262	36,346
Warrant officer.....	9,851	10,820	9,677	10,226	10,304
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>99,465</b>	<b>115,578</b>	<b>107,769</b>	<b>110,276</b>	<b>111,541</b>

	June 30, 1966	June 30, 1967	June 30, 1968 <sup>1</sup>	June 30, 1969 <sup>1,2</sup>	June 30, 1970 <sup>1</sup>
General.....	496	498	501	501	499
Colonel.....	5,264	5,582	6,032	6,334	6,340
Lieutenant colonel.....	13,329	14,674	16,176	16,461	16,609
Major.....	18,430	20,386	22,814	24,588	25,368
Captain.....	32,258	34,117	35,133	38,400	43,200
Lieutenant.....	36,125	51,595	64,743	60,500	55,384
Warrant officer.....	11,313	16,112	20,170	23,950	23,757
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>117,205</b>	<b>142,964</b>	<b>165,569</b>	<b>170,734</b>	<b>171,157</b>

<sup>1</sup> Includes Reserve component units involuntarily recalled to active duty.

<sup>2</sup> Program strengths.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are there further questions?  
Thank you, gentlemen.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 12, 1969.

## RESERVE PERSONNEL, ARMY

AND

## NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, ARMY

## WITNESSES

MAJ. GEN. J. M. HIGHTOWER, DEPUTY CHIEF, OFFICE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

MAJ. GEN. W. J. SUTTON, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

MAJ. GEN. F. S. GREENLIEF, DEPUTY CHIEF, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

BRIG. GEN. L. E. MANESS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF ARMY BUDGET (OPERATIONS)

BRIG. GEN. C. P. HANNUM, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INDIVIDUAL TRAINING FOR ROTC, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL

B. E. PETHAL, CHIEF, COMPTROLLER DIVISION, OFFICE, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, ARMY  
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification Code	07-05-2070-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>				
Direct program:				
1.	Reserve component personnel .....	228,788	259,028	277,869
2.	Reserve officer candidates .....	32,774	33,772	33,131
	Total direct obligations .....	261,562	292,800	311,000
Reimbursable program:				
1.	Reserve component personnel .....	321	900	900
2.	Reserve officer candidates .....	35	100	100
	Total reimbursable obligations .....	356	1,000	1,000
10	Total obligations .....	261,918	293,800	312,000
<u>Financing:</u>				
Receipts and reimbursements from:				
.11	Federal funds .....	-14	-24	-24
14	Non-Federal sources <u>1/</u> .....	-342	-976	-976
25	Unobligated balance lapsing .....	21,493	....	....
	<u>Budget authority</u> .....	283,055	292,800	311,000

See for all program budget estimates

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, ARMY  
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification Code 07-05-2070-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<b>Budget authority:</b>			
40 <u>Appropriation</u> .....	297,200	287,200	311,000
41 Transferred to other accounts (-) .....	-14,145	....	....
43 Appropriation (adjusted) .....	283,055	287,200	311,000
44.30 Proposed supplemental for military pay act increase.....	...	5,600	....
<b>Relation of obligations to expenditures:</b>			
71 Obligations incurred, net .....	261,562	292,800	311,000
72 Obligated balance, start of year .....	51,353	55,779	75,579
74 Obligated balance, end of year (-) .....	-55,779	-75,579	-98,579
77 Adjustments in expired accounts .....	-2,823	...	...
90 Outlays excluding pay increase supplemental .....	254,313	268,300	287,100
91.30 Outlays from military pay act supplemental .....	....	4,700	900
<u>1/ Reimbursements from Non-Federal sources are for subsistence furnished Reserve Component officers during field training and inactive duty training (10 U.S.C. 4621).</u>			

Data for all 3 columns based on estimates

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE - MILITARY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, ARMY  
Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification Code 07-05-2070-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<b>Direct obligations:</b>			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military .....	180,526	198,468	209,273
12.2 Personnel benefits: Military.....	35,009	36,446	37,348
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons .....	21,528	23,666	25,923
22.0 Transportation of things .....	6	158	243
26.0 Supplies and materials .....	23,449	33,169	37,247
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities .....	1,044	893	966
Total direct obligations .....	261,562	292,800	311,000
<b>Reimbursable obligations:</b>			
26.0 Supplies and materials .....	356	1,000	1,000
99.0 Total obligations .....	261,918	293,800	312,000

MIL-27

submit budget estimates

108

LANGUAGE SHEET

Section 1 - LANGUAGE

For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the Army Reserve on active duty under sections 265, 3019, and 3033 of title 10, United States Code, or while undergoing reserve training or while performing drills or equivalent duty, and for members of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, as authorized by law: /\$287,200,000/ (1)  
\$311,000,000. (2)

Section 2 - EXPLANATION OF LANGUAGE CHANGES

- (1) Deletion of FY 1969 appropriation.
- (2) Insertion of FY 1970 appropriation.

APPROPRIATION Reserve Personnel, Army		BUDGET PROGRAM (Number and Title) 3200 Reserve Component Personnel		
BUDGET PROJECT ACCOUNT	TITLE	(In Thousands of Dollars)		
		ACTUAL FISCAL YEAR 1968	ESTIMATE	
			FISCAL YEAR 19 69	FISCAL YEAR 19 70
3210	Training--Pay Group A.....	\$ 169,193	\$ 190,293	\$ 189,644
3220	Training--Pay Group D.....	17,169	16,253	16,271
3230	Training--REP--Pay Group F.....	26,512	36,157	54,465
3240	School Training.....	6,525	8,369	8,366
3250	Special Training.....	8,199	6,960	7,907
3260	Administration and Support.....	1,190	996	1,416
	Total Direct Obligations.....	228,788	259,028	277,869

**JUSTIFICATION**

Budget Program 3200 provides funds for direct military personnel costs of pay and allowances, clothing, subsistence, and travel for members of the Army Reserve.

The programed paid drill strength for FY 1969 is average 254,295 and end 254,121 and for FY 1970 is average 256,264 and end 261,220. This budget provides active duty and reserve duty training for the above including REP-63 input of 36,890 in FY 1969 and 55,172 in FY 1970.

Individual training is programed as follows:

	FY 1969		FY 1970	
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL
Individual reinforcements	3,400	36,600	3,400	36,600
USAR schools	4,748	-	4,000	-
Mobilization designees	4,874	-	4,000	-
Service and Army area schools	8,639	3,382	8,639	3,382
Special training	22,628	3,380	24,218	4,251

RESERVE PERSONNEL IN PAID STATUS

RESERVE COMPONENT USAR

Pay Groups	Paid Drills	Paid Days of Active Duty for Training		FY 19 68 (PAST YEAR)			FY 19 69 (CURRENT YEAR)		FY 19 70 (BUDGET YEAR)	
				BEGIN	AVERAGE	END	AVERAGE	END	AVERAGE	END
A	48	15	Off	34,958	34,034	32,201	32,951	33,700	34,073	34,700
			Enl	195,807	210,960	209,306	208,908	204,198	201,867	196,732
F	0	Minimum 4 Mos.	Off	2	1	0				
			Enl	31,190	11,401	2,732	12,436	16,223	20,324	29,788
<u>Paid Drill Training</u>										
Sub Total			Off	34,960	34,035	32,201	32,951	33,700	34,073	34,700
			Enl	226,997	222,361	212,038	221,344	220,421	222,191	226,520
			Total	261,957	256,396	244,239	254,295	254,121	256,264	261,220
<u>Paid Active Duty Training Only.</u>										
Sub Total			Off	16,225	12,456	12,456	13,022	13,022	11,400	11,400
D	0	15	Enl	53,417	54,840	54,840	36,600	36,600	36,600	36,600
			Total	69,642	67,296	67,296	49,622	49,622	48,000	48,000
<u>TOTAL PAID STATUS</u>			Off	51,185	46,491	44,657	45,973	46,722	45,473	46,100
			Enl	280,414	277,201	266,878	257,944	257,021	258,791	263,120
			Total	331,599	323,692	311,535	303,917	303,743	304,264	309,220

Averages computed by doubling the end strengths of the months of July through May, adding 30 June strengths of the previous year and the year under consideration, and dividing the total by 24, except for Pay Group D. Pay Group D represents the total number of personnel participating during the fiscal year, and average and end strengths are identical in any one year.

PROGRAM DRILL PAY STRENGTHS

	FY 1968			FY 1969			FY 1970		
	Begin	Ave	End	Begin	Ave	End	Begin	Ave	End
<b>Officer:</b>									
<b>Pay Group A</b>									
TOE Units	26,391	25,535	23,596	23,596	24,146	24,694	24,694	25,067	25,694
TD Units	5,642	5,692	5,726	5,726	5,863	6,000	6,000	6,000	6,000
S&F, USAR Sch	2,548	2,456	2,538	2,538	2,580	2,622	2,622	2,622	2,622
SeI Svc (USAR Aug)	377	351	341	341	362	384	384	384	384
<b>Total</b>	<b>34,958</b>	<b>34,034</b>	<b>32,201</b>	<b>32,201</b>	<b>32,951</b>	<b>33,700</b>	<b>33,700</b>	<b>34,073</b>	<b>34,700</b>
<b>Enlisted:</b>									
<b>Pay Group A</b>									
TOE Units	180,455	194,192	191,327	191,327	190,786	185,934	185,934	183,603	178,468
TD Units	13,750	15,084	16,186	16,186	16,093	16,000	16,000	16,000	16,000
S&F, USAR Sch	1,602	1,684	1,793	1,793	2,029	2,264	2,264	2,264	2,264
<b>Total</b>	<b>195,807</b>	<b>210,960</b>	<b>209,306</b>	<b>209,306</b>	<b>208,908</b>	<b>204,198</b>	<b>204,198</b>	<b>201,867</b>	<b>196,732</b>
<b>TOTAL DRILL PAY</b>	<b>230,765</b>	<b>244,994</b>	<b>241,507</b>	<b>241,507</b>	<b>241,859</b>	<b>237,898</b>	<b>237,898</b>	<b>235,940</b>	<b>231,432</b>
Officer	34,958	34,034	32,201	32,201	32,951	33,700	33,700	34,073	34,700
Enlisted	195,807	210,960	209,306	209,306	208,908	204,198	204,198	201,867	196,732

**PAID DRILL STRENGTH BY MONTH**

	<b><u>FY 1968</u></b> <b><u>Actual</u></b>	<b><u>FY 1969</u></b> <b><u>Estimated</u></b>	<b><u>FY 1970</u></b> <b><u>Estimated</u></b>
<b>1 July</b>	261,957	244,239	254,121
<b>31 July</b>	263,014	244,081	254,239
<b>31 August</b>	262,148	240,497	254,365
<b>30 September</b>	260,666	244,000	254,481
<b>31 October</b>	258,806	248,000	254,596
<b>30 November</b>	259,127	253,000	254,711
<b>31 December</b>	259,285	258,000	254,825
<b>31 January</b>	258,649	263,000	255,918
<b>28 February</b>	254,352	264,000	257,009
<b>31 March</b>	252,877	264,000	258,097
<b>30 April</b>	249,355	264,000	259,067
<b>31 May</b>	245,376	259,782	260,184
<b>30 June</b>	244,239	254,121	261,220
<b>(Average)</b>	<b>(256,396)</b>	<b>(254,295)</b>	<b>(256,264)</b>

APPROPRIATION Reserve Personnel, Army		BUDGET PROGRAM (Number and Title) 3300 Reserve Officer Candidates (ROTC)		
BUDGET PROJECT ACCOUNT	TITLE	(In Thousands of Dollars)		
		ACTUAL FISCAL YEAR 19 68	ESTIMATE	
			FISCAL YEAR 19 69	FISCAL YEAR 19 70
3310	Senior ROTC.....	\$ 30,076	\$ 29,229	\$ 28,683
3320	Scholarship Program.....	1,920	2,906	3,482
3330	Junior ROTC.....	778	1,637	966
	Total Direct Obligations.....	32,774	33,772	33,131

**JUSTIFICATION**

Budget Program 3300 provides funds for direct military personnel costs of subsistence allowance, clothing, pay and allowances for summer camp training, subsistence and travel for members of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, as authorized under the provisions of Public Law 88-647, dated 13 October 1964, and Public Law 89-51, dated 28 June 1965.

This estimate is based on an enrollment of 150,400 cadets in the Senior Division and 123,000 cadets in the Junior Division in FY 1970. The program includes an attendance at advanced summer camp training of 18,730 in July 1969 and 16,860 in June 1970, and at basic summer camp training of 3,400 in July 1969 and 3,600 in June 1970.

It is estimated that 16,605 Second Lieutenants will be commissioned from the program at end FY 1969 and 17,523 will be commissioned at end FY 1970.

RESERVE OFFICER CANDIDATES (ROTC) ENROLLMENT

FY 1968			FY 1969			FY 1970 *					
Actual Ingoing	Average	Actual Outgoing	Actual Ingoing	Average	Estimated Outgoing	Estimated Ingoing	Average	Estimated Outgoing			
			MS-I	72,200	66,575	60,950	MS-I	72,200	66,575	60,950	
MS-I	78,126	69,227	60,329	MS-II	41,300	39,425	37,550	MS-II	41,300	39,425	37,550
MS-II	49,787	46,174	42,562	MS-III	20,000	19,750	19,500	MS-III	18,000	17,775	17,550
MS-III	18,951	18,733	18,515	MS-IV	17,500	17,140	16,780	MS-IV	18,900	18,512	18,125
MS-IV	18,566	17,933	17,300								
Bas	127,913	115,401	102,891		113,500	106,000	98,500		113,500	106,000	98,500
Adv	37,517	36,666	35,815		37,500	36,890	36,280		36,900	36,287	35,675
Total	165,430	152,067	138,706		151,000	142,890	134,780		150,400	142,287	134,175
Advanced Camp	18,395		16,908		18,236		18,730		18,730		16,860
Basic Camp	1,874		2,415		2,415		3,400		3,400		3,600
Junior Div	97,339		87,866		117,000		109,360		123,000		114,970
Estimated Yield of Commissioned Officers from Outgoing MS-IV			17,210				16,605				17,523

\*Includes 300 Foreign Students

MS-I - 160      MS-III - 25  
 MS-II - 95      MS-IV - 20

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, ARMY

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 07-05-2060-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>			
Direct obligations: Reserve component personnel.....	308,751	320,900	363,500
Reimbursable obligations: Reserve component personnel....	1,048	900	900
10 Total obligations.....	309,799	321,800	364,400
<u>Financing:</u>			
Receipts and reimbursements from:			
11 Federal funds.....	- 318	.....	.....
14 Non-Federal sources <u>/1</u> .....	- 730	- 900	- 900
25 Unobligated balance lapsing.....	14,866	.....	.....
Budget authority.....	323,617	320,900	363,500
<u>Budget authority:</u>			
40 Appropriation.....	345,000	304,500	363,500
41 Transferred to other accounts.....	-21,383	.....	.....
43 <u>Appropriation</u> (adjusted).....	323,617	304,500	363,500
44.30 Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases....	.....	16,400	.....
<u>1/ Reimbursements from non-Federal sources are for subsistence furnished Army National Guard officers during field training and for inactive duty training (10 U.S.C. 4621).</u>			

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, ARMY

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 07-05-2060-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<u>Relation of obligations to outlays:</u>			
71 Obligations incurred net.....	308,751	320,900	363,500
72 Obligated balance, start of year.....	60,602	56,649	70,549
74 Obligated balance, end of year.....	-56,649	-70,549	-92,049
77 Adjustments in expired accounts.....	10	.....	.....
90 Outlays, excluding pay increase supplemental.....	312,714	293,500	339,100
91.30 Outlays from military pay act supplemental.....	.....	13,500	2,900

OBJECT CLASSIFICATION (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 07-05-2060-0-1-051	1968 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<u>Direct obligations:</u>			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military.....	249,517	257,521	282,046
12.1 Personnel benefits: Military.....	17,557	17,654	19,057
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	10,159	9,531	13,589
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	30,741	35,528	47,795
41.0 Grants, subsidies and contributions.....	642	536	881
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities.....	135	130	132
Total direct obligations.....	308,751	320,900	363,500
<u>Reimbursable obligations:</u>			
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	1,048	900	900
99.0 Total obligations.....	309,799	321,800	364,400

116

116

For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the Army National Guard while on duty under sections 265, 3033, or 3496 of title 10 or section 708 of title 32 United States Code, or while undergoing training or while performing drills or equivalent duty, as authorized by law; (\$304,500,000) (1)  
 \$363,500,000: Provided, that obligations may be incurred under this appropriation without regard to section 107 of title 32, United States Code. (2)

1. Deletion of the FY 1969 appropriation.
2. Insertion of the FY 1970 budget request.

APPROPRIATION National Guard Personnel, Army		BUDGET PROGRAM (Number and Title) 3100 National Guard Personnel		
BUDGET PROJECT ACCOUNT	TITLE	(In Thousands of Dollars)		
		ACTUAL FISCAL YEAR 19 68	ESTIMATE	
			FISCAL YEAR 19 69	FISCAL YEAR 19 70
3100	National Guard:	\$	\$	\$
	Direct Obligations:			
3110	Training - Pay Group A.....	251,593	266,354	277,375
3120	Training - REP - Pay Group F.....	40,109	34,697	65,590
3130	School Training.....	11,939	13,805	14,455
3140	Special Training.....	2,215	3,157	2,798
3150	Administration and Support.....	2,895	2,887	3,282
	Total direct obligations.....	308,751	320,900	363,500
	Reimbursable obligations.....	1,048	900	900
	Total obligations.....	309,799	321,800	364,400

NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL IN PAID STATUS (EXHIBIT 020206-1)

Pay Groups	Paid Drills	Paid Days of ACDUTRA	FY 1968			FY 1969		FY 1970			
			Begin	Average	End	Average	End	Average	End		
A	48	15 Off	33,880	34,019	31,938	32,357	32,200	32,817	33,000		
			Enl	331,008	360,153	353,030	343,781	339,718	339,479	336,880	
			Drill Pay Status	Off	(33,880)	(34,019)	(31,938)	(32,357)	(32,200)	(32,817)	(33,000)
			Sub-Total	Enl	(331,008)	(360,153)	(353,030)	(343,781)	(339,718)	(339,479)	(336,880)
					364,888	394,172	384,968	376,138	371,918	372,296	369,880
F	0	90-180 Off	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
			Enl	53,186	17,247	4,214	12,179	15,682	22,995	34,152	
Total Paid Status		Off	33,880	34,019	31,938	32,357	32,200	32,817	33,000		
			Enl	384,194	377,400	357,244	355,960	355,400	362,474	371,032	
				418,074	411,419	389,182	388,317	387,600	395,291	404,032	

FY 1970 STRENGTH PLAN

	<u>Off and WO</u>	<u>Aggregate Enl Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>REP</u>	<u>Paid Drill</u>
30 Jun 69	32,200	355,400	387,600	15,682	371,918
Jul	32,600	355,384	387,984	17,712	370,272
Aug	33,000	355,368	388,368	19,712	368,656
Sep	33,200	355,552	388,752	21,700	367,052
Oct	33,100	356,036	389,136	21,988	367,148
Nov	33,000	356,520	389,520	22,176	367,344
Dec	32,900	360,904	393,804	20,564	373,240
Jan	32,800	365,270	398,070	22,052	376,018
Feb	32,700	369,780	402,480	22,452	380,028
Mar	32,600	370,168	402,768	23,352	379,416
Apr	32,500	370,556	403,056	27,952	375,104
May	32,800	370,944	403,744	31,352	372,392
Jun	33,000	371,032	404,032	34,152	369,880
(Average)	32,817	362,474	395,291	22,995	372,296

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD MANPOWER PROCUREMENT PROGRAM, FY 1970

(Opens 387,600 Closes 404,032)

OPENING STRENGTH  
 Officers 32,200  
 Enl Personnel 355,400  
 TOTAL 387,600

MONTH	TAKE	TAKE	OBLI-	VETS	TRANS	ENL FR	ALL	TOTAL	TOTAL	OFF	OFF	ENL	TOTAL	ACDUTRA
	ACDUTRA	ACDUTRA												
	In 70	In 71				COMP		GAINS	LOSSES	LOSSES				
JUL	5288	0	148	148	50	100	150	5884	5900	+400	32600	355384	387984	4700
AUG	5288	0	148	148	50	100	150	5884	5900	+400	33000	355368	388368	2700
SEP	5488	0	148	148	50	100	150	6084	5900	+200	33200	355552	388752	3988
OCT	5788	0	148	148	50	100	150	6384	5900	-100	33100	356036	389136	5488
NOV	5788	0	148	148	50	100	150	6384	5900	-100	33000	356520	389520	3888
DEC	5788	0	2148	2048	50	100	150	10284	5900	-100	32900	360904	393804	3088
JAN	9670	0	148	148	50	100	150	10266	5900	-100	32800	365270	398070	4188
FEB	9814	0	148	148	50	100	150	10410	5900	-100	32700	369780	402480	4388
MAR	5692	0	148	148	50	100	150	6288	5900	-100	32600	370168	402768	6388
APR	5692	0	148	148	50	100	150	6288	5900	-100	32500	370556	403056	8488
MAY	0	5692	148	148	50	100	150	6288	5900	+300	32800	370944	403744	6488
JUN	0	5392	148	148	50	100	150	5988	5900	+200	33000	371032	404032	6988
TOTAL	64296	11084	3776	3676	600	1200	1800	86432	70800	+800				60780
								AVERAGE			32817	362474	395291	5065

REP TRAINING PROGRAM FY 1970

<u>FY 1969 Carryover:</u>	<u>Input</u>	<u>Graduates and Losses</u>	<u>End of Month</u>	<u>Man Months</u>
Jan	1,000			
Feb	2,700			
Mar	700			
Apr	2,000			
May	5,200			
Jun	3,700		15,682	42,250
<hr/>				
<u>FY 1970 Input:</u>				
Jul	4,700	2,670	17,712	16,712
Aug	2,700	700	19,712	18,712
Sep	3,988	2,000	21,700	20,706
Oct	5,488	5,200	21,988	21,844
Nov	3,888	3,700	22,176	22,082
Dec	3,088	4,700	20,564	21,370
Jan	4,188	2,700	22,052	21,308
Feb	4,388	3,988	22,452	22,252
Mar	6,388	5,488	23,352	22,902
Apr	8,488	3,888	27,952	25,652
May	6,488	3,088	31,352	29,652
Jun	6,988	4,188	34,152	32,752
<hr/>				
	60,780			275,944
			Manyears	22,995

TRAINING PROGRAMS FY 1970

FIELD TRAINING

	<u>Average Strength</u>	<u>Federal Status</u>	<u>School</u>	<u>Adm Excused</u>		<u>Strength Participation</u>		<u>Attendance Factors</u>		
<u>1st Quarter:</u>										
Officers	32,600	( - )	(375)	( - )	=	32,225	x	53% x 98%	=	16,737
Enlisted	355,384	(17,712)	(288)	(7,000)	=	330,384	x	53% x 98%	=	<u>171,602</u> 188,339
<u>4th Quarter:</u>										
Officers	32,900	( - )	(375)	( - )	=	35,525	x	47% x 98%	=	14,981
Enlisted	370,988	(32,752)	(288)	(7,000)	=	330,948	x	47% x 98%	=	<u>152,435</u> <u>167,416</u>
										Total Trainees..... 355,755
										Officers..... (31,718)
										Enlisted..... (324,037)

ARMORY DRILLS

<u>All Units:</u>										
Officers	32,817	( - )	(375)	( - )	=	32,442	x	98%	=	31,793
Enlisted	362,474	(22,995)	(288)	( - )	=	339,191	x	97.3%	=	330,033
										Total Trainees..... 361,826

Mr. ANDREWS. The committee will now consider the fiscal year 1970 budget request for Reserve and National Guard Personnel, Army.

We have before us today three distinguished gentlemen associated with the Reserve and National Guard programs of the Army. We have Maj. Gen. J. M. Hightower, Deputy Chief, Office of Reserve Components; Maj. Gen. William J. Sutton, Chief, Army Reserve; and Maj. Gen. F. S. Greenleaf, Deputy Chief, Army National Guard.

The request for the "Army Reserve personnel" for 1970 is \$311 million. This is an increase of \$18,200,000 over the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

The National Guard is requesting \$363.5 million, an increase of \$42.6 million over the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

We will first hear the statement of General Hightower, followed by General Sutton and then General Greenleaf.

#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MAJ. GEN. J. M. HIGHTOWER

General Hightower, we note this is your first appearance before the committee in your present capacity. Therefore, we will insert in the record at this time your biographical sketch.

(The material follows:)

#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH, MAJ. GEN. JOHN MILTON HIGHTOWER, DEPUTY CHIEF, OFFICE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

John M. Hightower was born in Coleman, Tex., July 29, 1916. He graduated from the New Mexico College in Agriculture and Mechanical Arts (now New Mexico State University) in June 1940 and was commissioned as second lieutenant, Infantry, in the Regular Army July 1, 1940.

His first assignment was with the 23d Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., and he served with that organization until 1945. He commanded the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, in the European Theater of Operations until he was wounded in action on March 10, 1945. There followed 11 months of hospitalization in England and at William Beaumont General Hospital, El Paso, Tex.

In February 1946, General Hightower was selected for attendance at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. and upon graduation in June 1946 was assigned to the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y. as a tactical officer. In July 1948 he was assigned to General Headquarters, Far East Command in Tokyo. There he served in G-3 and in the office of the Chief of Staff. He was appointed Secretary General Staff, Far East Command and Supreme Command Allied Powers, in September 1950.

In July 1951, General Hightower joined the 7th Infantry Division in Korea where he commanded the 32d Infantry Regiment. He was promoted to colonel in October 1951. In March 1952, he returned to the United States for assignment as director of instruction, the Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga.

General Hightower was a student at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., in 1954-55 and upon graduation in June 1955 was assigned to Headquarters Allied Land Forces Central Europe, Fontainebleau, France, as Chief of the Organization and Equipment Branch, G-3.

In July 1958 he returned to the United States for assignment as Military Secretary to the Joint Strategic Survey Council, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He attended the State Department's Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy from September 1961 to June 1962 and upon graduation was assigned as Chief of Staff, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China.

From August 1963 to March 1965, General Hightower served as Deputy Director, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, National Security Council. He was promoted to brigadier general October 1, 1963. From March to December 1965, he was Deputy Director, Special State-Defense Study Group, and assigned to the Holding Detachment of the Office of the Army Chief of Staff from December 1965 through April 1966. On May 1, 1966, he was promoted to major general and assumed command of Fort Dix, N.J., the same day.

In December 1967 General Hightower was reassigned to the Office of Reserve Components, Department of the Army, as Deputy Chief of that office.

**DECORATIONS**

Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, Bronze Star Medal with 1 Oak Leaf Cluster, Army Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, Purple Heart, Croix de Guerre with Palm, Star of Ethiopia, Belgian Fourragere, Combat Infantryman Badge with Star, Distinguished Unit Citation.

**GENERAL STATEMENT, DEPUTY CHIEF, OFFICE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS**

**Mr. ANDREWS.** General, you may proceed with your statement.  
**General Hightower.**

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to present to you the Army Reserve Component Program in general terms and, with the use of a few charts, to summarize the activities supported by budgets in the past year, and the present year, and the Army's proposed budgets for Fiscal Year 1970.

As in previous years, Major General F. S. Greenlief, Deputy Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Major General W. J. Sutton, Chief of Army Reserve, are here today to present statements concerning the budget estimates for those appropriations for which they are Appropriation Directors. Brigadier General C. P. Hannum, who is the Army General Staff Director for ROTC, also is present to discuss the ROTC Program which is funded in Reserve Component budgets.

Last year when the FY 1969 budget was being presented, the Reserve Components of the Army were completing the reorganization started in December 1967. Last May some of our units were being mobilized. Others were undertaking additional training to prepare themselves for possible use in controlling civil disturbances. I am happy to report that during the past year the units have made considerable progress.

To present the over-all picture of the Reserve Components of the Army, the chart below compares actual costs in FY 1968 and budget estimates for FY 1969 and FY 1970 in millions of dollars for the three appropriations and one OMA budget program considered as the Army's Reserve Component budgets:

#### ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT BUDGETS

(\$ in millions)

	Fiscal Year 1968 <u>actual</u>	Fiscal Year 1969 <u>estimate</u>	Fiscal Year 1970 <u>estimate</u>
NGPA	\$ 308.8	\$ 320.9	\$ 363.5
OMARNG	241.7	277.7	306.0
RPA	261.6	292.8	311.0
(ROTC)	( 32.8)	( 33.8)	( 33.1)
BP 2600	111.4	105.8	130.7
(ROTC)	<u>( 13.1)</u>	<u>( 15.8)</u>	<u>( 18.2)</u>
Total	\$923.5	\$997.2	\$1,111.2

The President's Budget for FY 1970 requests for these appropriations 114 million dollars more than in FY 1969. I will discuss briefly the specific increases. The figures to which I will refer are the total for the Army National Guard and the U. S. Army Reserve. General Greenlief and General Sutton will explain in more detail the provisions of their specific programs and budgets.

Approximately 44% or some 50 million dollars, of the increase supports the Reserve Enlistment Program (REP). In FY 1970 we are programming an input of 115,900 REP personnel into the Army Training Centers compared to 69,300 in FY 1969. These inputs are controlled by the capability of the active Army to provide training for REP personnel in the Army Training Centers. Although inputs are important in assessing the program, man-years are more significant in so far as budget estimates are concerned. The man-year estimates for FY 1970 are for 43,319 compared to 24,615 for FY 1969 - for an increase of 18,704.

Another significant increase is in the procurement and maintenance of equipment. For stock funded equipment, repair parts, and transportation of our equipment the increase is \$25.7 million. These figures do not include the procurement of major items of equipment which are included in the PEMA estimates.

Equally important to the readiness of the Reserve Component units is the increase of \$18.6 million for pay of technicians. This total includes pay for a substantial increase in the number of USAR technicians and full year costs associated with the federalization of Army National Guard technicians.

The budget also provides \$12.6 million for civil disturbance control training of Army National Guard units in FY 1970. Funds for this purpose were not included in the FY 1969 budget.

The following chart depicts, in the left column, the activities to be supported by the two personnel appropriations. The comparison between FY 1968,

FY 1969 and FY 1970 shows that variations in the total are due in the most part to changes in the REP programs:

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS-FISCAL YEAR PRESIDENT'S BUDGET ESTIMATES

PERSONNEL APPROPRIATIONS

(\$ in millions)

NGPA and RPA	<u>Fiscal Year 1968 actual</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1969 estimate</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1970 estimate</u>
Tng, unit personnel	\$420.8	\$456.6	\$466.8
Tng, Indiv reinforcement	17.2	16.2	16.3
Tng, REP	66.6	70.9	120.1
School Training	18.5	22.2	22.8
Special Training	10.4	10.1	10.7
Administrative support	4.1	3.9	4.7
ROTC	<u>32.8</u>	<u>33.8</u>	<u>33.1</u>
Total	\$570.4	\$613.7	\$674.5
SUPPORTS:			
End Strength	633,421	641,721	665,252
ARNG	(389,182)	(387,600)	(404,032)
USAR	(244,239)	(254,121)	(261,220)
REP input to tng	32,510	69,290	115,952
REP man-years	28,648	24,615	43,319
ARNG	( 17,247)	( 12,179)	( 22,995)
USAR	( 11,401)	( 12,436)	( 20,324)

In the lower part of the chart, the principal program factors are displayed. The end strengths for FY 1968 and FY 1969 reflect the absence of the Reserve Component units mobilized in May 1968. These mobilized units are scheduled to return during FY 1970 and therefor are included in the FY 1970 end strengths. Also included in those strengths are authorized overstrengths for increased Negro participation in the Reserve Component units. The Department of Defense has directed that a program somewhat similar to that undertaken in New Jersey last year be instituted in both the Guard and the Reserve nationwide in an effort to enlist more Negroes in the units. When vacancies are not available for a Negro applicant, the unit commander will enlist the Negro as authorized overstrength and will retain him in that category until the position he has trained for is available in the unit. The program in FY 1970 is intended to raise the present rate of participation for Negroes from 1.8% at end FY 1969 to 2.7% by end FY 1970.

The chart below depicts the operation and maintenance funds, by year, to support training, logistics, air defense, administration, and ROTC costs. Again ARNG and USAR costs are combined:

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS-FISCAL YEAR 1970 PRESIDENT'S BUDGET ESTIMATES

O&M APPROPRIATIONS

(\$ in millions)

OMARNG and BP 2600	<u>Fiscal Year 1968 actual</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1969 estimate</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1970 estimate</u>
Training Operations	\$112.7	\$114.4	\$125.5
Logistics	164.6	192.2	229.3
Air Defense	39.7	45.0	47.2
Administration	22.4	15.5	16.5
ROTC	<u>13.7</u>	<u>16.4</u>	<u>18.2</u>
Total	\$353.1	\$383.5	\$436.7

	<u>Fiscal Year 1968 actual</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1969 estimate</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1970 estimate</u>
<b>SUPPORTS:</b>			
Technician end strength	<u>28,207</u>	<u>28,917</u>	<u>30,741</u>
ARNG	23,740	24,417	24,614
USAR	4,467	4,500	6,127
Stock Fund Equipment Procurement	<u>\$ 19.6</u>	<u>\$ 36.1</u>	<u>\$ 46.2</u>
ARNG	12.3	21.9	24.0
USAR	7.3	14.2	22.2
Repair Parts	<u>19.6</u>	<u>16.7</u>	<u>27.3</u>
ARNG	13.9	10.8	20.1
USAR	5.7	5.9	7.2

The most significant increase is in the logistics area, an increase of \$37.1 million over FY 69 and \$64.7 million over FY 1968. Some of the increases over FY 69 are: \$10.1 million in procurement of stock funded equipment, \$10.6 million for repair parts, and about \$10.0 million of the \$18.6 million mentioned earlier as increased costs are attributable to technicians in the logistics area. The total increase in technician end strength, including those in all Reserve Component units, those in the ARNG operational Air Defense units, and in other ARNG support activities, are shown on the chart.

This, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, concludes my report on funding for the Reserve Components of the Army before the appropriation directors discuss their budget estimates. I would be happy to attempt to answer any questions you may have or, if you wish, to be available to you after the presentations of General Sutton and General Greenleaf.

**MR. ANDREWS.** Thank you, General.

#### **GENERAL STATEMENT, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE**

Now, General Sutton, we will be glad to hear your statement.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

It is a pleasure and privilege for me to appear before you today to present the Army Reserve and ROTC budget for FY 1970 and to inform you of the current status of the program. The Army Reserve is deeply appreciative of your demonstrated interest and efforts over the years to improve Army Reserve readiness. Your recognition of the loyal and faithful service of members of the Army Reserve has been a source of strength to those of us who strive to improve this important Army program.

Here with me today from my office are:

Mr. Pethtal, my Comptroller  
 COL King, Deputy Comptroller  
 COL Johnson, Chief, Personnel Division  
 COL Huddleston, Chief, Organization & Training Division

Also with me today is General Hannum who is the Deputy Director of Individual Training for ROTC Affairs in the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. He is available to respond to questions on the Army ROTC which is included in the "Reserve Personnel, Army" budget.

My office is responsible for the implementation and execution of approved plans, policies, and programs pertaining to the United States Army Reserve, including the preparation, justification, and execution of that portion of the budget under which we operate.

For "Reserve Personnel, Army" our FY 1970 request is for an amount of \$311.0 million, of which \$277.9 million is for the Army Reserve and \$33.1 million is for the ROTC.

An amount of \$287.2 million was appropriated by the Congress for FY 1969. The addition of a supplemental request amount of \$5.6 million for the military pay raise brings total FY 1969 to \$292.8 million. This amount includes the support of an Army Reserve average strength of 254,295 and end strength of 254,121.

The FY 1970 budget is a net increase of \$18.2 million over FY 1969. This results primarily from the REP-63 training input of 55,172 in FY 1970 as compared with 36,890 in FY 1969 and increase in special tours for USAR administration and summer camp support.

Our established mission is to furnish, in the event of war or national emergency, and at such other times as national security may require, units effectively organized, trained, and equipped in time of peace for rapid mobilization, expansion, and deployment; such units to be of the types and numbers to meet the requirement of the Army and also additional qualified individual personnel for necessary replacement and expansion of the Army. Our objective is to bring these units and individuals to the highest state of readiness attainable--a state of readiness that will insure a minimum requirement of post-mobilization training.

The other important program supported in this budget is Army ROTC with an enrollment of 150,400 students in the Senior Division and 123,000 students in the Junior Division. The ROTC program over the past ten years has provided over 70% of the Active Army's newly commissioned second lieutenants, excluding the professional branches and female officers. Over 50% of our regular Army second lieutenants are products of ROTC. Thirty-five percent of the present Active Army officer corps received their commissions through ROTC.

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY RESERVE

We began a major reorganization of the Army Reserve troop structure on 1 December 1967 and completed it by 31 May 1968. The FY 1968 or new structure consists of units with authorized strengths ranging from 93% to 100% of TOE, with the overall average being 95.6%.

Although this was the most comprehensive reorganization in the history of the Army Reserve, it was accomplished smoothly and on schedule. Every effort was made to accomplish the reorganization with the least possible loss of individual and unit readiness.

The members of this committee could immediately recognize that any reorganization affecting 70% of our units and unit strength is bound to have an adverse effect on some aspects of readiness. We did lose some strength, but successfully held the net loss to under 15,000. Still of concern to me are the unit officers and enlisted men who require retraining and requalification in Branch and MOS. We are making progress but there is still much to be done.

MAY 1968 MOBILIZATION

Forty-five US Army Reserve company/detachment-size units were mobilized on 13 May 1968. Of these, thirty-five units or 77% were deployed to and are serving in Vietnam. The remaining ten units were employed to strengthen the Strategic Reserve.

On mobilization, the units had an authorized strength of 5,879 and actual strength of 5,181. In addition, 2,752 members of the Individual Ready Reserve of the Army Reserve were mobilized and assigned to Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard units.

I have kept closely informed of the progress of our mobilized Army Reserve units. The performance of the officers and men during intensive post-mobilization training was highly commendable, and periodic reports from CONUS and Vietnam indicate that units and individuals are properly trained and equipped, have high morale, and are performing in a superbly professional manner.

TOTAL STRENGTH

The total strength of the Army Reserve as of 31 January 1969 was 1,513,000, consisting of 997,000 in the Ready Reserve, 271,000 in the Standby Reserve, and 245,000 in the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve consists of those units and individuals available for immediate employment in the expansion of the active forces in the event of mobilization.

PAID DRILL STRENGTH

The authorized paid drill strength was 300,000 until 1 January 1966; was then 270,000 until 30 June 1967; was an average of not less than 260,000 during FY 1968; is budgeted at 260,000 less the mobilized units for FY 1969 and FY 1970.

The beginning strength for FY 1965 was 268,524, and the end year strength was 261,680. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of reorganization proposals and the inactivation of units totaling 55,220 strength, we were able to end FY 1966 with a strength of 250,974. The strength gradually increased to 261,957 by end FY 1967. Our actual end FY 1968 strength of 244,239 was some 10,000 short of the program. The principal causes of this shortage were the reorganization and the suspension of enlistments until the reorganization was completed. In the meantime, requirements for training of Army Reserve units in civil disturbance and riot control, and organization of provisional brigades last year imposed further priority requirements that impeded recruiting and processing of personnel. Our technician shortage also militated against recruiting. The actual 31 January 1969 strength was 248,370.

This FY 1970 budget is for a begin strength of 254,121, average of 256,264, and end of 261,220 with return of the mobilized units to reserve status. The 1,220 strength above 260,000 is to provide for increased Negro personnel in units.

The basic strength authorization is 260,000. However, in the FY 1969 and FY 1970 programs that number is reduced by the strength of the mobilized units. Our FY 1970 budget provides for return of the units from the Active Army to Army Reserve status in mid-FY 1970.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL PROCUREMENT

We are now relying almost entirely on non-prior service enlistments for the maintenance of unit strength.

The Reserve Enlistment Program (REP-63) continues to be of great importance in the maintenance of Army Reserve strength and the stabilization of our trained unit personnel. These young men are enlisted for position vacancies in troop units, undergo their varying periods of active duty training, then return to their units as individually trained soldiers.

The rather extreme fluctuations from year to year result from the turbulence, uncertainty, and change the Army Reserve has sustained. From FY 1965 through budgeted FY 1970 - and in round numbers - they are 27,000, 62,000, 28,000, 18,000, 57,000, and 56,000.

RESERVE ENLISTMENT PROGRAM TRAINING INPUT

The program for REP-63 input to training for FY 1969 is 36,890 and for FY 1970 is 55,172.

PROGRAM DATA

For the Army Reserve, this estimate provides active duty and reserve duty training for a beginning strength of 254,121, including 16,223 enlisted personnel in the "REP-63" active duty training program. The end strength is budgeted to be 261,220, including 29,788 enlisted personnel in "REP-63" training.

The budget provides for 55,172 non-prior service enlistees to enter on a tour of active duty for training under "REP-63".

Active duty for training is included for 4,000 non-unit officer students in USAR Schools and for 4,000 officer mobilization designees.

Individual reinforcement training is included for 3,400 officers and 36,600 enlisted personnel. This provides MOS refresher training for members of the Individual Ready Reserve who are subject to being ordered to active duty on mobilization.

School training is for 8,639 officers and 3,382 enlisted, and includes Army Service Schools, Army Area Schools, OCS, and language training.

Special training is for 24,218 officers and 4,251 enlisted, and includes special tours, seminars, command-post exercises, supervision and operation of units, pre-camp conferences, and unit members in USAR Schools.

RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS

The Senior Division of the ROTC produces junior officers for the active Army and Reserve Components. The program is operated at selected civilian and military colleges.

The budget provides training for an FY 1970 Senior Division entering enrollment of 150,400. End FY 1969 commissions are estimated to be 16,605 and the 20,000 MS III enrollment in FY 1969 will produce about 17,500 junior officers at end FY 1970.

Since August of 1961, all commissioned ROTC graduates have been ordered to two or more years of active duty with the Army.

A Junior Division enrollment of 123,000 is budgeted for FY 1970.

My statement on the Army ROTC addresses only the budget for that program. General Hamm will respond to any program and policy questions you may have on the ROTC.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my opening statement. We appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you to present our FY 1970 budget.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, General Sutton.

GENERAL STATEMENT, DEPUTY CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Now, General Greenlief, have you a statement for the National Guard? We will be glad to hear from you.

General GREENLIEF. General Wilson regrets that official business on the west coast precludes his attendance this morning, and I am here in his absence.

Mr. ANDREWS. We appreciate your appearing in the absence of General Wilson.

General GREENLIEF.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you to report upon the functions and activities of the Army National Guard. We are here today to request funds to provide the necessary pay, allowances, subsistence, clothing, and travel for training and readiness of Army National Guard personnel during FY 1970.

The fiscal year 1970 National Guard Personnel, Army budget request is \$363.5 million. This will support a beginning strength of 387,600 officers and men and ending strength of 404,032.

Before proceeding with the details of this budget, I should like to review certain accomplishments during FY 1968, our major programs for FY 1969, and to discuss program forecasts for FY 1970.

#### REORGANIZATION

Fiscal Year 1968 encompassed the most extensive reorganization in the Army National Guard's history.

The Army National Guard structure now consists of eight combat divisions, 28 brigade level organizations, 89 group headquarters, 171 battalions, 125 battalion headquarters units, and other supporting units at 93 to 100 percent strength. This has reduced the Army Guard from 4001 to about 3,011 units.

The new SRF includes two infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one armored cavalry regiment, 34 separate battalions, 10 headquarters units, three evacuation hospitals, and 148 company/detachment size units of the Army National Guard.

#### STRENGTH

On 30 June 1968 the federally recognized strength of the Army National Guard was 389,182. The total number of officers and warrant officers was 31,938, and the number of enlisted personnel was 357,244. The average strength for the year was 411,419. The difference between the end strength and average is attributable to mobilization of 12,234 in May 1968. These personnel will be released prior to December 1969 in units returned to States.

The FY 1969 program provides for an Army National Guard year-end strength of 387,600. As of 31 January 1969 our strength was 388,605.

#### ENLISTMENT AND REP PROGRAM

Authorized strength levels are maintained by Army National Guard units through enlistment of prior service personnel and the recruitment of non-prior service personnel who are required to take active duty training with the Army. The active duty training required for all recruits under this program varies from a minimum of four months to that period required for military occupational specialty qualification. In FY 1968, 20,788 recruits entered training. The average period of active duty training was approximately five months.

The backlog of personnel awaiting training which was a significant problem in prior years should not be a major problem in FY 1969 or FY 1970. Programed backlog at end of FY 69 and FY 70 are 20,300 and 33,200 respectively. However, due to a lower than programed loss rate and higher than programed enlistments of prior service personnel, the end FY 1969 backlog is now estimated at approximately 15,000, which in turn will reduce the FY 1970 backlog to approximately 28,000.

#### TRAINING ON WEEK-ENDS

The mandatory four-hour training assembly concept was received with enthusiasm, especially by the tactical units. Almost all units employed multiple-unit training assemblies in conjunction with week-end training sites.

All units received 32 hours of unit instruction in FY 1968 on riot control operations, and staffs received an additional 16 hours, in addition to the experience of some units in actual operations. Annual refresher training will be conducted as determined by the Continental U.S. Army commanders in coordination with the State Adjutants General. The experiences of recent years highlight the importance of advance planning and carefully developed command and control methods and procedures.

The objective for FY 69 is the completion of platoon level training. Many units have already achieved this level and are progressing towards the completion

of company and higher level training. As the proficiency level of the Selected Reserve Force units increased, the need for larger, more adequate training areas to accommodate the training increased.

#### TRAINING AT ARMY SERVICE AND AREA SCHOOLS

During FY 1968, over 7,900 Guardsmen attended courses of instruction conducted in Army service schools. The Commanding General, USCONARC, established one-week courses for the training of commanders and staffs at brigade level. About 1,000 officers participated in these new courses.

The newly established Mobilization Advanced and Basic Courses were conducted during FY 1968. These courses include a preliminary phase of extension courses. As a result, courses were off to a slow start; the momentum picked up, and about 200 attended the resident phase of these courses during the year.

A special training program of civil disturbance planning and operations was developed. This was a 16-hour program. All States were authorized to conduct local unit schools for the training of commanders and staffs at battalion and higher levels. Additionally, the Department of the Army established a one-week senior officer's Civil Disturbance Orientation Course at the Military Police School. About 935 senior commanders and planners will attend this course during the year. A mandatory program of 3 1/2 hours of junior officer's leadership training relative to civil disturbance was developed. Over 9,000 lieutenants took this leadership course.

During FY 1969, we plan to enroll about 10,000 Guardsmen in Army-conducted schools. Our enrollment of 3003 Candidates in Officer Candidate courses includes 2,689 Army Guardsmen, 24 Air Guardsmen and 290 members of the U.S. Army Reserve.

#### UNIT TRAINING ASSEMBLY ATTENDANCE

In FY 1968, percentage of attendance at inactive duty training assemblies for officers increased from 97.8 to 98.0. Percentage of attendance of enlisted men rose from 95.7 to 97.3. The percentage of all personnel participating in inactive duty training amounted to 97.3, an increase from 95.9 in the previous fiscal year.

As of 31 December the FY 1969 percentage of attendance is 98.8 for officers, 96.7 for enlisted personnel, and 96.8 for the aggregate.

#### ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AVIATION

During FY 1968, the number of aviators on flying status decreased to 1,750 including those assigned to mobilized units.

In FY 1968 flying hours totaled 188,843, a decrease from FY 1967. The program for FY 1969 is 201,262 flying hours.

#### MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS) TESTS

The Army National Guard continued MOS testing of personnel during FY 1968 and 1969. Results of the latest test cycle show that 93.5 percent of the 31,585 Guardsmen tested achieved passing grades. When a prorated number of personnel in grade E-3 and below, who are considered MOS qualified are added to the total tested, the ARNG attains a qualified rate of 95.7 percent.

#### EQUIPMENT

Five major factors influenced Army National Guard logistics during FY 1968:

- a. Reorganization of force structure and associated redistribution of the equipment inventory to meet new requirements.
- b. Establishment of Selected Reserve Force (SRF) II and concurrent retention of SRF I through the last half FY 1968.
- c. Mobilization of selected units and related support actions prior to unit movement to mobilization station.
- d. Equipping and training of units for civil disturbance operations.
- e. Increased emphasis on unit equipment maintenance and coordinated efforts toward development of an Army program for improving readiness of equipment.

Materiel readiness status was gradually raised through distribution of new items and increased emphasis on maintenance effectiveness. Although no additional

funds were made available for SRF II, priorities were established within the annual funding program to meet the most important needs.

#### FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION

Since the reorganization of the Army National Guard was approved in 1968, we have resumed a more nearly normal construction program. This program provides armories for home station training and non-armory facilities to support administrative and logistical requirements as well as week-end and annual field training site facilities. Improvement of facilities contributes to attracting and retaining dedicated personnel to the Guard and to improving readiness through greater training effectiveness.

#### STATE DUTY

During calendar year 1968 the National Guard was called to State active duty by Governors for civil disturbance emergencies 76 times. They were actually committed to the streets 57 times. In three instances the National Guard was later called to Federal status at the request of the Governors.

#### PLANS FOR RELEASE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

The Army will release in the fall of 1969 approximately 10,500 Guardsmen mobilized last spring. All Guardsmen whose period of enlistment or military obligation expires before the time they would otherwise be released will be sent home not later than the date of the expiration of their enlistment or military obligation, whichever is later.

All Guardsmen who serve in Vietnam will be released after completion of the normal one-year tour of duty in Vietnam or 15 December 1969, whichever is earlier. All other mobilized Guardsmen will be released between 1 and 15 December 1969.

The net effect of this action will be to release by 31 October 1969 about half of the mobilized Guardsmen and the remainder by mid-December. For those who were members of mobilized units, this results in release at least five months before the expiration of the two-year period of active duty.

#### OVER-ALL BUDGETARY SIGNIFICANCES

The FY 1970 budget for National Guard Personnel, Army, totals \$363.5 million, an increase of \$42.6 million, compared to the FY 1969 program of \$320.9 million. A summary of the separate projects of this program follows.

#### TRAINING - PAY GROUP A

Provided within this project are the pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, and travel for both unit training assemblies and annual field training. There will be 31,718 officers and 324,037 enlisted personnel participating in two weeks annual field training, and 31,793 officers and 330,033 enlisted personnel participating in unit training assemblies at home stations and at week-end training sites. The FY 1970 estimate of \$277.4 million for this project is \$11.0 million more than the FY 1969 program of \$266.4 million. The difference is attributable to the additional drills for civil disturbance training, offset by a slight decrease in annual field training as a result of the increase in the Reserve Enlistment Program.

#### TRAINING - RESERVE ENLISTMENT PROGRAM - PAY GROUP F

This provides the support for pay, travel, subsistence, and clothing for the training of non-prior-service personnel on active duty training of not less than four months at Army training centers. The in-training strength at the start of FY 1970 is estimated to be 15,682 trainees, and support is provided for 60,780 non-prior-service personnel to enter training in FY 1970. The FY 1970 estimate of \$65.6 million is increased \$30.9 million over the FY 1969 program of \$34.7 million because of the increase of 10,816 in man years caused by an input of 60,780 in FY 1970 as compared to an estimated input of 32,400 in FY 1969. The increase is due to expiration of enlistments of large numbers of personnel joining the ARNG in 1964 (107,000) whose obligation will expire in FY 1970.

## SCHOOL TRAINING

This program provides support for pay, allowances, travel, and subsistence for the attendance of 9,958 personnel at Army service and area schools, and 730 at Air Defense training. The FY 1970 estimate of \$14.5 million, an increase of \$.7 million over the FY 1969 amount of \$13.8 million is primarily attributed to an increase of approximately 730 students during FY 70.

## SPECIAL TRAINING

This provides for essential special tours of full-time training duty to maintain individual and unit capability to administer, plan, and conduct training, such as pre-annual training conferences, command post exercises, short notice annual practice, and statutory boards. These tours vary in length from two to 90 days and permit participation of individual members as well as unit staffs in training missions essential to the over-all readiness posture of the Army National Guard. The FY 1970 estimate of \$2.8 million is \$.4 million less than programed for FY 1969 as a result of elimination of one-time reorganization costs.

## ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

This provides for pay and allowances of 93 Army National Guard officers on active duty tours with the Army under various statutory authorities; permanent change of station travel; death, disability and hospitalization benefits, and that portion of the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance which is paid by the Government. The FY 1970 estimate of \$3.3 million is increased \$.4 million over FY 1969, mainly because of additional group life insurance costs for a 60,780 REP input in FY 1970 as compared to 32,400 REP input in FY 1969.

## SUMMARY

During the past year we have seen a mobilization of a sizeable portion of both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. We are fulfilling missions in the jungles, mountains and plains of Southeast Asia and in the skies overhead.

The National Guard is being commended in the editorial columns of some of the Nation's largest and most influential newspapers. Unit after unit has been praised for splendid service in support of the active forces in Southeast Asia and in the Continental United States. They have also been commended for the dispatch and the efficiency with which they brought serious disorders under control in numerous towns and cities throughout these United States.

As the United States continued a major military involvement in Southeast Asia and strained to meet its military commitments elsewhere in the free world, urban disorders and violence reached unprecedented levels at home. This combination has produced history's sternest test of the National Guard's dual Federal and State status.

The National Guard, by virtue of ready availability, professional competence, moral strength and devotion to American ideals, has once again achieved a high mark of performance, serving both State and Nation.

## NATIONAL GUARDSMEN ON DUTY IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, General Greenlief. How many National Guardsmen are on duty in Vietnam?

General GREENLIEF. In Vietnam, sir, there are 5,000 or 6,000. We do not know the exact number because, in addition to the 4,000 who were mobilized in units, individuals are levied on and sent as individuals. We do not have records on that, sir. We estimate most of our men will probably serve.

## MILITARY SERVICE OBLIGATION

Mr. DAVIS. I do not know whether you are the one who wants to answer this, but I would like you to outline for us the differences in the requirements and the obligations that a young man assumes, first, if he is taken in selective service; second, if he joins the Reserves; and, third, if he is enlisted in the National Guard.

General GREENLIEF. Sir, I can provide you a summary answer to that. Your question is rather detailed, and since it would involve other services, both the Guard and the Reserve and the Active Army, we might provide you a more complete answer.

In summary, an individual who enters the military service, be it through the draft or through enlistment in the National Guard or some other Reserve component, incurs a 6-year military service obligation. If he enters the draft, he serves for 2 years on active duty. He then returns home with a military obligation to serve, which he may satisfy by service in the National Guard or the Army Reserve and after a period of time then goes into Standby Reserve.

If this individual joins the National Guard, he enlists in the National Guard for a period of 6 years, with both a State and National contract. He is obligated to serve that 6-year enlistment in the Guard, even though he may have completed his total military service obligation.

If an individual enlists in a Reserve component rather than being drafted or enlisting in the Active Army, at the time of his enlistment he agrees to serve for a period of 6 years, which coincides with his total military service obligation. He must also agree to enter a period of active-duty training. This period varies from 4 to 6 months, depending on the military occupational specialty that he enlists for. The current Army policy is that he must enter within 120 days. After completing that training, he must return to his unit, and he must serve the balance of his 6 years satisfactorily in the unit. There are, of course, provisions for him to transfer to other units if he moves geographically in the Nation. However, he is required to participate satisfactorily. Should he fail to participate satisfactorily, there are provisions of law which permit this individual to be ordered back to active duty to complete a period of service which, when added to his earlier service, would total 2 years.

I believe that is a rapid summary, sir. We might do it more justice with a written paper. I do not know whether or not it satisfies your question, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Do one of your other gentlemen wish to add to that?

General HIGHTOWER. That is a very good summary, but we can give you more if you like, sir.

#### REASSIGNMENT BETWEEN RESERVE UNITS

Mr. DAVIS. You spoke of the reassignment to a different Reserve organization in the case of the man who is transferred by his employer from one place to another. Is that a complete option on his part? Do the Reserve Components assume the responsibility of taking this man in and finding a place for him if he moves from one place to another?

General GREENLIEF. There has been some problem in the past, sir, because of the strength limitation. There are now provisions by which we can take the man, at least within the Guard. I cannot address General Sutton's program. There are provisions by which the adjutant general of the State who would receive this individual can take the man and would take him as a priority matter.

We do find, however, sir, that the unit commander involved who has the problem of maintaining his unit readiness, may question the necessity or the validity of the man's move to the other State, and he may have something to say about whether or not he will release the man. For example, if he moved to some town close enough so the original company commander feels this man can still serve in his unit, he normally will seek to retain him, because to replace him requires recruiting a new man who then has to be trained at the expense of time and money.

Provisions are there to permit the transfer, including between States.

Mr. DAVIS. His original commanding officer is the judge of whether or not he is going to keep him or let him go?

General GREENLIEF. In practice, sir, if the individual commander decided, "No, I am going to keep you in my unit because you can get back," and if the individual involved were distressed about that at all, he could seek review of the decision at a higher level, and it would be reviewed at the State adjutant general's level.

On some occasions, sir, it gets reviewed at the congressional level and the National Guard Bureau level. We bring those cases to the attention of the adjutant general, and the adjutant general then makes the decision—normally in favor of the man, unless in their judgment the man is not right.

Mr. DAVIS. Let us take a case where this factor does not substantially enter in. If he moves 100 miles away, this factor probably would not enter. Is the Reserve unit in his new place of residence required to take him in, even if it makes the unit overstrength?

General GREENLIEF. I cannot address the U.S. Army Reserve policy, sir. In the past, in the Army Guard where we have been struggling to come down to strength and where we have been rather severely limited, we have not always been able to take them. We are now within two-tenths of 1 percent overstrength, and have been able to relax some.

I am quite certain our policy now and our instructions do permit accepting this individual, even though he might produce a temporary overstrength, unless he represents a trained asset and we would rather keep him than to train a new man.

Mr. DAVIS. It is up to the commanding officer?

General GREENLIEF. I will have to check myself for accuracy, but I believe the National Guard Bureau has within the last month or so issued instructions to the States to permit this.

To assure my accuracy, I would like to recheck it, sir.

(The information follows:)

A recent revision to Army Regulation (AR 135-91) provides authorization for unit commanders to accept members who have left a unit assignment because of change of residence without regard to their unit's authorized strength providing the member possesses an MOS which can be utilized within the unit, can acquire the skill required by on-the-job training or agrees to perform a tour of active duty for training to acquire such an MOS. State adjutants general and area commanders will monitor the assignments of such personnel and manage the enlistment of non-prior-service personnel to insure that total paid drill unit strength authorizations announced by the Chiefs, National Guard Bureau and Army Reserve, including the overstrength provisions which may be in effect, are not exceeded.

General SUTTON. It is pretty much the same in the Army Reserve, Mr. Chairman. If a man, realizing he has to move across the country, will notify his unit commander of this impending move at least 30 days before he actually has to make the move, the letter is sent to the new Army commander and then to the new unit actually arranging for this man's assignment through Army channels.

If he neglects to let anybody know 30 days ahead, or if the move happens to be sudden, then he has to take the action himself.

The policy is that the new location can take him in the Army Reserve unit as overstrength. I feel we will have no problem taking him in overstrength and still remaining within our authorized strength and overstrength authorizations. I do not visualize any problem.

#### OVERSTRENGTH AUTHORIZED FOR ADDITIONAL NEGRO PARTICIPATION

Mr. DAVIS. Reference was made by one of you gentlemen to a mandatory overstrength in order to encourage the participation of Negro personnel.

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir.

General SUTTON. We have that in the Army Reserve. I think that may be what you are talking about. We have in the fiscal year 1970 program the provision for 1,220 overstrength. That is a very small number. In this fiscal year, fiscal 1969, I had an opportunity while at the same time complying with the law on the average strength, to issue a 1-percent authorization for overstrength for Negro personnel. So, I am doing it a year ahead of time in the Army Reserve.

This is not a mandatory overstrength, as you mentioned. This is an authorized overstrength. Of course, all units are encouraged to use that 1-percent overstrength, over and above everything else, for Negro participation. This, in case of the Army Reserve, would be approximately 2,500.

Mr. DAVIS. This is not a matter of legislation?

General GREENLIEF. No, sir. In the National Guard, we had a New Jersey test program in which they were authorized something over 5 percent. Within the balance of the National Guard, we did not authorize this because we were, in fact, overstrength and, as mentioned just now, are getting now down to strength.

The fiscal year 1970 program authorizes us an overstrength of 4,032 to provide spaces in which to enlist Negroes, the problem being

that we are already at full strength. It is not a mandatory overstrength. It is, however, a target and objective which we are directed to achieve.

Mr. DAVIS. Directed by whom?

General GREENLIEF. It is a DOD program. It is like all other things. You set an objective and work toward it. We intend to do our best, sir.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We will resume at 2 o'clock.

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. ANDREWS. The committee will come to order.

We will continue our hearings on the Army Guard and Reserve personnel requests.

General SUTTON, you are requesting funds for the pay of 304,264 Army Reserve personnel. This strength is composed of paid drill strength, 256,264; paid active duty training, only 48,000, for a total of 304,264 men. General, what is the difference between these two groups?

General SUTTON. The 256,264 are the members of the troop program units that drill 48 times per year and attend not less than 14 days of summer camps. The 48,000 received only 2 weeks of active duty training per year.

#### ATTENDANCE AT DRILLS

Mr. ANDREWS. What has been your record of absenteeism in these weekly drills? That is the part designated here as paid drill training.

General SUTTON. From the weekly drills our percentage of attendance is about 93 percent. For the summer camp training it is about 96 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that good?

General SUTTON. We think it is for the Army Reserve.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is your policy and what do you do in case of continued absence?

General SUTTON. First, I might say that participation has been increasing in the Army Reserve for several years. Now we are very careful about attendance at the weekly drills and at summer camps. If a man misses five drills, of the weekly drills at the home station, he is subject to being ordered to active duty.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that 5 consecutive weeks or five during the year?

General SUTTON. Within a year and if he is absent from 2 weeks camp without proper authority, then that also could be sufficient cause.

Mr. ANDREWS. Your record of attendance now is much better than it was a few years ago?

General SUTTON. That has increased; yes.

#### PAID DRILL STRENGTH

Mr. ANDREWS. What have you requested in the authorization bill for paid drill strength?

General SUTTON. The Department of Defense has requested 261,220, as the end strength.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have an authorized average strength of 256,264?

General SUTTON. Let me start with fiscal year 1969. By law we were to achieve the average of not less than 260,000 for the year, less any

mobilized strength. We started the year in 1969 at about 244,000. In order to achieve the required average we had to program above 260,000, which we have been attempting to achieve, and then come back down to the 254,000, which was our 260,000 less those units on active duty. So there we have a little higher average than we have of end strength because we will go a little above 260,000 between now and the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why is there a difference between the number you are requesting in the authorization, 261,200, and the number for which you are requesting funds in this appropriation, 256,264?

General SUTTON. Of course, the budget was put together with a request for the full amount.

Mr. ANDREWS. We are talking about 1970. These questions refer to your 1970 budget.

General SUTTON. For the 1970 budget, we start in with an authorized strength of 254,000 because we have the rest on active duty in Vietnam and elsewhere. The average strength will be 256,204 and the end strength 261,220.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many Reserves do you have in Vietnam?

#### RESERVES IN VIETNAM

General SUTTON. We have approximately 5,700 members of the U.S. Army Reserve serving in Vietnam in Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and Active Army units.

Mr. ANDREWS. About the same number as the Guard?

General SUTTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they there as individual replacements or as units?

General SUTTON. Mostly as units.

Mr. ANDREWS. What type units do you have in Vietnam, and what are they doing?

General SUTTON. They are service-type units, hospitals, truck companies, service companies, that type.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any combat troops in Vietnam?

General SUTTON. No combat troops; no, sir. We have one combat battalion which was called up in Hawaii and has remained there.

#### OVERSTRENGTH AUTHORIZED FOR ADDITIONAL NEGRO PARTICIPATION

Mr. ANDREWS. General Hightower, you say that you are requesting authorization overstrength and funds for increased Negro participation in the Reserve. Is this a new program?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. ANDREWS. When was it authorized, and what is its intent? Tell us something about it.

General HIGHTOWER. This is a result, Mr. Chairman, of the interest in raising the percentage of Negro participation in the Armed Forces, particularly in the Army Reserve components to approximate the percentage of the population. Over the years we have found that this is very low; as I recall, something like 1.7 or 1.8 at the present time, due to many things.

About 3 years ago New Jersey started an experiment on this. They were authorized 5 percent overstrength. It has been fairly successful. Everybody has been watching it. So the Department of Defense came

up with a requirement to all services to come in with a program to raise this participation in their own Reserve components. We have done this. For this year we hope to bring this up about 1 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. Which would get you up to 2½ percent?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes, we hope to get about 2.8 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. Did the 5 percent have reference to the Negro population of the State of New Jersey?

General GREENLIEF. No, sir. The Governor of New Jersey requested a 5-percent overstrength for both Army and Air National Guard. How he arrived at that figure I do not know, except I assume it was a figure they felt was within reach. They were authorized an increased strength in the Army Guard of 737, in the Air Guard of 128, for a total of 865.

#### RESERVE ENLISTMENT PROGRAM

Mr. ANDREWS. General Hightower, I note from chart 1 in your statement that you are requesting an overall increase for the Reserve and Guard for both military personnel and operations and maintenance of \$114,200,000. On page 2 of your statement you say that approximately 44 percent or some \$50 million of this increase is to be used to support the Reserve enlistment program. Why are you programing such a large increase in this program?

General HIGHTOWER. This is geared to the expected accessions of nonprior service personnel, Mr. Chairman, that will be coming in. It should be fairly high because of the enlistments 6 years ago under the REP-63 program and we expect a fairly high accession of these nonprior service personnel. So we have programed them into the training base to get their basic and MOS training.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will most of these people be on active duty?

General HIGHTOWER. They will be on active duty for 4 months up to 12 months of training, depending on the MOS they enlist for, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You state further, General Hightower, on page 2, that in fiscal year 1970 you are programing an input of 115,900 Reserve enlisted personnel into the Army training centers as compared to 69,300 in fiscal year 1969. This is an increase of 46,600 personnel during the fiscal year. On what basis did you compute this large input into the Regular Army?

General HIGHTOWER. This is not into the Regular Army, sir. These are reservists.

Mr. ANDREWS. What I meant was into the Regular Army training program.

General HIGHTOWER. Yes. These are the new accessions that we expect to get during the year that have to be trained in the Active Army training centers.

Mr. ANDREWS. The new program increases it by 46,600; is that correct?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes. It is the difference between 115,900 and 69,300.

Mr. ANDREWS. What program is that, the new program?

General HIGHTOWER. It is not a new program, it is just an increase over the REP training program from 1969 to 1970.

General GREENLIEF. An increased number going in, in 1970.

General HIGHTOWER. An increased number. It is the same REP training program.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the length of that training program?

General HIGHTOWER. Eight weeks basic combat training; for infantrymen it is another 8 weeks of advanced individual training. That second phase will vary depending upon the complexity of his MOS. A radio operator, for example, will go 10 weeks in the second phase. For some of the others, the more complex MOS, the longer the period of time.

#### WAITING TIME TO ENTER RESERVES

Mr. ANDREWS. If a man gets into a Reserve program and is assigned to a unit, he is draft exempt; is that correct?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes, sir.

General GREENLIEF. Deferred.

Mr. ANDREWS. Deferred?

General GREENLIEF. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. As long as he stays in that unit he continues to have that deferment from the draft?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes, sir; as long as he participates satisfactorily.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand. That is the 48 drill periods per year and 2 weeks' summer training?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about your waiting list to get into the Reserve? I have people who write me who have been waiting a year, 2 years, or sometimes 3 years to get in.

General HIGHTOWER. May I ask the chiefs of the components to comment?

General GREENLIEF. In the National Guard we do have waiting lists in all States. They are very lengthy. In the Guard, as you know, we have been overstrength and we have been trying to come down. As a result we have had little opportunity in past years to enlist personnel.

It is not uncommon for a man to be on a waiting list for a year or even more. Actually, the waiting list is a rather difficult thing to manage because the individual applicant will get on several waiting lists, whatever waiting list he can get on. When we find, for example, that a unit has a vacancy and they go to the waiting list to get the next man on the list, they may try 10 names before they find a man still available.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who makes the determination of accepting men in the National Guard or Reserve?

General SUTTON. The unit commander.

Mr. ANDREWS. He has the sole authority to do it?

General SUTTON. That is correct, under established procedures.

General GREENLIEF. That is true also in the Guard. However, he has a very explicit list of instructions that tell him the order of priority in which he must accept people.

Mr. ANDREWS. All things being equal, he takes them first come, first served?

General GREENLIEF. Yes. The only exception to that is if the next man on the list doesn't have the skill or the aptitude for a particular military occupational specialty. We enlist people against specific

vacancies in the unit. For example, if the vacancy is a radio operator or a clerical position and the next man on the list just has no aptitude for that, he cannot pass the aptitude area test for that, then the commander can go to the next name.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, you do not put a round peg in a square hole.

General GREENLIEF. We try not to.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do the Reserves and the Guard have the same or comparable MOS that the Army has?

General SUTTON. Yes.

General GREENLIEF. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you have No. 1 on the list of applicants for admission into the Guard or the Reserve, and No. 1 doesn't have the qualifications for a spot that you have in your unit, you could skip down to 10 or 15 on the list to get the man who has?

General GREENLIEF. Until you got to the man who had that aptitude.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is what I mean. You skip from one down to 15 if No. 15 is the man you need in your unit?

General GREENLIEF. Yes.

#### TRAVEL TO MEETINGS

Mr. ANDREWS. Now I have complaints from time to time, not many recently, about these reservists having to travel 100 miles a week for training, 100 miles to the company and 100 miles back home. Do you get many of those complaints, General Sutton?

General SUTTON. We don't have very many complaints from those that are doing that because in most cases it is what the man wants to do and he doesn't complain about something he wants to do.

Mr. ANDREWS. But you do have cases where they travel a considerable number of miles to get to and from the company?

General SUTTON. Yes, sir; we have some people traveling over 100 miles but they are glad to do it because they want to continue to participate.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who pays for their travel?

General SUTTON. The man has to bear that expense.

Mr. ANDREWS. Many of them down my way have car pools that they use to defray expenses.

General SUTTON. Yes, sir.

General HIGHTOWER. I wonder if I might make the record more explicit in terms of the percentages of Negro participation. Currently it is 1.8 percent. We are programed to raise to 2.7 by the end of fiscal year 1970.

#### TRAINING OF RESERVE RECRUITS

Mr. ANDREWS. Back to this input of Reserve personnel into the Army training centers, why will this increase cost an additional \$50 million?

General HIGHTOWER. That is based on the man-years, Mr. Chairman. For fiscal year 1970 the man-years are 43,319 compared to 24,615 for fiscal year 1969, an increase of 18,704. The money we have asked for is to support that increase in man-years.

Mr. ANDREWS. Break that down a little better. What do you mean by support? Is it pay for the troops?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. What else is there?

General HIGHTOWER. That takes care of pay and allowances, subsistence, travel, clothing.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have to give them special clothing for that training?

General HIGHTOWER. No. That is when they get their bag of uniform clothing equipment.

Mr. ANDREWS. These are raw recruits?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is their first clothing issue?

General HIGHTOWER. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long is that supposed to last them; several years?

General HIGHTOWER. They get replacement clothing as issue in kind. They do not receive a clothing maintenance allowance as in Active Army.

Mr. ANDREWS. When they go to camp, do you pay for their food?

General HIGHTOWER. In summer training?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; this Army training.

General HIGHTOWER. Yes. This takes care of subsistence.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you do, reimburse the Army?

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. We have to pay their way while they are at the Active Army installation.

Mr. ANDREWS. You reimburse the Army?

General SUTTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What other reimbursement do you make to the Army for the—is it 6 weeks' training program?

General HIGHTOWER. No; it is 8 weeks for basic training and 8 weeks for advanced training.

Mr. ANDREWS. Roughly 16 weeks?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the reservist put that 16 weeks in all at one time?

General HIGHTOWER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, he goes into basic training, enters as a private, receives the same type of training, treatment, et cetera, that a Regular Army man would?

General HIGHTOWER. Identical.

Mr. ANDREWS. For 16 weeks.

General HIGHTOWER. It is an average of 5 months.

Mr. ANDREWS. During that time the Reserve Component pays for his clothes and subsistence—

General HIGHTOWER. And travel to and from, and his pay.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you make any contribution to the Army for the services rendered by sergeants in the training of that raw recruit?

General HIGHTOWER. No, sir.

General SUTTON. They are on the Active Army payroll.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you figure it costs per man to send him through those 5 months of basic training? Do you have a breakdown on that?

General SUTTON. I have a breakdown on it. It is about \$1,200 out of my budget and about the same amount for the Army.

Mr. ANDREWS. About \$2,400?

General HIGHTOWER. No. That is only part of it. Well, all right, it is \$1,425 or thereabouts for each.

Mr. ANDREWS. \$1,400 or \$2,400?

General HIGHTOWER. \$1,400.

General SUTTON. That is out of our money.

Mr. ANDREWS. General Sutton gave a figure there that the Army spent on him.

General SUTTON. I don't have the exact amount.

Mr. ANDREWS. You said roughly \$1,200.

General MANESS. We will try to get you a statement for the record on that.

(The information follows:)

#### COST OF BASIC TRAINING—PER INDIVIDUAL

Reserve component costs for training one individual REP in the Army training centers in fiscal year 1970 will be \$1,202.

This consists of the following average costs:

Pay for 5.6 months, at \$113.45-----	\$635.32
Subsistence, including commutation of rations during leave-----	214.06
Travel to and from camp-----	126.00
Clothing (includes overcoat for only one-half of REP input)-----	196.24
Social security -----	30.50
<b>Total -----</b>	<b>1,202.12</b>

The \$1,425 estimate represents a derived man-year cost based on the total REP costs in the fiscal year 1970 budget. It differs from the individual cost above primarily because of the programed input by months into the training centers. Initial costs for the clothing bag and travel are generated by the input, and in a given year, can distort the man-year cost for that year.

In addition to the \$1,202 per REP funded in RPA or NGPA, active Army costs incident to training of REP's while in the training centers are:

Share of trainer costs (MPA)-----	\$358.00
Operation and maintenance of Army training center (BP 2100 OMA)-	743.00
Reception centers costs (BP 2400/BP 2500)-----	65.00
<b>Total -----</b>	<b>1,166.00</b>

The total cost per individual REP would be \$2,368.

#### REGULAR ARMY BASIC TRAINING COST

Mr. ANDREWS. How does that compare with cost of training an Army recruit? Your figure includes his clothes bag, his transportation to and from basic training camp. Now, if you can, put a figure in the record on that.

General SUTTON. It should be identical.

General HIGHTOWER. It would be the same for these particular things. Now, computing the cost of the trainers and the facilities—

Mr. ANDREWS. It is hard to get an estimate of that.

General HIGHTOWER. Yes. But the cost of his pay and allowance, subsistence, Army travel, clothing, for the Army man should be identical to this.

General SUTTON. For the Army Reserve it is \$1,172.62, without the overcoat, when he goes in the summertime. If he goes in the wintertime and has to have an overcoat it is \$1,231.62 per man. The average is \$1,202.12.

Mr. ANDREWS. I suggest you and General Hightower get together and agree on your figures. There have been two or three of them mentioned.

When you answer the question for the record I want to know the cost of training, training one of your men for 5 months compared to the cost of the Army for the same training.

General HIGHTOWER. Yes, sir.

(The information requested follows:)

Active Army costs to provide 16 weeks of training for a nonprior service man are \$2,051, including the \$1,166 for support costs included in the REP costs. Active Army pay costs were computed for 16 weeks (training time only) as opposed to the 23 weeks for REP trainees, which includes travel to and from the camp and leave. The costs, considering the differences involved, are virtually identical.

#### UTILIZATION OF ARMY TRAINING CENTERS

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, will this large increase not flood the Army training centers since the Army is not reducing its input to any great extent?

General HIGHTOWER. Our input is based on the spaces that the Active Army makes available to us.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, they tell you when to send them?

General HIGHTOWER. They tell us when there are spaces; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you know of any plans to close any of the Army training centers?

General HIGHTOWER. I know of none, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you, General Sutton?

General SUTTON. No, sir.

#### PERSONNEL TO BE DISCHARGED

Mr. ANDREWS. How many personnel do you anticipate will be discharged from the Reserve and Guard during fiscal year 1970?

General GREENLIEF. In the case of the Guard, and as it contributes directly to this large increase in REP, in 1964 there were 107,000 men enlisted in the Guard. We estimate, considering 35 percent of these individuals will extend their enlistment, that we will have losses of 70,000 from this group. That in the Guard is what contributes to this large input. The rest of the losses are contained in the gains and loss table. In fiscal year 1970 the total enlisted losses in the National Guard we estimate at 70,800.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that due mainly to completion of the tour of duty?

General GREENLIEF. In the main, yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is that complete tour of duty? Six years?

General GREENLIEF. Six years. You see, in 1964 when we enlisted these 107,000, during this coming fiscal year 1970 their 6-year tours will expire. We estimate we will retain 35 percent of those personnel beyond that 6 years. The balance is some 70,000, estimated losses plus other losses.

Mr. ANDREWS. From what you tell us about your waiting list, you will have no problem in refilling to your authorized strength.

General GREENLIEF. We anticipate none.

## AGE OF ENLISTEES

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any age limit on guardsmen?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir. First priority for enlistment is the non-prior serviceman below age 18½. The second category is 18½ to 20. They may then enlist up to age 26, but only if you cannot get the man from the lower age group. On the prior serviceman there is no age limit except that they may not—I cannot quote it exactly, sir—their age is a combination of the years of service they have had on active duty already and their actual age. I cannot quote that one for you exactly.

## MANDATORY RETIREMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. Now take, for example, a young man who goes into the Guard and who stays in there for years and years and years. Do you have a mandatory retirement age for him?

General GREENLIEF. Age 60; yes, sir. And they may not, a man may not enlist in the Guard unless the time required for enlistment will permit him to qualify for retirement, 20 years, he may not enlist in the Guard if his enlistment would extend him beyond 60.

Mr. ANDREWS. But at age 60 it is mandatory that he get out?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does that apply to officers and enlisted men?

General GREENLIEF. Officers, of course, their age limit is controlled by the Reserve Officer Personnel Act. Age 60 is a maximum age for colonels and brigadiers. In the lower ranks the age limits are lower. I cannot quote them for you, but they scale down in proportion to the grade of the officer.

General SUTTON. Generally an officer may serve 28 years unless he is a colonel or brigadier general, when he can serve 30 years and 5 years in grade whichever is later. A major general can serve 35 years and 5 years in grade, whichever is later. That usually determines when he leaves, but in any event he may not serve beyond age 60, unless he is extended by the Secretary of the Army.

General GREENLIEF. The Reserve Office Personnel Act functions so to force them out much earlier than that.

General SUTTON. You asked for the fiscal year 1970 Army Reserve losses. It is a total of 57,000 enlisted losses; 43,200 of which are the men who were in for 6 years and their terms of enlistment expire; 13,800 are the men, as you mentioned awhile ago, who are losses for all other reasons such as transfer out of the Reserve, deaths, or discharge.

Mr. ANDREWS. When a man goes beyond his 6-year term of duty he can stay on in the Guard or Reserve, if he wants to, if he does his homework, until he reaches age 60?

General SUTTON. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. And he receives a pension, an annuity after 20 years of service?

General SUTTON. If he has 20 or more good years of service, which means full participation, he is eligible for retirement pay when he reaches age 60. He can be placed on the retired list before 60 but he does not begin drawing money until age 60.

Mr. ANDREWS. Considering the fact that most of these men will be on active duty for most of the fiscal year, still talking about these

trainees, how did you determine the additional overall requirement of an increase of \$114 million in your fiscal year 1970 request?

General GREENLIEF. Sir, the additional cost involved in their being on active duty for an average of 5 months are the costs that produce this increase because these costs are borne by the Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve appropriation.

#### OFFICE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

Mr. ANDREWS. General Hightower, what is the function and responsibility of the Office of Reserve Components?

General HIGHTOWER. The Office, Mr. Chairman, has developed over the years since about 1948, when they first began to work on this kind of office, and through successive stages has developed into what it is now a general staff section with the Chief of the Office of Reserve Components enjoying the same position as the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for the Chief of Staff.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the operation of this Office necessary?

General HIGHTOWER. I believe it is, sir. It is the Office that coordinates the activities and functions between the two components for the Chief of Staff.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why is there such an office in the Army and not in the Air Force?

General HIGHTOWER. I don't know; I cannot address that question.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will you insert a statement in the record as to why the Army needs this Office? Also, what is the cost of operating this Office, including both military personnel and operation and maintenance?

(The information follows:)

#### NEED FOR OFFICE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

On 15 October 1948 in Executive Order 10007, which was concerned with vitalization of the Reserve components of the three Services, President Truman directed that the Service Secretaries assign "an active, capable, high-ranking officer to head the Reserve program in each department." Accordingly, on 21 December 1948, the Chief of Staff of the Army established the position of Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Civilian Component Affairs.

Congress, in the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, required the appointment of a general officer who was directly responsible to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs. Accordingly, the position of Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components was established. With the exception of logistics, major responsibilities for Reserve component matters in the Army Staff were transferred to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief, U.S. Army Reserves operated under the General Staff guidance of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve components.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs was afforded Deputy Chief of Staff status in 1963 and redesignated Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC). Some logistic functions of the Army Staff were transferred to the Office of Reserve components at the same time, and CORC was charged with the following responsibilities—

1. Allocation of units to Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve.
2. Operational readiness and training of the Army Reserve components.
3. Allocation of forces, funds, and manpower within the 5-year defense program—Program V (Reserve and Guard Forces).
4. Development of Department of the Army policy and priorities on all Reserve component affairs (personal, training, equipment).

Public Law 90-168 established the Office of the Army Reserve headed by a chief who is the adviser to the Chief of Staff on Army Reserve matters. This

provided the Chief, Army Reserve the same statutory right as the Chief, National Guard Bureau, with respect to direct access to the Chief of Staff.

Public Law 90-168 also continued on a permissive basis the authority to designate a general officer to be directly responsible to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs. No change was made to Chief, Office of Reserve components responsibility for policy direction of and general staff supervision over the Chief, Army Reserve and the Chief, National Guard Bureau for matters pertaining to the Army National Guard. With the Army Reserve components numbering almost 1,500,000 individuals and unit members in 6,382 companies and detachments, the magnitude of the general staff function is such that the Chief of Staff requires the assistance of a deputy to determine policies and procedures for this force. In consideration of the often expressed intent of the Congress that full attention and support be given Reserve components, the Army Chief of Staff believes that the necessary coordination of maximum support can be most effectively and economically accomplished by a senior general staff officer with clearly defined responsibilities working closely with the Army Reserve components and other general staff agencies.

The Chief, Office of Reserve components is authorized 61 personnel to assist him in the execution of his responsibility for policy direction and control of the Reserve components. The operating expense for fiscal year 1969 is programmed at \$836,005 which includes \$491,114 for pay of the 31 military, \$318,191 for pay of the 31 civilians, and \$27,300 for operating costs including visits and inspections.

#### REORGANIZATION OF ARMY RESERVE

Mr. ANDREWS. General Sutton, on page 3 you discuss the organization of the Army Reserve. Has the recent reorganization been completed?

General SUTTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you tell us anything about it? Has it been successful? Are you satisfied with it?

General SUTTON. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. What are the advantages of the new set-up?

General SUTTON. We began reorganization on December 1, 1967, and completed the bulk of it by the end of February 1968. There were only a very few units, four or five, that we finished up in May. The organization has in it those units which are needed in the force structure for the Army. We have no unneeded units.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is this a program where you change outfits around, moving one here and one there?

General SUTTON. We had to move a great number of units from one place to the other in reorganizing them. That has been accomplished and we are now approaching full strength in all those units and we are training the people that had to be retrained. Of course, new men coming in are getting their training in their proper MOS's. I think we are making a great deal of progress.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are your troops happy with the reorganization?

General SUTTON. I think they are now and they are going ahead and making it work.

Mr. ANDREWS. You got a little flack when you first mentioned it, didn't you?

General SUTTON. Yes, sir; they were not happy during the reorganization.

Mr. ANDREWS. I had some complaints while they were talking about it, but since they have been reorganized I have not had any complaints down my way.

General SUTTON. We have had very few, where some individual did

not fit in and is trying to get his own personal case settled. I think overall everyone has accepted it and is now trying to make it work.

#### UNSATISFACTORY PARTICIPATION

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What do you do with a misfit when you find him and conclude you cannot do anything with him and he is making no contribution to the organization? He might be damaging morale, and so forth. How do you get rid of him, if you do get rid of him?

**General SUTTON.** I guess it is fortunate in the first place that the Army Reserve does not have very many of those cases because our people try to fit themselves into the organization. Actually, in the Army Reserve there is not very much we can do to man if he is a misfit, unless he is such a bad misfit that we could, under the regulations, count him absent from drill. For example, he has to satisfactorily participate in the drill, this means his uniform, his appearance, attention, and achievement in the training. If he does not, we can mark him absent.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Even though he is there with a bad attitude?

**General SUTTON.** That is right. If he does that five times, then he may be ordered to active duty.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Have you had any cases of that?

**General SUTTON.** I have no specific ones in mind at this time.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** If you decide he has been absent for five periods, then does he go on active duty?

**General SUTTON.** We have had a number of such people.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** If you do that to an individual, does he have a right of appeal?

**General SUTTON.** Yes.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Where?

**General SUTTON.** He has a right to appeal his case up through the chain of command all the way to the Department of the Army for determination.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do you operate about the same way in the Guard, where you have misfits?

**General GREENLIEF.** An individual who does not participate satisfactorily—and that can include the individual who cannot learn or won't learn or does not conduct himself in a military manner at an assembly—can be ordered to active duty for failure to participate satisfactorily. That determination is made by the State adjutant general. If the individual involved did not want to accept that they sometimes write to their Congressmen, they sometimes write to the National Guard Bureau. The decisions rests with the State adjutant general because the National Guard, as you know, in peacetime is administered by the State adjutant general for the Governor.

#### INVENTORY OF EQUIPMENT—ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Sir, in answer to your question about the reorganization for the Guard, the Guard in general is pleased with the structure, they are pleased with the strength authorization, but the States are quite unhappy because the equipment support that was to have been a part of the reorganization has not been delivered.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Whose fault is that? DOD?

**General GREENLIEF.** Sir, it is a fault or a problem that generates from the circumstances of fighting the war, the demands for equipment in Vietnam, the money that it costs, the cost of supporting the Army. But to the man in the unit, to him, he only understands a couple of items. One is he was told "If you are reorganized you will be supported." They recognized this support would take time to come, but so far they have not gotten it.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How long has it been since that promise was made?

**General GREENLIEF.** I cannot give you the date, sir; but this was a subject discussed at considerable length during the hearings last year and the year before prior to reorganization. There were no promises given as to when. As to the amount that has been delivered, we have had gains and losses in inventory through the year, with the result that our inventory is about where it was a year ago.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Of course, we are only talking about personnel now, but since you mentioned equipment, I will ask you this: When you get equipment in the Guard, is it brandnew equipment or is it hand-me-downs?

**General GREENLIEF.** Sir, we are receiving some brand new from the factory equipment. We are receiving some that is used by the active Army. We have no objection to this as long as it is in condition that we can use or can put it into condition. Equipment is categorized as category A and B, which is acceptable on active duty, and C and T, which is contingency and training, which is usable for training but not deployable. C and T equipment, although we cannot deploy it, will permit us to conduct meaningful training. A large percentage of what we have is C and T. We have about (——) percent of our full training equipment requirements.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Now, we have heard a lot about cannibalizing. Have you done any of that—has Army done any of that with respect to the Guard or the Reserve, for the Army in Vietnam?

**General GREENLIEF.** There have been some equipments withdrawn from the Guard to support the active Army. This is something that is very closely controlled in the Army, by the Department of Defense. As a matter of fact, for an item to be withdrawn it has to be approved at a very high level in OSD. There has been some of this, yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What about the Reserve?

**Mr. MINSHALL.** Will you yield for a minute?

What have they been cannibalizing in the last calendar year?

**General GREENLIEF.** Sir, to talk specifics in equipment, it is classified confidential and I can give you the information we have as classified information.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Everything before this committee is classified until you declassify it.

**General GREENLIEF.** All right, sir. I just did not want a goof on my part.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** We can tell you some secrets if the security requirement of "need to know" is met.

**General GREENLIEF.** Cannibalization is a specific term that relates to equipment but not quite what we are talking about. Cannibalization as they mean it, as a technical matter, occurs when you take parts off of an old worn-out vehicle and put it on another.

Mr. ANDREWS. It has a more general meaning to this committee. We have been hearing about it in one form or another for 25 years. So whether it is parts or the whole, it means the Army reaching over and taking what you have so they can use it. We understand all that.

General GREENLIEF. All right, sir. In that regard, in the Guard during fiscal year 1969 the dollar value of items withdrawn has been \$4,100,000. The dollar value of items to be received during fiscal 1969, the gains to the Guard inventory at the beginning of fiscal year 1969 were forecast to be \$170 million. Actual issues during the first half of fiscal year 1969 have been \$37 million. If the same quantity of equipment is received in the second half of the year, we will gain a total \$74 million for the year.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you mean they took \$4 million?

General GREENLIEF. Items worth \$4 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. And they said they were going to give you \$170 million, but will only give you \$74 million.

General GREENLIEF. Yes, we will lose \$4.1 million and we will gain \$74 million, a net gain of \$70 million.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is this \$4.1 million? Let's get it out of the dollar sign terminology. What kind of equipment are we talking about? Is this vehicles?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir. There were ———. Twenty-six items which totaled \$4.1 million.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is all they took from you last year?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir; in fiscal year 1969. The cost of equipment is such that it doesn't take many items.

Mr. MINSHALL. Yes. But what was the amount the year before? Do you have records of that year, and the year before that?

General GREENLIEF. I do not have the previous years here. Last year there were about 23 line items, but I have forgotten the dollar value. It was a greater figure during the previous year. This was during the buildup of the active Army for Vietnam. The Army's equipment posture being much better now than it was then.

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, on that \$4 million, they took from the Guard \$4,100,000 worth of equipment.

General GREENLIEF. \$4,146,000; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. After taking \$4.1 million worth they promised the Guard \$170 million?

General GREENLIEF. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Of which they have actually given you \$37 million?

General GREENLIEF. \$37 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. So as a matter of fact as the situation stands today they have taken from you \$4 million-plus, and given you in return \$37 million?

General GREENLIEF. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You are not going to be in business long.

General GREENLIEF. Our total estimated value of our inventory now is about ——— billion. That is about ——— percent of our total training requirement.

Mr. ANDREWS. I noticed that in your statement.

General GREENLIEF. That is the training requirement.

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, you are still out \$4 million of equipment.

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir. Our gains have exceeded our losses.

But it still leaves us far short of what our commanders feel they need to conduct the training.

Mr. ANDREWS. I don't understand, General; how you say you gained more than you lost.

General GREENLIEF. Well, we expect to gain \$74 million; we lost \$4 million, and that is a net increase of \$70 million.

Mr. MINSHALL. Wouldn't you have gotten this \$74 million anyhow?

General GREENLIEF. Hopefully; yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Then this wasn't a tradeoff of any kind?

General GREENLIEF. No. I was not suggesting, sir, it was a tradeoff; this is what had happened.

#### AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

Mr. MINSHALL. How about choppers? Do you have any record of any choppers being taken by the Regular Army?

General GREENLIEF. No, sir. They have withdrawn no helicopters from us this year.

Mr. MINSHALL. You did not have too many to begin with?

General GREENLIEF. That is correct, sir. Our vintage is a little old, also.

The aircraft inventory is a major problem to us. It is one of the areas that our commanders are dissatisfied with the reorganization.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long has it been since you had new choppers?

General GREENLIEF. New? We have not received any brandnew ones. We received CH-37's last year and this year. Now, they are new to the Guard inventory. They are a definite improvement—more complex, heavier lift helicopters. We have no helicopters in the UH-1 series.

Mr. MINSHALL. These 37's, are they new ones or hand-me-downs?

General GREENLIEF. No, sir; they are used by the Active Army. We are very pleased to get them, however. The State of California has a unit of them. They have told me that they are very happy with them, but we need more.

#### INVENTORY OF EQUIPMENT—ARMY RESERVE

Mr. ANDREWS. You and General Sutton have heard General Greenlief talking about the equipment of the Guard. Have you had the same experience in the Reserve?

General SUTTON. It has not been quite the same. If I may, I will give a few figures.

First of all, in 1968 my authorization was \_\_\_\_\_ million in PEMA equipment; I actually had \_\_\_\_\_ million valuation on hand. In 1968 I received \$42.5 million in PEMA equipment and there were withdrawals of \_\_\_\_\_ million of Army Reserve PEMA equipment.

In 1967, we received about \$20 million. In 1966 about \$6 million. So the issue of PEMA equipment to the Army Reserve has increased from \$6 million to \$20 million to \$42.5 million, and I feel sure that I will get about \$43 million of PEMA in the 1969 total.

Mr. MINSHALL. Would you yield? General, I don't want to interrupt your continuity, but how much cannibalization, as the chairman referred to it, have you experienced?

General SUTTON. We don't have that same problem in the Army Reserve because, in the first place, I refuse to take equipment that is not in usable condition. When I do have equipment that has to be rehabilitated, it is done by the active Army and—

Mr. MINSHALL. I am not talking about rehabilitation of equipment. I am talking about equipment that you might have had on board and they came and said "Look, we want this now."

General SUTTON. You mean withdrawal? This has been \$6 million in our case so far this year.

Mr. MINSHALL. What kind of equipment was this?

General SUTTON. We had some withdrawals of ———. I feel that when the active Army needs equipment that I have for its Vietnam requirements, this is perfectly all right. I don't see anything wrong with that. I think I feel I should get more equipment than I am getting, but if I have a piece of equipment that I am using for training and they need it over there to fight, I am perfectly willing to give it up. The problem is not giving up equipment when they need it, the problem is not getting it in the first place.

#### SHORTAGES OF EQUIPMENT—RESERVE AND GUARD

Mr. MINSHALL. What is your biggest shortage equipmentwise in the Reserve? I would like to have the Guard answer the same question. What is your major shortage with respect to equipment as of today?

General SUTTON. We are short in a number of categories.

Mr. MINSHALL. If you had a shopping list, what would be the three top items on your shopping list?

General SUTTON. We need wheeled vehicles, we need aircraft, we need communications equipment.

Mr. MINSHALL. How about you, General?

General GREENLIEF. Sir, our most serious shortage is our aircraft, communications, and I would think No. 3 would probably be engineer equipment.

Communications and aircraft are our really most serious ones.

Mr. MINSHALL. They are serious shortages?

General GREENLIEF. Yes.

Mr. MINSHALL. Are they serious shortages in your case?

General SUTTON. I have serious shortages in helicopters. I don't have any shortages in fixed wing aircraft because my requirements are very low.

Mr. MINSHALL. How about communications equipment?

General SUTTON. We have practically none of the new communications equipment.

Mr. MINSHALL. Then that is a serious shortage.

General SUTTON. Then in the Army Reserve we have many specialized type units. I need power shovels, road graders, technical equipment, printing presses, things like that. Where, for instance, we have a map reproduction unit, they should have map production equipment and they do not have it.

Mr. MINSHALL. Would you supply for the record—so we won't belabor this any more on the record—both you and General Greenlief—what these shortages are and what you would like to have to bring you up to T.O. & E.

General SUTTON. Yes, sir.

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir.

(The formation is classified and submitted for committee use.)

EFFECT OF LACK OF MODERN EQUIPMENT ON MOBILIZATION

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman.

I have been told that units which were called to active duty have reported to their camps or posts, and that their training there has had to be extended because they were not adequately trained or combat-ready by the time they were originally scheduled to go on overseas.

General GREENLIEF. Sir, the units that were ordered to active duty were given a prescribed amount of training time available, based on when they were to be deployed. The training time required was, for one reason, more than originally contemplated when we built the SRF. The equipment posture as a whole was that they would use and fight with the equipment that they had. By the time our units were mobilized the Army's equipment posture had improved to the point that they were equipped with new equipment, very often requiring a new training program. Yes, sir; this did take time, but in my judgment it was time well spent because as a result our units went overseas with the best available equipment. It was a big improvement over what I think would have occurred had they been mobilized the first year we had created the SRF.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I agree with you as to the necessity for it but I think the point here is that in the Guard's case it was due to the fact that the modern equipment had not been delivered to them at their regular duty Guard locations.

General GREENLIEF. No question, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Therefore, the evidence indicates a quick mobilization was not possible or would not be possible today unless they trained with the new equipment.

General GREENLIEF. If the requirement was to deploy with new equipment, there can be no question that the lack of this modern equipment in the Guard does add to our training time and thus it decreases our combat readiness, without question, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So it is to the advantage of the security of our country to keep them equipped with the latest and best weapons.

General GREENLIEF. I certainly believe that, and the Guard supports that, recognizing it is extremely costly. To attain the readiness that we understand is required of us, modern equipment is required.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Fortunately, in these cases I am talking about where it took a longer time, we were lucky we had that extra time to get mobilized.

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It could have been lots more costlier than the dollar value of the weapons.

General GREENLIEF. Our units when deployed went with the best equipment available and they were trained on it.

Mr. MINSHALL. What weapons do you have to train with now in the National Guard?

General GREENLIEF. Most of our units are equipped with the M-1 rifle.

Mr. MINSHALL. No 16's?

General GREENLIEF. We have a few M-16's in our special forces units; we have M-14's in a few of our SRF units. The bulk of the Guard is still equipped with the M-1.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is the situation in the Reserves?

General SUTTON. Most of our men are equipped with the M-1. We are reported to have about 56,000—I am told—M-14's and we have a few of the M-16's for our special forces and for instruction purposes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you send your troops into battle with the M-1 and the M-14—would you?

General SUTTON. Yes, sir. We should have the current rifle, but there is nothing wrong with the M-1. I assume that before they went into battle they would be furnished with the M-14 or the M-16.

General GREENLIEF. I do not want it to appear that it is all bad. We are making progress. This year we are going to receive 382 new M-109, 155-millimeter self-propelled howitzers, which is a new weapon. This is a tremendous gain for us. We have some new M-109's.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is a product of the Cleveland ordnance tank plant.

General GREENLIEF. And we thank you, sir. It is a tremendous item; 382 is a major increase. We are making improvement. The equipment problem of the Guard, and I assume the Reserve components is a major problem and it is a major money outlay.

#### READINESS OF GUARD

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask at this point: What is the readiness posture of the Army National Guard?

General GREENLIEF. Sir, the Continental Army Command training requirement for this summer's training is platoon level. Many of our units are actually operating at company level. Because my memory is bad I cannot translate that into weeks or readiness required, but remaining training time, company to battalion, is 8 weeks, and 5 weeks on up to brigade. ——— Generally speaking, we are at the platoon level.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any National Guard divisions now ready to go within 20 weeks?

General GREENLIEF. Our National Guard divisions would require about ——— weeks of training.

Mr. ANDREWS. And they then would be ready to go to battle?

General GREENLIEF. That includes the time to prepare them for shipment overseas. I think that takes about ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many of them do you have?

General GREENLIEF. Eight divisions.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many of them would be ready to go into battle in ——— weeks?

General GREENLIEF. ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. What percentage of equipment do you say they have today?

General GREENLIEF. On the average, we have about ——— percent of our full training requirement of PEMA equipment.

Mr. ANDREWS. You would need ——— percent equipment for all eight divisions to have them battle-ready in ——— weeks?

General GREENLIEF. Roughly, yes.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** How can you say they would be ready, trained, and combat-ready, when they didn't have the equipment or the right type of equipment?

**General GREENLIEF.** Readiness based on the current equipment they have, sir. In other words, when I say ——— weeks that does not include time to retrain to the M-16 rifle, for example, or if they have a towed howitzer substitute for a self-propelled howitzer, I am not including that time. We can measure it only on the basis of the level of training they have achieved with their current equipment.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** They would be trained with equipment that was less combat-capable than the equipment being used by the Regular Army?

**General GREENLIEF.** Generally speaking, yes, sir. Some items we have the modern equipment. Some items we do not. Your level of training is usually determined by your slowest unit, your pacing unit.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** I do not want the record to show that we would mobilize our National Guard with equipment that was not at least on a par with or better than the equipment of the enemy, insofar as we could determine. But that is the appearance that I get from it now.

**General GREENLIEF.** Yes, sir; I am sorry I stirred this all up. It was in response to the question: "Are you satisfied with the reorganization?" Our States, in general, are satisfied with the reorganization as far as the structure they are now in. The troop units they have, et cetera. They are dissatisfied because they feel they have not been supported at the level that they expected to be supported.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** With equipment?

**General GREENLIEF.** Equipment. There are many other items, for example, that go into training readiness. We have a major problem in training areas, weekend training areas. Readiness being a combination of equipment, time to train, facilities——

#### PREPARATION FOR RIOT CONTROL

**Mr. MINSHALL.** How much training have your units had for riot duty within the continental limits of the United States

**General GREENLIEF.** Sir, in that area we think we do quite well. In the fall of 1967, following Newark and Detroit, when we started to learn some lessons we should have learned right after Watts, we established a 32-hour training program. All of the units in the Guard took that 32 hours. During the winter the program was revised, and then in the spring, which would have been last spring, 1968, the Continental Army Command required all of our units whose readiness to conduct civil disturbance operations had been impaired or decreased because of the reorganization, to retake the 32 hours. Those units whose readiness was not materially affected by the reorganization could take a lesser amount.

In fact, most States, at least those which had a riot potential problem, conducted the full 32 hours. In addition, Continental Army Command authorized using up to 44 hours or half of the available training time as field training for riot control. Very few States felt that they needed the full 44 hours.

**Mr. MINSHALL.** What specialized equipment do you have?

**General GREENLIEF.** In specialized equipment we have authorized the States the bullhorn and the armored vest. We have increased allow-

ances of ammunition to include the chemical items. The Army has stockpiled radios in ready-to-go kits, battalion-sized kits, a kit that will equip a full battalion, that are available for delivery to the closest airport within 24 hours.

The Army has also prepositioned stocks of winter clothing that are available on call.

The current program provides 16 hours of refresher training. In addition, the Army in the military police school conducted a course for senior officers, a civil defense orientation course. We had 800-and-some officers attend that. That course is still going. Last spring we conducted a course of 32 hours for 9,000 lieutenants.

We think the Guard is well trained for this duty. We think they are adequately equipped. We think their performance last spring demonstrates that they are not only capable but well supported in this area.

Mr. MINSHALL. How about the Reserve, General Sutton?

General SUTTON. In the Army Reserve, CONARC has been charged with the responsibility of planning the number of troops to be used. The current plan is that we will have 18 brigades, about 2,500 people per brigade. Three of those brigades will be the three infantry brigades that we have in our troop structure. Fifteen of them will be in composite brigades made up of various type units.

They received 32 hours of training in this last year, and are now receiving 16 hours' refresher training.

Mr. MINSHALL. Similar to the Guard program?

General SUTTON. Similar to the Guard program. However, we have not had any of our brigades fully equipped with riot duty equipment. The three infantry brigades are in condition to do a pretty good job right now. The special equipment needed for this type of operation has not been provided the Army Reserve in full.

Mr. MINSHALL. Have you requisitioned it?

General SUTTON. It is on requisition, and it is being issued to us as rapidly as it can be obtained. Some of our units are nearing completion of the receipt of the special equipment they need.

Mr. MINSHALL. When do you think these requirements will be fully met?

General SUTTON. The last reports I had were that the full requirement of some items of special equipment cannot be met before November of this year.

Mr. MINSHALL. But you are making good progress?

General SUTTON. Yes.

Mr. MINSHALL. Thank you.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have any of your troops been used in riot duty, General?

General SUTTON. None.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any outfits that could be used?

General SUTTON. I think our three infantry brigades are in pretty good condition to be used at this time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have they had any special riot training?

General SUTTON. Yes; 32 hours last year and 16 hours' refresher training planned for this spring.

## ROTC OFFICER PROCUREMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. To what extent will the recent cancellation of ROTC programs in various colleges and universities affect future officer procurements?

General HANNUM. Sir, I would like to preface my remarks on that to say that there have been no cancellations of the program as of today.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have some of them denied credits for ROTC training?

General HANNUM. Some of the faculty on some of the campuses have made recommendations to the institutional authorities that such be the case.

Mr. ANDREWS. But no programs have been canceled?

General HANNUM. No programs have been canceled, and there have been no institutional authorities formally come to the Department of the Army or the Office of Secretary of Defense with a proposition for change. We expect some pretty soon, however.

## AVIATOR STRENGTH—NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. ANDREWS. General Greenlief, you state that during fiscal year 1968 the number of aviators in flying status decreased to 1,750. What is your planned aviator strength for 1969 and 1970?

General GREENLIEF. The flying aviator strength remains at 1,750, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. For both years, 1969 and 1970?

General GREENLIEF. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. How are your aviators in the Guard trained?

General GREENLIEF. We used to have a program of putting our people in the initial pilot training provided by the Active Army. We have had no inputs in the initial flight training program since September of 1965.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that due to the buildup in Vietnam?

General GREENLIEF. That is due to the Army's buildup in Vietnam. I am happy to say we do have 35 spaces this coming year. That is the first we have had, and we are delighted.

Mr. ANDREWS. The Regular Army aviation schools, I would assume, would train all your pilots.

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir; our people go to the same school as the Army, and we have 35 spaces this coming year, which is a big improvement.

Mr. ANDREWS. They take them when they can handle them, as they do the Reserve?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir; on a program basis. The Army apparently can meet their quotas and have 35 spaces.

Other than that, our procurement is from former Army or Air Force aviators, on active duty in either the Army or Air Force, who join our program.

## FLYING HOURS—NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. ANDREWS. You also state that the flying hours for 1968 totaled 188,843, and the program for 1969 is 201,262 flying hours. Why is the flying our program increased in the 1970 budget?

General GREENLIEF. We had a decrease in 1969. There was a 4-month period in which we had a problem obtaining direct support maintenance from the Active Army. That lack of direct support maintenance provided to us decreased the number of aircraft flying hours available to us. Plus, sir, we had about 50 aviators in our mobilized units who went on active duty, thus reducing our flying hour program.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the proposed flying hour program projected in the 1970 budget?

General GREENLIEF. 201,250 flying hours, I believe, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is about the same as 1969.

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir. I am sorry, fiscal 1968 was the year we had a decrease. Our program in 1970 is about the same as 1969, sir.

(Off the record.)

Mr. ANDREWS. It is to be 201,250 hours in 1970, slightly under 1969.

#### ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AIRCRAFT

What type of aircraft and what type of missions are the Army National Guard aviators flying?

General GREENLIEF. At the present time, our inventory is made up of \_\_\_\_\_ aircraft total. Of that, \_\_\_\_\_ are fixed-wing. That includes the O-1, Birdog, the observation aircraft, the U-6, which is a very small command-support, transport-type aircraft, the U-1A, and we have one U-8.

In helicopters we have OH-13's and OH-23's, which are both reconnaissance helicopters, very small. We have UH-19's, which is a small-sized cargo helicopter. We now have \_\_\_\_\_ and expect to have in 1970, \_\_\_\_\_ CH-37's, which is a medium cargo helicopter.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think you have told us you are satisfied with the numbers of aircraft you have, but not the age and quality.

General GREENLIEF. As far as the number, sir, our pilots-to-aircraft ratio is currently about \_\_\_\_\_ meaning \_\_\_\_\_ pilots to each aircraft. That is sufficient aircraft to maintain individual pilot proficiency. But they are not flying the type of aircraft required by the missions of the units. It would not be enough aircraft if we were flying the kind of training missions that are envisioned for our units.

Of the types of aircraft we are supposed to have, the authorized total inventory should be \_\_\_\_\_.

Mr. ANDREWS. Could your pilots as of today fly newer type aircraft without additional training?

General GREENLIEF. No, sir; they would have to be transitioned into it.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long would that take?

General GREENLIEF. It would vary with the type of aircraft.

Mr. ANDREWS. Let us say the newest type chopper that would be used by your forces in combat. If they went into combat, how long would it take?

General GREENLIEF. I am not qualified to answer your question. I can provide it for the record.

Mr. ANDREWS. They could not step from what they are using today into the new type without additional training?

General GREENLIEF. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. That answers the question.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, did you list all the types of aircraft that the Army National Guard has?

General GREENLIEF. I did list all we had. I did not give you the numbers for each. Those are all the types we do have, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. When you put it in the record, you will give the inventories of each of those?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir.

(The information is classified and submitted for committee use.)

Mr. ADREWS. Are there any questions on "Army personnel, Guard and Reserve"?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Yes, sir.

Mr. ADREWS. Mr. Lipscomb.

#### PROSPECTIVE CHANGES TO ROTC PROGRAMS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I want to be sure I understood correctly that there have been no ROTC program canceled by universities and colleges.

General HANNUM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Over what period of time?

General HANNUM. The last one we had withdraw from the program was in 1961, and this had nothing to do with the general tenor of the times today. This was a financial matter. They withdrew through the mutual agreement of the Army and the institution. Since that time there has been none withdrawn, and no institution has indicated it wished to withdraw.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I have read a report that was drawn up entitled, "The Mershon Committee" at Ohio State. Are you familiar with that?

General HANNUM. I am, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is that an official report sponsored by the Army?

General HANNUM. It was a report that we took great cognizance of in doing what we do every so often, that is, overhaul our curriculum in order to keep pace with the times, not only the times on the campus but our changing requirements. The Mershon committee report in essence said you should make your ROTC curriculum, those purely military subjects that you teach, more academically, stimulating, and credit-worthy.

As a result of that report, we came up with a third curricular option which was approved about a year and a half ago. We instituted it on 11 campuses this fall on a test basis. It is successful on those 11 campuses, but it would not be successful as the main thrust of our effort in the curriculum field, because under this option we are into areas that are taught by the civilian faculties, and the civilian faculties are objecting to that. They say, "We teach these subjects. Why should you, the Army, be teaching the same thing?"

I agree with them. We should get out of that business. So, the thrust of our curriculum overhaul that we have been working on for the last year, as follow-on from the option we started this fall, is not going in that direction. We are getting out of the academic field and turning this over to the civilian professors, and we are staying within our own sphere of purely professional subjects.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Was the Mershon report an official Army study?

General HANNUM. No, sir, not as such.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did the Army embrace it?

General HANNUM. The Army embraced it, yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. They did not pay for the study?

General HANNUM. No, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It was independently done?

General HANNUM. Yes sir. Three Army members appointed by the Secretary of the Army did sit as members of the study groups, though.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. But that Army ROTC program was instituted at 11 volunteer institutions?

General HANNUM. The theory of the Mershon study was put into effect at 11 institutions this fall, yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So, the Army did not prepare the report, did not sponsor the report, but embraced it to the extent that it put it in to effect in 11 institutions?

General HANNUM. Not the complete study, but the main thrust of their report, yes, we did.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are the 11 institutions where this is being experimented with also where they are having the anti-ROTC demonstrations?

General HANNUM. I would say on those 11 campuses there is nothing major in the way of dissidence and anti-ROTC effort. There is some. They are not completely clean. But it does not rank with the City College of New York or Berkeley, and so forth. They are not in that category.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. According to an article that was in Army Digest, the author of the article said that this Mershon Report "is an exercise in curriculum tinkering—some might say curriculum elimination—which is now going on at 11 volunteer institutions." Do you agree with that?

General HANNUM. I do not.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That was an article in the Army Digest.

General HANNUM. Yes, I am aware of that.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For the record, would you indicate in what institutions, universities and colleges, you are having this great difficulty with the anti-ROTC program?

General HANNUM. Yes, sir, I would be happy to.

To put this in its context, we currently have 268 institutions in the senior program. Of those 268, there are 27 that enough is happening on the campus that I keep a record of what is happening. Of those 27, there are only 13 where I am concerned about in what direction they will finally be headed. Those 13 I can tick off briefly as being Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine; Dartmouth; Pennsylvania University; Princeton; Cornell; Harvard; Syracuse; Pittsburgh University; Johns Hopkins; Yale; Stanford; Washington University in St. Louis and Claremont College in California. Of that list, I think about 5 are in the Ivy League.

Let me go back and clarify this concern. By "concern," I do not mean that the ultimate will be no ROTC program on that campus. That is not my concern. The concern is what changes we will have to make on the campus.

(The information follows:)

INSTITUTIONS CONTEMPLATING ARMY ROTC PROGRAM CHANGES

Institution	Issues	Faculty actions to date	Administration action
Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine.....	Academic credit for military science courses.....	Faculty committee on military affairs recommended that academic credit for military science courses be eliminated. Governing boards authorized the president to undertake negotiations with Department of Defense to eliminate from contract requirements that academic credit be awarded for military science courses.	President of Bowdoin announced on Feb. 15, 1969 that he intended to pursue negotiations, in conjunction with other colleges, with DOD. He stated that the college's governing board has asked him to seek negotiations.
Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H.....	1. Degree credit to be eliminated after 3 years. 2. Faculty status of military personnel limited to senior officer.	The issues were drawn up by an executive committee of the faculty. The faculty met on Jan. 31, 1969, and approved the report in concept: i.e., to negotiate with DOD in conjunction with other colleges. The faculty has formed an ad hoc committee to implement changes	On Feb. 24, 1969, the president indicated to the Secretary of Defense that he had requested his associates to initiate discussions with sister institutions to be ready to respond to DOD negotiators.
Pennsylvania, University of Philadelphia.	No credit toward the baccalaureate degree for courses taught by ROTC staff.	In December 1968, the faculty of the college of arts and sciences adopted the recommendation of its curriculum committee that effective with the class entering in September 1970 no credit for ROTC course work. Faculty at Wharton School of Finance tabled a similar resolution and appointed an ad hoc committee to reexamine accreditation.	In a letter to Secretary of Defense on Feb. 24, 1969. President Harnwell "welcomed the invitation" to discuss ROTC with DOD representatives.
Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.....	1. Abolish credit for new students entering ROTC in July 1, 1969. 2. Phaseout of ROTC expeditiously.	College of arts and sciences voted on Dec. 7, 1968, to abolish academic credit in ROTC effective July 1, 1969. No other faculty in Washington University has taken such action (11 other colleges).	Chancellor referred study on status of ROTC to a faculty-student university-community council to the chancellor. Action is expected in spring 1969.
Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.....	1. All instruction offered by ROTC will be in addition, to not as substitute for, normal requirements leading to a baccalaureate degree 2. ROTC grades will not be used in determining academic standing. 3. ROTC unit commanders will hold appointments as "visiting lecturer with the rank of professor" instead of professor, other ROTC personnel will not hold academic appointments. 4. ROTC units will be designated "programs" rather than "departments."	The ad hoc committee on ROTC reported the issues to the faculty on Mar. 3, 1969. The faculty approved the recommendations of the ad hoc committee.	In a letter to the Secretary of Defense, on Feb. 24, 1969, the President of Princeton was ready to discuss what should be the most appropriate relationship between the university and the ROTC programs. No action has been taken by the governing body of the institution.
Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.....	1. Courses of political or policy content should be offered by the appropriate academic departments and should not be taught by military officers on active duty. 2. That university credit not be granted for courses offered solely by the military services.	A Cornell faculty-student presidential commission published its findings on Dec. 10, 1968. The full faculty will consider the report on Mar. 12, 1969. Final vote on report is not anticipated until April 1969.	On Feb. 24, 1969, President Perkins informed Secretary of Defense that Cornell would welcome discussion with DOD on ROTC.
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.....	1. Withhold academic credit from any ROTC courses. 2. Termination of faculty appointments after the current academic year. 3. Withdraw description of ROTC courses from Harvard catalog. 4. Terminate allocation of space in university buildings to ROTC. 5. Provision for scholarship funds where need is created by this faculty action.	On Feb. 4, 1969, the Harvard faculty voted 207 to 125 to approve the issues and recommend their adoption by the Harvard Corp. The Harvard Corp met on Feb. 17, 1969. The corporation (7-man executive committee) rejected faculty recommendations 4 and 5; returned issue 3 to faculty for its own decision, and "sympathized" with the faculty on issues 1 and 2.	On Feb. 20, 1969, the president of Harvard, in a letter to Brigadier General Hannum, DCSPER-RUO, indicated that the corporation would "find a way to meet the basic questions raised by the faculty (issues 1 and 2)." It is expected that the corporation will negotiate with the DOD on academic credit and faculty appointment procedures.

Institution	Issues	Faculty actions to date	Administration action
Syracuse University Syracuse, N.Y.-----	1. That ROTC be removed from the college of Liberal arts. 2. That academic credit for liberal arts students be reduced from 18 to not more than 12 hours. 3. That ROTC be housed in a nonexistent all-university unit. 4. That further study be made to determine value of ROTC.	The university voted approval on all issues and forwarded the recommendations to the board of trustees.	Trustees have not taken action on proposals.
Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh, Pa.	1. Abolish academic credit for military science courses for freshmen entering college of arts and sciences effective fall 1969.	The faculty of the college of arts and sciences voted 97 to 81 to approve issue 1. College of engineering and college of education have not followed suit. Another faculty committee within arts and sciences is now reviewing curriculum content toward upgrading the program. Meeting with PMS on Mar. 12, 1969.	The administration has gone along with the faculty of arts and sciences recommendation. Provost of University of Pittsburgh has met with Department of the Army representative. University of Pittsburgh chancellor has been meeting with Pennsylvania Legislature on ROTC matters.
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.	1. Military science courses not counted toward requirements for graduation. 2. Grades continue to count for grade point average and transcript purposes.	Academic council approved the issues during fiscal year 1967-68. Faculty committee is studying the whole ROTC picture.	A letter dated July 27, 1968, from president of Johns Hopkins to Secretary of the Army Resor stating no intent to violate contract. Secretary of the Army approved the action stating no contract revision need be made.
Claremont Colleges, Pomona, Calif., Claremont, Calif.	1. Removal of academic credit. 2. Professorial rank of PMS.	Faculty action in January 1969. Pomona faculty has accepted recommendation of the policy review council to abolish credit effective with entering class in fall 1969. Assistant PMS also changed title to visiting professor. Claremont faculty committee voted 3 to 2 to leave ROTC as it is now. The issue will come to a complete faculty vote spring 1969.	An amendment was placed on faculty vote to leave the door open for review of credit if ROTC course is upgraded academically.
Yale University, New Haven, Conn.-----	1. Sense of faculty that military training should be given extracurricular status without academic credit. 2. The PMS title should eliminate professorship. 3. The PMS requested the president and fellows of Yale to initiate negotiations to alter contract to realize these goals.	Yale faculty meeting voted on Jan. 30, 1969, to approve the issues; 16 professors voted 4 to 1 in favor of issues.	President Brewster notified Secretary of Defense on February 21, that Yale Corp. had instructed him to proceed with negotiations with DOD. Also indicated that credit would not be given for courses taught by military instructors. No further action until negotiations have been completed; therefore, no immediate change in status.
Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.-----	1. Effective fall 1970, no academic credit for military training and education. 2. No on campus military training. 3. Military programs will be regulated by Stanford voluntary organization. 4. No faculty member or administration shall encourage student participation in military training. 5. Revise contract with student to eliminate punitive clause concerning enlisted service. 6. PMS retitled "lecturer." 7. Initiate action with DOD to terminate contracts.	On Feb. 13, 1969, the Stanford faculty senate voted to adopt the slate of issues. The recommendations were sent to the President for approval. Note: Students voted Feb. 17, 1969, by a margin of 2,107 to 1,396 to retain the present status of ROTC.	The president of Stanford has appointed a new committee to review the slate of issues.

## DENIAL OF CREDIT FOR ROTC

Mr. ANDREWS. Suppose they were to deny credit for ROTC, what would be the position of the Army?

General HANNUM. The position of the Army is that this is an institutional matter in the first place. Neither the law nor the Army specifies the amount of credit to be given for this course of study.

Mr. ANDREWS. If they withdrew credit, the Army would not remove the ROTC unit?

General HANNUM. Not for that reason alone; no, sir. We have done exhaustive studies on this matter of academic credit. It is a very complicated thing. We have five institutions that for a number of years have not given academic credit for ROTC, and all five of those institutions produce more than the minimum required number of officers yearly, and they are quality officers. So, we would not disestablish for academic credit reasons alone.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Have you done any study as to whether there is an organized effort by different groups attacking the ROTC?

General HANNUM. I personally have not conducted such studies. There are agencies within the Department of the Army which have. There are elements which are targeting against ROTC, not only in the colleges and universities, but this year they plan to move into the high schools. I am referring specifically to the SDS and their manifesto entitled "Smash the Military Machine," or words to that effect, which they adopted about a month ago.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It seems to me, if I am not mistaken, some of the very universities and colleges you mentioned are the same ones that, for instance, had the strike against military research.

General HANNUM. Some, yes. These institutions that I mentioned are traditionally the leaders in change. Harvard is a shining example of that. If I would have to predict where this demand for change had gotten started, I would have predicted 90 percent of these institutions that I named, because they are traditional leaders. Stanford is an example on the west coast.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## RIOT TRAINING

Mr. DAVIS. Does the civil disturbance training take place at all of your normal Guard training centers, or do you have a few special places at which this training takes place?

General GREENLIEF. It is conducted in the unit, sir, for the unit training. The schooling of the 9,000 officers I mentioned was centralized within the States, but the unit training is conducted at their weekend training sites and at their field training sites.

Mr. DAVIS. So, all Guard units either have had or will have had this 32-hour training for civil disturbance; is that correct?

General GREENLIEF. They all have had it, sir. What they will have from this point on is 16 hours a year refresher training.

Mr. DAVIS. What basis do you have for assuming there will be a 98 percent attendance rate at meetings?

General GREENLIEF. Sir, the Guard budget is based on experience in training attendance in past years, averaging about 98 percent. That is our attendance rate.

## AVIATORS AND FLYING HOURS—NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. DAVIS. What is the basis for the decrease in the anticipated number of National Guard aviators and flying hours?

General GREENLIEF. Sir, the number of aviators in the fiscal year 1970 program is 1,750, which is the number in the 1969 budget. The decrease in the number of hours is something like 12. It is essentially the same program that we had in 1969, sir. There was a lesser number in 1968, to which I referred earlier.

## FEDERALIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. DAVIS. What is the significance of a call to Federal status of the Guard?

General GREENLIEF. The National Guard, as you know, in its inactive duty status is commanded and administered by the States in accordance with the instructions provided by the Army. The National Guard in that status trains with Federal pay, with Federal equipment, according to Federal standards to meet Federal objectives.

At the same time, because they are also a State force, they are available to the Governor for use in State emergencies, floods, tornados, civil disturbances, whatever requirements the Governor has. In those circumstances the States provide the pay and allowances and the operating costs of the forces.

Mr. DAVIS. What would be the normal circumstance for federalization of the Guard? Did this not occur at Detroit, for instance?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir. In that instance the Governor of the State of Michigan requested Federal assistance, Federal troops. The administration in providing those Federal troops chose also to bring the National Guard from State status into Federal status so there would be no duality of command. The entire force would then be under the Active Army.

This then became the policy that has been applied in subsequent instances where that occurred.

Mr. DAVIS. The net effect, as far as we are concerned, is to have the Federal Government pick up the entire tab in a circumstance of this kind, rather than having the State do so; is it not?

General GREENLIEF. If the Governor requests Federal assistance and if the administration calls the National Guard into Federal status, yes, sir; the pay of the National Guard troops then becomes a Federal responsibility.

The Army's purpose, sir, is to have the entire military force under the command of one officer, and if Federal troops are committed, that officer should be a Federal officer.

Mr. DAVIS. This would never occur, then, in instances where available National Guard troops within the State were sufficient to cope with the disorder. Is that a fair statement?

General GREENLIEF. That is correct, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Would it then be anticipated that either federalized National Guard troops or regular troops from outside of that State would be brought in? Would that be a normal accompanying circumstance?

General GREENLIEF. If the State asked for Federal troops or U.S. Army troops, and if the Army for some reason that I do not perceive

did not have available troops and they had used all the National Guard troops in that State, it would be possible to mobilize National Guard units in other States and commit them in that other State as Federal troops. It has not happened, sir. I know of no case where it has been considered.

Mr. DAVIS. In the instance of Detroit, were there other troops used other than federalized National Guard troops in the State of Michigan?

General GREENLIEF. Yes, sir; U.S. Army troops.

POLICY ON ASSIGNMENT TO THE RESERVES OF MEN SEPARATED FROM THE  
ARMY

Mr. DAVIS. What is the basis for a direct civilian input into both National Guard and Reserve at a time when you have an assured and mandatory input into those organizations from men separated from the Army?

General GREENLIEF. Sir, there is no mandatory input into the National Guard from the individuals who have been separated from the Active Army.

Mr. DAVIS. Except is it not true that they must participate in either Reserve or National Guard training until their entire 6-year period, or whatever it is, has been fulfilled?

General SUTTON. May I address myself to that. When a man is drafted into the Army or voluntarily joins the Army for an enlisted period, he incurs a 6-year military obligation. When he is separated from the Active Army, he is separated into the Army Reserve.

He can voluntarily go into the Guard, but not mandatorily.

Mr. DAVIS. In other words, he can fulfill his total obligation by service in postactive service in either the Reserves or the National Guard. Is that not true?

General SUTTON. That is correct.

Mr. DAVIS. How do you justify taking men directly out of civilian life for the Guard or for the Reserves when you have this assured input?

General SUTTON. Actually, at this time, sir, we are not mandatorily assigning to Army Reserve units these people who are separated after having done 2 years in the Active Army. They go to our individual Ready Reserve. They may voluntarily come into a unit in the Army Reserve or they may voluntarily transfer and enlist in the National Guard, with the permission of the National Guard, DOD policy is that they may now be involuntarily assigned to Army Reserve units only where we are unable to obtain non-prior-service personnel. Vietnam veterans may not now be so assigned under any conditions.

Mr. DAVIS. What are they, then? Unless they choose to go into the so-called Active Reserve or the National Guard, they are simply in a Standby Reserve status and are required to take some period of training each year, but not the regular weekly training, is that correct?

General SUTTON. Actually, when you say "Standby," we have a category of people in Standby. That is not what they are. They are in the individual Ready Reserve. They are Ready Reservists. They are subject by law to training of not more than 30 days a year until the expiration of their obligation. They are absolutely needed. For the

Active Army we need units and we need individuals. In the individual Ready Reserve we have officers and enlisted men who are trained and ready to be used to form new units, to fill units of the Army Reserve and National Guard that are ordered to duty, and to furnish replacements.

Mr. DAVIS. So, the man who has been on active duty for 2 years and comes back to the Reserve or the National Guard is in quite a different status from the man who comes into those organizations directly from civilian life.

General SUTTON. That is correct; yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

---

MONDAY, MARCH 17, 1969.

## MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

### WITNESSES

VICE ADM. CHARLES K. DUNCAN, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL  
 VICE ADM. G. M. DAVIS, MC, U.S. NAVY, CHIEF, BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY  
 REAR ADM. W. D. GADDIS, U.S. NAVY, OFFICE OF THE NAVY COMPTROLLER, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND REPORTS  
 REAR ADM. J. T. BURKE, JR., U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT DEPUTY FOR CNO (NAVAL RESERVE)  
 REAR ADM. R. R. CRUTCHFIELD, U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL  
 CAPT. A. LOTTERHOS, JR., SC, U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR FINANCE (COMPTROLLER), BUPERS  
 CAPT. D. D. ENGEN, U.S. NAVY, AVIATION PLANS DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
 CAPT. C. H. GRIFFITHS, U.S. NAVY, SUBMARINE/NUCLEAR POWER PLACEMENT SECTION, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL  
 CAPT. R. LENIHAN, U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR WOMEN  
 H. F. NUTTMANN, MILITARY PERSONNEL BUDGET DIVISION, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL  
 A. P. KENYON, ASSISTANT FOR PLANS AND POLICY, BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL  
 A. N. MINTON, FINANCE DIVISION, NAVAL SUBSISTENCE OFFICE

MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses of temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for members of the navy on active duty (except members of the Reserve provided for elsewhere), midshipmen, and aviation cadets;

\$4,526,000,000

~~[\$4,235,000,000]~~

(10 U.S.C. 600, 683-4, 701-4, 744, 1035, 1037, 1212, 1475-80, 2031, 2101-11, 2421, 2634, 5401, 5404, 5406-17, 5441-2, 5444-7, 5449-52, 5454-7, 5501, 5503, 5537, 5865, 6081-6, 6148, 6221, 6911-12, 6960, 6969; Chapters 3, 5, 7, 9, and 10 of Title 37, United States Code; 50 U.S.C. App. 2201-16; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

07-05-1453-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>			
Direct program:			
1. Pay and allowances of officer . . . . .	932,000	1,025,601	1,038,100
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted. . . . .	2,645,700	2,846,279	2,905,798
3. Pay and allowances of cadets. . . . .	10,651	11,179	11,166
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel . . . . .	304,926	302,154	307,543
5. Permanent change of station travel. . . . .	229,000	240,592	231,162
6. Other military personnel costs. . . . .	35,491	33,195	32,231
Total direct obligations. . . . .	4,157,768	4,459,000	4,526,000
Reimbursable program:			
1. Pay and allowances of officers. . . . .	1,531	1,656	1,656
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted. . . . .	1,470	1,482	1,482
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel . . . . .	29,184	29,136	29,136
5. Permanent change of station travel. . . . .	9	100	100
Total reimbursable obligations. . . . .	32,194	32,374	32,374
10 Total obligations . . . . .	4,189,962	4,491,374	4,558,374

10-5

Use for all bookkeeping and accounting purposes except details of personnel services

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars) -- continued

07-05-1453-0-1-051		1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<u>Financing:</u>				
Receipts and reimbursements from:				
11	Federal funds . . . . .	-15,611	-15,978	-15,978
14	Non-Federal sources <sup>1/</sup> . . . . .	-16,583	-16,396	-16,396
25	Unobligated balance lapsing . . . . .	2,132		
Budget authority . . . . .		4,159,900	4,459,000	4,526,000
Budget authority:				
40	Appropriation . . . . .	4,134,100	4,235,000	4,526,000
42	Transferred from other accounts . . . . .	25,800	-	-
43	<u>Appropriation (adjusted)</u> . . . . .	4,159,900	4,235,000	4,526,000
44.30	<u>Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases.</u>	-	198,700	-
	<u>Proposed supplemental for Southeast Asia support.</u> . .	-	25,300	-
Relation of obligations to outlays:				
71	Obligations incurred, net . . . . .	4,157,768	4,459,000	4,526,000
	Obligated balance, start of year. . . . .			
72.40	Appropriation. . . . .	137,226	161,092	210,092
72.49	Contract authorization . . . . .	23,568	-	-

M 127

Use for all budget estimates except detail of personnel services

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars) -- continued

07-05-1453-0-1-051		1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
Relation of obligations to outlays -- continued				
74	Obligated balance, end of year . . . . .	-161,092	-210,092	-236,092
77	Adjustments in expired accounts. . . . .	-23,065	-	-
90	Outlays, excluding supplementals . . . . .	4,134,406	4,186,200	4,499,800
91.30	Outlays from military pay act supplemental . .	-	198,700	-
	Outlays from Southeast Asia support supplemental . . . . .	-	25,100	200
<p><sup>1/</sup>Reimbursements from Non-Federal sources are derived from sale of meals and clothing to service members (10 U.S.C. 4621).</p>				
Status of Unfunded Contract Authorizations (in thousands of dollars)				
Identification Code 07-05-1453-0-1-051		1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
	Unfunded balance, start of year . . . . .	23,568	.....	.....
	Administrative cancellation of unfunded balance (-) . . . . .	-23,568	.....	.....
	Unfunded balance, end of year . . . . .	.....	.....	.....
	Appropriation to liquidate contract authorization. . . . .	.....	.....	.....

7  
over 100  
25 pages

7  
over 100  
25 pages

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

07-05-1453-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
Direct obligations:			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military . . . . .	2,898,581	3,279,846	3,350,767
12.2 Personnel benefits: Military . . . . .	841,761	753,138	752,886
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons. . . . .	103,426	109,291	105,362
22.0 Transportation of things. . . . .	93,358	100,625	98,713
25.0 Other services. . . . .	9,656	10,470	10,316
26.0 Supplies and materials. . . . .	204,699	198,405	199,719
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities. . . . .	3,530	3,134	3,095
43.0 Interest and dividends. . . . .	2,757	4,091	5,142
Total direct obligations. . . . .	4,157,768	4,459,000	4,526,000
Reimbursable obligations:			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military . . . . .	1,995	2,183	2,183
12.2 Personnel benefits: Military . . . . .	874	761	761
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons. . . . .	8	100	100
26.0 Supplies and materials. . . . .	29,317	29,330	29,330
Total reimbursable obligations. . . . .	32,194	32,374	32,374
99.0 Total obligations . . . . .	4,189,962	4,491,374	4,558,374

11-1-77

This list of business budget activities except details of personnel services

Department of the Navy  
Military Personnel, Navy

APPROPRIATION INTRODUCTION  
(In thousands)

	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
Total direct obligations	\$4,157,768	\$4,459,000	\$4,526,000
Proposed supplemental for military pay act increase	-	-198,700	-
Proposed supplemental for Southeast Asia support	-	-25,300	-
Net adjustments	2,132	-	-
Appropriation	4,159,900	4,235,000	4,526,000

Pay, allowances, subsistence, clothing, permanent change of station travel and other personnel costs authorized by law and regulation for Regular and Reserve personnel on active duty, aviation cadets, and midshipmen at the Naval Academy are funded under the appropriation "Military Personnel, Navy".

The number of officers and enlisted personnel to man and support the operating ships and aircraft of the Navy is used as the basis to estimate funding requirements. Provision is also made for training of personnel to provide operating and support personnel in future years.

Officer promotions are those necessary for career planning commensurate with law and military requirements. Service in grade is being controlled within the provisions of law and distribution in the senior grades remains within limitations. Enlisted advancements are necessary to attain top six enlisted pay grade numbers authorized.

Statutory rates, authorized allowances, and current prices, as applicable, have been used to estimate requirements.

The fiscal year 1970 request for \$4,526,000 will provide funds for an average of 770,603 man years. Personnel strengths are summarized as follows:

Department of the Navy  
Military Personnel, Navy

APPROPRIATION INTRODUCTION--Continued

SUMMARY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	<u>FY 1968 Actual</u>		<u>FY 1969 Planned</u>		<u>FY 1970 Planned</u>	
	<u>Man Years</u>	<u>End Strength 30 June 1968</u>	<u>Man Years</u>	<u>End Strength 30 June 1969</u>	<u>Man Years</u>	<u>End Strength 30 June 1970</u>
<u>DIRECT PROGRAM</u>						
Officers . . . . .	81,933	85,081	85,408	84,744	85,524	86,303
Enlisted . . . . .	665,877	675,058	670,757	681,416	680,918	680,557
Academy Midshipmen . . . . .	4,186	4,591	4,138	4,243	4,161	4,243
Aviation Cadets. . . . .	16	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal	<u>752,012</u>	<u>764,730</u>	<u>760,303</u>	<u>770,403</u>	<u>770,603</u>	<u>771,103</u>
<u>REIMBURSABLE PROGRAM 1/</u>						
Officers . . . . .	118	119	116	116	116	116
Enlisted . . . . .	385	383	281	281	281	281
Subtotal . . . . .	<u>503</u>	<u>502</u>	<u>397</u>	<u>397</u>	<u>397</u>	<u>397</u>
<u>TOTAL PROGRAM</u>						
Officers . . . . .	82,051	85,200	85,524	84,860	85,640	86,419
Enlisted . . . . .	666,262	675,441	671,038	681,697	681,199	680,838
Academy Midshipmen . . . . .	4,186	4,591	4,138	4,243	4,161	4,243
Aviation Cadets. . . . .	16	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	<u>752,515</u>	<u>765,232</u>	<u>760,700</u>	<u>770,800</u>	<u>771,000</u>	<u>771,500</u>

1/ Military personnel assigned to agencies outside of Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis under the provisions of 10 USC 5416.

Department of the Navy  
 Military Personnel, Navy

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS

(In thousands)

Bud. Act. No.	Budget Activity	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate	Difference 1970 Compared with 1969	Justification page
1	Pay and allowances of officers	\$932,000	\$1,025,601	\$1,038,100	+\$12,499	1-10
2	Pay and allowances of enlisted personnel	2,645,700	2,846,279	2,905,798	+59,519	1-24
3	Pay and allowances of cadets	10,651	11,179	11,166	-13	1-38
4	Subsistence of enlisted personnel	304,926	302,154	307,543	+5,389	1-41
5	Permanent change of station travel	229,000	240,592	231,162	-9,430	1-48
6	Other military personnel costs	35,491	33,195	32,231	-964	1-68
Total direct obligations in budget document		4,157,768	4,459,000	4,526,000	+67,000	

Department of the Navy  
 Military Personnel, Navy

BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF OFFICERS

(In thousands)

Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
1 Basic pay	\$662,038	\$741,874	\$749,841
2 Incentive pay for hazardous duty	58,509	58,584	59,360
3 Special pay	20,857	24,578	24,833
4 Basic allowances for quarters	91,084	93,122	94,233
5 Basic allowance for subsistence	47,098	49,072	49,139
6 Station allowances overseas	4,416	3,197	3,197
7 Uniform allowances	2,834	2,277	2,684
8 Family separation allowances	3,111	3,036	3,075
9 Separation payments	19,079	21,953	22,642
10 Social security tax - employer's contribution	22,974	27,908	29,096
<b>Total</b>	<b>932,000</b>	<b>1,025,601</b>	<b>1,038,100</b>

Department of the Navy  
Military Personnel, Navy

BUDGET ACTIVITY 2: PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

(In thousands)

Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
1 Basic pay	\$1,855,490	\$2,032,228	\$2,061,211
2 Incentive pay for hazardous duty	41,815	43,353	42,644
3 Special pay	127,398	129,762	131,738
4 Proficiency pay	35,576	37,952	38,277
5 Reenlistment bonus	57,404	69,991	86,992
6 Basic allowance for quarters	273,838	272,513	276,461
7 Station allowances overseas	7,940	6,492	6,492
8 Clothing allowances	81,840	80,131	77,479
9 Family separation allowances	19,172	18,600	17,900
10 Separation payments	63,309	61,796	67,711
11 Social security tax - employer's contribution	81,918	93,461	98,893
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,645,700</b>	<b>2,846,279</b>	<b>2,905,798</b>

Department of the Navy  
 Military Personnel, Navy

BUDGET ACTIVITY 3: PAY AND ALLOWANCES OF CADETS

(In thousands)

Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
1 Aviation cadets	\$53	-	-
2 Midshipmen	10,598	\$11,179	\$11,166
Total	10,651	11,179	11,166

BUDGET ACTIVITY 4: SUBSISTENCE OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL

(In thousands)

Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
1 Basic allowance for subsistence	\$106,500	\$105,695	\$107,160
2 Subsistence in kind	198,426	196,459	200,383
Total	304,926	302,154	307,543

Department of the Navy  
 Military Personnel, Navy

BUDGET ACTIVITY 5: PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION TRAVEL

(In thousands)

Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
1 Accession travel	\$35,370	\$34,969	\$30,675
2 Training travel	22,475	23,465	23,439
3 Operational travel between duty stations	52,577	55,644	57,288
4 Rotational travel to and from overseas	76,132	78,423	76,522
5 Separation travel	40,174	44,543	39,694
6 Travel of organized units	2,272	3,548	3,544
<b>Total</b>	<b>229,000</b>	<b>240,592</b>	<b>231,162</b>

BUDGET ACTIVITY 6: OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL COSTS

(In thousands)

Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
1 Apprehension of military deserters, absentees, and escaped military prisoners	\$162	\$200	\$200
2 Interest on uniformed services savings deposits	2,757	4,091	5,067
3 Death gratuities	3,530	2,959	2,969
4 Servicemen's Group Life Insurance	29,042	25,945	23,995
<b>Total</b>	<b>35,491</b>	<b>33,195</b>	<b>32,231</b>

Mr. ANDREWS. This morning we will take up "Military personnel, Navy." For this appropriation the Navy is requesting \$4,526 million, an increase of \$67 million over the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

We are pleased to have with us to discuss this request, Adm. C. K. Duncan, the Chief of Naval Personnel.

Admiral Duncan, we welcome you and all of your supporting witnesses.

Since this is your first appearance before the committee in your present position, we will at this point in the record insert your biographical sketch.

(Biographical sketch follows:)

#### VICE ADM. CHARLES KENNEY DUNCAN, U.S. NAVY

Charles Kenney Duncan—born December 7, 1911, in Nicholasville, Ky. His first duty station was the cruiser *Salt Lake City* where he served as turret officer. In the summer, 1938, he reported aboard the destroyer *Schenck* as engineering officer. Following duty in *Schenck*, he was assigned as flag lieutenant and force personnel officer to Commander Destroyers, Atlantic Fleet. In August, 1942, he became executive officer of the destroyer *Hutchins*.

In October, 1943, he assumed command of the destroyed *Wilson* operating in the Pacific. For his services as commanding officer during the air attack on Rabaul on November 11, 1943, he received a letter of commendation from Commander, South Pacific. A second letter of commendation was received from Commander in Chief Pacific for services as commanding officer of *Wilson* from January 25, to February 27, 1944 in the Marshall Island, Truk, Tinian, and Saipan areas.

In the spring, 1944, he was assigned as Assistant Director and later Director of Naval Officer Procurement in the Bureau of Naval Personnel. During this tour in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, he served as a member of the "Holloway Board," established by the Secretary of the Navy.

He was executive officer of the battleship *Wisconsin* from June 1946 until January 1948. Upon completion of the Armed Forces Staff College course in July 1948, he served for 3 years in the Plans Division, Staff of Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet.

In October 1951, he reported as Commander Destroyer Division 62. In the spring, 1952, he was transferred to the newly formed international staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, the NATO Sea Command, as the U.S. naval officer in the Policy and Plans Section. When detached in the summer, 1953, he became administrative aide to the Chief of Naval Personnel. In August 1955, he became commanding officer of U.S.S. *Chilton* (APA-38). In November 1956, he became Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) to Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

After selection to the rank of Rear Admiral in July 1958, he reported as Commander Amphibious Group 1 in the Amphibious Force, Pacific. In the fall of 1959, he assumed command of the Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet. He was commander Naval Base, Subic Bay, Luzon, Philippine Islands from January 1961 until April 1962, when he became Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Plans, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Navy Department.

From March 1964 to June 1965, he was Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, after which he commanded the Amphibious Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. "For exceptionally meritorious service \* \* \*" in the latter assignment, he was awarded the Legion of Merit. In May 1967 he became Commander Second Fleet and on April 5, 1968 assumed the duties of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Naval Reserve) and Chief of Naval Personnel, Navy Department.

Admiral Duncan's hometown is Lexington, Ky. His wife is the former Sheila Taylor of Halifax, Nova Scotia. They have two children, Bruce and Anne.

#### GENERAL STATEMENT OF CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

Mr. ANDREWS. I note, Admiral Duncan, that you have a prepared statement. We will be glad to hear from you without interruption.

Admiral Duncan.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

As Chief of Naval Personnel, I am privileged to present the requirements for military personnel appropriations of the Navy. As in the past years, the Fiscal Year 70 request is designed to ensure adequate personnel readiness in the Navy. In spite of the emphasis on our military hardware and the ever-increasing sophistication of our equipment, in the final analysis it is the Navy man who continues to be the most important factor in determining our readiness.

We have a fine, dedicated group of people in the Navy who are giving valuable service to the country and who are a great asset to the United States. Our object is that they be of the highest professional quality and thus merit your interest and appreciation. Your assistance in obtaining and keeping the most professional Navy man in the world is requested.

My statement will first take up some personnel matters of general interest, and then discuss the funds and strengths for Fiscal Year 1970. In meeting personnel commitments, we have a number of problems. I would like to summarize some of these for you.

Officer Personnel. Although officer requirements have increased by about 1600, initial officer procurement in general continues to be adequate; however, it should be noted that our ability to attract reserve officer candidates is influenced by the size of draft quotas. The Officer Candidate School at Newport, Rhode Island, is operating at or near capacity. Applications also exceed openings in most other officer procurement programs, thereby allowing us to continue selectivity. On the other hand, we are experiencing difficulty in procuring enough nurses to meet our needs, primarily because of civilian opportunities available.

Despite our general successes in initial officer procurement, we continue to have a shortage of surface line officers in the grades of lieutenant commander and above, with an overage in the grades of ensign and lieutenant (junior grade). This overage in ensigns and lieutenants (junior grade), however, does not compensate for the lack of experience inherent with the more junior officers. Within the officer corps, in the grades of lieutenant through commander, it is still necessary selectively to defer for one year the resignations and retirements of many regular line officers. This includes surface line officers, naval aviators, and submariners. Also certain specialties such as engineering duty officers, weapons engineering duty officers, and civil engineer corps officers. The selective deferment also applies to medical corps officers in the grades of lieutenant through captain.

We are continuing our policy of manning ships and squadrons in the combat area at somewhat higher than peacetime levels. To accomplish this, it has been necessary, temporarily, to vacate billets elsewhere until replacements can be trained, to drawdown less critical areas, and to defer assignments to service colleges, undergraduate and graduate education programs. This last measure has been counter-productive to career retention and to the professional development of the officer corps. Every effort is being made to increase the input this fiscal year to our education program. In the coming years we hope to step up the number of officers with graduate education.

Although recruitment of enough highly qualified individuals to meet naval aviation requirements continues to be extremely difficult, we are increasing

our pilot training rate to fulfill requirements. In Fiscal Year 1970, the Navy share of the 2860 pilot training rate will increase to 2200 as compared to 1800 in Fiscal Year 1969. This increase in pilot output will contribute significantly in reducing our numerical shortage toward the Fiscal Year 1971 goal of inventory equalling requirements. However, we still foresee long-term problems with deficits in the inventory of pilots in the 5-14 year experience range.

Enlisted Personnel. Also assisted by draft pressure, voluntary enlistments have remained excellent in quantity during the past year. Ships and aircraft of the fleet become more complex each year, and it is increasingly difficult to man them with technically trained personnel in the face of rising training costs. We have realized some improvement in career manning levels by continuing several incentive programs, such as the Variable Reenlistment Bonus, Proficiency Pay, and programs which offer advanced technical training in return for increased service obligation. Despite these programs, the retention of enlisted personnel beyond the first enlistment continues to be one of our major problems. Our first-term reenlistment rate in Fiscal Year 1966 was 23.7 percent, and in Fiscal Year 1968 was 16.8 percent. This is a 7 percent drop in 2 years. This rate has declined even further in Fiscal Year 1969 to 16.4 percent at the end of December. We have not had a first-term reenlistment rate this low since 1957.

Distribution of Personnel. The Navy's Fiscal Year 1970 budget submission provides for the following distribution of personnel: 63.4 percent in the operating forces; 18.0 percent in training activities as instructors, students, and staff; and 18.6 percent elsewhere. The Navy continues to be constrained by an inherent dislocation problem resulting from personnel commitments in Southeast Asia. Tours of duty in-country in Vietnam and in non-rotated fleet units in Southeast Asia, are, of course, of one year duration. Therefore, it is necessary to go through the process of moving personnel in and out of these billets every twelve months instead of approximately 24 to 36 months as is the case elsewhere. In order to meet the enlisted in-country and non-rotated ship requirements alone, in excess of 55,000 permanent change of station moves are made annually.

Training. The conflict in Vietnam continues as an additional strong stimulus for Navy training efforts. Combatant operations have demanded increased emphasis on electronics warfare, damage control, and SeaBee training. At the same time, we must continue to train our technical specialists to cope with the maintenance and operational problems accompanying the ever-increasing sophistication of Navy equipment. In order to keep pace with training requirements, we are constantly reviewing and adjusting training courses and methods of instruction to ensure maximum utilization of resources.

I am happy to report that construction of our third Recruit Training Center at Orlando, Florida, has proceeded to the point where recruits are now being trained in the first of the two recruit training camps planned for Orlando. We now have a capacity of about 3200 recruit trainees. The majority of the facilities for the second recruit camp which will increase this capacity to a total of 8,000 are included in the Fiscal Year 70 Military Construction Program. This will eliminate the current serious overcrowding at San Diego and Great Lakes and provides the Navy with a much needed, modern East Coast recruit training facility.

We are using educational and training opportunities as feasible for reenlistment or career incentives. We are hopeful that we will be able to expand

in Fiscal Year 1970 the effort in such areas as: The Navy Enlisted Scientific Education Program (NESEP), the Associate Degree Completion Program (ADCOP), the Tuition Aid Off-Duty Education Program, and the Program for Afloat College Education (PACE).

The Navy is experiencing increasing competition in obtaining quality candidates for the Naval Academy and for the NROTC Program. While there continues to be an adequate number of applicants for the U. S. Naval Academy nominations and the NROTC, the availability of large numbers of scholarship opportunities is tending to draw away some candidates who possess the highest potential for becoming successful naval officers. The increased nominating power by members of Congress, which is effective this year, is expected to provide additional qualified Naval Academy candidates. We solicit assistance in encouraging qualified young men to apply for the Naval Academy and the NROTC and thus to enter a career of service to their country.

Retention. Both the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations have given emphasis to the serious nature of our personnel retention problem. I repeat their concern since the personnel readiness posture is a controlling factor in fleet readiness. Combat readiness is dependent upon our ability to provide qualified personnel to build and maintain a dedicated career force capable of a high level of accomplishment. Unfortunately, low retention rates are a principal factor militating against a career force with the proper mix of required skills. We simply are not retaining an adequate percentage of capable personnel to keep pace with the rapid growth of technology. Since we measure "quality" substantially in terms of service experience of high potential people, I refer specifically to officers in the middle grades (lieutenant and lieutenant commander) and to enlisted personnel completing their first and second enlistments. Within these frames of experience, we are most concerned with low retention, especially among those skills requiring a high degree of technical training. This includes our submarine officers trained in nuclear power, where we are experiencing an acute retention problem at the moment. Navy pilots' retention rate has been dropping over the past several years. Among our enlisted personnel the retention problem applies especially to ratings associated with electronic and engineering skills. Loss of these personnel, whose skills are a very marketable commodity in industry, has a most immediate impact on readiness, and is a loss to the Navy in terms of high training costs in time and money.

The serious increase in nuclear submarine officer resignations is a major cause for concern. Low retention in this community is very damaging because of the extremely high quality of officer required successfully to complete the difficult nuclear submarine training, and the narrow base of the whole program. Thus, input is necessarily limited by the manpower pool with necessary educational prerequisites, and current input will not compensate for the low retention we are experiencing. As of 1 March, 385 officers of this relatively small community of 1849 officers in the ranks of commander and below have submitted their resignation requests, and 330 will leave nuclear submarines in the next 12 months, making the situation most serious.

Corrective action, in the form of several long-range programs designed to increase input and to improve retention, has been initiated. The effectiveness of these programs has yet to be felt. The severe officer shortage that will occur this year in the nuclear submarine community may require further and more drastic remedial action.

Low retention of officers, however, is not limited to these specific areas. Our surface line officers, for example, who man carriers, destroyers, amphibious and service force ships that are heavily committed in Southeast Asia, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean, continue to show the lowest retention rate of any community, as they have for many years.

The reasons given by officer and enlisted personnel leaving the service fall chiefly in the categories of: Conditions of service, job satisfaction, education, and compensation. Principal items under these categories include: Family separation, lack of adequate housing, desire for further education, and the better pay offered by industry. Inasmuch as we can do really very little to substantially improve the arduous nature of sea duty, as readiness to fight at sea is our reason for existence, it should be compensated for by a meaningful sea pay and other factors.

To stem the declining retention rates, or more positively, to improve career motivation, we need support for programs in the areas of expanded educational opportunities and more adequate housing as indicated by the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations. These are necessary to help enhance the attractiveness of a Navy career in competition with civilian opportunities. Adequate housing gives the married man the additional assurance that his family is secure while he is away at sea. This is a critical problem especially to the Navy, since the majority of our people are located in or near metropolitan seaport areas where living costs are often far higher than elsewhere in the nation.

In-service education programs are essential to provide opportunities for personal growth of the individual in a Navy career comparable to those available in civilian life. The naval profession increasingly requires its career members to have higher education. For our qualified officers, this means an opportunity for graduate-level education; for our top quality career enlisted men, it means an opportunity to qualify for an Associate Degree. We are seeking a substantial increase in these programs in Fiscal Year 1970.

While we are dependent upon your assistance for meaningful progress in the foregoing areas, within the Navy we are taking a number of actions which require a minimum of funding support. These include: Greatly increased emphasis on personal leadership in career motivation at all levels of authority, planned changes in the assignment system for enlisted personnel, and elimination of a number of irritants in the administration of personnel. These career motivation tools have thus far fallen short of stimulating the required input to the career force. Further remedial action is necessary.

FUNDING REQUIREMENTS -- MPN. The detailed budget justification for the request under the appropriation "Military Personnel, Navy" is as follows:

Navy strength at the end of Fiscal Year 1970 will be 771,103 and the average strength will be 770,603, an increase of about 10,000 average strength over Fiscal Year 69. This average strength is composed of 85,524 officers, 680,918 enlisted personnel, and 4,161 midshipmen. Included in the total planned end-strength are 101,524 augmentation billets for support of Southeast Asia operations.

The total budget request under this appropriation for Fiscal Year 70 is \$4,526,000,000. The Fiscal Year 1970 pay and allowances of officers reflect a net increase of 12.5 million dollars over the currently planned Fiscal Year 1969 programs. Pay and allowances for enlisted personnel show an increase of 59.5 million dollars in Fiscal Year 1970. The increase in funds allows a man-year average for officers and enlisted men which permits the Navy to approach more closely the requirements authorized by end-year ceilings and to meet fleet

manning requirements. Without sufficient funds to support an adequate man-year average efficient manpower planning for the Navy is impracticable. For example, during Fiscal Year 1969, the Navy will have released about 30,000 enlisted personnel early to effect savings required in the MPN account as a response to the requirements of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968, Public Law 90-364. This produced by mid-year a serious deficit in personnel below authorized strength. This deficit was translated into personnel shortages for the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets of about 15,000 men each. Adequate manning of the Fleet, both in quality and numbers is of overwhelming importance to the readiness of the Navy. Not only does inadequate manning have a direct effect, as when in Fiscal Year 69 we have ships in temporarily reduced operational status, but it has far reaching effects on motivation and the morale of Navy people. Inadequate manning breeds frustrations, overwork, poor job satisfaction, and an unhealthy career environment. We will make all efforts to employ our personnel efficiently and to cut down on any over-manning. It is, however, counter-productive when it is necessary to reduce manning to the point that Navy people lose a necessary satisfaction in their work and face workloads with which they can never effectively cope.

Reserve Program. The Navy's selected reserve has a membership composed of about 38 percent non-rated and 62 percent Top Six personnel, that is, pay grade E-4 through E-9. This is very satisfying progress from a mix of about 70 percent non-rated and 30 percent Top Six of a few years ago. It is accounted for by the increased addition of veterans returning from active duty. We hope this trend continues since our mobilization requirements are largely for Petty Officers. At present, 85 percent of all reservists who go to active duty do so in the highest non-rated pay grade (E-3). This is a credit to the emphasis being placed on pre-active duty training within the reserve units themselves. Because of this emphasis, more of the men achieve petty officer status while on active duty, first-term reenlistments are favorably affected, and more combat and fleet-trained petty officers released from active duty become members of a trained Ready Reserve.

Funding Requirements -- RPN. The request for funding under the appropriation "Reserve Personnel, Navy", for Fiscal Year 70 is \$139,700,000. This amount will provide an average reserve strength in drill pay status of 129,000, adjusted to 128,053 to reflect the two CB Battalions now on active duty. It will also provide training tours for 3,350 personnel in non-drill pay status and 12,381 tours in essential schools and special training. This estimate also provides for an average of 10,006 regular and contract enrollees in the NROTC Program and for 1,914 students under instruction during the summer in the Reserve Officer Candidate (ROC) and Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate Programs.

Conclusion. This concludes my statement of our requirements for the two Military Personnel Appropriations--MPN and RPN.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Admiral Duncan, for a very enlightening statement.

#### INCREASE IN PERSONNEL

We note that for fiscal year 1970 you are projecting an increase in average strength of 10,300 man-years and an increase in year-end strength of 700. Can you explain how you determine your requirements for fiscal year 1970? Specifically we would like to know what rationale was used in determining this increase.

Admiral DUNCAN. As you note, Mr. Chairman, the increase in end strength was relatively small, about 700, and is related to increased pilot training, some increases in shipyards and supply corps procurement officers, enlarging the Judge Advocate General Corps, and the expansion of off-base housing referral service which assists military personnel in locating suitable housing.

#### INCREASE IN FLEET MANNING LEVELS

The increase in man-year average is tremendously important and one I hope the committee will see fit to approve. The 10,300 man-year average will permit us to man the fleet throughout the year at its authorized strength compared, as I mentioned in my statement, with this year when we were required to go about 30,000 short in the middle of the year.

Mr. ANDREWS. What percentage of your ships at sea are fully manned?

Admiral DUNCAN. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to reply in an inverse order and say that there are 40 ships in a reduced operational status.

Mr. ANDREWS. Forty in what status?

Admiral DUNCAN. Reduced operational status, having only about a third of their crew aboard.

The rest of the ships, to reply directly to your question, are slightly under allowance as determined by the fleet commanders on a priority basis to meet this shortage which I am encountering during the current fiscal year. The fleet commanders have to give priorities to their ships. For example, submarines will be fully manned. Amphibious ships will be less than fully manned. Ships back on the coast will be less than fully manned. Therefore, I could not give you the exact percentage figure but I would be glad to provide it to you.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about your ships in Southeast Asia, the 7th Fleet?

Admiral DUNCAN. We keep the ships in Southeast Asia at their normal allowance plus their augmented allowance for Southeast Asia which is above the peacetime allowance.

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you consider them to be fully manned?

Admiral DUNCAN. We consider them to be fully manned for the task at hand. There is a rather technical point that they are not at full wartime complement. However, they are at our required manning level; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. They meet the requirements suggested by the fleet commanders?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about the *New Jersey*? Was she ever fully manned?

Admiral DUNCAN. She was fully manned in a qualified sense, Mr. Chairman. She was manned for the mission assigned, that is, as a gun-fire support ship. She has an allowance of 1,626 and there are 1,622 aboard. That is not the full wartime complement, but it was adjudged sufficient for the task of bombarding in North and South Vietnam under the threat conditions existing; in other words, there was no submarine threat and only a potential air threat.

Mr. ANDREWS. The mission down there was not one of naval warfare in the sense that she had to protect herself against surface ships and aircraft?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What are the 40 ships that are one-third manned?

Admiral DUNCAN. I would like to give you the detailed list for the record, but there are destroyers, minesweepers, and we have some tenders which are partially manned; that is, their engineering crews have been reduced.

I would like to give you the exact list, if it is acceptable, for the record by name.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. And where they are?

Admiral DUNCAN. And where they are.

(The information was classified and supplied to the committee.)

Mr. LIPSCOMB. When was the last time they were fully manned? You can also do that for the record.

Admiral DUNCAN. I might say that the reduced operational status started well over a year ago when we were drawing down the Atlantic Fleet in senior petty officers and this caused a reduced operational status. Then just as they were about to get well the situation was continued because of our early release of 30,000 enlisted men and a reduction in the total strength of the Navy.

Mr. RHODES. Would you care to explain a little further the term "reduced operations?" I assume a destroyer with one-third of its normal complement would have almost no operational capability whatsoever. Is that an accurate assumption?

Admiral DUNCAN. It would have a capability to get underway for a short period, let us say during daylight hours. It would not have a capability to fight the ship.

They try to keep the ship maintained but, very frankly, one-third of the crew cannot keep the ship maintained properly.

Then if the crew were added there is quite a time period before she would be fully ready to fight.

Mr. RHODES. I cannot help but wonder about the economy of use of personnel in such a situation, whether it would not be more economical insofar as doing the best job you can with the available facilities to mothball more ships and concentrate your personnel in more effective units.

Admiral DUNCAN. We believe that the number of ships which are now allowed to the Navy, all of which have commitments, are best kept in a situation where they can be brought up as quickly as possible and put back on the line.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long would it take you to fully man a destroyer at sea today which is presently undermanned?

Admiral DUNCAN. If we had the petty officers and men to put in the ship, she would go through refresher training, which takes approximately 5 weeks, and we would be able to operate fairly efficiently as a unit. To gain her full effectiveness as a fleet unit, she would then want to go through a series of fleet exercises, gradually increasing her competence to work with other ships in a multithreat environment. Therefore, as a unit, 5 or 6 weeks are involved. To be really effective, it would take a series of exercises.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the reason for the undermanning of so many ships the fact that you do not have the personnel?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is correct.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who makes the determination of the strength of the Navy? Is it reviewed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

Admiral DUNCAN. Speaking of the current fiscal year, the end strength of the Navy would have been sufficient numerically to man the Navy that we are authorized.

As I mentioned, however, the reduction of funds available required us to have less men in the Navy than we were authorized, and this is the reason for the manning shortage in fleets.

Mr. ANDREWS. I do not think you answered the question, Admiral Duncan. Who makes the determination of the strength of the Navy?

Admiral DUNCAN. The determination of the strength of the Navy is made essentially at the Department of Defense level after we present and justify our requirements.

#### NAVY REQUEST FOR 1970

Mr. ANDREWS. You are requesting for "Military personnel, Navy," \$4.526 billion, in the fiscal year 1970 budget, which is before us at this time. What amount did you originally request from DOD as compared to the \$4.526 billion figure?

Admiral DUNCAN. We requested originally \$4,675,500,000 and a total end strength of 819,806 men.

Mr. ANDREWS. So you were reduced by DOD \$149 million and how many men?

Admiral DUNCAN. In the process of the preparation of the budget, Mr. Chairman, the requirements were reduced and the figure of 771,103 was agreed on in view of the reduced requirements.

To answer specifically it was 48,703 men less than originally requested.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, they Navy requested more dollars and more men, but your original request was reduced by the Department of Defense?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. The Navy's initial judgment was higher than the budget which appears before us today.

Admiral DUNCAN. The Navy's original request was higher.

Mr. ANDREWS. I assume they are the same.

#### EARLY RELEASE OF 2-YEAR ENLISTEES IN FISCAL YEAR 1969

Mr. RHODES. You mentioned the 30,000 men who were released before their time elapsed. Whose idea was it to release these men?

Admiral DUNCAN. As a result of the Revenue and Expenditure Act of 1968, the Navy was required to reduce expenditures roughly by \$1 billion. The assessment on the military personnel account was \$105 million. This reduction was finalized late in the first quarter of fiscal year 1969.

In order to do this we considered several alternatives. You can save money in various ways—such as by not taking people in, by letting more senior people go, these are the more skilled people, and by delaying promotions.

After looking at all these different methods we decided that the way which would have least detrimental effect on the readiness of the fleet and from which we could recover the quickest was to let the 2-year men go. Therefore, we allowed 30,000 men on a 2-year active duty enlistment go home early, and we are now recruiting to meet our end strength by June 30 of this coming year.

#### MOTHBALLING AND REACTIVATION COMPARED TO OPERATING AT REDUCED OPERATIONAL STATUS

Mr. RHODES. To start on another line now but related, how long does it take to mothball a destroyer, for example?

Admiral DUNCAN. I would have to furnish you the exact time for the record. Each ship has a specified time period and crew, and the crew is phased down in order to see that that ship is laid up properly.

I would like if I may to furnish the exact months in the record.

Mr. RHODES. If you would, and also a related study as to how long it takes to get it out of mothballs.

Admiral DUNCAN. Very well.

Admiral GADDIS can answer some of that.

Admiral GADDIS. I put a squadron of destroyers out of commission at one time. It takes approximately 3 months time to put a destroyer out of commission.

As far as returning a ship from mothball condition to active operational condition you would add approximately 3 months to the figures cited by Admiral Duncan before as phaseup in training, and so forth. This involves demothballing, assembling the crew, assembling your outfit of equipment, and getting ready for refresher training.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many months?

Admiral GADDIS. About 3 months additional to the time Admiral Duncan cited for the training and readiness preparation of the crew.

Mr. RHODES. When you take a ship out of mothballs is it necessary to have the crew available at the time that you begin the mothball process? Do you have the crew assembled first or do you have the initial work done by other people who are perhaps employees of the Navy Yard or civilians who are land-based?

Admiral DUNCAN. You should have the crew assembled first because they need to go through various schools just as in a ship which is building and to assemble themselves as a crew and to be organized as a crew and ready to go aboard.

Mr. RHODES. You have a certain amount of leadtime from a man coming from civilian life to the Navy.

Assuming a program of this type don't you have a certain leadtime

before a new man would be ready to actually be part of the crew, a training period for the individual?

Admiral DUNCAN. If we were to man this ship out of mothballs from within the Navy, drawing down the rest of the Navy to man her, we would get a fair percentage of experienced people.

If there were any substantial commissioning of ships, naturally we would rely on a callup of Reserves.

Mr. RHODES. What I am trying to arrive at is a study as to whether or not it would be better and more economical to actually mothball some of these units rather than to operate on the basis of one-third strength which, after all, leaves a ship in a position where it cannot fight, and really can do nothing except, perhaps, keep itself afloat.

I am thinking now not only in terms of economy with the dollar sign but with a man-hours sign, also.

How did you come to the conclusion that it would be better to operate these ships as you are doing it than it would be to mothball them?

Admiral DUNCAN. This is a very important point, sir. We would in general certainly like to operate our ships properly manned for all of the reasons that all of us know.

#### MANNING LEVELS IN FISCAL YEARS 1968, 1969, AND 1970

In this particular case, and the important point I was trying to make, we had been given the authorized strength but I did not have sufficient funds in the MPN budget to hire the men. Therefore, since these ships will return to operational status during fiscal year 1970, assuming approval of our 1970 fund request, we did not consider that it would be profitable to mothball them in fiscal year 1969 and return them to the fleets in 1970.

Mr. RHODES. You think the budget which has been submitted to the Congress now is sufficient to bring these 40 ships you were talking about when Mr. Lipscomb was questioning you up to operating strength?

Admiral DUNCAN. Absolutely.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Admiral, this testimony sounds so familiar. A year ago in the hearings there were 49 Atlantic ships laid up or placed on caretaker basis. This is in the testimony on page 251.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Then on page 252 I asked "What plans are there in existence, or what plans do you have for correcting the situation?" This is exactly the question Mr. Rhodes asked.

In the testimony we have Admiral Strean said, "I believe this will take care of itself by June by the increased quality which we will get from added promotions in the top six petty officer categories."

You used the month "June" again a moment ago.

Then I say "Apparently this all happened because of the loss of about 3,700 petty officers and 2,500 enlisted men who were transferred. You mean you will correct this in June?"

Admiral Strean said "Starting in June we will correct this according to plan. This was a drawdown because of the requirements of Southeast Asia in what we call program 5."

Then it tells in this testimony, and you can check it, exactly what

you said here today again—that there was adequate funding in the fiscal year 1969 budget and that by November these ships would be adequately staffed.

Now you are telling us the same story. I think it deserves an explanation as to what the problem is. Evidently we appropriated sufficient funds. You were going to have promotions. The ships were supposed to be brought up to strength in June or at the latest November, and here we have the same identical testimony again, and this is just in the Atlantic.

Admiral DUNCAN. The initial reduced operational status which existed at the time Admiral Strean was testifying was caused by the drawdown of senior petty officers for Vietnam. There was a great call for enginemen, boatswain mates, and related ratings. They were in reduced status because of the lack of senior petty officers, and he was predicting, and we all predicted, that we could repair this.

In the meantime what we call Project 693 caused a numerical reduction which is now the cause of the ships stood down.

With your permission I would like to show a chart which illustrates this. May I do this?

This is actually just a chart we use in the Bureau of Naval Personnel to measure our performance against planned strengths. I thought it would illustrate just this point because I thought perhaps you would be concerned.

This is the start of the year and it goes through the fiscal year.

When Admiral Strean was testifying last year the ships were stood down, due not to a numerical shortage, but to a qualitative senior petty officer shortage.

We thought we would be well by November of fiscal year 1969. However with the \$105 million reduction, it was necessary to plan our monthly personnel strength as indicated on the lower line. To reach the planned levels, and save the necessary man-years, the early release of 30,000 men was required. We released these men and then started recruiting as fast as we could to come up to our approved strength at the end of the year. The authorized end strength was all right; but we did not have the people on board during the fiscal year. All of these people were missing, and this saved a large part of the \$105 million.

Now we are in a numerical bind, if you will, opposite to the situation when Admiral Strean was speaking to you.

If we had not had this numerical reduction I think we could confidently say that most of the 40 ships would not have been in a reduced operational status. I don't know whether all of them would have been returned to a full operational status.

Mr. RHODES. You lost 30,000 people. You have an increase of 10,000 in 1970. I am a little bit at a loss to know how these 10,000 will take the place of 30,000 to put the ships back into commission.

Admiral DUNCAN. They are two slightly different things. This loss was required by a specific reduction in the budget during the year. I was especially trying to make the point that I am very pleased and hopeful for the man-year average and the funding which OSD approved for the coming year because it allows us to go from beginning strength to end strength with the proper man-year level. In other words, we don't get the necessary funding, let us say, we would not be able to man during the year at an authorized level but would come down to somewhere below our requirements.

This is a very unsatisfactory situation which you see here. We would rather that the man-year average approximate a straight line between the beginning and end strength.

ALLOCATION OF 1960 APPROPRIATION REDUCTIONS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If we funded for adequate personnel what happened to the funds which we appropriated? How were they utilized?

Admiral DUNCAN. There was during the roughly \$1 billion cut, a reduction of \$105 million to this appropriation account.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What happened to it?

Admiral DUNCAN. It was not appropriated. Admiral Gaddis, as the Navy budget officer, can substantiate that. When the appropriation act was finally passed the money was not in the appropriation.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is that correct? How much did Congress cut your appropriation in "Military personnel"?

Admiral GADDIS. The "Military personnel" appropriation was recommended for a \$90 million reduction by this committee, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In what areas?

Admiral GADDIS. Merely as a gross reduction, citing certain interests of the committee, but there were no specific reductions in any budget activity.

This basically resulted from compliance with the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act because the recommended reduction, which Admiral Duncan has referred to as Project 693, at that time was between \$85 million and \$90 million.

Additionally, after this committee acted on the bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended an additional decrease of \$15 million to a total of \$105 million. This is the number Admiral Duncan has spoken of. Therefore you can say that the appropriation bill was \$105 million below the request.

However, I would offer that it was not specifically reduced because of committee action alone but because of the knowledge of and reaction to the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act at the time, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You are talking about two things. Congress reduced military personnel for some suggested reasons which we outlined in our report.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Now before the committee you have also said that it was reduced because of the Revenue and Expenditure Limitation Act.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. But altogether you reduced the amount by \$105 million.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir; with no reduction by the Congress, sir, of the allowed personnel strength. This is what Admiral Duncan speaks of when he speaks of taking actions to save money, by going well below the allowed strengths at various times during the year.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Which did you finally use, the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act or did you use the cut made by the committee?

Admiral GADDIS. The cuts made by the two committees totaling \$105 million. These were all of the cuts made under the Revenue and Expenditures Control Act by the service. No additional cuts were taken. Is that right, sir?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right, in this account.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did you release the 30,000 men because of the cut of the committee?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir, as our choice of how to take a part of that dollar reduction.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So \$90 million you attributed to the congressional cut and \$15 million you attributed to the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act?

Admiral GADDIS. Both cuts, sir, were made by congressional committees and agreed to in the final bill, a total of \$105 million.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So you did nothing in personnel because of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act?

Admiral GADDIS. Only in so far as our actions in response to that act were communicated to the Congress, sir, and were contributory to that cut.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I know the record is getting confused but you are talking about two different acts, the Appropriations Act and one action, the cut of 30,000 men and \$105 million.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You cannot take it from both places. You were authorized and we appropriated \$105 million, evidently less than you requested.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That was the Appropriation Act.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Why do you keep talking about the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act? That was a separate act in itself. Am I to assume that you took no action in Military Personnel, Navy because of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act?

Admiral GADDIS. No action beyond that taken by the Congress. That is correct.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Under the Appropriation Act?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So when I asked the question what happened to the funds that were withdrawn or retained under the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act, you had none.

Admiral GADDIS. No separate action beyond the Appropriation Act. That is correct, sir. However, in coming to the total reduction within the services, the reductions to the budget request made in the Appropriations Act, were credited against the Revenue and Expenditures Control Act.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Under that last law you either rescind the funds or you reapply them to Southeast Asia.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You had none.

Admiral GADDIS. In this appropriation we had none. That is correct.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So you did nothing with the funds?

Admiral GADDIS. That is right.

#### COMPLIANCE WITH COMMITTEE REPORT

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Because you had none. It took a long time to get that. Now you say because of the actions of Congress that you had to cut 30,000 personnel. Was there any consideration given to the likely tar-

gets suggested by this committee on economy action? One area suggested was numbers of personnel assigned to public affairs, public relations and public information activities. Still other suggested areas in which economies should be required in the use of military personnel were reductions in the numbers assigned relating to communications services and intelligence services. Those areas also involve civilian personnel and are more fully discussed in other sections of our report.

Was there any consideration given to any of those areas?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, indeed. We have looked at them and are looking at them very carefully. In some areas we have made some progress and in other areas we have not. In the area of reducing the headquarters personnel there is currently in process about a 9-percent reduction in headquarters personnel in Europe.

We looked very carefully at the area of decreasing duty rotation and permanent change of station frequency and in this fiscal year 1969 actually it is probably the highest year we have had because, in addition to the normal rotation, a large part of the 30,000 men would not have gone out this year so there was an additive amount. In addition, Project 693, of which we have spoken, resulted in 52 ships being inactivated. These were not in the plan. So a large proportion of those men were transferred. The permanent change of station moves this year have gone up.

I would like to say, though, that we are looking at this very carefully and you may note in the budget that we are asking for \$9.4 million less in 1970 than we did in 1969.

As to the number of people in communications, actually the number of requests for communications people are continuing to go up. It is getting much more complex, and from my recent sea experience I can assure you, and this is my opinion, that the number of people desired may well go up because when we go to sea our communications personnel usually go on watch and watch; that is, they are on watch 12 hours a day, 7 days a week at sea. We have looked at each item you have suggested to us carefully.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Could you, for the record tell us what you did in following the suggestion of the committee with regard to personnel assigned to public affairs, public information activities, and so on?

Admiral DUNCAN. The total number of people has not been reduced. I will give you the actual numbers now assigned and assigned previously for the record.

(The information follows:)

#### MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

The number of military personnel assigned to public affairs for the Navy on June 30, 1968 was 996. As of December 31, 1968, the number assigned had decreased to 971. These numbers include officers designated for special duty in the field of public affairs and the specialized supporting enlisted rating of journalist.

The number of Navy personnel assigned in communications services for the Navy as of June 30, 1968, was 40,937. As of December 31, 1968, this number was 38,587. Included in this number were those officers designated for special duty in the field of Communications or cryptology as well as the directly associated enlisted rating skills of radiomen, communications technicians, and communications yeomen. A considerable proportion of these personnel were in the operating fleet which have integral communications organizations.

In the area of intelligence services, as of June 30, 1968, 1,856 Navy personnel were assigned. For the same group, as of December 31, 1968, 1,947 were assigned.

These numbers include those officers designated for special duty in the field of intelligence, and their associate supporting enlisted rating skills of photographic intelligencemen and yeomen specially trained for assignment to intelligence duties.

While the above numbers identify those military personnel specially designated for duty in their associated areas, the Navy does detail other personnel, both officer and enlisted, to perform tours of duty in these areas also.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Would I be correct in assuming that even with the cut of \$105 million you have absorbed that you did nothing in these three areas?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The number of permanent change of station moves went up. We are reducing headquarters people in Europe. The changes in the public affairs-public relations manning would be a minor thing at best. I would have to furnish them for the record. It is nothing substantial. I believe it is on the order of 1,200. I will have to verify that number.

I understand it is about 1,200 people assigned to public affairs-public relations.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** And public information?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** Yes, sir.

#### SHIPS DEACTIVATED IN FISCAL YEAR 1969

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** How many ships were planned to be deactivated in fiscal year 1969?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** Fifty-two ships were ordered removed from active service as a result of the \$1 billion reduction, most of which were not in the plan.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Would you mind backing up a moment? I asked how many ships were planned to be deactivated in fiscal year 1969? That is, what was the original plan as submitted in the budget?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** We were to go from 932 ships to 958 ships as planned in the fiscal year 1969 budget for a net increase of 26.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** And you had 26 ships to be deactivated?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** No sir; we had 33 ships so planned. We had planned a net increase of 26 ships for fiscal year 1969. This net increase resulted from the planned additional 59 ships offset by the loss of 33 ships. With the additional loss of 52 resulting from Project 693, we now will have a loss of 85 ships in fiscal year 1969. Additionally, the time frame for effecting these losses is important to us.

Usually a ship will be retained if she is doing a useful job as long as possible within the year, or if she is being put out as the result of a new ship coming in she will be held on until the new ship is fully operative.

In order to save funds, naturally we tried, especially the personnel people, to have these ships removed from active service as early in the year as possible in order to save funds. In other words, the plan may have been that the action be taken in June and we suggested that they be deactivated earlier in October.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** The original budget submission, then, anticipated 33 ships to be deactivated, and that would also have the anticipated personnel actions as submitted in fiscal year 1969 budget?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** Yes, it would have.

## ACTION TAKEN BY NAVY TO MEET FUNDING REDUCTIONS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I do not remember at the time we made our reduction in the fiscal year 1969 budget request that the action would have been as drastic as the Navy has been required to take. There has been the release prematurely of 30,000 personnel. We went over this carefully with the Secretary of Defense and with the Comptroller's Office several times before we took our action, and I do not remember any word, that I had, anyway, that any action as drastic as you subsequently took would have been necessary.

Admiral DUNCAN. I did not mean to imply that the committee intended that certain actions be taken. It is my understanding that each military department was required to reduce the submitted budget by about a billion dollars, and many things that from our standpoint were very difficult to do were done. This is one of the actions taken. There were many other actions to which Admiral Gaddis might speak, which were taken during this billion dollar reduction of the submitted budget.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If because of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act you had to go beyond what the committee required, I would understand it better; but, as has been testified, you took the action because of what the Congress did.

Admiral GADDIS. There were no dollar reductions beyond those taken in the appropriation bill, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I do not understand that.

Admiral DUNCAN. To take \$105 million from the planned appropriation for MPN would require drastic action at any time. It was a question of which way was best for the Navy to do it.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I still say at no time was it brought to our attention that our action would require a 30,000 prerelease of personnel. At no time. It would have been a questionable action, in my view, as is shown by your testimony today, because you are coming back for an additional 10,000, in order to add 10,000. It would have been much more efficient and less expensive and better operating procedure to keep 20,000 on—

Admiral DUNCAN. I would agree.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Than to run the Navy this way. You would have retained experienced personnel. They would have been more experienced today. I just do not understand that way of running things.

Mr. DAVIS. On that point, the chart which you have shown us indicated that you had some arbitrary funding problems at a time when one of your biggest problems was retaining experienced and trained personnel. With early release of experienced personnel, with acceleration of release, then the chart shows a sharp acceleration of recruitment of untrained personnel in order to bring you up to a body level at the end of the year. This is the real heart of the thing which I get from Mr. Lipscomb's questions. I am wondering where the decision was made to meet the funding requirement in that manner, which seems to be so derogatory of your operational requirements.

Admiral DUNCAN. There are two considerations there. One is that if we reduced the input we would have to reduce in man-months about twice the number of recruits that we reduced in what we call the 2 by 6 category, or the men enlisted for 2 years. They were primarily the pay

grades E-3 and E-4. I would have had to reduce roughly three times the number of recruit inputs. This would have been very bad for the future of the Navy, because all of the normal recruit input is for a 4-year enlistment.

The recruit input provides a normal training base for the petty officers of the future. In our opinion, it would have been unwise to drastically decrease the recruit input.

Mr. DAVIS. In effect, what you did was to sacrifice current effectiveness in order to provide a base for more effective operations in the future?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir, essentially to take it and get it over with and to obviate the necessity of releasing a greater number of personnel later in the fiscal year.

Mr. RHODES. How many earlier releases do you expect to effect in fiscal 1970?

Admiral DUNCAN. We do not expect any program similar to this. We have normal programs which run all the time. We have a Christmas early release program starting roughly within the month before Christmas, for those whose time is up in early January. We have a college release program for men who are accepted for college and have only a month or so to go. Men coming back from Vietnam may be released early. But nothing of this nature at all. These are continuing programs.

Mr. RHODES. Then the cut of 30,000, according to the testimony as I now understand it, must have come primarily from the work of this subcommittee. Did you in your testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense tell them that the effect of the House cut would be to reduce personnel or to cause 30,000 early releases? Was this done?

Admiral DUNCAN. Of course, I have only read over the testimony. I do not recall that it was done. The Senate applied an additional \$15 million cut, separate from the House cut.

Mr. RHODES. This is a strange way to run the Navy. If I had known, as one member, that this would have the effect which it had, of mothballing 50 ships and putting 40 more in a state of ineffectiveness, I would not have been for the cut. I am amazed that we were not told this would be the effect.

Admiral DUNCAN. May I stress one thing, sir. The mothballing or inactivation of 50 ships was related to other cuts, rather than just personnel; 19,000 people were involved in the force reduction.

Mr. RHODES. But the 40 ships in the Atlantic Fleet were related to this. What about the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral DUNCAN. There were several in the Pacific.

Mr. RHODES. How many?

Admiral DUNCAN. Four.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. There were 49 ships that were one-third manned last year.

Mr. RHODES. Are the 40 that are now partially manned the same ships as the 49 that were partially manned 2 years ago?

Admiral DUNCAN. Not necessarily, no. Some have gone into yard overhaul and come out and been manned, and others have taken their place.

Mr. RHODES. To me, it is a less than satisfactory way to run the Navy. I am sorry it was done this way.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, last year you had a \$105 million cut in "Military Personnel, Navy." In the face of that cut, you felt it mandatory to reduce your strength, and that accounts for the 30,000 early discharges.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes.

#### ACCESSIONS

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Duncan, how many accessions does the Navy estimate for fiscal year 1969 and 1970 and, of this number, how many will be officers and how many will be enlisted men.

Admiral DUNCAN. The number of accessions for 1969 will be fairly high because of the matters that we have discussed. The accessions for 1969 in officers are 12,318. The number of accessions for officers in 1970, is 13,778. The number of net accessions in 1969 for enlisted men is 186,995; and for 1970, 163,891 men.

#### INCREASED FUNDS REQUESTED FOR 1970

Mr. ANDREWS. For "Military personnel, Navy," you are requesting \$4.526 million. This is an increase of \$291 million over the amount appropriated for fiscal year 1969. Can you give us an explanation for the reason for this increase, other than what you have already discussed?

Admiral DUNCAN. The primary reason for the increase is the increased man-year average which we are asking for. In addition, there is an increase in actual numbers of somewhat less than 1,000.

#### AVERAGE STRENGTH BY GRADE

Mr. ANDREWS. The funds being requested for 1970 are to support an average strength of 770,603. The average strength is broken out by grade on pages 14 and 15 of the justification book. How did the Navy arrive at the estimated average strength, per grade, for fiscal year 1970?

Admiral DUNCAN. On the enlisted side, Mr. Chairman, the grade distribution is specified by agreement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for all services. In the particular case of the Navy, we are not able to meet qualitatively our entire requirements, but we are permitted to go to 406,000 petty officers, which is what we think we can do with quality, and it approaches our requirements in petty officers within about 2 percent.

In officers, we are governed, as you know, by laws and ceilings according to the ranks.

#### SHORTAGE OF LINE LIEUTENANT COMMANDERS

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2 of your statement you refer to the fact that you continue to have a shortage of surface line officers in the grades of lieutenant commander and above, with an overage in the grades of ensign and lieutenant (junior grade). Would you explain that a little more in detail?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes. The retention rate in the years past for surface line officers has been the lowest of any of what we call communities

or groups. It has run around 20 to 23 percent. So, we have deficiencies because of this lack of retention in the lieutenant commander bracket, for example. We make this up by procuring more ensigns and they, of course, stay on for 3 years, on the average, and become lieutenants (junior grade). We have an overage in ensigns and lieutenants (junior grade) to take care of the deficit in the higher grades.

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 1-15 of the justification book, we note that the estimated average number of line lieutenant commanders for 1970 is 10,705. This number is about 17.8 percent of the total estimated officer corps. Would not this number and percentage of lieutenant commanders appear to be reasonable in relation to the total officer strength?

Admiral DUNCAN. I am not sure that I understood your question. The number of surface line officers required are computed as the total of the billets written.

Mr. ANDREWS. The justification shows that the number of lieutenant commanders for the line is 10,705, which is 17.8 percent of the total. The question is: Do you have a shortage of lieutenant commanders?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; but it varies with communities, Mr. Chairman. The shortage of which we are speaking is in the surface line lieutenant commanders.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is what we are talking about, the figures on page 1-15. You have listed, "Line officers, lieutenant commanders, 10,705," which is 17.8 percent of the total. The question is: Is that a sufficient number in relation to the total number of officers you have?

Admiral DUNCAN. Overall, in lieutenant commanders we have no substantial shortage.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, your shortage is down in the ensign, and, junior grade lieutenants.

Admiral DUNCAN. We make up the shortages by having more ensigns than we need.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have mentioned the problem you have in the retention of junior grade officers. That has been a problem which the Navy has had for many years. I do not know how you can correct it. You have made certain suggestions. Many of those suggestions have been followed by the Congress. I do not know that we can ever get an adequate amount of housing, but we try to.

I was thinking if a man reaches the rank of lieutenant commander and above, he has been in the Navy long enough to like it and to want to make it a career, but until he reaches that level of commission, he often becomes dissatisfied and gets out.

You mention on page 2 that, despite our general successes in initial officer procurement, we continue to have a shortage of surface line officers in the grades of lieutenant commander and above, with an overage in the grades of ensign and lieutenant (junior grade). Back to the question, your record shows that the planned average strength for fiscal 1970 is 10,705 lieutenant commanders in the line, which is 17.8 percent of the total officer strength. Our question, in light of those figures, is: Would not this number and percentage of lieutenant commanders appear to be reasonable in relation to the total officer strength?

Admiral DUNCAN. The overall number is reasonable, Mr. Chairman. We have a shortage of surface lieutenant commanders. Our figures show, 1,435 shortage of lieutenant commanders in the surface line as of November 30, 1968.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have a shortage of 1,400?

Admiral DUNCAN. 1,435, which we make up for, of course, by ensigns and lieutenants (junior grade).

#### PILOT CANDIDATE RECRUITMENT DIFFICULTIES

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2 of your statement you refer to the fact that although recruitment of enough highly qualified individuals to meet naval aviation requirements continues to be extremely difficult, you are increasing pilot training rates to fulfill requirements.

If you are having difficulty finding qualified candidates, how are you able to increase the number of pilot trainees?

Admiral DUNCAN. We are putting a terrific amount of effort on this, Mr. Chairman. That is why we say it is difficult. We are having people at the officer candidate school at Newport in effect stand in line—as you know, we take only about seven out of 100—while for the aviation officer candidate program we are barely able to meet our quota. That is why I mentioned it is very difficult.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long have you had that problem with respect to applicants for naval aviation training?

Admiral DUNCAN. It has gone up and down, naturally, as our requirements have gone up and down and as the retention rate varies. Several years ago we retained about 60 percent of our pilots at the point at which we measured retention. That has dropped to about 36 percent. At the same time, we have set a basic standard of a baccalaureate degree for all inputs, for all officers of the Navy, insofar as we can maintain it. So, we are trying to increase the pilot training rate with very highly qualified men, and it is a very difficult thing to do. We put terrific effort in on this.

#### PILOT TRAINING

Mr. ANDREWS. At how many schools do you initiate naval aviation training?

Admiral DUNCAN. All of our basic naval aviation training is started at Pensacola. We do have certain other training which I do not believe could be counted as training for naval aviators. It is more in the nature of motivating and screening. For example, in our NROTC we have a rather short curriculum.

Mr. ANDREWS. But you pilots go through Pensacola?

Admiral DUNCAN. Exactly.

Mr. ANDREWS. How often do you have a class down there? Do you have a class every month? How often do you start a class through initially?

Admiral DUNCAN. Every week.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you getting enough students to keep the classes up to the required number, or do you have some understrength?

Admiral DUNCAN. Until the first part of this year, we were meeting the numbers. We are very slightly under now, but not seriously under. We hope to make it up by June.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long does it take from the day he enters as a cadet for a naval aviation trainee to become a pilot?

Admiral DUNCAN. About 18 months.

Mr. ANDREWS. During that time, he goes to any number of schools?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What percentage of the cadets who enter the class go through to completion and become pilots?

Admiral DUNCAN. The attrition that we have experienced has been something on the order of 25 percent. As you know, this changes somewhat by source, that is, some sources have a higher attrition than others, but the average has been about 25-percent attrition.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, you get 75 percent of the original class as pilots.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. In fiscal year 1970, you plan to increase the pilot training rate to 2,200 as compared to 1,800 in fiscal year 1969. You state this increase in pilot output will contribute significantly in reducing the numerical shortage toward the fiscal year 1971 goal of inventory equaling requirements. Would you please tell us what your 1971 goal is, the total number of pilots included in the 1970 budget, and your current strength?

Admiral DUNCAN. The current strength is 15,322.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have that many pilots?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the total number of pilots included in the 1970 budget?

Admiral DUNCAN. 15,659, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many do you plan to train in fiscal year 1970?

Admiral DUNCAN. In fiscal year 1970, we plan to train 2,200 as the Navy portion of the total pilot training rate at Pensacola. As you know, we train others than Navy.

Mr. ANDREWS. The record on page 1-4-9 under operation and maintenance, projects a total for fiscal year 1970 of all type pilots as 2,860.

Admiral GADDIS. 2,200 is the Navy officer portion of that.

Mr. ANDREWS. I see. If history repeats, you will get 75 percent of that total at the end of the course.

Admiral DUNCAN. No; the 2,200 is the output.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have to train more pilots than that?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, we put more in.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. On pilot training, what happened in fiscal year 1969? We understood from testimony last year that the Navy pilot training rate was being expanded, and that the Navy requested and OSD approved a 2,573 pilot training rate for fiscal year 1969. I understand from your testimony that you anticipate only 1,800.

Admiral DUNCAN. That is the Navy proportion of the pilot training rate. There are, as you know, the Marines, Coast Guard, and I believe some foreign officers. There are others trained there in addition to Navy pilots.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What is the situation in regard to the 2,573 training rate for fiscal year 1969?

Admiral GADDIS. The fiscal year pilot training rate now approved by OSD and planned by the Navy is 2,525 pilots. This includes 1,800 Navy, 625 Marines, 50 Coast Guard, and 50 foreign (MAP) pilots. Production to date indicates these goals will be achieved.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Would the plan for fiscal year 1969 come up to the 2,573 pilot training rate?

Admiral GADDIS. The Navy's pilot training rate is for 2,525 pilots in fiscal year 1969. There are, however, additional pilots being trained by other services, principally Marine Corps helicopter pilots being trained by the Army which when added to Navy's PTR will exceed the pilot training rate of 2,573.

#### EFFECT OF DRAFT ON ENLISTMENTS

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 3 you state that voluntary enlistments have remained excellent in quantity during the past year as a result of draft pressure. We note that you also made a similar statement in connection with procurement of new officers. What would the effect be on voluntary enlistments if the draft were eliminated or seriously curtailed?

Admiral DUNCAN. I would estimate that if the draft were eliminated or seriously curtailed, it would drastically reduce enlistments.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the Navy take any draftees?

Admiral DUNCAN. The Navy does not take any draftees.

Mr. ANDREWS. But the draft has a way of affecting your enlistment rate?

Admiral DUNCAN. It does.

#### DESERTIONS FROM NAVY

Mr. ANDREWS. The Army told us they had had a very bad year as far as desertions are concerned—53,000, if I remember correctly, in the year 1968. What has been the experience of the Navy with AWOL and desertions in the calendar year 1968?

Admiral DUNCAN. We have had no increase in desertions. We have run along about the same.

Mr. ANDREWS. Supply something for the record in that connection, please.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The following data indicating decreasing trends in the Navy for AWOL's and deserters are provided:

Unauthorized absence (AWOL):	
Fiscal year 1967.....	14, 810
Fiscal year 1968.....	9, 580
Deserters:	
Fiscal year 1967.....	6, 416
Fiscal year 1968.....	5, 651

In fiscal year 1968 the average daily AWOL rate was 26, with each member being absent on an average of 8 days. Additionally, on an average day, there were 208 members in an AWOL status.

In fiscal year 1968 the average daily deserter rate was 10, with the individual deserter being at large for an average of 932 days. As of 31 December 1968, there were 1,403 deserters at large.

## VARIABLE REENLISTMENT BONUSES AND PROFICIENCY PAY

**Mr. ANDREWS.** On page 3 you state that you have realized some improvement in career manning levels by continuing several incentive programs, such as the variable reenlistment bonus, proficiency pay, and programs which offer advanced technical training in return for increased service obligation. However, on page 32 of your budget justification book we note that you are planning to decrease the number of enlisted personnel drawing proficiency pay in 1970 by almost 7,000.

Why are you reducing the number to receive proficiency pay?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The number receiving variable reenlistment bonuses goes up some, and there is a high relation between variable reenlistment bonus and proficiency pay. I would like to ask Admiral Crutchfield if he has anything to add to that.

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** The pro pay and the VRB both are controlled by guidelines which are provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. There is interplay back and forth between the Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense as to certain levels of pro pay and VRB. These are the ones that conform to the guidelines which have been laid down.

In general, there is a tendency to reduce pro pay as an incentive and to upgrade variable reenlistment bonuses. The trend is in that direction, as indicated and directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the reenlistment bonus now in the Navy?

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** It varies, depending upon the particular rate, and it is done on the basis of multiples. For the highest multiple it could be as much rate as approximately \$10,000 for a 6-year reenlistment in one of the highly technical, scarce rates.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Technicians.

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** We are talking about electronics—

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You have had that program for some time, Admiral Crutchfield. Do you find it economical to the Navy to follow that policy?

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** Yes, sir. We find it is very effective, and we think it is an economical program to get additional enlistments.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** It is one way that you have to compete with private industry, is that not correct?

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** Yes, sir; and we can apply it in specific areas in which we are having the most difficulty.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do you pay a bonus to a sailor who has no special skill, to reenlist?

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** No, sir; we do not pay any bonus other than the normal reenlistment bonus.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** That is what I am talking about, the reenlistment bonus.

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** We do pay a small reenlistment bonus, and have done so for many years.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What does it amount to?

**Admiral CRUTCHFIELD.** I would have to get it for the record.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Put something in the record about what the bonus is for reenlistment.

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The total amount over a service career is limited

to \$2,000, which he receives at different reenlistments according to rate and the length of time he reenlists for.

(The information follows:)

A member in the Regular Navy who reenlists and is entitled to the normal reenlistment bonus receives an amount computed by multiplying all or a portion of his monthly basic pay by the number of years specified in his reenlistment contract. For his first reenlistment the bonus is computed using all of the monthly basic pay to which the member is entitled at the time he reenlists. For the second reenlistment, two-thirds of his monthly basic pay is used; for the third, one-third is used; and for the fourth and subsequent reenlistments, one-sixth is used. However, the cumulative total of all normal reenlistment bonuses paid may not exceed \$2,000.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You think those programs have been helpful in helping you to retain men whom you would have lost otherwise?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** In my opinion, Mr. Chairman, we would be in extremis if it were not for the variable reenlistment and proficiency pay situation. They have been very productive in increasing our retention of highly skilled people.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How many received the maximum variable reenlistment bonus last year? Do you have that figure? If not, put something in the record on it.

**Admiral DUNCAN.** I would like to furnish that for the record, Mr. Chairman.

(The information follows:)

During fiscal year 1968, the average variable reenlistment bonus payment for all four multiple levels was approximately \$3,700. The average amount paid at the maximum multiple level (four times the normal bonus) was about \$5,500. Additionally, about 100 of our reenlistees received the maximum variable reenlistment bonus awardable (\$8,000) which, when combined with the maximum normal reenlistment bonus of \$2,000 equates to the maximum of \$10,000.

#### REDUCTION IN PROFICIENCY PAY

**Mr. ANDREWS.** We note you are reducing the number to receive proficiency pay. Will this not have an adverse effect on your reenlistment rate?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** As Admiral Crutchfield said, there is a relation between the variable reenlistment bonus and proficiency pay and which should be used. We are asking for permission to give more lump sum payments in the variable reenlistment bonus. We think this will help. I would say that with the two combined, variable reenlistment bonus and proficiency pay, I hope we will be able to maintain the present advantages of the system.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Admiral, in your discussion concerning your reenlistment rate, you state that the enlisted rate has dropped year by year until your first-term reenlistment rate is now at about the 1957 level.

Information supplied the committee substantiates this fact. However, we note on page 32 of your justification book you show an increase of 4,000 in the number of enlistees to receive a reenlistment bonus. In the fact sheet supplied the committee, there is shown an increase of only 959. Why are you asking funds for the additional 3,000?

Admiral DUNCAN. We are asking for additional funds for variable reenlistment bonus because we have rating groups that are short, and we have gotten permission from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to extend the number to whom we apply the variable reenlistment bonus.

#### RESIGNATION OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINE OFFICERS

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 6 of your statement you discuss the very serious problem with regard to nuclear submarine officer resignations. To what do you attribute the substantial increase in resignations? Is it perhaps a result of the loss of the *Thresher* and the *Scorpion*?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, I would not judge that it has a direct relation to the loss of the *Thresher* and the *Scorpion*. It is more directly related to the fact, as I mentioned, that these are extremely highly qualified officers. We have not met our input quota for several years. So, we have an inventory that does not permit us to have a good career pattern for these young men. They work extremely hard. They meet very high qualifications. We do not have sufficient numbers to allow them to go to postgraduate school, to duty on staffs, to duty in Washington, and other duties, to broaden their career. As you know, sea duty is arduous in any circumstances. For example, in Polaris submarines, they are totally isolated for 60 days while they are at sea. They do not get any mail. They have no way to communicate with their families. If something happens to their families, they cannot get back. It is very confining and isolated. It is a very strange environment.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you still have the blue and gold teams that alternate?

Admiral DUNCAN. We do for the Polaris submarines.

Mr. ANDREWS. So about the only thing that keeps a man in that type of service is love for that type of service.

Admiral DUNCAN. We have many good things about this program, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure they are appreciated—the very best of equipment, the best of training, an extremely important mission for the country. We feel we have to change the conditions of service.

Mr. ANDREWS. How much additional pay do the Polaris submarine people get?

Admiral DUNCAN. All those on submarine duty get additional pay according to rank. Submarine pay is hazardous duty pay and is the same as aviation pay. For example, a lieutenant with over 4 and under 7 years service would get \$165 extra per month.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the base pay of a jg.?

Admiral DUNCAN. The base pay of a junior grade lieutenant with over 2 years' service, but not over 3 years' service, is \$474.30 per month.

Mr. ANDREWS. What does one who has just made jg. get?

Admiral DUNCAN. \$399.30.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does he get any fringe benefits?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; if he has dependents he gets a quarters allowance of \$120 a month. However, if he is a bachelor and is stationed on a ship, he does not get what is known as the BAQ or quarters allowance. He gets no allowance at all in that respect. He does get a subsistence allowance of \$47.88 per month.

Mr. ANDREWS. Of course, quarters are furnished him aboard ship.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman; but in many of these, the young officers are living four or five to a room under extremely crowded conditions.

Mr. ANDREWS. What would a jg. aboard a Polaris submarine get? I am looking at this \$400 a month figure that you gave me.

Admiral DUNCAN. The lieutenant (jg.) would get \$125 a month additional for hazardous duty pay while attached to the submarine.

Mr. ANDREWS. When he is back on the beach, he would not get that \$125?

Admiral DUNCAN. If he is transferred from the submarine and no longer attached, he would not get it. This would also be true if he is shifted to Washington or to postgraduate school.

Mr. ANDREWS. If he gets out of that service. But my question is, If a man spends 60 days aboard a Polaris submarine, then he is returned to the beach for 60 days, does he continue to get that hazardous duty pay?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. He is considered to be in the Polaris submarine service until he is detached?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes. There was a special law passed for that group.

Mr. ANDREWS. You state that current input will not compensate for the low retentions you are now experiencing, still speaking of the submarine people. However, on page 18 of your justification book, in the section on incentive pay in connection with submarine duty, you actually show a slight increase for fiscal year 1970 in the number of officers drawing submarine duty pay. How can you explain this increase if your current input will not compensate for the present low retention rate?

Admiral DUNCAN. By the low input, Mr. Chairman, I was speaking solely of nuclear power qualified input. The input into submarines in general—they all receive hazardous duty pay—is satisfactory, speaking of it as a whole.

Captain GRIFFITHS. I am Captain Griffiths, submarine detail officer, Mr. Chairman. I believe that this might be explained by virtue of the fact that all regular officers in the Navy are being held 1 year beyond their obligation or 1 year beyond the receipt of their resignation, whichever is the later date. We have enough resignations on hand to know that by next year we will be in serious trouble. Right now the inventory is building up, but it will fall off greatly next year. The retention rate of officers in the ships right now is about 70 percent, if we stopped the problem right now, if we could freeze the problem. But with resignations on hand, we know that it will drop to below 40 percent next year, by the end of fiscal year 1970.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long does it take to train a Polaris submarine officer and/or enlisted man?

Captain GRIFFITHS. For a submarine officer, the training time is 18 months' initial training. There is additional training along the line. To become a navigator, there is 4 additional months' training. It is approximately 2 years of training in total for a Polaris officer.

For enlisted men, the training time varies by the rating. The ET's

have a rating training alone of 48 weeks plus an additional submarine and nuclear power training of about 16 months.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about your students in those submarine schools? Do you have enough in there to take care of the vacancies that you anticipate?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Not at the present retention rate of officers, we do not, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. You will have a problem with all these threatened resignations, in view of the fact that it takes 2 years to train an officer to take over a Polaris submarine?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they all go to Admiral Rickover's school up in New London?

Captain GRIFFITHS. All of the nuclear-trained people go to the nuclear power school, which is actually held in two places, Vallejo, Calif., and Bainbridge, Md. One of those two schools.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am talking about the school up at New London.

Captain GRIFFITHS. That is not Admiral Rickover's school, sir. That is a BuPers School. That is the submarine school. At one time the nuclear power training was held at New London. As a matter of fact, it was held there until about 5 years ago, Mr. Chairman.

(Off the record.)

Mr. RHODES. You actually have two full crews, do you not, for each Polaris submarine?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. RHODES. When one crew is not on station, do its members receive leave over and above the normal leave which naval personnel are granted?

Admiral DUNCAN. I would like Captain Griffiths to tell you in detail. It is not above the normal leave.

Captain, would you describe the sequence of events?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Yes, sir.

The Polaris people are entitled to 30 days' leave a year, just as all other people in the Navy. They take this leave generally within the 2-week period following the return from patrol. They take a 2-week period twice a year, because their cycle gives them two patrols a year. That is where they get their 30 days of leave per year.

Mr. RHODES. So they actually get no more leave than anybody else.

Captain GRIFFITHS. They do not. However, I might point out that their time is quite productively used ashore in training while in off-crew status. It might serve to hamper the training if we were to give them more leave than 30 days.

Mr. RHODES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are those crews transported by air to and from duty station?

Captain GRIFFITHS. They are, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do most of them live on the east and west coasts?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Most of them live in Charleston and in New London, Conn., for the east coast; and in Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, for the west coast.

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Duncan, on page 7 you go on to state that the severe officer shortage that will occur this year in the nuclear submarine community may require further and more drastic remedial

action. What type of action would you contemplate taking, and do you have any idea as to what might be done to improve this situation?

#### CONTINUATION PAY FOR NUCLEAR SUBMARINE OFFICERS

Admiral DUNCAN. We are taking actions within the service to ease the situation among the nuclear power officers. We have changed certain regulations which are very restrictive.

The further remedial action of which I spoke was that we hope to come to the Congress with a proposal for continuation pay for the particular group in question. This would be at the lieutenant level. These are the young men who are resigning. We hope to come to the Congress with a proposal for continuation pay, and that is the further remedial action of which I spoke. We are continuing to take other actions within the service.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do all submarine officers and men get the same pay, conventional and atomic and Polaris?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, it varies only by pay grade.

#### REASONS FOR LEAVING NAVY SERVICE

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral, you state the reasons given by officers and enlisted personnel leaving the service fall chiefly into the categories of condition of service, job satisfaction, education, and compensation. Is it not a fact that job satisfaction and education are two of the most salable points the Navy has to offer to encourage people to remain in the Navy?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; I think they are extremely important.

#### IMPROVEMENTS PLANNED IN PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 8 of your statement, you discuss several ways the Navy is trying to improve career retention.

Two of the items you discuss are changes in the assignment system for enlisted personnel, and elimination of a number of irritants in the administration of personnel.

Would you please give us a little more detail on both of these items?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes. We are moving toward what we believe will be a more efficient system of assignment of enlisted personnel, which will eventually be a completely centralized system here in Washington. Our first step toward this is that by next fall we expect to combine all chief petty officer assignments here in Washington. At present we have centralized detailing of E-8's and E-9's, and we do intend to bring in E-7's.

As to the irritants, we find for a great many reasons our personnel administration can be vastly improved. Here in Washington, for example, men may have to go about five places to get paid, or to get their health records. We are trying to increase the skill of our personnel men. We are now going to put all who are qualified through school. We are trying to change the attitudes of people whom the men contact for their pay, for their personnel actions. We are trying to give them the proper information and improve communications about their opportunities.

These are some of the areas we are working on.

## TERMINAL LEAVE PAYMENTS

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Your statement seems to indicate the Navy is having serious retention problems among officers. However, on page 23 of your budget justification you show only a slight decrease in lump sum terminal leave payments to officers. If this problem exists, why is there a slight decrease in the number to receive terminal leave payments?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The difference in the figures here, I believe, Mr. Chairman, is accounted for by pay grade distribution rather than any change in policy or circumstances.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** For 1967 through 1970, there are only very minor increases in your yearly terminal leave payment, increases that are hardly offset by increases in pay. If your retention rate has been decreasing each year, should not this account have been increasing more each year?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** I believe the difference I mentioned was partly pay grade distribution. The other thing that probably affected these estimates is, that we have been encouraging people to take leave to the maximum, and in some of the commands they even practically order it for the good of the person and the good of the Navy.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** For terminal leave for 1967, you received \$18 million-plus; in 1968, \$19 million-plus; in 1969, \$21 million-plus; and for 1970 you are requesting \$22 million-plus. There is a little increase each year. You say that is due to the fact that more people are leaving—

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The pay raise may account for part of it.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** We are not inviting you to ask for more money than you are now asking for. The point is, due to the fact that more and more people are leaving, it looks as if this figure for terminal pay leave should increase at a more rapid rate than it has—either that, or else you are not having as many people separated as you anticipate.

**Admiral GADDIS.** I would offer one adjustment, sir. For 1969 and 1970, the same pay rate is represented. So, that is not a factor in the increase from 1969 to 1970.

## MILITARY PAY SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You are going to get a pay increase beginning July 1.

**Admiral GADDIS.** That will be the subject of a supplemental request.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** I was going to ask you, when it is coming forward?

**Admiral GADDIS.** It is not a fact at this time, sir. Our guidance for preparation of the budget was to use the pay increase level that was effective as of July 1, 1968, both for the 1969 column in the 1970 budget and for the 1970 budget.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You are not requesting in this budget money for any pay increase that might occur the 1st of July, 1969?

**Admiral GADDIS.** Exactly correct, sir, because we do not know the magnitude of that increase as of this time.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** But if the increase occurs, which I think it will, it will be mandatory that we pay it, and you will look then to a supplemental request?

Admiral GADDIS. We would ask for deficiency apportionment and request supplemental funding during the next budget season, that is correct, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. How have you handled pay increases that occurred during fiscal 1969?

Admiral GADDIS. Exactly the same way, sir. The supplemental hearings which were held with this committee just a short time ago included funding for the pay increase for 1969.

Mr. ANDREWS. Gentleman, we are at the high noon hour. So far as you are concerned, the committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow, unless you receive notice otherwise.

TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1969.

Mr. ANDREWS. The committee will come to order.

We will continue our hearing on personnel for the Navy. We have with us again Vice Admiral Duncan and his staff. We will proceed with questioning Admiral Duncan.

#### SUBSISTENCE OF PERSONNEL

Admiral, on page 45 of your justification you show an increase of over 7,000 in the number of people to be maintained in messes in 1970. Almost all of this increase is in those afloat. How did you determine that this increase would occur in those to be maintained afloat as opposed to those to be provided for ashore?

Mr. MINTON. The ratio for those being subsisted afloat for the past 6-month period is what we actually used plus personnel increases planned for fiscal year 1970.

Mr. ANDREWS. How do your rations compare with those of the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps?

Mr. MINTON. The Navy rate in the United States is \$1.32; overseas, \$1.42; afloat, \$1.32.

The Marine Corps, \$1.26 United States; \$1.42 overseas.

Air Force, \$1.32 United States. I do not have the Air Force overseas rate.

The Army, \$1.27 United States, and \$1.33 overseas.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, it is about in line with the other services.

Mr. MINTON. Yes, it is.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they the projected costs for fiscal 1970 or for fiscal 1969?

Mr. MINTON. They are projected for 1970 based on actual experience.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you felt inflation in your food costs?

Mr. MINTON. The food cost index for the base period was \$1.38. That is January through June 1968. For July to December 1968, it was \$1.39, up a penny; and for January to March, it was \$1.41. That is an increase of 3 cents over the base period.

Mr. ANDREWS. Your big increase is for subsistence afloat. I am looking at page 1-45 of the justification book.

Mr. MINTON. Are you speaking of numbers of people?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes; numbers of people.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, the increase in man-years is the reason for the increase in numbers. This relates back to our roughly 10,000 increase in man-years.

## ACCESSION TRAVEL FOR ENLISTED MEMBERS

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 1-53 of the justification book, under "Accession travel for enlisted members," we note that the number traveling by land to recruit training centers in 1970 decreases by 28,000 recruits. Is this inconsistent in any way with the fact that the average strength of the Navy will increase by 10,000 in 1970?

Mr. NUTTMANN. No; Mr. Chairman. This is not inconsistent in that if you remember our discussion yesterday about gains, our gains have decreased considerably in fiscal year 1970 in relation to fiscal year 1969. This is because, as Admiral Duncan explained, of the Project 693 effects, the need to reach our approved end strength. So, after we saved our man-years, we turned our attention to meeting our approved end strength.

## NAVAL TRAINING CENTER, ORLANDO, FLA.

Mr. ANDREWS. You mentioned yesterday, Admiral Duncan, your training facilities at Orlando, Fla. How many bases will there be there—one or two?

Admiral DUNCAN. There will be one base, but it will have quite a few activities on it. We will have eventually there, the recruit training, a load of 8,000, as I mentioned.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that boot training?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; recruit training, with a load of 8,000. That will be after the fiscal year 1970 "Military construction" appropriation. We will have in addition, at Orlando, the Service Schools Command, such as yeoman training and personnel man training.

## WAVE TRAINING

The Wave recruits will move there eventually. This is several years away.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where are the Waves stationed now?

Admiral DUNCAN. In Bainbridge.

Mr. ANDREWS. There was quite a controversy as to whether or not your facility should be located at Orlando or Bainbridge. We were shown some buildings over at Bainbridge. What is the condition of those buildings? Is that where you are training your WAVES?

Admiral DUNCAN. Approximately 90 percent of the buildings at Bainbridge are of World War II vintage and are in poor condition and beyond economical repair. It is our desire, of course, to concentrate the training facilities at Orlando to realize economies. However, current plans call for the Naval Reserve Manpower Center, the personnel data processing installation and the Naval Academy Preparatory School to remain at Bainbridge.

## NAVAL ACADEMY PREPARATORY SCHOOL, BAINBRIDGE

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you still operate that preparatory school at Bainbridge?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the requirement for attendance at that school?

Admiral DUNCAN. If an enlisted man is nominated by his commanding officer and has met the required mental level cutting score and is in all respects eligible, he can request transfer to the preparatory school.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about a congressional alternate appointee? There was a time when they were eligible for attendance at that school.

Admiral DUNCAN. Mr. Kenyon.

Mr. KENYON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. A congressional appointee is still eligible, provided he is brought into the Navy under the same regulations as anyone else.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, he must enlist in the Navy?

Mr. KENYON. Yes, sir, or the Naval Reserve and subsequently be ordered to active duty.

Mr. ANDREWS. And then receive a congressional appointment, either as principal or alternate?

Mr. KENYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Then he will be eligible to attend the school?

Mr. KENYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I have not checked on that school recently, but several years ago it had a very fine reputation, and it was designed almost exclusively for preparing young men who were to enter the Academy. Is that still the situation?

Mr. KENYON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Its principal function still is to prepare prospective input for the Naval Academy.

Mr. ANDREWS. Any appointee, congressional or otherwise, who is actually in the Navy can be transferred to that school?

Mr. KENYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. If a Member had one principal and three or four alternate appointees, he could put them all in there if they joined the Navy?

Mr. KENYON. Sir, I would like to check on that particular point.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am not going to overcrowd you over there, but I just wanted to find out what it takes to get in.

Mr. KENYON. The answer is "Yes."

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the duration of that school; how many years?

Mr. KENYON. Ordinarily, about 9 months, Mr. Chairman. A man goes in in September, and then competes for Naval Academy entrance the following spring.

Mr. ANDREWS. If he is in the Navy and goes to the school at Bainbridge and does not get an appointment to the Academy, he reverts to seaman or whatever he was when he left the Navy?

Mr. KENYON. He is still on active duty at whatever his rate is.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many students do you have over there?

Mr. KENYON. On the order of 250.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that the limit of the school? How many can you handle?

Mr. KENYON. The limit would be on the order of 320.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am sure it is comparable to the best private school or academy that advertises that it prepares a young man for the Academies.

Mr. KENYON. We like to think so, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is the rate of acceptance into the Naval Academy from Bainbridge? What do you average out?

Mr. KENYON. I will have to supply that for the record. It varies from one year to another, depending upon—

Mr. MINSHALL. Varies from what to what?

Mr. KENYON. On the order of 40 to 50 percent.

Mr. MINSHALL. Admissions?

Mr. KENYON. Yes.

Mr. MINSHALL. Thank you.

(The information follows:)

*Preparatory school*

Fiscal year 1968:

Prep school enrollment.....	275
Academy admissions.....	126
Percent .....	45.8

SEPARATION TRAVEL

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 1-63 of the justification book, you show a decrease of 23,000 in "Separation travel, military member, enlisted." Is this decrease not also inconsistent with your statements regarding current retention problems?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, this is not inconsistent, again for the same reason that accession travel was not inconsistent. Our separations are expected to decrease for the same reason.

CONTROL OF MILITARY PERSONNEL FUNDS

Mr. ANDREWS. How do you control the appropriation for military personnel?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, our control is based on an open allotment system.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the open allotment procedure, and how does it operate?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of the year, the Navy Comptroller publishes in its manuals the open allotments which are available for charging by disbursing officers throughout the world. Personnel properly entitled to pay are paid by disbursing officers and, through the Navy accounting system, these payments are reported as expenditures.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you set aside specific funds for the various activities within a budget program?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. ANDREWS. In your open allotment ledger?

Mr. NUTTMANN. When you say specific programs, Mr. Chairman, are you talking about budget activities, or are you talking about the sub-budget activities?

Mr. ANDREWS. We are talking about sub-budget activities.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes sir; we do.

REPROGRAMING OF PERSONNEL FUNDS

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the extent of reprograming within the military personnel appropriation for the Navy?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Are you addressing yourself, Mr. Chairman, to within the budget activities, or are you talking about between budget activities?

Mr. ANDREWS. Between budget activities.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Would you be talking about fiscal year 1969?

Mr. ANDREWS. 1969, yes.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes sir. Reprograming has been very limited in fiscal year 1969, Mr. Chairman. We have increased or decreased individual budget activities by not more than \$3 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. What has your reprograming been within the budget activities?

Mr. NUTTMANN. I do not have that here, but we would be happy to furnish it for you.

Mr. ANDREWS. Off the top of your head, would it be extensive?

Mr. NUTTMANN. No, sir. It would be my best estimate that it would not be extensive, but I would be happy to check it out for you.

Mr. ANDREWS. Based upon your statements, you are saying in effect that you do not have much reprograming within military personnel.

Mr. NUTTMANN. I cannot really say that, but generally speaking I would say, considering the magnitude of the dollars involved, no, we do not have a lot of reprograming.

Mr. ANDREWS. You said about \$5 million within budget activities.

Mr. NUTTMANN. No. I said not more than \$3 million was reprogramed between budget activities during fiscal year 1969 to date.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is your estimate for the rest of the year? Have you any idea?

Mr. NUTTMANN. As to what we might reprogram?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Mr. NUTTMANN. No, sir; not at this time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Give us an example of reprograming within your area.

Mr. NUTTMANN. For any year?

Mr. ANDREWS. For this year. We are talking about 1969. How much did you reprogram, for what purpose, and from what department to what other department?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Specifically, Mr. Chairman, we found that because of our additional moves in PCS travel, largely due to the decision to save man-years, in connection with Project 693, it was necessary for to put a little over \$2 million into PCS travel.

Mr. ANDREWS. That came out of personnel?

Mr. NUTTMANN. That came out of personnel; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Pay and subsistence?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has the Department of Defense or the Navy Department reprogramed any of your money to activities outside the military personnel account?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Not this year; no, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. That has happened in the past?

Mr. NUTTMANN. It has happened; yes, sir.

#### AMOUNTS REQUESTED COMPARED WITH OBLIGATIONS, 1967-69

Mr. ANDREWS. Will you prepare for the record a schedule showing the amounts requested and the actual expenses incurred over the last 3 years, by budget activities, broken down into the various budget program accounts?

Mr. NUTTMANN. We would be pleased to provide the data we have available, Mr. Chairman.

(The information follows:)

MILITARY PERSONNEL, NAVY AMOUNT REQUESTED AND ACTUAL OBLIGATIONS

It is not possible to submit the requested information for fiscal year 1968, since funding and accounting records are no longer available. Additionally, the requested information by budget program within budget activity is arbitrary because supplements and transfers in and out of the appropriation were not distributed below the budget activity level. However, the following data by budget activity are available.

(In thousands of dollars)

Budget activity	Fiscal year 1967		Fiscal year 1968		Fiscal year 1969	
	NOA	Obligations as of June 30, 1967	NOA	Obligations as of June 30, 1968	NOA	Obligations as of January 31, 1969
Pay and allowances of officers.....	887,492	886,475	932,000	932,000	971,793	592,968
Pay and allowances of enlisted.....	2,496,147	2,495,890	2,645,700	2,645,700	2,696,279	1,656,840
Pay and allowances of cadets.....	11,008	10,847	10,700	10,651	10,604	6,726
Subsistence of enlisted personnel.....	296,182	295,974	306,000	304,926	302,154	173,297
Permanent change of station travel.....	216,608	216,556	229,000	229,000	228,032	141,641
Other military personnel costs.....	18,999	18,457	36,500	35,491	26,138	19,874
Total.....	3,926,436	3,924,199	4,159,900	4,157,768	4,235,000	2,591,346

NROTC PROGRAM

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the NROTC program producing the quality of officer candidates that you expect, Admiral Duncan?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, it certainly is producing a very high quality officer candidate, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does a graduate of an NROTC program at the college level have the same opportunity to progress in the Navy through promotions, et cetera, that a graduate of the Academy has?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, he has.

Mr. ANDREWS. Some years ago there was a little doubt as to whether or not that was true.

Admiral DUNCAN. I think that is quite natural, Mr. Chairman, because of the numbers on active duty in the early years. For example, when I graduated from the Naval Academy, there were few NROTC officers on active duty. Through subsequent years, the contribution of non-Academy sources to total officer strength has dramatically increased.

For example, in the career senior lieutenant category, 71 percent of the officers are now from other than Naval Academy sources.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you any admirals who are graduates of NROTC?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, indeed, we do have. The total number of admirals from other than the Naval Academy is on the order—I would like to furnish the exact number for the record—of 73. This increases year by year as these large year groups move up into the area of consideration for flag rank.

(The information follows:)

The grand total of flag officers other than Naval Academy from the unrestricted line, restricted line and Staff Corps totals 73, of which eight are NROTC source.

Mr. ANDREWS. How old is your NROTC program?

Admiral DUNCAN. We started the NROTC program in a very small way in 1926, with six units, but the modern program really started in 1946 in 52 colleges.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many do you have today?

Admiral DUNCAN. Fifty-four.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, a graduate of NROTC can expect, if he makes the Navy a career, to go just as high as a graduate of the Academy if he has the qualifications necessary for promotion up the ladder?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is correct.

#### NURSE SHORTAGE

Mr. ANDREWS. In your statement you discuss the fact that you are also experiencing difficulty in procuring enough nurses to meet your needs. Does the Navy have any plans currently underway to alleviate this shortage of trained nurses? I assume Admiral Davis would like to answer that question.

Admiral DAVIS. Yes, Mr. Charmian.

Actually, the last year has seen an improvement in this regard. We currently are somewhat in the range of 300 short for this year. We think that with better recruitment and an established program going on now in the hospital nursing type of school—

Mr. ANDREWS. How old is that program?

Admiral DAVIS. That program is just a year old. The latter one was just started.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you gotten any nurses from that program yet?

Admiral DAVIS. We will get our first output this particular year, 25.

Mr. ANDREWS. You say that overall, as of today, you have a shortage of about 300?

Admiral DAVIS. Yes, sir. By the end of this fiscal year, we will have only about 300. By the end of next year, we anticipate something on the order of 75.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many nurses do you have in the Vietnam area?

Admiral DAVIS. We have 34 at the station hospital in Danang, and we have something on the order of 29 on each of our hospital ships.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have a shortage in Vietnam?

Admiral DAVIS. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is your top priority, I would assume.

Admiral DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about your male nurse program? How are you getting a'long with it?

Admiral DAVIS. As you may recall, we employed the draft for male nurses some 2 years ago. We, speaking in terms of the whole Department of Defense, pretty nearly exhausted the total eligible male nurse population at that particular time.

As of the first of this year, we had 122 male nurses. We have the naval enlisted nursing program which will allow a man to come from the Hospital Corps if he meets certain qualifications, and we will then subsidize him through nursing school. We are getting now approximately 12 a year for this particular program.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the length of the nursing school? Where do you send them to nursing school?

**Admiral DAVIS.** The collegiate program is a 4-year program. The hospital program is a 3-year program.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the difference in the nurses you get from the hospital program and from the collegiate program? Are they on a par so far as qualifications are concerned?

**Admiral DAVIS.** I think in general they have a good practical background, Mr. Chairman, but they do not have quite the basic science, broad-based platform on which to build into the subspecialties. We do try to encourage the 3-year graduates to accept a year of further training. I am talking about the hospital group now.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You pay for them going to the hospital and also through college.

**Admiral DAVIS.** We have two programs. We have just inaugurated a program which would pay them the base pay of an E-3 under the hospital program. For this they would be obligated 2 years.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You pay all the expenses incurred by the college graduates?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes; and the base pay of an E-3.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the obligated tour of service of the college graduate nurse program?

**Admiral DAVIS.** We have two programs there. One starts in their junior year. If they start in their junior year, they will have an obligation of 3 years. If they start in their senior year, they have an obligation of 2 years.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** When they enter the service as a graduate nurse, either from the hospital program or the college program, are they given a commission.

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Ensign?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes, sir. They get their ensign commission in the college program about the midterm of the senior year. That whole last senior year is financed.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** So, you think within a year you will have your nurse situation well in hand?

**Admiral DAVIS.** I think it is improving, and we hope to have it well in hand by then.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the retention rate of nurses? Have you any problem keeping them in the service?

**Admiral DAVIS.** About 30 percent remain for 2 or more years after serving the 2-year minimum on active duty. We do have a retention problem. There is a great turnover after the end of their obligated service. I would have to furnish the exact figures for the record. There are some other things that happen to nurses that sometimes cause them to leave the service. They get married, and things of this sort.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do you have any restriction against retaining a married nurse?

**Admiral DAVIS.** No, sir. Assigning them equitably to the others on a comparative basis may sometimes constitute a problem.

#### NAVY DOCTORS

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What about your doctor problem, Admiral Davis?

**Admiral DAVIS.** We have problems, as you likely know, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do you have a shortage of doctors?

**Admiral DAVIS.** We do not have a shortage right now.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do you use the draft to get doctors?

#### BERRY PLAN

**Admiral DAVIS.** We have used the draft 10 times in the last 19 years, but we are not using it this year. As a result of the Berry Plan, we generally fulfill our needs, although we get short in certain critical specialties.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** The committee is familiar with the Berry Plan. It has been with us a long time. Describe briefly for the record what the plan is.

**Admiral DAVIS.** The plan is something like this: In the last year of medical school, a senior medical student is sent a form by the Department of Defense. On this form he can make an election as to whether he wants to go into the service immediately after internship or whether he wants to wait 1 year and then go into the service or, the third election, whether he wants to pursue his entire specialization career and then enter the service.

These cards are then sent back to the Department of Defense, where they are placed in a computer. He also marks on the card his preference as to which service he would prefer.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Does the Berry Plan apply to all services, or just the Navy?

**Admiral DAVIS.** All services, sir. It is run by the Department of Defense, not by the Navy.

The machine then selects these people as to what we have put in as our requirements for the forthcoming years. It is a very successful program, I might say.

#### FINANCING MEDICAL EDUCATION

**Mr. ANDREWS.** I understand it is. Does the Navy finance any part of the young man's medical education?

**Admiral DAVIS.** We have programs starting with the so-called ensign 1915 Program whereby we try to enlist the medical student as a freshman. During this program he is given a provisional commission as an ensign. He is allowed the opportunity to serve some specific length of time on active duty during his summer vacation. In this way he joins in our reserve and will ultimately come on his period of duty with the Navy. He is given in his senior year the opportunity either to accept a naval internship or to go into the Berry plan.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Does the Navy pay for any part of his educational costs?

**Admiral DAVIS.** None in this particular program.

The second program is the senior medical student program, and we finance this program as an ensign for the last year. He is obligated then for 3 years.

#### BERRY PLAN

**Mr. ANDREWS.** If he goes to the Berry Plan and is selected by the Navy, what is his term of obligated service?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Two years.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do you take them as soon as they finish their internship?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Their first election is immediately after internship.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** When a medical student gets his M.D. degree, he has 2 years as an intern, as I understand it.

**Admiral DAVIS.** Just one.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What about residency?

**Admiral DAVIS.** This depends upon the specialty. Under the Berry Plan, he may elect to go through his entire specialized training. For a surgeon, this is a minimum of 5 years.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is his term of obligated service under the Berry Plan?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Only 2 years. Again, we do not finance this. This is all at this own option.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** When a man gets in the Berry Plan and expresses a desire for service in the Navy, what is his chance of getting naval service?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Reasonably good.

#### COMPARISON OF NURSE PROGRAMS OF THE SERVICES

**Mr. ANDREWS.** We are told every year that the Navy has a problem with nurses and the Army has a problem with nurses. The Air Force has plenty of them. One of our colleagues, Congressman Flood, always wants to know what the Air Force has that the Navy does not? Why are they getting nurses and you cannot get them?

**Admiral DAVIS.** I cannot speak to that particularly about the nurses, but there are two specific reasons as they affect the Medical Corps. One of them is about a third of them who go into the Air Force get flight pay.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** That is quite an incentive.

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes, sir.

The other is that their liability for serving in a rather arduous area is less in the Air Force than it is in the Navy.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You have told us about your nurse problem and your doctor problem. What about dentists?

#### NAVY DENTISTS

**Admiral DAVIS.** The dental problem is beginning to deteriorate somewhat in the line of the Medical Corps, but it has not reached that magnitude as yet.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do you have a program for dentists comparable to the Berry Plan?

**Admiral DAVIS.** There is no corollary of the Berry Plan for dentists. There is a program for dental students called the ensign 1925 program. Students may obtain an ensign commission after acceptance by a dental school, after which they remain in inactive status until after graduation. They may apply for 2 months' active duty for training between school years; 30 days may be approved for each summer period.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Tell us briefly about your dental program.

**Admiral DAVIS.** They have an internship wherein they bring in people for a period of obligated duty for 2 years, during which they will be paid at the price of a two-striper, full pay and allowances of a

lieutenant. The American Dental Association has been a very strong supporter in guiding the dental schools toward the services so they would not have to use the draft so much. I think they have employed the draft only twice in the last 15 or 20 years.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have no problem at present with dentists, but you anticipate you might have?

Admiral DAVIS. Our biggest problem is the factor that as they become subspecialized, such as oral surgeons, prosthodontists—

#### RETENTION OF DOCTORS, DENTISTS, AND NURSES

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us briefly in the record what percentage of those who enter the Medical Corps—dentists, nurses, doctors—stay in the Navy and make it a career. You may put that in the record.

Admiral DAVIS. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

Retention rates for these corps are as follows:

Medical Corps: Only 2.4 percent of reservists remain in the Navy beyond their 2-year military obligation. A majority of young Regulars obtain residency training; only 25 percent retain their commissions more than 2 years after serving obligated time for residency training. Of the 150 trained in flight surgery each year, only 25 percent remain in service more than 2 years beyond service obligation. In the Medical Corps only 12.8 percent have served more than 10 years active service.

Dental Corps: 17.5 percent. The percentage of 2 year obligators in fiscal year 1965 was 34.5 percent; in fiscal year 1969 it is 50.5 percent. There has been a 42-percent decline in the number of USN lieutenants from June 30, 1965, to February 17, 1969.

Nurses Corps: 30 percent.

Medical Service Corps: 38 percent.

#### MEDICAL TECHNICIANS

Mr. ANDREWS. What about your problem with reference to technicians, dietitians, hospital employees who fall in a special category of being experts?

Admiral DAVIS. We have noted a gradual deterioration in our career enlisted personnel, which includes largely most of our specialty-trained men, over the course of the past 3 or 4 years. This is after the first reenlistment. These are definitely career people who have had 2 or more reenlistments. It has dropped from something on the order of 87 percent, now down to something like 79 percent.

Insofar as dietitians are concerned, we have a similar type of program for them that we have for nurses, in that we will subsidize a dietitian through the dietitian school for the last 2 years of her program at an ensign's base pay and allowances. For this we get a 3-year obligation.

#### NAVY HOSPITAL

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you say overall that your hospital situation is in good condition?

Admiral DAVIS. Our hospital situation in Vietnam, except perhaps for some shortage of beds, is in excellent condition. I think it is a very admirable situation.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many hospital ships have you there?

Admiral DAVIS. We have two, the *Sanctuary* and the *Repose*.

I think we are functioning satisfactorily in the States, perhaps not ideally. We have a heavy workload, somewhat long waiting lines.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Are you prepared in all cases to take care of emergencies?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes, sir.

#### USE OF HOSPITAL SHIPS

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Tell us briefly about the experience you have had with the two hospital ships. What type of patients do you take? What is the length of stay on the ship? What do you do with patients when you treat them on the ship?

**Admiral DAVIS.** One of the ships has now been in operation almost 3 years. They are placed on station on recommendation of in-country assigned personnel who try to anticipate where the need is by virtue of the next coming engagement. Most of their acute casualty load comes by helicopter.

For instance, I had a letter just yesterday from one of my hospital commanders who said he had something on the order of 70 admissions, 70 acute traumatic casualties, within the 1 day that he operated off the coast where an engagement was going on.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Was that 70 admissions on one of the hospital ships?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Was he able to take care of all of them?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes, sir. They triage these men in accordance with their priority. The operating rooms are apt to run all night—as far as that goes, on into the next day. This type of load is not a daily situation. They have the capability also, in case they do get saturated, of moving them to other particular hospital activities.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Are those ships there for emergency cases, or do you take a patient there and give him treatment and keep him until he is fully convalescent?

**Admiral DAVIS.** They operate under a 30-day convalescent program. By that I mean if the man can be made well and returned to the beach in 30 days, that is done. If not, he is given definitive care and moved on back toward the United States.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How many beds does each ship have?

**Admiral DAVIS.** 560, with an expanded capability of over 700.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is that combined?

**Admiral DAVIS.** No, sir; that is one ship.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You have about 1,400 beds?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Yes, sir.

#### NAVY HOSPITALS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How many hospitals do you operate in South Vietnam?

**Admiral DAVIS.** We have one large general station hospital which is at Danang.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is that primarily for Marines?

**Admiral DAVIS.** It is primarily for Marines and Navy.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How many beds are there in that hospital?

**Admiral DAVIS.** It has an expanded capability of 700.

In addition, every Marine regiment has a backup medical company which has a capability of 180 field beds.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are those field hospitals prepared to do all types of emergency surgery?

Admiral DAVIS. They are, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Once the emergency is met at the field hospital, is the patient transferred back to your big hospital at Danang?

Admiral DAVIS. He may or may not be, depending upon what his prognosis is for, eventually, recovery to rejoin his unit.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you know of anything you need in the medical field in South Vietnam, or are all your needs pretty well met?

Admiral DAVIS. They are. I think I should say that I think we are working out our problems there. We have some problems at times in mobilizing sufficient helicopter support, but in general this has been quite good.

There have been over 120,000 helicopter evacuations. In general, I think we are in good shape in Vietnam medicalwise.

Mr. MINSHALL. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. MINSHALL. You mentioned the shortage of beds in Vietnam. Can you detail this a little more, please?

Admiral DAVIS. For the last year or so, in trying to plan based upon what our casualty rate is and what our morbidity rate is, we have felt we needed on the order of 400 more beds permanently in the Vietnam area. This has been met by backup at Guam and in Japan, sometimes by utilizing Army facilities.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is your proposal as far as the Navy is concerned, to obtain 400 more beds?

Admiral DAVIS. We had hoped to add 400 more beds to the station hospital at Danang.

Mr. MINSHALL. Is there anything in this budget for that?

Admiral DAVIS. No, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Or in the military construction budget?

Admiral DAVIS. No, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Did you ask for it? Was it on the shopping list?

Admiral DAVIS. We asked for it. It had gone through the entire area of consideration. The general feeling at a triservice meeting was that there were sufficient beds in all three services to take up the load, and our specific needs could be met by the other two services.

Mr. MINSHALL. Do you think that they can be?

Admiral DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. MINSHALL. Why did you ask for the 400 beds in the first place?

Admiral DAVIS. I like to take care of my own, Mr. Congressman.

#### ROTATION OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL

Mr. MINSHALL. What is the average tenure or length of duty at naval hospitals such as Bethesda?

Admiral DAVIS. There isn't any established length of duty. We try to keep our chiefs of service and those people who actually do our training programs, longer than others. It is a training facility. So, as our graduates finish their residency programs, they will be moved. The

staff itself, we try to keep the junior people at least 3 years. Sometimes the senior people will stay longer. In general, this is the policy we try to adhere to.

Mr. MINSHALL. I would like to pay tribute at this juncture to Dr. Osborne, who I think is still out there. He does a magnificent job.  
(Off the record.)

#### MEASURES TO RECRUIT AND RETAIN NUCLEAR SUBMARINE OFFICERS

Mr. MINSHALL. On page 7 of your statement, regarding the retention of personnel, specifically officer personnel in the Navy, you said you were having unusual problems with the nuclear group. You said corrective action has been initiated, in the form of several long-range programs designed to increase input and to improve retention.

Can you briefly describe what these long-range programs are, especially for the nuclear submarine group?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, Mr. Minshall. We are having a much intensified recruiting program for the nuclear input. We are doing such things as screening those who apply for our Officer Candidate School who might be interested in nuclear power. These applicants are invited to go to the head of the list. This is one of the types of steps we are taking.

We are also sending visiting teams to the NROTC's. We go to the Naval Academy and give them a presentation, and to the Officer Candidate School, to try to get more of the qualified officers and those with high academic standing to come into the nuclear power program.

Another long-range step we are taking is looking over administrative practices in the nuclear area. The young officers, as we discussed yesterday, are under terrific pressure. They have a very hard job with very demanding qualifications. We are trying to look into the administrative duties to see if we can relieve them of some of these administrative duties.

The heart of the solution to the long-range problem is to increase the inventory sufficiently to permit us to give them a reasonable career pattern so they will not have to stay at sea continuously throughout their career, and they may be rotated to postgraduate school, to Washington, and to other normal billets for such officers.

Mr. MINSHALL. That is fine as to recruitment, Admiral, but how about retention of those who are already in?

Admiral DUNCAN. One of the steps I mentioned has to do with retention, that is, relieving the young men of certain of the administrative and collateral duties that an officer has. We also are taking certain administrative actions on the submarines so they will not be qualifying for several different things at once. They have to qualify as a nuclear engineering officer of the watch. They have to qualify in the submarine. They have to qualify as the officer of the deck. They have to qualify in the weapons department. We are trying to stage those.

One other thing, a letter has been signed by our Secretary to the Speaker requesting special legislation for a type of continuation pay somewhat similar, actually, to the variable reenlistment bonus, for officers just in the bracket where the big problem is, that is, in the lieutenant bracket, heads of departments.

(Off the record.)

Mr. MINSHALL. Thank you.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Admiral Duncan, the increase in nuclear submarine officer resignations is as you stated a major cause of concern. The current input will not compensate for the low-retention rate you are experiencing, and the fact that you have 385 officers in this small community of 1,849 officers in the ranks of commander and below who have submitted their resignation requests, is a serious matter which shocked me, really. I did not get the impression that you had a really aggressive program or that you explained adequately here how you will retain these officers or build up additional officers.

It appears to me that you need to take the drastic action now that you are talking about. Am I viewing this with too much concern?

Admiral DUNCAN. No. It is a very serious problem.

I might tell you, in addition to the statements I have already made, some of the things we have gone through, and then later call on Captain Griffiths.

We held a very detailed conference of the submarine force commanders and representatives of the fleet commanders in chiefs in January, and went into every aspect that we could of what is causing this exit, if you will, of the young officers. From that we came up with several proposed courses of action, some of which I have enumerated.

The more drastic action which we hope will produce the results I mentioned is that we are proposing to the Congress legislation to give a 4-year continuation pay in return for 4 years' extension beyond their obligated service to officers within this particular group, to stem resignations. If we can stem the flow of resignations from this group of young men, we will have made progress on the problem.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You have 385 resignations pending now. Has there been any effort to sit down and talk to them and find out what is wrong?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, indeed. We have done several things. We have conducted questionnaire surveys designed to determine what influences these officers to go out and what would influence them to come in.

In addition, Captain Griffiths, who is my project officer, has gone around personally and talked to a great many young officers. Perhaps you would like to hear comments from him in a moment.

The force commanders themselves have talked to the young officers to try to find out what are the causes of dissatisfaction, what would cause them to leave the Navy, or what would influence them to stay in the Navy.

We have, indeed, gone into it in great detail.

Perhaps you would like to hear Captain Griffiths mention some of the results of his trips.

Captain GRIFFITHS. I have talked to approximately 100 of these young officers to determine what the root core reason for their leaving was.

I believe we established quite definitely what these reasons are. They are primarily the lack of officer inventory, which denies an opportunity for them to go to PG school, as other officers in other communities can do, which leads to lack of opportunity to go ashore; and the requirement to stay continuously at sea. This is the basic problem. My talks highlighted many symptoms of this and other problems, such as the extreme pressures of continual qualification which these officers must

go through, the long uninterrupted patrols which they must make, the rigid inspections by outside authorities which are required to insure nuclear safety and weapons system readiness. After all, we are combining a nuclear reactor, ballistic missiles, and atomic weapons all in one ship, with very sophisticated submarine technology.

The pressures on these officers are just greater than they are on almost any other community in the Navy.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You will not be able to correct that, will you?

Captain GRIFFITHS. That is right; however, we have already alleviated some of the factors causing the pressures and are correcting others.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Because of the very nature of the Polaris duty you have to maintain very high standards and very restrictive regulations and rules?

Captain GRIFFITHS. That is right.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You cannot correct that too well.

Captain GRIFFITHS. That is right.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So every officer that comes into the program must understand that at the outset.

Captain GRIFFITHS. They do, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. To give them more shore leaves and more education, does that not mean you have to qualify more officers for Polaris duty?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are there any plans to increase the size?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Yes, sir. We have a new program in effect called the nuclear officer candidate program.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. When did that start and how will it work?

Captain GRIFFITHS. It has been in effect for about 6 weeks. We have about 20 people in training from this program already.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Twenty is next to nothing.

Captain GRIFFITHS. We hope to get at least 100 from it this year.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That does not even begin to meet your needs.

Captain GRIFFITHS. It should meet our shortfall in recruitment for this year, Mr. Lipscomb. There is no way that we can meet the loss of 385 people in 1 year with trained and experienced people. There is just no source we can bring outsiders from to replace those people.

What we must do is to retain the people that we have on board, or at least a certain number of them.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. According to the complaints you have you need more officers to give them relief.

Captain GRIFFITHS. That is right.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Or else they will have to come——

Captain GRIFFITHS. Only because we are losing these people do we need more officers. If we were able to retain them we would be able to send some people ashore.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. We cannot administer your personnel problems here but it seems to me that the Polaris program is one of our most important deterrent forces in our defense and deserves the highest priority and attention. This statement that we have before us is shocking.

Captain GRIFFITHS. Yes, sir. I believe it is getting the highest priority of attention.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is all volunteer service, is it not?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. All people connected with the Polaris submarine are volunteers?

Captain GRIFFITHS. Yes, sir.

Admiral DUNCAN. I would like to add that we would hope that this continuation pay, if passed by the Congress, would certainly stem the outflow to a considerable extent, and we would hope that some of the men who have submitted resignations would withdraw them. The Secretary of the Navy is writing a letter to each individual officer outlining what we are doing and trying to do.

Also I would like to say that the factors that are leading them out of the Navy are the same factors that are at work on all naval officers and Navy enlisted men. The retention rate in submarines has been very, very high and continues to be high, but the whole point is that it is a very small community.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Have you had occasion to discuss this with the wives of the young officers to get their impressions?

Admiral DUNCAN. I will ask Captain Griffiths.

Captain GRIFFITHS. I have talked to several, sir. I have not done this nearly to the extent that I have talked to the officers.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For the record, Mr. Chairman, can we have an analysis of your submarine recruitment and retention problem for the past 3 years, broken down into the Polaris and the attack submarines? Give us a picture of it.

Admiral DUNCAN. Indeed, Mr. Lipscomb. We can furnish it for the record.

(Information requested follows:)

#### SUBMARINE OFFICER MANNING

##### A. RECRUITMENT/TRAINING

	1966	1967	1968
1. Nuclear submarine (SSBN/SSN) officers (18 months' training after commissioning prior to reporting to 1st ship):			
Accepted for training.....	320	305	360
Resulting graduates.....	260	260	310
2. Diesel submarine (SS) officers (6 months' training):			
Accepted for training.....	135	140	125
Resulting graduates.....	105	120	100

<sup>1</sup> Estimates. Many are still in training.

##### B. RESIGNATION AND RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY (RAD) LOSSES

	1966	1967	1968	1969
SSBN.....		40	40	190
SSN.....	5	15	15	80
SS.....	45	85	160	130

<sup>1</sup> Small numbers of officers become eligible to resign these years. These figures represent about 40-percent retention.

#### REENLISTMENT RATE FOR POLARIS SUBMARINES

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Last year we did not get into it in this detail, but we were under the impression, at least from the hearings, that the reenlistment rate for Polaris submarine crews since last year had remained very high. You just said it again.

Admiral DUNCAN. The reenlistment rate for enlisted men is still very high, although dropping a little bit.

This rush of resignations is something which has occurred within the past year and is partly due to fairly large groups becoming eligible for resignation, in other words, at the end of their obligated service.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Do you think the accidents we have had in this area might have something to do with it.

Admiral DUNCAN. I don't.

Captain GRIFFITHS. I do not think so, sir. We changed our input source in 1961 primarily because of the expansion of the Polaris program. Prior to that time all of the input into the program came from sea-experienced officers, from either destroyers or diesel submarines. These were all career-motivated officers when they entered the program.

In 1961, because of the expansion of the Polaris program, we had to go to direct-source officers, to Officer Candidate School, to the Naval Academy, and NROTC units, and recruit candidates whose career motivation we had no way of determining.

These officers are coming to the end of their initial obligated service. Because the obligation rules for these officers were changed in 1964, we happen to have three groups eligible to leave at approximately the same time. This is aggravating the problem.

Of course, we also have a considerable buildup in competition from the civilian community. At the present time the Navy operates more power reactors than the rest of the world combined, but there is a considerable increase in civilian reactor construction so we are getting more competition now from civilian industry than we did. Approximately 50 percent of the people who have left our program are associated with civilian jobs that utilize their reactor training.

Mr. ANDREWS. And I would assume their salaries are much higher than they were while in the Navy?

Captain GRIFFITHS. That is right, particularly after they have been in the business for a year or two.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Has Admiral Rickover reviewed this problem and furnished any suggestions?

Captain GRIFFITHS. He has reviewed it in considerable detail, yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Has he furnished any suggestions?

Captain GRIFFITHS. He has furnished some suggestions, most of which have already been implemented.

Off the record.

(Discussion held off the record.)

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Rickover told the committee last year that he personally screened each applicant for Polaris submarine duty.

Captain GRIFFITHS. That would be correct, sir. Each nuclear-trained officer applicant is personally screened by Admiral Rickover prior to commencing nuclear power training.

#### ENLISTMENT AND TRAINING OF WAVES

Mr. ANDREWS. Now we would like to talk a little about the Waves. What is the planned strength for the Waves contained in the 1970 budget?

Captain LENIHAN. Six hundred officers and 5,600 enlisted women.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many enlisted?

Captain LENIHAN. 5,600.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has the reenlistment rate for WAVES improved any over the last year?

Captain LENIHAN. Mr. Chairman, we really have no reenlistment or retention problem in the WAVES. This is understandable when it is recognized that there is no draft of women. They are all volunteers.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any plans for expanding the WAVES program?

Captain LENIHAN. In 1967 there was a 20-percent increase planned for the WAVES, and we are presently recruiting for that increase.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the authorized strength of the WAVES?

Captain LENIHAN. The programmed planned strength is 584 officers and 5,400 enlisted women.

Mr. ANDREWS. You are not now up to that strength?

Captain LENIHAN. Not yet, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you hope to reach that authorization in fiscal 1970?

Captain LENIHAN. We shall reach the officer strength in 1970 and we shall reach the enlisted strength probably in 1972.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any plans for the future beyond the authorized strength of 5,400 enlisted and 584 officers?

Captain LENIHAN. The plan is reviewed annually. We shall look at the 584-5,400 strength again at a future date.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many WAVES are now serving in Vietnam and what is planned for fiscal year 1970?

Captain LENIHAN. We have one WAVE officer there now and one enroute, Mr. Chairman. Our number there is small because of the nature of the Navy's mission.

Mr. ANDREWS. One officer onboard in Vietnam at this time and one on the way over?

Captain LENIHAN. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any enlisted WAVES there?

Captain LENIHAN. We do not, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What kind of duty would those two officers perform?

Captain LENIHAN. One is a functional language training officer. That means she is teaching Vietnamese.

The other is a data systems resource management analyst.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had any requests for WAVES in Vietnam?

Captain LENIHAN. By the Navy in Vietnam?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

Captain LENIHAN. I think that the WAVES' primary mission is supporting the fleet in the shore establishment and our needs here are sufficient to use the number of WAVES on active duty.

#### COMBINATION OF SERVICES WOMEN'S OFFICER TRAINING

Mr. ANDREWS. Since there are relatively few officers entering the four services' Women's Corps each year, would it not be feasible to combine their basic training and thus save substantial training costs?

Captain LENIHAN. I think not, for this reason. I think it is very important that the WAVES be professionally oriented to the service

to which they belong. It has been very successful and I think that it parallels, for instance, the West Point and Annapolis training.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am concerned only with regard to basic training.

Captain LENIHAN. No, sir. I think it is essential that the WAVES be trained by the Navy.

Mr. ANDREWS. We cannot shake you away from your loyalty to the Navy. I can see that.

Thank you.

Captain LENIHAN. Thank you, sir.

#### PROJECT 100,000

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Duncan, can you bring the committee up to date on what the Navy is doing in connection with Project 100,000?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We are required to take a certain percentage of our recruit inputs—we are required to take 18 percent of our nonprior service male accessions as mental category group IV—and one-half of that number must be in what are known as new standards, those formerly not acceptable under any conditions in the armed services. This program has been running now for some time—

Mr. ANDREWS. How many were you supposed to take?

Admiral DUNCAN. Eighteen percent of whatever the number of new recruits we take in during the year. One-half of those would be the new standards; that is, the lowest of the mental group IV. Additionally, we are required to take 2 percent of our input in the medical remedial program of Project 100,000.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is this the group which the Army referred to as category IV?

Admiral DUNCAN. We have labeled it mental group IV. We watch them very closely. When I say watch them closely, I mean we watch their success rate and their attrition rate. Their attrition rate has been higher than the average recruit in training. We have taken care of it to some extent by recycling, by extra instruction, and in certain cases some of the men received need basic literacy training, and we give them extra help. There are a few who can go on to some of the advanced schools, but a very few.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have a remedial reading program for these people?

Admiral DUNCAN. We do.

Mr. ANDREWS. For what grade level do you aim?

Admiral DUNCAN. Mr. Kenyon.

Mr. KENYON. The effort is to make sure that the man can read and write at not less than the fourth-grade level.

Mr. ANDREWS. After you have trained these people in your basic training and put them into service what experience have you had with them? What duties are assigned them?

Admiral DUNCAN. We assign them as we would other recruits. We do follow them, in their activities, more closely and keep statistics on them. They have a somewhat higher than average disciplinary rate. They are enlisted for 2 years, and they are sent on to normal fleet and shore duty.

Very few qualify for advanced training.

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you say the experience you have had with them has been good? Has it justified the additional expense which I am sure you had to incur?

Admiral DUNCAN. I think that the Navy and the other services have done a good job and thus they contribute to the solution of a national problem.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What does that mean?

Admiral DUNCAN. I meant that I felt we had upgraded the level of education and abilities of a group of people which I believe is in the interest of the country as a whole.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In other words, you say the program has been, you believe, beneficial to the domestic area.

You are a military man. Has it been beneficial and is it improving the capability of the U.S. Navy?

Admiral DUNCAN. No. I don't believe it was intended to upgrade the capability of the U.S. Navy. We would normally take people of higher mentality.

I believe this program is a matter of national policy to be addressed by the Administration.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. We have rather massive programs going on in the domestic area under Health, Education, and Welfare. Does not the military have enough problems in trying to keep the quality of armed services up to standard? You have spoken here today and yesterday about the shortage of qualified skilled personnel. You have implied in your statement that we have some serious personnel problems.

Are you not using a share of your expertise in the Navy to handle this program which you have determined yourself is really in the domestic area?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I was going to ask you whether you did not think there was some other agency of Government which should handle this problem, but I don't think that would be a fair question.

Mr. ANDREWS. How did the Navy get Project 100,000? Did you ask for it?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Did Congress pass it?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Was it an Executive order?

Admiral DUNCAN. We were directed by the Department of Defense to do our part of this program.

Mr. ANDREWS. Eighteen percent of your overall strength. Is that right?

Admiral DUNCAN. Eighteen percent of those coming in in any one period, plus 2 percent under the medical remedial program.

Mr. ANDREWS. It will eventually be 18 to 20 percent of your overall strength if they stay in.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, but we have certain quality controls on reenlistments.

Mr. ANDREWS. You handle it administratively. I imagine that is a good way to put it.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Off the record.

(Discussion held off the record.)

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the Navy's quota for Project 100,000 inductees in fiscal year 1970?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The quota is 18 percent for mental group IV plus 2 percent for what is known as medical remedials.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What does that mean in numbers?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** About 21,500 plus approximately 2,400 for MREP for a total of 23,900.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How many in Project 100,000 and how many in the 18 to 20 percent? You can put it in the record if you do not have it now.

**Admiral GADDIS.** Assuming the same quotas are applied to phase IV that are currently assigned the services in phase III, then 18 percent of our nonprior service male accessions for fiscal year 1970, or about 21,500, will be mental category group IV, and an additional 2 percent, or 2,400 will be new standards physical (medical remedial) accessions.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Admiral Davis, what are you doing in the medical field to qualify these enlistees?

**Admiral DAVIS.** Our experience, Mr. Chairman, is involved sometimes only in the medical screening insofar as getting them out when they are totally unsatisfactory. Some of them have remedial physical defects, such as hernia, and things of this sort, which can be rapidly corrected. Some will refuse to have normal surgical corrective measures.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** If they do they are then not accepted?

**Admiral DAVIS.** That is correct.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** In those categories where they refuse to cooperate, are they charged to your 18-percent ceiling, Admiral Duncan?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** No sir, they would be initially charged to our 2 percent quota and recorded statistically when discharged for medical reasons.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Have you given these people ship duty?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** If their physical condition is all right, yes.

#### REMEDIAL READING TRAINING

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** The Army found that their studies showed that these men should be trained to a fifth-grade reading level. I understood the Navy to say they train to a fourth-grade reading level. Why is there a difference?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** I cannot tell you why there is a difference.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Studies which have been made just for this purpose show that the fifth grade is where the qualification comes.

**Mr. KENYON.** I think that the grade level really is not a very good measure as it is being used here. It is in the fourth to fifth grade neighborhood, you might say. In other words, if the individual progresses he may get to the fifth grade or he may get only to the fourth grade, but you would have improved his literacy to a point where he makes satisfactory progress in the recruit training. Experience to date shows the grade level attained by men successfully completing literacy training averages in the range from 5 to 5.5.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Has the Navy lowered its training standards to any degree to accommodate these thousands of category IV people?

Admiral DUNCAN. We have done our best to maintain training standards and where they could not meet them we have recycled the men through the training and given them extra instruction to bring them up to the standards.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Have you in any way lowered your training standards for your other recruits to accommodate them? You put these people together, do you not?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right. We have not lowered the recruit training standards.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. And you expect category IV people to fit right into that recruit class and stay with them?

Admiral DUNCAN. A reasonable percentage do not stay with them, as I mentioned. The rate of training for these individuals has been changed in certain aspects. In other words, we accept the fact that their rate of learning is slower, but they must attain the same general training level as other recruits.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I do not quite understand what that means.

How do you put category IV men in with your regular recruit classes and expect them to keep up without special help?

Admiral DUNCAN. They do need special help and they take longer.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does the regular recruit class move out, graduate, or whatever while these category IV stay for another class?

Admiral DUNCAN. Some may.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What is the total cost estimated for 1969 and planned for 1970 for Project 100,000 for the Navy?

Admiral DUNCAN. The total cost estimated for 1969 is \$2,428,000.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That is for personnel?

Admiral DUNCAN. That includes all costs—O. & M., military staff, and Research and Development.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For all of the thousands of these personnel?

Admiral DUNCAN. No sir, that does not include the MPN basic cost of the recruits. These are additional costs.

Mr. ANDREWS. Just for the extra special attention you have to give these people but it would not include the subsistence and pay?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, sir, not for the basic MPN costs of the recruits. This would include extra recruiting, extra training costs, and extra time in training. Incidentally, it is more difficult to recruit these people than the average person.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The \$2.4 million includes your recycling, remedial reading programs—

Admiral DUNCAN. Remedial literacy programs, research and personnel studies, special processing and testing, the additional pay of the military staff, and the pay for extra time the men themselves spend in training.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Teachers and all?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You do not happen to have the operation and maintenance costs there, too; do you?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes. This is part of that which I gave you. In 1969 it will be \$1.319 million and in fiscal year 1970 it will be \$1,291,000.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, if you did not have this Project 100,000 you could save that \$2 million-plus?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is generally correct.

Mr. ANDREWS. But as long as you have a program you will have that annual cost?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Do you by any chance maintain any records as to the disposition of these men, how many went to sea and how many went into different work in the Navy, the number who were discharged, and so forth?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; we do maintain those records. We will have to supply them for the record. However, we do follow them.

As I mentioned, the attrition has been higher.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Would analysis of that show disciplinary problems that you have?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; it would.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That would be a valuable chart, then.

(The information requested follows:)

#### DISPOSITION OF GROUP IV ACCESSIONS

From January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1969 about 15,500 new standards mental group IV accessions were enlisted in the Navy. Of this group 89 percent (13,780) were assigned to sea, the remaining 11 percent (1,720) were assigned initially to shore-based activities.

Assignment of new standards accessions by Department of Defense Occupational Area Code is as follows:

#### DOD OCCUPATIONAL AREA

Code	Title	New standards (percent)
0	Gun crews and seamanship.....	31.8
1	Electronic equipment repairmen.....	.7
2	Communications and intelligence specialist.....	3.7
3	Medical and dental specialists.....	.1
4	Other technical and allied specialists.....	.3
5	Administrative specialists and clerks.....	6.0
6	Electrical/mechanical equipment repairmen.....	32.2
7	Craftsmen.....	8.3
8	Service and supply handlers.....	16.9
Total.....		100.0

New standards men have performed significantly better in occupational areas in the Navy which stress practical work and do not require significant reading and mathematical abilities.

From January 1, 1967 through January 1, 1969, 11.5 percent (1,786) new standards mental group IV accessions were separated from the service prior to their expiration of enlistment. The major cause of separation was unsuitability for service (800). Attrition from the Navy for all causes for new standards personnel with 19-21 months of service is nearly three times as high (18.4 percent) as the average of the other three upper mental categories.

Of those receiving general or special courts-martial, mental group IV's make up 32.5 percent of the population, almost three times their proportionate size in the total enlisted Navy population (11.4 percent).

#### USE OF MARIHUANA AND OTHER DRUGS

Mr. ANDREWS. We note from recent news releases that the use of marihuana and other drugs has increased substantially in the Army, especially in Vietnam. Is the Navy experiencing this same problem? If so, what are you doing to combat this situation?

Admiral DAVIS. The Navy is experiencing the same problem. It actually is alarming.

There have been a number of positive measures started. We have set up in virtually all of our recruit training and even aboard all of the ships that we can and stations an educational program with some very excellent movies which show the specific harmful effects and what happens in these particular areas.

There has been a special study group which has visited all of our larger stations with a concentrated effort to try to see whether they can evaluate the program locally and see what measures they can take to correct it. All force commanders have been alerted by the Chief of Naval Operations to personally institute measures directed to relieving this particular problem.

Mr. ANDREWS. I assume it is worse in Vietnam than elsewhere?

Admiral DAVIS. That is right, and that makes it worse because particularly in the Marine Corps, and with the use of marijuana, it distorts your judgment and you can see what it might do on a patrol to a man who perhaps is not well grounded. It can bring about a terrible experience.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the situation getting worse or better?

Admiral DAVIS. I have the feeling in the last year or two it has gotten worse. I think perhaps in the next year we will be drawing some dividends from the things we are positively doing now.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you put some statistics in the record for us?

Admiral DAVIS. Yes, sir.


Mr. ANDREWS. Experience over the last 5 years.

Admiral DAVIS. We have these.

(The information follows:)

It has become apparent over the past few years that there has been an increase in the use of illegal and dangerous drugs by members of the Navy. To combat this situation, a widespread educational program has been initiated, and, at the same time, the intensity of investigation into drug abuse has been increased. With this two-fold approach, it is not possible to state categorically whether there has actually been a marked increase in drug abuse or whether the seemingly increased rate reflects the intensified detection procedures. In the Navy, the handling of drug abuse cases is primarily not a medical, but a line or administrative process.

The following chart provides historical data on the number of drug users administratively discharged from the Navy:



**NOTE:** Historical data on users placed on probation or retained in the service were not maintained prior to calendar year 1968. In that year there were approximately 1100 such cases.

VENEREAL DISEASE RATE

Mr. ANDREWS. While you are putting frightening statistics in the record also put a statement in the record about the VD rate and what you are doing about it.

Admiral DAVIS. Our venereal disease rate has declined in the past year, I am happy to report.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does that include Vietnam?

Admiral DAVIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. We were told Korea was the worst place for the Army but the Navy does not operate much up there.

Admiral DAVIS. This is true, sir.

(Information requested follows:)

The worldwide venereal disease rate per thousand men was 48.4 for 1967 and 47.0 for 1968. The Vietnam rate for 1967 was 112.9 and for 1968 was 107.5.

PROJECT TRANSITION

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Duncan, would you please describe for the committee the Navy's efforts in Project Transition?

Admiral DUNCAN. Project Transition is divided into two parts: One is a counseling part which goes on on-board the ship, or wherever the man may be stationed. It inventories his skills, if you will, and advises him as to the direction he should go in civilian life; what he might be qualified to do. It advises him on a plan to follow. We try to assist the man who comes for counseling to get a high school or equivalent education certification, and we try to assist in placement and referral. About one out of three men leaving the Navy is counseled at one of 14 transition sites.

The second part of transition, in addition to counseling, is training. The Navy does not lend itself to high participation in the training program for the reason, as we discussed yesterday, that individual ships are short of men and the commanding officer can not afford to let men go ashore for long periods of training. Nevertheless, we have trained some men. We estimate in fiscal year 1970 that we will train about 28,000. This will be for relatively short periods, and it will primarily result from volunteer efforts by industry to help train them.

Mr. ANDREWS. The emphasis in the Navy is on counseling rather than training, then?

Admiral DUNCAN. In the Navy.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think it is a good program?

Admiral DUNCAN. It is a helpful program for the individual. It competes, again, for time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any indication that the Navy is gaining a side benefit from the program in that some members are reenlisting after they compare their prospects in the Navy with their prospects in civilian life?

Admiral DUNCAN. I would not say that it has been a benefit to the Navy in the reenlistment effort.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did you give us the figure that is budgeted for fiscal year 1970 for Project Transition?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes. The figure that is budgeted is 68,000 men counseled and 28,000 men trained for short periods.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. And the funds?

Admiral DUNCAN. The total of budgeted funds is \$1.3 million. That is "Operations and maintenance, Navy" cost.

In fiscal year 1970, we are going to stay at the same level as planned for fiscal year 1969, for Project Transition.

I might say that early in fiscal year 1969 we reduced support of Transition Project 693, which we were talking about yesterday. However, in fiscal year 1970 the same number of military people will be assigned, which is 59. The civilians we expect to increase to the approved level of 82 man-years. We had planned that number for fiscal year 1969, but were cut short as a result of Project 693. We just could not do it under the funding situation in fiscal year 1969.

The same number of training sites, 14, will be involved.

To repeat myself, we are intending to operate at the same level in fiscal year 1970 as planned for fiscal year 1969.

Mr. ANDREWS. You say you have 14 training stations. Supply that information for the record.

(Information requested follows:)

#### PROJECT TRANSITION SITES

Naval station, Charleston, S.C.  
 Naval station, Key West, Fla.  
 Naval station, Long Beach, Calif.  
 Naval station, Newport, R.I.  
 Naval station, Norfolk, Va.  
 Naval station, Philadelphia, Pa.  
 Naval station, San Diego, Calif.  
 Naval station, Washington, D.C.  
 Naval station, San Francisco, Calif.  
 Naval air station, Corpus Christi, Tex.  
 Naval air station, Jacksonville, Fla.  
 Naval air station, Pensacola, Fla.  
 Naval supply center, Puget Sound, Seattle, Wash.  
 Naval training center, Great Lakes, Ill.

#### TYPES OF TRANSITION TRAINING

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you do at one of these training stations?

Admiral DUNCAN. In addition to continuing the counseling we try to place them in Navy schools where we have space. Some of our schools run on shifts and have no spaces. We attempt to put them into schools which will relate to a civilian trade.

In certain places private industry has volunteered to come in and give training, for example, in automotive maintenance.

Mr. ANDREWS. When do you put a man into that training program?

Admiral DUNCAN. We can put them in up to 6 months prior to separation. However, the commanding officers usually cannot spare their men so most of our people get very brief training.

Mr. KENYON. Usually it is not more than 10 days, Mr. Chairman, it is at the time when he is in the separation process.

Mr. ANDREWS. Ten days before he gets out of the service you put him into a training program?

Mr. KENYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You cannot expect too much from the program, then.

Mr. KENYON. As the admiral said, the Navy is not concentrating heavily on the training aspect of this program at the present time.

Mr. ANDREWS. When do you start counseling him?

Admiral DUNCAN. On the ship.

Mr. KENYON. He is counseled on the ship or duty station 6 months before his termination date. That counseling also includes the effort to get him to reenlist.

Then when he gets to the transition site or his separation station during his separation process he is counseled again as to what opportunities are available outside the Navy and where he may receive some training, either while he is still in the Navy, during the few days he has left, or where he may go for training after he is discharged.

Mr. DAVIS. We read now and then that the District of Columbia Police force is attempting to recruit in various separation centers. Do you, in addition to training, give an opportunity for recruitment by prospective employers in the transition stage?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, we do. Additionally, there is a program which is being instituted in the Department of Defense which will permit prospective employers to list available positions for the information of men leaving the services.

Mr. DAVIS. This is really not a significant or major part in the transition program so far as the Navy is concerned at the present time. You are now looking toward the future and something more effective and in larger scope?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. I get the impression that the main purpose of this program is to try to retain a man in the Navy. Is that about right?

Admiral DUNCAN. We try very hard to retain qualified people in Navy. The man most in need of transition might be a man who is not qualified to remain in the Navy. If he is, our first approach would be to try to reenlist him.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many of those people would the Navy retain? Do you have an idea?

Admiral DUNCAN. I would have to furnish for the record the number of people who are counseled that are reenlisted in the Navy.

Mr. ANDREWS. Put something in the record on that.

(Information requested follows:)

Men whose enlistment is about to expire are processed for separation by numerous commands. Those desiring job-oriented counseling are counseled either at a transition site, if one is close at hand, or by the command by which they are separated. There are no definitive records related to the numbers of men who change their minds and decide, during the separation process, to reenlist due to counseling or other influences. However, a sampling of the recent experience of a majority of the transition sites indicates that reenlistments after transition counseling or training approximated 1 percent in January and February 1969.

#### SHIPMENT OF PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES

Mr. ANDREWS. Under permanent change of station travel the cost for the shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs within most of the budget projects varies from low of \$231 to a high of \$275. Why is there such a variance in this cost?

Mr. NUTTMANN. You are referring to the MSTs costs in the various travel categories?

Mr. ANDREWS. That is right.

Mr. NUTTMANN. I can give you only a general answer to your question. I could not explain each individual variation but I can say

that in the last 2 or 3 years, because of the difficulty in estimating such costs, we have attempted to set up an accounting base under the PCS moving system. We are trying to perfect this base. We started this in 1966. The Bureau of Naval Personnel Controller previously reported this to this committee.

Unfortunately, sir, we are still not sure that we have the very best costing factors worked out based on historical data received through the system. We are working at it and we are attempting to provide the committee the best estimates we can. The PCS fund control system to which I refer is based in Cleveland, Ohio, at the family allowance activity. It is an evolutionary thing, Mr. Chairman. We feel that as we progress, our rates and factors will reflect less and less inconsistency.

We believe the rates we are using now are better than we have had in past years. In this particular case I believe we can furnish data which will indicate that the cost variance is not as great as it would initially appear.

Mr. ANDREWS. We are talking now about cost of shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have a budget projection which varies from a low of \$231 to a high of \$275.

Mr. NUTTMANN. May I explain that for the record? I cannot give you an explanation specifically here today.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has the General Accounting Office looked into these charges recently?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Not that I am aware of, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you been overcharged, to your knowledge?

Mr. NUTTMANN. To our knowledge we have not; no, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has the Navy audit section looked into these charges?

Mr. NUTTMANN. I am not aware of that. Perhaps Admiral Gaddis might know.

Admiral GADDIS. I know of no naval audit investigation since the institution of the machine system which Mr. Nuttmann speaks of.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you tell us why not?

Admiral GADDIS. It has not been requested.

Mr. ANDREWS. We know of cases where freight users have been grossly overcharged. If I remember correctly the General Accounting Office, which appears before another committee on which I happen to serve, told us last year that overcharges by shippers, which included all shippers, to the military ran into millions of dollars.

I hope that you would have some better check on the charges billed to the Navy in the movement of goods and automobiles. You might save some money.

Admiral GADDIS. It would be deserving of an audit investigation; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would put in the record for us anything that you can in connection with what we are talking about.

Admiral GADDIS. We will do that, sir.

(The information requested follows:)

## SHIPMENT OF PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLES BY MSTs

The rates for shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs within the budget projects were obtained from the cost accounting and statistical reports developed by our variance analysis department of the family allowance activity in Cleveland, Ohio. Though we are in the process of effecting improvements, we now feel that we have the system sufficiently operational to use the historical data being generated in the reports to improve our visibility with regard to moves and rates for PCS budgeting, particularly where MSTs is involved. It should be recognized that rates will fluctuate due to the number of elements involved that create variables in our PCS rates. The more significant of these elements are:

1. Number of cubic feet of space required to transport a privately owned vehicle;
2. Distances involved; and
3. Port handling charges.

A recap of the numbers and estimated amounts for shipment of privately owned vehicles in the 1970 congressional submit shows that for officer members we are experiencing an overall average rate of \$265.67 whereas for enlisted members we are experiencing an overall average rate of \$269.54 per shipment of a vehicle. The following numbers and average rates were used to develop estimates for privately owned vehicles by travel category for fiscal year 1970:

Category	Officers			Enlisted		
	Number	Rate	Amount	Number	Rate	Amount
Accession.....	522	\$264.37	\$138,000	106	\$255.40	\$27,000
Training.....	830	248.19	206,000	636	250.60	159,000
Operational.....	90	268.29	24,000	387	242.72	94,000
Rotational.....	3,426	272.85	935,000	7,410	275.02	2,038,000
Separation.....	456	229.66	104,000	127	239.11	30,000
Organizational units.....	21	600.00	13,000	316	230.77	73,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>5,345</b>	<b>265.67</b>	<b>1,420,000</b>	<b>8,982</b>	<b>269.54</b>	<b>2,421,000</b>

## SHIPMENT OF OFFICERS' VEHICLES

Mr. NUTTMANN. You, of course, appreciate that the rates you are looking at are a function of the dollars and the number of vehicles moved. I am not sure that this represents the actual charges for moving a vehicle. It is strictly an average. Our system for reporting numbers as well as dollars somewhere might well be off.

Mr. ANDREWS. We recognize that, but we are looking at the average here, \$231 to \$275.

On page 65, in connection with shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs, why is the average cost of \$600 per officer's vehicle when the shipment is the result of travel by an organized unit?

On page 1-65, under travel of organized units, subsection 7, shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs, you show 34 shipments at a rate of \$600.

Admiral DUNCAN. They are required to charge for the vehicle regardless of the method of travel.

Mr. ANDREWS. We understand that, but the question is why, when you are shipping organized units, should there be 34 privately owned vehicles? Why should that not be part of the cost of moving the organized unit?

Admiral DUNCAN. We will have to furnish that for the record, Mr. Chairman.

(The information requested follows:)

Travel of organized units are defined as permanent change of station movements resulting from a change of home port/home yard of a ship, from a change

in the permanent duty station of a mobile unit, or from relocation of a shore based activity. Elements of cost which may be associated with organized unit moves are as follows:

1. Member's travel plus per diem when not accompanying the moving unit (gold submarine crew when blue crew operational).
2. Dependents travel.
3. Dislocation allowance.
4. Household effects plus nontemporary storage when applicable.
5. Trailer allowance.
6. Privately owned vehicle.

When transoceanic travel is involved, the member, if otherwise eligible, may ship his privately owned vehicle at Government expense in accordance with Public Law 89-101. The line item for privately owned vehicles in our budget is an integral part of the costs associated with organized unit moves.

Mr. ANDREWS. And also tell us why that figure of \$600 is there.

Admiral GADDIS. I would hypothecate a circumstance. For example, if a ship's home port is changed from, let us say, Japan to the west coast, the members would be allowed transportation of their vehicles in that case.

You note that there is an extremely small number of vehicles to be transferred in this way. The unit cost is related to the specific distance moved as compared to the smaller average for a larger number of moves in the case of rotational travel.

Mr. ANDREWS. Elaborate on that, Admiral, for the record.  
(Information requested follows:)

On page 1-65 of the justification book, under the caption "Shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs" associated with travel of organized units, we have estimated 34 automobiles will be shipped at an average cost of \$600 each for a total cost of \$20,000. A detailed analysis of historical PCS documents utilized in the development of the rate for costing this element reveals that distances were erroneously stated and estimated costs, therefore, were overstated in about one-half of the cases involved. Correctly computed, the average rate should have been \$276 which is consistent with the cost of shipping POV's reflected in other travel categories. Recorded costs have been adjusted and procedures instituted to prevent subsequent over costings. Additionally, it is not believed realistic to draw an analogy between rates for operational/rotational moves as opposed to change of home port/home yard moves because the number of privately owned vehicles shipped under organized unit moves are relatively small and lack diversification in destination. Also, all members on a change of home port/home yard are going to one destination instead of various destinations throughout the world as is the cases of accession, training, operational, rotational, and separation travel.

#### OFFICER VERSUS ENLISTED COST OF SHIPPING VEHICLES

Mr. ANDREWS. Why is there a difference between the MSTs cost of shipping an officer's automobile and the cost of shipping an enlisted man's automobile? For example, under accession travel the rate for an officer's is \$264 and an enlisted man \$255. Under training travel an officer is allowed \$248 and an enlisted man \$251. Under operational travel the rate for an officer is \$268 and an enlisted man is \$243.

Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. NUTTMANN. I would have to investigate it, Mr. Chairman.  
(Information requested follows:)

The rates differ between officer and enlisted member's shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs because of varying magnitudes of elements that are involved in shipping vehicles. For example, a lower or higher rate is due to one or more of the more significant elements listed below:

1. Number of cubic feet (converted to measurement tons) required to transport a vehicle,
2. Distances involved, and
3. Port handling charges.

Mr. ANDREWS. Other than for "rotation travel to and from overseas" why are you requesting funds for the shipment of privately owned vehicles overseas by MSTs?

Mr. NUTTMANN. I would like to answer it for the record, Mr. Chairman. I cannot answer it now.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does anyone have an answer?

Admiral GADDIS. One answer would be the assignment of a home port from United States to overseas or from overseas to United States. This would have the same effect and enablement as rotational travel.

Mr. NUTTMANN. I cannot answer specifically, Mr. Chairman, but because of the definition of the various categories of travel, such as accessions, separations, operational, and rotational, you could well have across water shipments which would incur MSTs charges, but the PCS funds control system, by OSD definition, costs would be charged to separation travel or another travel category rather than to rotational.

#### TRAVEL EXPENSES

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would put the figures in the record, if they are not now available. Show the total amount in this budget for travel of all types and break it down—PCS, shipment of furniture, automobiles, and so on. Give us a one-package statement of travel expenses. (Information requested follows:)

*Fiscal year 1970*

	<i>Amount (in thousands)</i>
<b>Member :</b>	
Land -----	\$64, 201
MSTs -----	1, 064
MAC -----	20, 569
Commercial air -----	4, 923
<b>Total member -----</b>	<b>90, 757</b>
<b>Dependent :</b>	
Land (FAM) -----	13, 926
MSTs -----	2, 169
MAC -----	3, 427
Commercial air -----	2, 468
<b>Total dependent -----</b>	<b>21, 990</b>
<b>HHE :</b>	
Pack, crate, transportation HHE (land) -----	84, 537
Shipment HHE via MSTs -----	16, 760
Dislocation allowance -----	9, 315
Traller allowance -----	1, 764
Nontemporary storage -----	2, 198
Automobiles -----	3, 841
<b>Total funds requested -----</b>	<b>231, 162</b>

Funds were requested for the shipment of privately owned vehicles overseas by MSTs in categories other than "rotational travel to and from overseas" because overseas travel, by OSD definition, is included in all travel categories, for example, accession, separation, operational, rotational, training and organized units.

## MILITARY SEA TRANSPORTATION SERVICE READINESS BILLING

Mr. ANDREWS. In past years you have shown an amount in your budget for MSTs readiness billing. Why do you no longer budget for this charge?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, there was a determination made within the Navy Department that the MSTs billing costs which were previously requested and funded under MPN would be funded under O. & M. Admiral Gaddis spoke to this point when we had our fiscal year 1969 supplemental hearing.

Admiral GADDIS. In brief, Mr. Chairman, the shift is related to the fact that in past years the majority of the readiness billing was related to point-to-point movement of Marine Corps personnel between the United States and overseas. That movement has been reduced to the point that the large bulk of the billing now is related to support, or readiness to support, Marine amphibious lift with the administrative lift by MSTs, and therefore this is a more proper charge to "Operation and maintenance, Navy."

## REENLISTMENT BONUS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Admiral Duncan, in your discussion concerning the reenlistment rate you state that the enlisted rate has dropped year by year until your first-term reenlistment rate is now at about the 1957 level.

Information supplied the subcommittee substantiates this fact.

However, on page 1-32 of the justification book it is shown that reenlistment rate will increase 4,000 in number of enlistees to receive the reenlistment bonus.

In a fact sheet which was supplied to this subcommittee there is shown an increase of only 959 Navy enlistees to receive the reenlistment bonus.

Why is the Navy asking for funds for 3,000 others?

Admiral DUNCAN. The standard enlistment bonus?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Yes. On page 1-32 it shows an increase in the reenlistment rate entitled to a bonus, approximately 4,000. On the fact sheet which the Navy submitted entitled "Navy reenlistment data" it shows only 959 more entitled to a reenlistment bonus. The question is, Why in your justification sheets are you asking for an additional 3,000?

Admiral CRUTCHFIELD. I believe that is due to a greater number of eligibles predicted. This varies from year to year, the number of people eligible for the reenlistment bonus.

I am confident it involves the number of eligibles.

Admiral DUNCAN. In other words, in 1 year we may have a much larger group of men becoming eligible for reenlistment or leaving. This relates to numbers.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I think that is understood, but what we are trying to do is to reconcile the figures. We are talking about \$3 million here. According to your fact sheet, 1969 estimated number reenlisted, for reenlistment bonuses, 41,221. You are estimating for fiscal year 1970 42,180, an increase of 959.

Admiral DUNCAN. I would say 1966 was a much higher recruit input year than 1965.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I am talking about 1969 and 1970.

Admiral DUNCAN. I was speaking to the time that the men became eligible to reenlist.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Am I talking about two different things than you are? One is the fact sheet reenlistment data and one is entitled bonuses.

Mr. ROSENHYMER. Not everybody who reenlists is entitled to a reenlistment bonus. He might have collected the full \$2,000 reenlistment bonus at his first reenlistment. This is why we show figures of people reenlisting much higher than the number of bonuses we expect to pay. There is a difference of around 5,000 people between the number reenlisted and the number of bonuses we expect to pay. It is connected with the legal limitation as to how much money a man can receive as a bonus payment, no more than \$2,000.

A man can receive the full \$2,000 in his first reenlistment. If he reenlists the second time he will get no bonus.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Will you look at those figures and see whether perhaps that might be overestimated?

Admiral GADDIS. We would like to verify them for the record; yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### AMOUNT OF REENLISTMENT BONUSES

The planned level of total reenlistments for fiscal year 1970 is 42,180, an increase of 959 over fiscal year 1969. On page 1-32 it is estimated that 35,690 members, an increase of 3,896 over fiscal year 1969 will receive bonus payments. It would appear that the increase in the numbers estimated to receive bonus payments is excessive compared to the increase in the numbers estimated to reenlist. However, increases in the number of bonus payments do not follow in proportion to the increases in the numbers of planned reenlistments. This is because the relationship between reenlistments and bonus payments varies to the extent that reenlistees for any given year are eligible for reenlistment bonuses. While the career reenlistment rate is the same in both fiscal years, because of a lower average length of service per enlisted man, we are estimating that a greater number of career reenlistees will not have utilized their full \$2,000 legal limitation on such bonuses in fiscal year 1970 than in fiscal year 1969 and must be paid upon reenlistment.

#### NAVY AND MARINE CORPS BRIG POPULATIONS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Can you again this year provide us with some statistics on the disciplinary barracks population?

Admiral DUNCAN. We had in shore station brigs, as of January 31, 1968, 1,756 Navy members actually confined, and 1,909 Marine Corps members. Average load for calendar year 1968 was 1,513 for the Navy and 2,059 for the Marine Corps. At the Disciplinary Command at Portsmouth, actual on board count was 469 Navy and 531 Marine Corps. The average load for calendar year 1968 was 362 Navy and 634 Marine Corps prisoners.

I have additional figures as of December 31, 1968 if you wish them.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Would you put that in the record, please?

(Information requested follows:)

## TOTAL CONFINED, DEC. 31, 1968

	Actual	Years average
<b>Brigs:</b>		
Navy.....	1,230	1,513
Marines.....	2,193	2,059
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>3,423</b>	
<b>Discom:</b>		
Navy.....	260	362
Marines.....	700	634
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>960</b>	

## DISCIPLINE OF MEN IN CONFINEMENT

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Can you tell us what the situation is in regard to your men undergoing confinement? Are you having any troubles? Is your population greater than you are able to accommodate?

Admiral DUNCAN. We are not having any extraordinary problems in our confinement program as such; however, we are crowded in certain of our brig facilities and we have a request in this year to replace the Navy brig at Norfolk, Va., which is one of those which needs it most. The individual brig facilities range from good to very bad. The brig in Norfolk is in the worst condition and we are requesting replacement in the 1970 budget.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Has the Navy any program going on to look at its disciplinary barracks and confinement problems to see whether they can be improved or whether they are all right?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; we do. We have certain instruction programs going on to try to help the men get a high school education and to get further education.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Has the Navy had any complaints or problems such as other services have as to treatment of the prisoners?

Admiral DUNCAN. I have no knowledge of any at this time.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This is an area where the Navy keeps constant watch; is it not?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes.

## PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAMS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. On page 259 of the hearings last year we discussed briefly public relations. How many officers and civilians are doing public relations work in fiscal year 1969 and planned for fiscal year 1970?

Admiral DUNCAN. The figures I gave you yesterday I would like to verify for the record. I have the figure of 1,059 in public affairs assignments.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I had forgotten if we had gone into this yesterday.

On page 259 of last year's hearings there is a statement that you might like to duplicate or bring up to date for fiscal year 1970.

(Information requested follows:)

There are 1,059 military and civilian personnel assigned public information and community relations duties in the naval establishment. This figure includes military and civilian personnel, both clerical and professional.

Professional military-----	572
Professional civilian-----	177
Clerical military-----	122
Clerical civilian-----	188

#### TEMPORARY OFFICER PROMOTIONS

Mr. DAVIS. Do you have any substantial number of officers in the Navy at the present time who are serving in temporary ranks and being paid in temporary ranks beyond their permanent ranks?

Admiral DUNCAN. If you are referring, Mr. Davis, to spot promotions we have in the junior ranks 167 officers at sea serving in and being paid at an advanced rank.

If you speak of the method of promotions, as you know almost all of our promotions are made under the temporary law.

Mr. DAVIS. When the Army people were before us they indicated to us that a very substantial number of their officers were serving in and being paid in ranks above their permanent commission ranks. Is this situation true in the Navy?

Admiral DUNCAN. I believe there are two different subjects here. One is that we do select for and promote under temporary law and then when the numbers are accommodated under permanent law they become permanent in that rank.

Admiral GADDIS. In the Navy we select for temporary promotion and permanent rank follows automatically when the numbers catch up. This is the difference in emphasis.

Mr. DAVIS. You have a so-called limitation on the number of officers in ranks I think it dates back to about 1953 or 1954, along in there.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. The temporary promotions of which you speak, then, permit officers to serve in ranks in greater numbers than what occurs in those ceilings that were established at that time?

Admiral DUNCAN. Established back in 1947, the Officers Personnel Act.

Mr. DAVIS. I think we have to go beyond that. Was there not legislation enacted in about 1953 or 1954 which affected the number of officers you could have in the various ranks?

Admiral DUNCAN. I think we would have to supply for the record the matter of the legislation. If I understand your question, Mr. Davis, we are, under our normal promotion system, selecting for temporary rank but we do not have a further selection for permanent rank. There is one selection and one promotion. Then when there are adequate numbers under the permanent promotion table they are promoted to their permanent ranks.

Mr. DAVIS. I imagine what I am getting at, then, is that somewhere in the gap then has there been authorization by reason of Korea, Vietnam, or something of this kind to permit the promotion of larger number of officers into ranks beyond the limitations imposed in 1953 or 1954 which was a permanent overall legislative ceiling?

Admiral DUNCAN. I will have to furnish that for the record. I do

not believe there has been any change in the Officer Grade Limitation Act.

We are using emergency authority for certain promotions.

Mr. DAVIS. I wish you would provide for us the basis upon which these additional temporary promotions are being made.

I would like to get some idea of this because there are apparently different systems throughout the different branches of the services.

Amiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. If I recall correctly, prior to 1953 or 1954, there were no limitations whatsoever on the number of temporary promotions that could be made in at least some branches of the armed services. I know it was true with respect to the Air Force. I do not believe it was true with respect to the Navy.

(The information requested follows:)

Title 10, United States Code, establishes grade ceilings for temporary and permanent promotions of line officers. The number of officers in grade for the staff corps is the result of the "running mate" system. The number of temporary and permanent grade officers as of January 1, 1969, were (the temporary grade numbers include the permanent grade numbers):

	Flag	Captain	Commander	Lieutenant commander	Lieutenant	Lieutenant, (jg)-ensign
<b>Unrestricted line:</b>						
Permanent.....	150	1,712	3,324	4,986	6,856	10,664
Temporary.....	228	2,500	5,300	7,900	13,576	25,174
<b>Restricted line:</b>						
<b>Engineering duty:</b>						
Permanent.....	15	177	274	301	201	26
Temporary.....	15	193	284	314	226	160
<b>Aero engineering duty:</b>						
Permanent.....	8	93	173	172	42	2
Temporary.....	8	94	176	182	47	34
<b>Special duty:</b>						
Permanent.....	2	79	136	231	85	12
Temporary.....	2	98	168	328	248	100
<b>Staff corps:</b>						
<b>Medical:</b>						
Permanent.....	14	330	484	485	666	0
Temporary.....	14	340	624	917	2,960	3
<b>Dental:</b>						
Permanent.....	3	276	268	273	193	0
Temporary.....	4	283	270	277	1,088	3
<b>JAG:</b>						
Permanent.....	2	79	63	67	28	1
Temporary.....	2	92	73	76	316	102
<b>Medical service:</b>						
Permanent.....		60	186	272	195	32
Temporary.....		63	194	304	463	613
<b>Nurse:</b>						
Permanent.....		18	151	451	84	8
Temporary.....		19	175	674	332	1,261
<b>Chaplain:</b>						
Permanent.....	2	86	222	236	28	0
Temporary.....	2	98	265	341	366	36
<b>Supply:</b>						
Permanent.....	18	325	585	866	939	552
Temporary.....	18	326	597	926	1,396	2,549
<b>Civil engineer:</b>						
Permanent.....	7	124	176	236	298	154
Temporary.....	7	132	198	270	431	1,032

Note: Total permanent grade, 39,364; total temporary grade, 77,965.

Mr. DAVIS. I still have a question in my mind as to whether there is in fact any limitation on the number of temporary promotions to higher ranks that can be made other than the limitations provided here by the appropriations.

## NOMINATIONS TO NAVAL ACADEMY

In your statement, Admiral Duncan, you referred to increased nominations to the Academy by Members of Congress. What is that?

Admiral DUNCAN. A law was passed last year which permitted Members of Congress to nominate a principal and nine alternates, which provides a larger list of applicants from which to screen. We think this would increase the eventual quality of the person who enters.

Mr. DAVIS. It provides you with a larger pool of qualified alternates. That is about what it amounts to.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

## ASSOCIATE DEGREES

Mr. DAVIS. In your statement, also, you referred to associate degrees. What is that concept?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is a program for career enlisted men who have very good records and very good mental ability to go to college the first 2 years, and eventually to attain what is called an associate degree after 2 years.

The numbers at present are very modest. We feel it works in two ways—one, it is certainly a great incentive for individual improvement, and in addition to that we think it makes a better man for the Navy. We therefore like this program very much.

The numbers in it now are really quite modest; 120 will be the requested input for next year, which is not large compared with the total number, but it is for career petty officers of the highest quality.

Mr. DAVIS. Those are people who have had prior service in the Navy who are then assigned to attend college for a period of 2 years?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right. It is being run at four junior colleges at present, mainly in the electrical, technological, and business administration fields.

Mr. DAVIS. A junior college degree.

Admiral DUNCAN. Eligibility is that he must be a career petty officer second class or above, must have completed one or more enlistments, and he has to agree to extend his period of enlistment for 6 years at the time of entry into this program.

This is really to upgrade the career cadre.

Mr. DAVIS. I will ask some questions about the NROTC program this afternoon.

That is all I have now.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, gentlemen, very much.

## AFTERNOON SESSION

## RESERVE PERSONNEL, NAVY

Mr. ANDREWS. The committee will come to order.

We will now consider the fiscal year 1970 budget request for Reserve Personnel, Navy. We will insert in the record the appropriate justification book pages.

(The pages follow :)

Reserve Personnel, Navy

For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the Naval Reserve on active duty under section 265 of title 10, United States Code, or while undergoing reserve training, or while performing drills or equivalent duty, and for members of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, as authorized by law; ~~\$125,000,000~~

\$139,700,000

(10 U.S.C. 683, 1475-80, 2031, 2101-11, 6081-86, 6148; 26 U.S.C. 3121; 37 U.S.C. 204, 206, 301, 305, 309, 402-4, 415-18, 427, 1002; 38 U.S.C. 701-12; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, NAVY

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

07-05-1405-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>			
Direct program:			
1. Reserve component personnel .....	112,225	124,300	129,600
2. Reserve officer candidates .....	8,812	9,200	10,100
Total direct obligations .....	121,037	133,500	139,700
Reimbursable program:			
1. Reserve component personnel .....	11	20	20
10 Total obligations	121,048	133,520	139,720
<u>Financing:</u>			
14 Receipts and reimbursements from Non-Federal sources 1/ .....	-11	-20	-20
25 Unobligated balance lapsing .....	944	....	....
<u>Budget authority</u> .....	121,980	133,500	139,700
Budget authority:			
40 Appropriation .....	118,100	125,000	139,700
42 Transferred from other accounts .....	3,880	.....	.....
43 <u>Appropriation (adjusted)</u> .....	121,980	125,000	139,700

117

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, NAVY

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars) - continued

07-05-1405-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
44.30 <u>Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases</u>	.....	3,500	.....
<u>Proposed supplemental for per diem for Reservists</u>	.....	5,000	.....
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71 Obligations incurred, net . . . . .	121,037	133,500	139,700
72 Obligated balance, start of year. . . . .	16,505	20,751	21,251
74 Obligated balance, end of year. . . . .	-20,751	-21,251	-23,951
77 Adjustments in expired accounts. . . . .	+394	.....	.....
90 Outlays, excluding supplementals . . . . .	117,184	125,700	135,800
91.30 Outlays from military pay act supplemental . .	.....	3,000	500
Outlays from per diem to Reservists supplemental	.....	4,300	700
1/ Reimbursements from non-Federal sources are derived from undeliverable checks.			

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, NAVY

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

07-05-1405-0-1-051	19 68 <i>actual</i>	19 69 <i>estimate</i>	19 70 <i>estimate</i>
Direct Obligations:			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military .....	97,831	104,756	107,983
12.2 Personnel benefits: Military .....	6,325	6,775	7,608
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons .....	10,097	15,519	17,102
26.0 Supplies and materials .....	6,709	6,360	6,907
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities .....	75	90	100
Total direct obligations	121,037	133,500	139,700
Reimbursable Obligations:			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military .....	11	20	20
99.0 Total Obligations .....	121,048	133,520	139,720

Department of the Navy  
Reserve Personnel, Navy

APPROPRIATION INTRODUCTION  
(In thousands)

	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
Total Direct Obligations	\$121,037	\$133,500	\$139,700
Net Adjustments	+944	-	-
Proposed for later transmission	-	-8,500	-
Appropriation	121,980	125,000	139,700

The "Reserve Personnel, Navy" appropriation provides financial support for the Naval Reserve. As individually entitled, Reserve personnel and Reserve officer candidates who perform prescribed training receive pay and allowances, uniforms, clothing, subsistence in kind, travel to and from training and miscellaneous benefits authorized by law. This appropriation also provides funds for the pay and allowances and permanent change of station travel of selected Naval Reserve officers on active duty. These officers are assigned to designated headquarters locations for the training and administration of Naval Reservists.

The Naval Reserve has a twofold mission. This component of the Navy produces trained units and qualified individuals ready for instant mobilization in time of war or national emergency. It also is the source of a continuing supply of personnel for the regular Navy.

Reserve personnel are trained by drills and active duty for training. Drills are conducted at specified intervals in training centers or facilities, at air stations and aboard ships or planes. Active duty for training of two weeks duration is required of all members in a drill pay status. It is also made available to those members not in a drill pay status who have already served on active duty and desire to maintain their skills. Enlisted members being trained in certain aviation programs are provided active duty for training ranging in length from four to ten months. In addition, school and special tours of active duty for training are offered to selected personnel who wish to qualify quickly in certain rates and specialties.

Reserve officer candidates are trained to qualify for commissions in the regular Navy and in the Naval Reserve. Their training consists partly of academic courses and partly of active duty during the summer months. The Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) students are enrolled in colleges and universities throughout the United States. During the school year they pursue studies in acceptable curricula and in naval sciences. During summer vacations they are given ship or shore based professional naval training of eight weeks. The Reserve Officer Candidates (ROC and AVROC) are provided professional naval training of eight weeks during each of two summers at the Officer Candidate School, Newport, Rhode Island and the Naval School, Pre-flight, Pensacola. Women Officer Candidates (OC-WAVE) are given one period of training of eight weeks following their junior year of college at the Officer Candidate School (Women), Newport, Rhode Island. NROTC students are enrolled in high schools throughout the country and receive training in naval sciences and orientation.

For fiscal year 1970, \$139,700,000 are requested to support the personnel strengths and kinds of training indicated on the following pages.

Department of the Navy  
Reserve Personnel, Navy

## RESERVE PERSONNEL IN PAID STATUS

Pay group	Paid drills	Paid Days of Active Duty for Training	Off. or Enl.	Fiscal year 1968			Fiscal year 1969		Fiscal year 1970	
				Begin	Average	End	Average	End	Average	End
A	48	15	Off. Enl.	20,761 101,516	20,500 102,735	20,352 101,497	19,153 107,095	18,980 113,450	19,000 107,458	19,020 108,384
B	24	15	Off. Enl.	1,444 35	1,111 25	1,036 21	796 -	800 -	795 -	776 -
F	0	90-180	Enl.	980	895	998	762	762	800	800
Paid Drill Training			Off.	22,205	21,611	21,388	19,949	19,780	19,795	19,816
Sub-Total			Enl.	102,531	103,655	102,516	107,857	114,212	108,258	109,184
			Total	124,736	125,266	123,904	127,806	133,992	128,053	129,000
D	0	15	Off. Enl.	6,800 423	6,714 311	6,714 311	3,400 250	3,400 250	2,800 550	2,800 550
E	0	30	Enl.	406	313	313	300	300	-	-
Paid Active Duty Training only,			Off.	6,800	6,714	6,714	3,400	3,400	2,800	2,800
Sub-Total			Enl.	829	624	624	550	550	550	550
			Total	7,629	7,338	7,338	3,950	3,950	3,350	3,350
Total Paid Status			Off.	29,005	28,325	28,102	23,349	23,180	22,595	22,616
			Enl.	103,360	104,279	103,140	108,407	114,762	108,808	109,734
			Total	132,365	132,604	131,242	131,756	137,942	131,403	132,350

Department of the Navy  
Reserve Personnel, Navy

SUMMARY OF RESERVE OFFICER CANDIDATE STRENGTH  
(Average numbers)

	<u>1968</u> <u>Actual</u>	<u>1969</u> <u>Estimate</u>	<u>1970</u> <u>Estimate</u>	<sup>+</sup> <u>-Difference</u> <u>1970</u> <u>Compared with</u> <u>1969</u>
Senior NROTC	4,646	5,145	4,959	-186
Scholarship NROTC	4,834	4,935	5,047	+112
Reserve officer candidates	1,885	1,890	1,895	+5
OC(W) college juniors	<u>24</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>-</u>
Total	11,389	11,989	11,920	-69

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS

(In thousands)

Bud. Act. No.	Budget Activity	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate	<sup>+</sup> Difference 1970 compared with 1969	Justi- fica- tion page
1	Reserve component personnel	\$112,225	\$124,300	\$129,600	\$+5,300	2-10
2	Reserve officer candidates	8,812	9,200	10,100	+900	2-25
	Total direct obligations	121,037	133,500	139,700	+6,200	
	Appropriated	-	125,000	-	-	
	Proposed supplemental	-	8,500	-	-	

Department of the Navy  
Reserve Personnel, Navy

BUDGET ACTIVITY 1: RESERVE COMPONENT PERSONNEL  
SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS

(In thousands)

Budget Project No.	Budget Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate	±Difference 1970 compared with 1969
1A	Reserve Personnel Training-- Pay Group A	\$94,935	\$105,198	\$109,666	\$+4,468
1B	Reserve Personnel Training-- Pay Group B	1,160	1,009	1,072	+63
1C	Reserve Personnel Training-- Pay Group D	3,856	2,467	2,032	-435
1D	Reserve Personnel Training-- Pay Group E	102	109	-	-109
1E	Reserve Personnel Training-- Pay Group F	2,162	1,925	2,050	+125
1F	Reserve Personnel School Training	5,054	8,002	8,073	+71
1G	Reserve Personnel Special Training	2,427	2,941	2,906	-35
1H	Reserve Personnel Administra- tion and Support	2,529	2,649	3,801	+1,152
	Total Direct Obligations	112,225	124,300	129,600	+5,300

Department of the Navy  
Reserve Personnel, Navy

BUDGET ACTIVITY 2: RESERVE OFFICER CANDIDATES

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS

(In thousands)

Budget Project No.	Budget Project	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate	Difference 1970 compared with 1969
2A	Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps	\$2,120	\$2,263	\$2,323	+\$60
2B	Scholarship Program	4,499	4,624	5,153	+529
2C	Junior ROTC Program	1,085	728	1,055	+327
2D	Reserve Officer Candidates	1,108	1,585	1,569	-16
	Total Direct Obligations	8,812	9,200	10,100	+900

Mr. ANDREWS. For this appropriation the Navy is requesting \$139,700,000, an increase of \$6.2 million over the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

### GENERAL STATEMENT

Admiral Duncan, I think it would be helpful if we inserted in the record at this point the part of your statement which you have given with reference to the Reserve program on page 10, and the next paragraph, "Funding requirements, Reserve personnel, Navy," which ends on page 11, so we will have all of your statement at one place in the record.

(The statement follows:)

*Reserve program.*—The Navy's selected reserve has a membership composed of about 38 percent nonrated and 62 percent top six personnel, that is, page grade E-4 through E-9. This is very satisfying progress from a mix of about 70 percent nonrated and 30 percent top six of a few years ago. It is accounted for by the increased addition of veterans returning from active duty. We hope this trend continues since our mobilization requirements are largely for petty officers. At present, 85 percent of all reservists who go to active duty do so in the highest nonrated pay grade (E-3). This is a credit to the emphasis being placed on pre-active duty training within the reserve units themselves. Because of this emphasis, more of the men achieve petty officer status while on active duty, first-term reenlistments are favorably affected, and more combat and fleet-trained petty officers released from active duty become members of a trained Ready Reserve.

*Funding requirements—RPN.*—The request for funding under the appropriation "Reserve personnel, Navy," for fiscal year 1970 is \$139,700,000. This amount will provide an average Reserve strength in drill pay status of 129,000, adjusted to 128,053 to reflect the two CB battalions now on active duty. It will also provide training tours for 3,350 personnel in nondrill pay status and 12,381 tours in essential schools and special training. This estimate also provides for an average of 10,006 regular and contract enrollees in the NROTC program and for 1,914 students under instruction during the summer in the Reserve Officer Candidate (ROC) and Aviation Reserve Officer Candidate programs.

### NAVY RESERVE PERSONNEL BY PAY STATUS

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Duncan, you are requesting funds for the pay of 131,403 Navy Reserve personnel. This strength is composed of paid drill training, 128,053; paid active duty training only, 3,350; for a total of 131,403. Is that correct?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the difference between these two groups with respect to their obligation, the type of training they receive, and the annual cost?

Admiral DUNCAN. The 128,053 which later in the year will be corrected to 129,000 when the CB's return to inactive duty, are required to perform drills, to be listed as a member of drill pay units, and are liable to call up by the President as part of the Selected Reserve by the President. He has that authority until July 1, 1969.

The 3,350 are what is known as category D. These are officers and enlisted personnel, and they are not attached to drill pay units or in drill pay status, but they perform 2 weeks of active duty training with pay per year.

So, the first part of the group which you asked about are those who are required to perform a set number of drills per year and 2 weeks'

active duty training. The second part of that group performs 2 weeks active duty for training only.

Mr. ANDREWS. You said this figure 128,053 would be increased?

RETURN OF RESERVE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS FROM ACTIVE DUTY

Admiral DUNCAN. There are two CB battalions now on active duty, and when they are returned to inactive duty, that will bring the Selected Reserve up to 129,000.

Mr. ANDREWS. Even?

Admiral DUNCAN. Even.

Mr. Chairman, it would be 129,000 average throughout the year.

TOTAL NAVY RESERVE STRENGTH

Mr. ANDREWS. Are these all Reserve's that the Navy has, 131,403?

Admiral DUNCAN. No. The Navy has Reserves totaling 491,324, which are broken down into several categories which I would be glad to read or to provide for the record.

Mr. ANDREWS. You may provide it for the record.

(The information follows:)

As of Nov. 30, 1968:

1. Ready Reserve:

Pay status—Selected Reserve.....	128,287
Nonpay status.....	227,853

Total Ready Reserve.....	356,140
--------------------------	---------

2. Standby Reserve, active status.....	17,177
--	--------

3. Standby Reserve, inactive status.....	21,634
--	--------

4. Retired Reserve.....	96,373
-------------------------	--------

Grand total, inactive duty.....	491,324
---------------------------------	---------

Mr. ANDREWS. These are the only ones in the so-called ready class, the Ready Reserve?

Admiral DUNCAN. The ones that I gave you, the 129,000, are in the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve.

Mr. ANDREWS. This is the Navy's counterpart of the Army National Guard?

Admiral DUNCAN. They are the ones ready to go, ready for callup.

READINESS POSTURE

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the readiness posture of the Navy Reserve at the current time?

Admiral DUNCAN. The readiness posture, Mr. Chairman, varies a great deal with the unit and with the hardware with which they are equipped. I think in general they are very good. In certain cases, particularly, of course, in the Air Reserve where aircraft had to be withdrawn, they do not have the hardware to go with the units. But where they do have the hardware, as in the antisubmarine warfare squadrons or as in the Ready Reserve destroyer training group, their readiness is quite good.

I might ask Admiral Burke if he would like to amplify on that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Burke?

**Admiral BURKE.** The ships that we have in the antisubmarine element are fleet fallout. They are ready for employment off the coastal shores of the United States if required. We have destroyers and destroyer escorts and minesweepers in this category. If they were to be deployed overseas, they would require preparation for overseas movement and some additional refresher training with active fleet ships. Depending on the state of the particular training of the ship, it would take between 2 and 16 weeks to make ready for overseas deployment.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Let us take, as an example, one of your reservists attached to a destroyer unit. If you called him up, would you call him up individually, or would you call up his unit to go to destroyer duty?

**Admiral BURKE.** If the ship were called, he would go with the ship.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Are all your units attached to ships?

**Admiral BURKE.** No, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** I am thinking about a unit that has had training in destroyer work. I assume at the base you have some destroyer equipment with which to train.

**Admiral BURKE.** Yes, sir. We have what is called the fleet augmentation unit. They could be designated to augment destroyers or the amphibious force.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Are those augmentation forces included in the number of paid drill trainees?

**Admiral BURKE.** The augmentation personnel fall within this group; yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Back to my question. Suppose you had occasion to call up some of these augmentation reservists, would you call them individually, or would you call them as a group?

**Admiral BURKE.** It would depend on the nature of the callup.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You want to man a destroyer or beef up one that is already in service. You need additional manpower.

**Admiral BURKE.** You would call up a fleet augment unit and assign those people to the type commander who would redistribute them within his available resources and his requirements.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How long would it take to get that individual man who is a reservist ready to take his place on board that ship?

**Admiral BURKE.** He is ready. He carries his orders in his pocket.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** He is ready to go?

**Admiral BURKE.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is that true of all these 129,000 paid drill trainees?

**Admiral BURKE.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** So, this is the backbone of your reserve program.

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The Selected Reserve; yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the difference in the state of readiness between this group we are talking about and the next group? Which group would be after the paid drill training group in readiness?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The Ready Reserve that is not in drill pay status.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How long would it take to get them in condition to join the fleet?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** I will ask Admiral Burke to respond.

**Admiral BURKE.** We normally consider 30 days.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How many do you have in that group?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** We have 227,800 in the active status pool, is that right?

Admiral BURKE. That is close to it.

Mr. ANDREWS. How do you designate that group?

Admiral BURKE. They are in the Ready Reserve pool.

Mr. ANDREWS. But they are not paid drill trainees?

Admiral BURKE. No, sir.

Admiral GADDIS. They are not in the Selected Reserve, sir.

Admiral BURKE. The Ready Reserve has within its body the Selected Reserve, the 129,000 we have just been discussing.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is this 129,000 a part of the 227,800 figure you gave me?

Admiral BURKE. This would be in addition to it.

Mr. ANDREWS. These 227,800 can be ready for fleet duty within 30 days?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. I would like to qualify this, Mr. Chairman. The Ready Reserve includes those who do not drill. Some of them can drill and do. Others do not, but they have their 6-year obligation in accordance with law, and they remain in that pool until they have completed their obligation.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they get any kind of training while they are in that pool?

Admiral BURKE. It is not mandatory. You see, our reservists—I am talking about the enlisted men—serve 2 years on active duty. We feel that they are better trained, having had that much active duty as opposed to those who serve, for example, only 6 months and have a mandatory drilling requirement.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the group that serves 2 years and then are put in the Reserve. That is the group you could get ready in 30 days?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. These 129,000 ready reservists have orders in their pockets?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have various types in this 129,000, I believe you said.

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. All types—destroyers—

Admiral BURKE. We have destroyers, minesweepers, destroyer escorts.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does this also include your air people?

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Everything.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Admiral BURKE. And Reserve construction battalions.

#### EXPERIENCE IN CALLUP OF RESERVE CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS

Mr. ANDREWS. How long were the two CB battalions in training before deployment to active duty?

Admiral DUNCAN. They were called up in May.

Admiral BURKE. One was deployed in August and the other was deployed in September, I believe.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Three or four months.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why did it take so long? I thought you said they were in this category that had orders in their pockets.

Admiral GADDIS. They came to active duty, sir, but they were stationed stateside, and they picked up their normal spot in the rotation of CB battalions in August and September.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, they were ready to go when called up?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. They did not have to have additional training?

Admiral BURKE. They were sent down to Gulfport, the training center, and they were brought through a regular training cycle that the active construction battalions were submitted to. They were put into the rotation cycle.

Mr. ANDREWS. They were not ready to go, then, when called up, were they?

Admiral BURKE. Specifically, no, sir. When you say ready to go, they were not ready for overseas deployment; no, sir, they were not.

Admiral DUNCAN. May I suggest this would be a matter of degree, because even the regular CB battalions and every other Regular who goes to Vietnam gets very special training, as you know. So, they were ready to come to active duty and did go to Gulfport, as Admiral Burke mentioned. They had to be slightly readjusted as to structure. We had some volunteers who went with the unit. They were sent down there and formed up into a battalion.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, they were in a ready status, but they had to have additional training because of the unique duty they had assigned in Vietnam.

Admiral GADDIS. As Regular CB units do who go to Vietnam.

Mr. ANDREWS. When are these two battalions scheduled to be deactivated?

Admiral DUNCAN. We will deactivate them within 30 days after their return from Vietnam deployment. One returned on March 14, I believe it was, last week in any event. We advised them that they will be deactivated or put on inactive duty within 30 days after their return to the continental United States.

The other unit will also be deactivated this spring; April or May.

Mr. ANDREWS. Was the morale of the people good when they left and when they came back? Do you know anything about that?

Admiral BURKE. The reports back have been most favorable. They have done outstanding work out there.

#### CONSTRUCTION BATTALION ROTATION CYCLE TO VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. What was the reason for recalling them? Had they been there a year?

Admiral DUNCAN. You mean called to active duty?

Mr. ANDREWS. No; called back from Vietnam.

Admiral DUNCAN. They had completed their 8 months' deployment, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral GADDIS. The normal tour in Vietnam is 8 months, sir, for CBs.

Admiral DUNCAN. CB's are different from the rest of the Navy people they deploy over there as a unit for 8 months and come back to the United States for 6 months. Then the cycle begins over again. Individuals go for 1 year. So, there is a difference in the way we handle the CB battalions.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have much work to be done in Vietnam by CBs or are you on top of it?

Admiral GADDIS. There is a total at this time of 10 CB battalions.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they reservists or regular Navy?

Admiral GADDIS. Most of them are Regular Navy.

Mr. ANDREWS. You still have a lot of work for them?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir. Admiral Husband maintains they are the hardest working sailors in Vietnam.

Mr. ANDREWS. They had a mighty good reputation in World War II.

Admiral GADDIS. They are embellishing it in this war, also, sir.

#### FULL TWO WEEKS TRAINING VITALIZATION ACT

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2-12, you are requesting an increase of \$4,680,000, from \$105,198,000 to \$109,666,000, for pay group A. We note that the increase results from changes in rates rather than from increases in average number of personnel.

If we apply your 1969 rates to your 1970 personnel strength in the various categories, we find you will need about \$400,000 less in 1970 than you have in 1969. Why do all your rates increase in 1970 when the comparable rates for the Active Navy remain relatively constant?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, this is a result of complying with the Vitalization Act wherein we were required to add 2 days to the active duty training tour. Instead of 13.6 days, they are now paid for 15.6 days, 14 days for training and 1.6 days' travel time.

Mr. ANDREWS. Would that be for all categories?

Mr. NUTTMANN. No, sir, the 2 additional days apply to pay groups A and B only.

Admiral GADDIS. There is a slight adjustment of average grade, as well.

Mr. NUTTMANN. That could happen.

Mr. ANDREWS. Should not the rates for 1970 be the same as the revised estimate for fiscal year 1969?

Mr. NUTTMANN. No, sir, because we do not have the 2 extra days in the 1969 column.

Mr. ANDREWS. When did that act go into effect?

Admiral BURKE. It became effective January 1, 1968, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. If it was January 1968, it should have been in the 1969 column, should it not?

Mr. NUTTMANN. We were not able to get it into the 1969 column, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. I guess you put your 1969 budget together before January 1968.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Mr. ANDREWS. The 1969 column of the 1970 budget is an update of your original estimate for 1969?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, sir, it is. We asked for about \$8.5 million more than the Congress allowed for our Military Personnel Reserve budget.

Mr. ANDREWS. Then the rates between 1969 and 1970 should be comparable or should be the same, because the law went into effect on January 1, 1968, and that was taken into effect in your supplemental request for 1969.

Admiral GADDIS. I think the problem is this, sir: The supplemental was specifically restricted as to what may be included therein.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is it not a fact that in the supplemental request you have the increased per diem rate for your Reservists and other categories?

Mr. NUTTMANN. That is true. We were not able to get the 2 days' additional active duty tour time into the supplemental. We got the per diem and we got the pay raise, but that was the size of it.

Mr. ANDREWS. What 2 days' extra are you talking about?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Public Law 90-168 required that our Reserves serve on active duty for training for not less than 14 days—exclusive of traveltime—during each year. Previously we had not done this.

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2-14, you are requesting an increase of \$63,000 for pay group B training. This increase is also based solely on increased rates in 1970. Would you comment on that?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The same reasons apply there that we gave for pay group A.

#### ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2-24 of the justifications, you show an increase of \$1,152,000 for administration and support. Of this total increase, \$1,118,000 is for pay and allowances of officers. Why does the number of officers increase from 170 in 1969 to 225 in 1970?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, there have been designated 225 billets, with agreement of the Department of Defense, for the direct administration of the Reserve program. It was the determination about 3 years ago, sir, that these 225 billets—these are active duty people, now—would be supported out of the Reserve personnel, Navy appropriation.

We never were able to get the full 225 people charged to Reserve Personnel, Navy. During the last budget review process with the OSD, we asked them if we could have enough money to go up to the full 225. They agreed, and that is the basis for the increase in our request, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Once a man leaves a Reserve outfit for active duty, is he considered a member of the Navy rather than of the Reserves?

Admiral DUNCAN. He is considered a member of the active duty force.

Mr. ANDREWS. U.S. Naval Reserve on active duty?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. But he is still a reservist?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Back to these officers. Why does their average compensation increase from \$14,612 in 1969 to \$16,009 in 1970?

Admiral DUNCAN. I believe that is the pay increase, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. The pay increase was in the revised column of the 1969 budget.

Mr. NUTTMANN. No, sir. Mr. Chairman, that is not the pay increase. All other things being equal, those two rates should be the same. In picking up the additional 55 numbers, we have picked up some pretty high-graded individuals, so their average pay would be higher than we show here in fiscal year 1969.

Mr. ANDREWS. All right.

What do these 225 officers do? Are they considered on active duty?

Mr. NUTTMANN. They are on active duty, yes, sir. They fill billets specifically related to the administration of the Reserves.

Mr. ANDREWS. What grade officers are they?

Mr. NUTTMANN. They run the gamut, sir, admirals on down. In fact, the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel for Naval Reserve and Naval District Affairs is an admiral, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. In the Regular Navy?

Mr. NUTTMANN. He is on active duty, yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. But is he a Reserve officer?

Mr. NUTTMANN. He is a Reserve officer.

Mr. ANDREWS. On active duty?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, sir.

#### ADMIRALS IN RESERVE

Mr. ANDREWS. How many admirals do you have in the Reserve?

Admiral DUNCAN. We have a total of 49, with two on active duty at present. We have one additional one selected. He will be the third one.

Mr. ANDREWS. When they go on active duty, they get regular Navy pay?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is correct.

#### SENIOR ROTC PROGRAM

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2-27, you are requesting an increase of \$60,000 for senior ROTC. The \$60,000 increase is almost entirely a result of the increased rates in 1970. What caused these rates to increase?

Mr. NUTTMANN. You are speaking to page 2-27, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. ANDREWS. Right.

Mr. NUTTMANN. And the increase of something less than \$100,000?

Mr. ANDREWS. \$60,000.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What I would like to know is why did these items such as pay and allowances for summer camp training increase?

Admiral GADDIS. That reflects a few more days' pay in relation to summer camp training, and an increase in the total amount of subsistence for each trainee.

Mr. ANDREWS. You may supply the answer for the record.

Mr. NUTTMANN. Thank you, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### INCREASES IN SENIOR ROTC PROGRAM

(In thousands of dollars)

Explanation	1969 estimate	1970 estimate	Difference
Increase of 17 members eligible to receive subsistence allowance.....	877	886	+9
Slight increase in cost of uniform.....	574	579	+5
Increase in man-days.....	431	455	+24
Do.....	170	175	+5
Variation in cruise locations.....	211	228	+17
Total increase.....	2,263	2,323	+60

## NROTC TRAVEL

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2-28, you indicate that 5,363 Reserve officer candidates will travel for training. If you have only 3,850 students in the program, what makes up the other 1,513 which you estimate will be traveling?

You show, on page 2-28 under 2B4, "Pay and allowances, summer camp training," under the 1970 estimate, 3,850. Then under 2B6, "Travel of Reserve officer candidates," 5,363. You have nearly twice as many in the travel category as you show you have on board.

Do you see those figures?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, I seem them, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral GADDIS. The only explanation I have, sir, is that the additional travelers are those who are accessions to the program this year. Is that right, Mr. Kenyon?

Mr. KENYON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is a pretty big difference, 1,513.

Admiral GADDIS. That would be new inputs to the program, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, this figure 3,850 would not be correct.

Admiral GADDIS. No, sir. You notice the first number is 4,873, sir. That is the number planned for subsistence payments. The 3,850 figure is the number traveling to camp.

Mr. ROBENHYMER. There are 3,850 traveling to summer camp, and, in addition, there are 1,500 new inputs to the program, freshmen coming into the NROTC program for which travel funds have to be provided.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would look at this very carefully and explain it as thoroughly as you can in the record.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

The number of 5,363 shown as traveling is made up of the following:

Personnel already in the program traveling to summer camp-----	3, 850
New enrollees traveling from home to college (these students will go to their first summer camp at the end of the school year)-----	1, 513
Total -----	5, 363

The number of 4,873 drawing subsistence allowance is based on the average strength during the year of personnel already in the program plus the new enrollees.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why has the rate for travel increased by \$32.52 in 1970, up from \$139.40 in 1969 to \$171.92 in 1970?

Mr. NUTTMANN. Mr. Chairman, The increased rate is due to additional members performing summer training overseas which makes that travel cost per trainee higher in fiscal year 1970.

## JUNIOR ROTC PROGRAM

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 2.29 of your justification, you show approximately a 45-percent increase in the number of uniforms to be issued in connection with the junior ROTC program. Are you planning an expansion of this program in 1970?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, we are.

Mr. ANDREWS. Explain it to us, Admiral Duncan.

Admiral DUNCAN. We have a planned expansion each year of the Junior ROTC program. The 1970 expansion is from 55 to 78 schools, or 23 additional schools in the 1970 program.

Mr. ANDREWS. I suppose that requires more uniforms.

Admiral DUNCAN. And from 11,000 to 16,614 participants; in other words, about 5,000 more students.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are these all high school ROTC units?

Admiral DUNCAN. Generally, yes sir. However, some academies are also included, such as the Admiral Farragut academies in New Jersey and Florida.

Mr. ANDREWS. What will the total number be?

Admiral DUNCAN. In 1970, there will be 16,614 participants.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many schools?

Admiral DUNCAN. Seventy-eight.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you planning any more beyond the 78?

Admiral DUNCAN. Our ultimate goal is 245 schools, depending upon funding and authorization. That would be in fiscal year 1973.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have those 245 schools been authorized?

Admiral DUNCAN. We have to ask each year for authorization for the funding for these schools. So far as the Department of Defense authorization is concerned, yes.

#### STATUS OF NROTC PROGRAM AT COLLEGES

Mr. ANDREWS. Are naval ROTC units located on any college campuses that are contemplating canceling their ROTC program?

Admiral DUNCAN. They are located on campuses where there have been faculty votes concerning the credit to be given and the status of the professor. They have not voted to cancel the program per se. They have voted to change the status in certain of the colleges.

The Department of Defense is engaged in negotiations with these colleges on the Defense level.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you know of any demonstrations that have occurred on any of the college campuses because of the presence of naval ROTC units on the campus?

Admiral DUNCAN. I cannot recall specific ones directed at the NROTC. We have had some demonstrations when our recruiters came on certain campuses.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have any of your ROTC activities been curtailed or interfered with by demonstrating students?

Admiral DUNCAN. We have had some physical damage to certain buildings, the responsibility for which has not been fixed, at Stanford and Washington, among others. We had one in Oregon where the accused people were arraigned before the grand jury. I do not know the current status of that particular case.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you anticipate any problems with regard to officer procurement as a result of actions contemplated by some of the colleges?

Admiral DUNCAN. If the colleges actually withdrew all credit, we could anticipate some difficulty, because the student hours required for the NROTC are substantial, and the student may not be able to carry

this load and still obtain his degree. This is an area in which we wish to negotiate to see that we get academic credit where we think it is due.

Mr. ANDREWS. An NROTC student carries a pretty good academic load; does he not?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. In addition to drilling and activity incident to naval training?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us briefly—we generally know and have been told, but not in recent years—about your NROTC program. How long does it last? What benefits does the young man get? What does he receive upon graduation?

Admiral DUNCAN. The NROTC program differs quite a bit from the other two services. In the first place, we have a nationwide selection to get into the program, and the young man then applies to one of the 53 colleges.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is very competitive; is it not?

Admiral DUNCAN. It is very competitive. We have about 20,000 applicants for roughly 1,700 entrants. This is our scholarship program. In the scholarship program—I will mention the other one later—in the scholarship program the Navy pays for tuition, books, and administrative expenses, and the young man is given a \$50-a-month so-called subsistence allowance. Upon successful completion of 4 years and obtaining a degree, he is obligated to serve for 4 years as an officer in the Regular Navy.

Mr. ANDREWS. He is in as an ensign?

Admiral DUNCAN. He is in as an ensign.

#### COMPARISON OF NROTC SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM WITH NAVAL ACADEMY

Mr. ANDREWS. How do the pay and other benefits he gets compare with a cadet at the Academy at Annapolis?

Admiral DUNCAN. I think it would be very difficult to make such a comparison, Mr. Chairman. At Annapolis, as you know, they are there 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, and in a completely regimented environment. They are paid a stipulated amount. They take their entire available hours as directed by the Academy. So, I think it would be very difficult to equate what the individual receives. They are under entirely different conditions. The Academy graduate at present is required to serve for 5 years minimum.

Mr. ANDREWS. That requirement has not been the law for too many years, has it?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, sir. We would prefer, of course, that his service be voluntary and extend for an entire career. That was passed about 1964, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. I was on the committee here when the action was taken. So many resigned upon graduation.

Admiral DUNCAN. We can and did administratively hold them as we do the NROTC now. We could administratively hold the Naval Academy graduate. However, the Congress saw fit at that time to pass a law governing it.

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you say a young man who goes through the NROTC program in a first-rate college receives as good an education as does a man at the Academy?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** He receives as good an education. Basically, Mr. Chairman, we believe the officer corps is stronger by receiving people from different sources with different backgrounds and with different educational majors. As you know, the Academy, even if it were desirable, is not large enough to provide all the regular officers for the Navy.

**Mr. DAVIS.** Could we go off the record a minute?  
(Off the record.)

#### JUNIOR ROTC PROGRAM

**Mr. DAVIS.** What do you have of benefit to the Navy, once a young man has participated in the junior ROTC and has graduated from high school? Then what do you expect from him?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** I believe the main benefits, Mr. Davis, are really to improve his citizenship and, hopefully, to give him an initial motivation toward the Navy.

The Junior ROTC graduate enters one grade higher?

**Mr. KENYON.** Yes, sir; E-2.

**Admiral DUNCAN.** He may enter the Navy as an E-2, but the main benefits are, as I said, citizenship and some initial motivation.

**Mr. DAVIS.** What potential does he have as far as the regular NROTC programs go?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** I would say the main potential lies in interesting good students and qualified people in the NROTC and in the Naval Academy, rather than in a concrete translation.

**Mr. DAVIS.** In other words, he is not, per se, having satisfactorily completed the Junior ROTC course, shall we say, a priority or in some sense a privileged candidate as far as NROTC goes?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** He has to compete equally with others.

#### RESERVE OFFICER CANDIDATE PROGRAM

**Mr. DAVIS.** When would a Reserve officer candidate enter that program as contrasted to NROTC?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** The Reserve officer candidate enters into the program as a college junior, and he takes two periods of summer training. He is not trained at all during the college year. That is the Reserve officer candidate program. We call it the ROC program.

**Mr. DAVIS.** He goes to summer training for 4 years?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** 2 years.

**Mr. DAVIS.** Just for 2 years?

**Admiral DUNCAN.** Yes.

**Mr. DAVIS.** And satisfactorily finishes his college course with a degree. What is his status then as far as the Navy is concerned?

#### TRANSFER OF RESERVE OFFICERS TO REGULAR NAVY

**Admiral DUNCAN.** He is commissioned as an ensign, USNR, comes on active duty, and subsequently has the option to join the Regular Navy (USN).

We try to get the best ones to apply for the Regular Navy and stay in.

Mr. DAVIS. Is his status substantially the same, then, as your NROTC graduate?

Admiral DUNCAN. The status of all young Reserve officers, in a sense, is substantially the same. They have come different routes and have different strong and weak points when they first arrive.

If they transfer to the Regular Navy, in the very long pull we feel they have an equal chance. We try to get the best of the young Reserve officers to transfer to the Regular Navy. Approximately 23 percent, for example, from the Officer Candidate School currently are staying in the Navy.

#### WAYS OF BECOMING A RESERVE NAVAL OFFICER

Mr. DAVIS. If a young graduate from high school wants to qualify himself for a commission as a Reserve officer in the Navy, he has two routes. He can go to NROTC in one of the 54 colleges in which you sponsor this program. He must then compete in a nationwide examination to be chosen as one of those who could then enter one of the 54 colleges in which the program exists. Or he might go the other route of the ROC program and graduate from college with his degree, and he would be in substantially the same position as the NROTC graduate.

How does he get in the Reserve officer candidate program as a high school graduate?

Admiral DUNCAN. He applies and enlists in the Naval Reserve. He applies through our normal recruiting procedure.

There is a third route which you did not mention, and that is, the young man who completes his college training, gets his degree, and then goes to Officer Candidate School. This again produces an ensign, USNR, at the end of his training after graduating from college.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they go through the officer procurement offices?

Admiral DUNCAN. We have combined them now with the recruiting service. The recruiting service largely processes them. They do conduct interviews. They give them several batteries of tests. But the final screening is done here in Washington.

Mr. ANDREWS. That was true back during World War II.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. You called them procurement officers.

Admiral DUNCAN. We had them separate then.

Mr. ANDREWS. I know I went through New Orleans, was examined in several different ways, but my final orders came out of Washington. Is that about the procedure today?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is correct. The final judgment is made in the same manner as at the time of World War II.

One of the reasons, particularly now, for concentrating the final

selection in Washington—I am talking now of the young men who are going to the Officer Candidate School—is the very high number who are applying. The process for the selection of the NROTC is somewhat different. As you know, we have State committees who pass on candidates for NROTC.

I would like to finish answering part of the chairman's question. I talked about the scholarship plan for NROTC. There is the other section which we call the contract, or in the law I believe it is called the senior program. This young man only receives his uniform his first 2 years, and then he starts his last 2 years to receive a subsistence allowance. He does not receive tuition and books. He has only a 3-year obligation.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does he drill and take naval courses along with the scholarship candidate?

Admiral DUNCAN. He does, indeed.

#### SOURCES OF NEW OFFICERS

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you supply for the record the source of your new officers for fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970? For example, the number of NROTC, the number from ROC, and the number from Annapolis.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, I will be glad to supply that for the record. (The information follows:)

#### SOURCE OF NEW OFFICERS

	1968	1969	1970
Naval Academy.....	733	763	844
NROTC (reg. and cont).....	1,097	1,173	1,631
OCS.....	4,095	3,546	3,205
ROC.....	454	646	492
AOC.....	1,303	1,555	2,041
NAOC.....	336	723	924
WAVES.....	145	132	148
Interns.....		32	32
Procurement (MC, DC, MSC, etc.).....	2,417	2,383	2,386
NESEP.....	194	291	257
Senior nurse students.....	194	200	200
Merchant marine.....	5	22	3
AVROC (pilot and NFO).....	88	193	407
Voluntary recall.....	698	355	335
Senior medical students.....	179	200	200
Warrant officer appointment.....			680
NAVCAD.....	58	4	
O CAN.....		2	
REIMB.....		34	
Other.....		64	
Total.....	11,996	12,318	13,778

#### NAVAL RESERVE EQUIPMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. We have finished our questions with regard to personnel. Do you want to tell us anything about the condition of the equipment that the reservists have?

Admiral DUNCAN. I would like to ask Admiral Burke to speak to this.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does that come under your shop?

Admiral BURKE. I have coordinating authority. I can speak to it, sir.

The surface program, the other-than-air program, is my responsibility.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you mean by "surface program"? Ships?

Admiral BURKE. Ships and the other-than-aviation program.

The actual hardware we have, the ships, are fleet fallout. We went for a period of about 3 years, because of the current conflict in Southeast Asia, where we did not receive any. Those ships that normally come into the Reserve community are the oldest in the active fleet and, therefore, least ready materially. So, their condition is a bit below the active fleet units when we receive them.

After they move into the Reserve community they are maintained at the same standards that the fleet is, but because of the fact that they are the oldest, old age enters in as a factor.

In the past year, because of budgetary restrictions, we have received several additional ships, which has had the effect of upgrading the readiness.

Mr. ANDREWS. What type ships did you receive? Not new, I should think.

Admiral BURKE. No, but we did receive four destroyer escorts that were about 10 years old.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is new to the Reserve, is it?

Admiral BURKE. For the Reserve community.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you ever gotten any new ships in the Reserve?

Admiral BURKE. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. ANDREWS. But you can, as a matter of fact, train as well with a used ship as you can with a new one.

Admiral BURKE. Actually, I think we can do better.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is good.

Admiral BURKE. The reason for it is that the reservist on active duty acquires a very good proficiency, but as time goes on after he goes inactive, in the technical Navy we have today it is almost impossible for them to improve the capability of the individual man.

If the equipment becomes too technical he simply cannot keep up with the required numbers of drills that we have at the present time.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, you start him off with simple gadgets and then build him into the sophisticated equipment?

Admiral BURKE. When he is in his active duty. Practically all of our reservists have at least 2 years active duty, and then he goes inactive and becomes a selective or ready reservist. It is very difficult for a reservist to maintain that proficiency he had when he was on active duty.

#### NAVAL RESERVE OBLIGATION

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have a program like the Army has where a man can go into the National Guard and take 6 weeks of basic training and then return to his Guard unit and stay in drill status for 6 years?

Admiral BURKE. We have it at only one place in the Navy, which is in the aviation program, called the 4 by 10.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us about that program.

Admiral BURKE. This program has an annual input of approximately 1,600 enlisted men in specialized aviation ratings averaging about 800 men-year. They are procured to support the air squadrons, the fighter squadrons, the attack, and antisubmarine squadrons. They

get a basic air school plus what we call a class A school which qualifies them for a rate, such as an aviation electronics man or an aviation machinist or a weaponeer.

After they complete that period of active duty, which would be somewhere between 4 and 10 months, they revert to their parent command, an air station in the Naval Air Reserve Training Command, and join a reserve squadron and participate in that squadron unit and are subject to unit recall if that particular unit were, in fact, activated.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is somewhat similar to the National Guard program.

What about your air reservist?

Admiral BURKE. This situation which I described is in the Air Reserve program.

#### NAVAL AIR RESERVE

Mr. ANDREWS. I am talking about aviators. How many pilots do you have in your Reserve, Admiral Duncan?

Admiral DUNCAN. 3,300 in the Ready Reserve.

Mr. ANDREWS. They would be ready to go at the drop of a hat, would they?

Admiral DUNCAN. They would be ready to go when called up and according to the unit training.

Mr. ANDREWS. Would they join fighter squadrons within a relatively short period of time?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir. However, the squadrons are related to hardware, and you may have read where recently Admiral Moorer has directed a reorganization of the Air Reserve, to organize them into two wings. Eventually over a period of years they will be equipped with adequate hardware.

#### NAVAL AIR RESCUE SQUADRONS ACTIVATED

Mr. ANDREWS. Have any of your reservists been called into duty in South Vietnam, I am referring to pilots?

Admiral DUNCAN. Not as units. There are many Reserve pilots graduated from flight training who are doing duty in Vietnam, but not the Reserve units to which you are now speaking.

Mr. ANDREWS. Were they called up or did they volunteer?

Admiral DUNCAN. The six squadrons were called up and were released approximately November 1, 1968.

Mr. ANDREWS. They never left the continental United States, did they?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is where there was some problem?

Admiral DUNCAN. We didn't have much trouble.

Admiral GADDIS. That was an air unit at Andrews, sir.

#### NAVAL AIR RESERVE EQUIPMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. What about the condition of your aircraft in the Reserve?

Admiral DUNCAN. In the antisubmarine warfare squadrons and patrol squadrons, what we call VS squadrons, and helicopter squadrons

we have fairly good equipment partly because last year we deactivated several antisubmarine squadrons.

In the VA and VF categories, deployable aircraft were required in Southeast Asia for the active fleet.

I would like to ask Captain Engen to speak to that, how over the long range we intend to help the situation.

Captain ENGEN. As you know, in the active Navy we plan to keep our aircraft for one service tour. When they enter the second service tour they are given to our Reserve forces.

In the tactical aircraft area, which Admiral Duncan has referred to, some of our active force aircraft are on their second and third service tours.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is a normal tour?

Captain ENGEN. A normal tour is 7 years and this length of time is determined more by the threat that faces us than by the age of the aircraft. In other words, we feel within 7 years an aircraft will age to the extent that it is no longer capable of facing the threat. Air Reserve flies, for example, A4-A's. We also have four F4-B's assigned as a prelude to later introduction of more F-4's. The model we now have in the Active Forces is the F4-J. We are establishing the basic requirements for carrying out what Admiral Duncan just mentioned and which Admiral Moorer is planning on. This is giving our Reserves the newer and more modern fighters.

In the ASW field I think the Reserves are essentially flying the same aircraft as the Active Forces. They are flying the S2, the SH-3, the P-2. Their forces are essentially as modern as the regular Navy forces.

#### NAVAL AIR RESERVE ACCIDENT RATE

Mr. ANDREWS. What about the accident rate of the Reserve pilots?

Captain ENGEN. I am really not prepared to discuss that but I will be glad to furnish some information for the record.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would put a chart in the record showing the rate of accidents.

Captain ENGEN. In general, I can say that the rates are comparable. We have no higher accident rate in the Reserve Forces than in the Active Forces.

(The information follows:)

#### NAVY MAJOR AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT RATES<sup>1</sup>

Major commands	Fiscal years—			
	1965	1966	1967	1968
Naval Air Forces, Atlantic.....	1.51	1.18	1.26	1.01
Naval Air Forces, Pacific.....	1.55	1.63	1.82	1.97
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic.....	1.74	1.55	1.32	1.68
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.....	1.57	1.82	2.10	2.11
Chief of Naval Air Reserve Training <sup>2</sup> .....	.68	.66	.84	1.07
Marine Air Reserve Training Command <sup>3</sup> .....	1.07	1.20	1.51	1.15

<sup>1</sup> Accident rates are the number of accidents per 10,000 hours.

<sup>2</sup> Rates for all USN Reserve pilots.

<sup>3</sup> Rates for all USMC Reserve pilots.

## AGE OF RESERVE EQUIPMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the oldest plane you are using in the Reserve?

Captain ENGEN. The C-54 which has now reached the venerable age of about 26 years. We have some in the active forces as well.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any old C-47s?

Captain ENGEN. Yes, sir, and we have them in the active forces as well.

Mr. ANDREWS. There has not been one of those made in 25 years, has there?

Captain ENGEN. That is right.

Admiral DUNCAN. Just to put things in perspective, if I understood the question about the new ships in the Reserve, I am sure that you are very much aware of the fact that approximately 58% of Navy ships are at least 20 years old.

Admiral GADDIS. That is correct.

Admiral DUNCAN. So it would not be logical to put a ship in a position where it is not being used all the time in the Reserve, as long as there were older ships in the active service which were being rotated to Vietnam and to the Mediterranean.

## NAVY CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. How long now has the Navy been engaged in the shooting war in Vietnam? When did you suffer your first casualties?

Admiral DUNCAN. I will have to furnish the date of the first casualty for the record, but it was in August of 1963 when an adviser accompanying South Vietnamese forces was wounded by sniper fire, however, we generally keep our statistics of active participation as of the summer of 1965.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you tell us the total casualties suffered during the Vietnam war.

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir, as of March 8, 1969, 1,050 members were killed, and 6,932 were wounded—

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the casualty rate increasing? What I mean is it getting higher each month or each year?

Admiral DUNCAN. It is not getting higher each year. We have had an increasing rate in the last 3 or 4 weeks which you read about in the paper during this newest offensive.

## NAVY MISSIONS IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. Just what activities is the Navy engaged in in South Vietnam? You have the Riverine program.

Admiral DUNCAN. We are engaged in several programs. The Riverine warfare flotillas constitute the Riverine Program; the river support and assault squadrons constitute these flotillas.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think that has been a successful program?

Admiral DUNCAN. Very successful.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us something in the record about the success you have had with it and what it will accomplish and what the mission is.

Admiral DUNCAN. They are operating in the heart of the hard-core Vietcong area. They have successfully choked off much of the enemy's supply operations because, as you well know, the canals and rivers are the roads in the delta area.

We also have the Riverine surveillance patrol which goes up all of the major rivers in Vietnam—

Mr. ANDREWS. A sort of police patrol?

Admiral DUNCAN. It again is an interdiction patrol for supplies. The Riverine assault force, on the other hand, works with the Army and goes out and seeks the enemy.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is an assault group?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is correct. Then there is the offshore interdiction patrol, called Market Time—

Mr. ANDREWS. What about the river barracks you have there?

Admiral DUNCAN. They are part of the Riverine flotilla and they house Army troops. These troops are taken up the rivers and land at appropriate points on shore.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the Navy man the ships and perform house-keeping chores?

Admiral DUNCAN. They do more than housekeeping chores. They man the gunboats which accompany the troops up the river and give direct fire support to the troops.

#### NAVY CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had any lost?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; a considerable number of personnel casualties. As a matter of fact, the primary naval casualties in this war have come from the Riverine flotillas and the River Patrol.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have lost relatively few on board ship?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is correct; very few.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have either of the hospital ships been attacked in any way?

Admiral DUNCAN. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. ANDREWS. How far off the beach are they?

Admiral DUNCAN. At times they are right in the harbor, right off the beach.

Admiral GADDIS. They move around but normally they are oriented to logistics-based ports.

Admiral DUNCAN. I was reminded of one other group which has done valiant service and has a very high casualty rate—the hospital corpsmen who operate with the Marines. They have a high wounded and killed in action rate.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are the hospital corpsmen Navy people?

Admiral DUNCAN. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they armed?

Admiral DUNCAN. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Their casualty rate is high?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral GADDIS. The other big group is the aviators during the period when they were flying over the northern part of North Vietnam.

Mr. ANDREWS. I guess your loss rate of pilots has gone down?

Admiral GADDIS. Significantly, but we are still losing aircraft to ground fire.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are your pilots operating over South Vietnam?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir. We have both Navy and Marine pilots.

Mr. ANDREWS. Admiral Duncan, in conclusion can you think of anything you should tell us about your Bureau which you have not told us or which you have not been asked about?

Admiral DUNCAN. I don't think so, Mr. Chairman. You have given me very good opportunity to speak on the subject with which I am concerned.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Davis?

#### INFORMATION ON NAVY AVAILABLE TO HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

Mr. DAVIS. Just one followup on an earlier discussion. Does the Navy work with the guidance counselors at the various high schools so that if a young man about to graduate from high school is interested in fulfilling his service obligation as a commissioned officer in the Navy that the high school guidance people have the routes this young man can follow, and how he goes about interesting himself in these programs?

Admiral DUNCAN. Yes; we do. We are very interested in getting this information to the guidance counselor, and also that he or she does not stick it in the bottom drawer. We seek opportunities to talk to the students. Sometimes this is possible and sometimes it is not.

We try, also, to interest the principals in nominating their best young men and guiding them along this route.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MINSHALL. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RHODES. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, gentlemen. Your mission has been accomplished.

Admiral DUNCAN. We appreciate your courtesy, sir.

---

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 19, 1969.

## MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

### WITNESSES

MAJ. GEN. JONAS M. PLATT, U.S. MARINE CORPS, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS

REAR ADM. W. D. GADDIS, U.S. NAVY, OFFICE OF THE NAVY COMPTROLLER, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND REPORTS

BRIG. GEN. E. H. SIMMONS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DEPUTY FISCAL DIRECTOR, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS

BRIG. GEN. CHARLES F. WIDDECKE, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DIRECTOR, MARINE CORPS RESERVE

COL. J. I. SUSTAD, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DIRECTOR, WOMEN MARINES

L. G. TROEN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SECTION, BUDGET BRANCH, FISCAL DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS

J. A. LOBI, OFFICE OF THE NAVY COMPTROLLER

R. W. MEADE, TRAVEL BUDGET PLANS SECTION, PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT, HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS

Military Personnel, Marine Corps

For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses of temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for members of the Marine Corps on active duty (except members of the Reserve provided for elsewhere); [\$1,474,000,000]

\$1,580,000,000.

(10 U.S.C. 1035, 1212, 1475-80, 2634, 5402, 5404-5, 5409-11, 5413-17, 5441, 5443, 5445-6, 5448, 5451, 5453-6, 5458, 5502-3, 5531, 5537, 6032, 6081-6 6147-8, 6157, 6222; 12 U.S.C. 1715m; Chapters 3, 5, 7, and 9 of title 37, United States Code; 38 U.S.C. 2101-5; 42 U.S.C. 1594d; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Military Personnel, Marine Corps  
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification Code 07-05-1105-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>			
Direct program:			
1. Pay and allowances of officers.....	256,784	286,295	290,519
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted.....	907,621	980,667	1,013,150
3. Pay and allowances of cadets.....	85	.....	.....
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel.....	135,724	154,138	151,592
5. Permanent change of station travel.....	108,420	102,555	105,287
6. Other military personnel costs.....	22,055	21,345	19,452
Total direct program.....	1,430,689	1,545,000	1,580,000
Reimbursable program:			
1. Pay and allowances of officers.....	426	500	500
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted.....	154	200	200
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel.....	22,374	20,830	21,000
5. Permanent change of station travel.....	535	900	900
Total reimbursable obligations.....	23,489	22,430	22,600
10 Total obligations.....	1,454,178	1,567,430	1,602,600

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Military Personnel, Marine Corps

Program and Financing Summary (In thousands of dollars) - continued

Identification Code 07-05-1105-0-1-051	19 68 <i>actual</i>	19 69 <i>estimate</i>	19 70 <i>estimate</i>
<b>Financing:</b>			
Receipts and reimbursements from:			
11 Federal funds.....	-21,569	-18,299	-18,200
14 Non-Federal sources (10 U.S.C. 6087) <sup>1</sup> .....	-1,920	-4,131	-4,400
Budget authority.....	1,430,689	1,545,000	1,580,000
Budget authority:			
40 Appropriation.....	1,396,300	1,474,000	1,580,000
42 Transferred from other accounts.....	34,389	.....	.....
43 Appropriation (adjusted).....	1,430,689	1,474,000	1,580,000
44.30 Proposed supplemental for military pay act increase.....	.....	64,500	.....
44.40 Proposed supplemental for SEA	.....	6,500	.....

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Military Personnel, Marine Corps

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars) - continued

Identification Code 07-05-1105-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71 Obligations incurred, net.....	1,430,689	1,545,000	1,580,000
Obligated balance, start of year			
72.40 Appropriation.....	60,128	55,657	70,657
72.49 Contract authorization.....	1,692	.....	.....
74 Obligated balance, end of year	-55,657	-70,657	-86,657
77 Adjustment in expired accounts.....	-4,185	.....	.....
90 Outlays excluding supplementals.....	1,432,666	1,459,100	1,563,900
91.30 Outlays from military pay act supplemental.....	.....	64,500	.....
91.40 Outlays from proposed supplemental for SEA.....	.....	6,400	100
<sup>1</sup> Reimbursement from Non-Federal sources are derived from sale of meals and clothing to service members. (10 U.S.C. 4621).			

Status of Unfunded Contract Authorization (in thousands of dollars)

Identification Code 07-05-1105-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
Unfunded balance, start of year.....	1,692	.....	.....
Administrative cancellation of unfunded balance (-).....	-1,692	.....	.....
Appropriation to liquidate contract authorization.....	.....	- .....	.....

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
 Military Personnel, Marine Corps

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification Code 07-05-1105-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
Direct obligations:			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military.....	957,924	1,052,420	1,082,023
12.2 Personnel benefits, military.....	225,634	236,843	244,519
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	80,616	72,719	74,486
22.0 Transportation of things.....	18,220	19,901	20,244
25.0 Other services.....	5,076	5,367	5,563
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	133,382	147,671	144,156
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities.....	8,837	9,079	8,169
43.0 Interest and dividends.....	1,000	1,000	840
Total direct obligations.....	1,430,689	1,545,000	1,580,000
Reimbursable obligations:			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military.....	400	500	500
12.2 Personnel Benefits, Military.....	180	200	200
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	535	900	900
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	22,374	20,830	21,000
Total reimbursable obligations.....	23,489	22,430	22,600
99.0 Total obligations.....	1,454,178	1,567,430	1,602,600

Department of the Navy  
Military Personnel, Marine Corps

APPROPRIATION INTRODUCTION  
(In thousands)

	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
Total Direct Obligations	\$1,430,689	\$1,474,000 <u>b/</u>	\$1,580,000
Proposed Supplemental	-	71,000 <u>c/</u>	-
Appropriation (adjusted)	\$1,430,689 <u>a/</u>	\$1,545,000	\$1,580,000

a/ Composed of original appropriated amount (P.L. 90-96) \$1,396,300 plus a transfer of funds in the amount of \$34,389 to provide funds for the Congressionally approved pay raise effective 1 Oct 1967.

b/ Reflects \$-6,000 adjustment related to Congressional Action (P.L. 90-580).

c/ Proposed supplemental is based on a requirement of \$64,500 for the 6.9% pay raise effective 1 July 1968 and \$6,500 for additional SEA requirements.

Department of the Navy  
Military Personnel, Marine Corps

APPROPRIATION INTRODUCTION -- continued

A. This appropriation provides funds for the pay and allowance, subsistence in kind, travel and transportation costs related to permanent change of station and other personnel costs, as authorized by law and regulations, for Marines on active duty with the regular establishment.

B. The total personnel programs are summarized in the following table:

SUMMARY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	<u>FY 1968 Actual</u>		<u>Fy 1969 Planned</u>		<u>FY 1970 Planned</u>	
	<u>Man Years</u>	<u>End Strength 30 June 1968</u>	<u>Man Years</u>	<u>End Strength 30 June 1969</u>	<u>Man Years</u>	<u>End Strength 30 June 1969</u>
<u>DIRECT PROGRAM</u>						
Officers.....	23,788	24,534	25,096	25,984	26,087	26,031
Enlisted.....	273,842	282,696	287,874	287,386	290,684	288,440
Aviation Cadets.....	25	0	0	0	0	0
Subtotal.....	297,655	307,230	312,970	313,370	316,771	314,471
<u>REIMBURSABLE PROGRAM 1/</u>						
Officers.....	24	21	26	26	27	27
Enlisted.....	2	1	4	4	2	2
Subtotal.....	26	22	30	30	29	29
<u>TOTAL PROGRAM</u>						
Officers.....	23,812	24,555	25,122	26,010	26,114	26,058
Enlisted.....	273,844	282,697	287,878	287,390	290,686	288,442
Aviation Cadets.....	25	0	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>297,681</b>	<b>307,252</b>	<b>313,000</b>	<b>313,400</b>	<b>316,800</b>	<b>314,500</b>

1/ Military personnel assigned to agencies outside of Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis under the provisions of 10 USC 5416

Department of the Navy  
Military Personnel, Marine Corps

APPROPRIATION INTRODUCTION -- continued

C. The Congress appropriated \$1,396,300,000 in the 1968 Appropriation Act which provided for a Marine Corps end strength of 301,895 and a man year average of 297,975. During the year the President authorized an increase to 309,179 end strength and a man year average of 298,173. The actual attained strengths for the year were; end 307,230; man year average 297,655; a short fall of 1,949 end strength and 518 man years. Additional funds in the amount of \$34,389,000 were provided for the Congressionally approved pay raise effective 1 October 1967.

D. The 1969 budget request, submitted to Congress, provided for an end strength of 306,408, a man year average of 314,904, and funding in the amount of \$1,480,000,000. This amount was later reduced to \$1,474,000,000 during the Congressional budget review. During the course of the year, the President authorized a further personnel increase to end fiscal 1969 with 313,370, or about 7,000 above the Congressionally approved plan. The man years, however, have been reduced from the Congressionally approved 314,904 man years to 312,970 man years. In addition, a supplemental of \$64,500,000 will be required to fund the military pay raise of 6.9% which became effective 1 July 1968 and an additional \$6,500,000 for increased SEA requirements in subsistence of enlisted personnel.

E. Concurrently, with the increase in personnel authorized for end fiscal 1969 referred to above, the President has authorized a further increase to end fiscal year 1970 with 314,471 or 1,101 over end 1969. The 1970 request for \$1,580,000,000 will fund that end strength and the related man years. The man year average of 316,771 is required to support the increased strength for a full year and to provide sufficient deployable Marines to meet replacement requirements in the Western Pacific.

Department of the Navy  
Military Personnel, Marine Corps

Justification of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1970

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS

(In thousands)

Budget Activity No.	Budget Activity	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate	Difference 1970 compared with 1969	Justification Page
1.	Pay and allowances of officers....	\$ 256,784	\$ 286,295	\$ 290,519	\$+ 4,224	3-11
2	Pay and allowances of enlisted personnel.....	907,621	980,667	1,013,150	+32,483	3-12
3	Pay and allowances of cadets.....	85	-	-	-	3-13
4	Subsistence of enlisted personnel.....	135,724	154,138	151,592	- 2,546	3-14
5	Permanent change of station travel.....	108,420	102,555	105,287	+ 2,732	3-16
6	Other military personnel costs....	22,055	21,345	19,452	- 1,893	3-18
	Total direct obligations.....	\$1,430,669	\$1,545,000	\$1,580,000	\$+35,000	

## OPENING REMARKS

Mr. ANDREWS. The subcommittee will come to order.

At this time we will give consideration to the request for "Military personnel, Marine Corps." For this appropriation the Marine Corps is requesting \$1,580 million an increase of \$35 million over the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

We have with us to discuss this request Maj. Gen. Jonas M. Platt, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Headquarters, Marine Corps.

General Platt, we welcome you before us and all of your supporting witnesses. You have a very distinguished record as a Marine Corps officer and we would like to insert your biographical sketch in the record at this point.

General PLATT. Thank you, sir.

(The document follows:)

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MAJ. GEN. J. M. PLATT

MAJ. GEN. JONAS M. PLATT, USMC ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF,  
G-1, HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS

Jonas M. Platt was born September 21, 1919 in Brooklyn, N.Y., and graduated from high school in Cranston, R.I. He attended Norwich University in Vermont, graduating in 1940 with a bachelor of science degree in civil engineering, and was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant in June 1940.

While serving in the Marine detachment aboard the battleship U.S.S. *Washington* during World War II, he rose from lieutenant to major, participating in Russian convoy operations in the Norwegian Sea, and six operations in the Pacific, including Guadalcanal, Tarawa, and Kwajalein. In 1944, after 4 months in the United States, he returned to the Pacific area. As a member of the 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division, he participated in the assault landings on Peleliu and Okinawa, earning the Navy Commendation and Bronze Star Medals, both with Combat "V," and the Purple Heart.

Following the war, he organized and commanded the Provisional Marine Guard at United Nations Headquarters in New York. He later served at Headquarters Marine Corps; earned a master's degree in psychology at Ohio State University in 1949; and taught infantry tactics and instructional techniques at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, until December 1952.

During the Korean conflict, he earned the Legion of Merit with Combat "V" as Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and Assistant G-3, 1st Marine Division.

During subsequent assignments, he served again at Headquarters Marine Corps; was assigned to a joint staff in London; served briefly in the Mediterranean during the Suez crisis in 1956; and from 1958-60 commanded the Marine Barracks, Washington, D.C.—the oldest post in the Corps.

Upon completing the National War College in 1961, he was assigned as Regimental Commander, 6th Marines, followed by duty as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 2d Marine Division. During this period the division deployed for the Cuban crisis in October 1962.

From 1963 to 1965, he served as Commanding Officer of the basic school, which trains the Marine Corps' new second lieutenants.

General Platt was promoted to brigadier general on November 1, 1965, while en route to Vietnam. Upon his arrival, he became Assistant Division Commander, 3d Marine Division, at Chu Lai. While serving with the Division, he commanded Task Force Delta in operations Harvest Moon, Double Eagle I, Double Eagle II and Utah. In March 1966, he moved to Danang and became Chief of Staff for Lieutenant General Walt—commander of the Marine forces in Vietnam.

While serving in Vietnam, he was awarded three U.S. decorations—the Silver Star Medal, and a second and third Legion of Merit with Combat "V." He was also awarded three decorations by the Government of Vietnam—the National Order of Vietnam, and two Vietnamese Gallantry Crosses with Palm.

Detached in December 1966, General Platt reported to Headquarters Marine Corps in January 1967, and was assigned as Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1.

Upon his promotion to major general on March 19, 1968, he assumed his current assignment.

A complete list of his medals and decorations include: the Silver Star Medal, the Legion of Merit with two Gold Stars in lieu of second and third awards, the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V", the Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V", the Purple Heart Medal, the Presidential Unit Citation with two bronze stars, the Navy Unit Commendation Medal, the American Defense Service Medal with Fleet clasp, the American Defense Service Medal, the European-African-Middle Eastern Campaign Medal with one bronze star, the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with one silver star and three bronze stars, the World War II Victory Medal, the China Service Medal, the National Defense Service Medal with one bronze star, the Korean Service Medal with two bronze stars, the Vietnam Service Medal with three bronze stars, the United Nations Service Medal, the Korean Presidential Unit Citation, the Vietnamese National Order, two Vietnamese Gallantry Crosses with Palm, and the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal.

General Platt and his wife, the former Nina Fernandez of Northfield, Vermont, have one daughter, Joanne Julie.

### GENERAL STATEMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. You have a prepared statement?

General PLATT. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. We would be glad to have you read it without interruption, and then we will ask you some questions. Before we proceed to ask the questions following the reading of your statement, we want to tell you that if we ask you any questions which you think some member of your staff could answer better than you, you may feel free to call upon your supporting witnesses.

General PLATT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a privilege for me to present to you the highlights of the Marine Corps' military manpower program for fiscal year 1970, and the budget estimate which supports that program.

As in prior years, our manpower program continues to be dominated by the need to sustain large forces committed to combat in Vietnam, while at the same time insuring that our uncommitted forces have the personnel resources necessary to maintain them at an adequate level of combat readiness for contingencies.

### FISCAL YEAR 1969 MANPOWER PROGRAM

The demands and dynamics of these manpower requirements during the past year have caused certain revisions in the manpower program funded by the fiscal year 1969 appropriation.

Before presenting our fiscal year 1970 program, therefore, I would like to first briefly highlight these changes.

The most significant change was an increase in end strength. The original personnel plan for fiscal year 1969 provided for an end strength of 306,408 and a man-year average of 314,904. The revised plan provides for an end strength of 313,370 and a man-year average of 312,970. The end strength increase of approximately 7,000 marines has been used primarily for the purpose of improving readiness in our CONUS-based Fleet Marine Forces.

Other significant adjustments to the original plan included increased recruit input to sustain the required flow of replacements to Southeast Asia, and slightly increased endyear strengths in the top six NCO grades.

## FISCAL YEAR 1970 MANPOWER PROGRAM

Starting from the modified fiscal year 1969 program, the fiscal year 1970 request provides an additional end strength authorization, and sufficient average strength to insure an uninterrupted flow of replacements to Southeast Asia and an adequate readiness posture in units not committed to Vietnam.

Essentially, fiscal year 1970 reflects a continuation of our posture at end fiscal year 1969. Total strength in fiscal year 1970 grows from a beginning of 313,370 to an end of 314,471, with a man-year average of 316,771. To support this plan, we are requesting \$1.58 billion, an increase of \$35 million over the fiscal year 1969 adjusted authorization.

The officer plan for fiscal year 1970 provides for approximately 26,000 officers—an increase of only 47 officers over end fiscal year 1969.

Officer grade distribution remains essentially unchanged. The percentage of our total strength in the officer ranks remains at 8.3 percent.

To sustain the officer population, we plan on procuring approximately 4,200 officers during fiscal year 1970, a decrease of about 600 from the fiscal year 1969.

Planned promotions to all grades will be less than fiscal year 1969 except for promotions to first lieutenant and warrant officer (W-2).

Turning to our enlisted plan, it provides for an increase in end strength of 1,054.

In response to requirements, the total number of noncommissioned officers in the top six grades will increase by almost 900 from end fiscal year 1969 authorizations. Thus, the ratio of corporal (E-4) and above to total enlisted strength changes only slightly—from 44.6 percent at end fiscal year 1969 to 44.7 percent at end fiscal year 1970.

To sustain this enlisted population we plan on approximately 96,000 enlisted accessions during the year—about the same as fiscal year 1969. Within this total we anticipate a requirement for 10,000 inductees, which is about the same number we are taking this year. To date, we have taken only 29,000 inductees since the beginning of the Vietnam war compared to 84,000 during the Korean conflict. Even this number would have been reduced had we not shifted to a level monthly recruit input from our previous procedures of varying our recruit input by month in accordance with volunteer recruiting potential. Our inductees have performed very well both in training and in combat. We do not, however, expect to retain as great a percentage of them as we do of volunteers.

Looking at enlisted promotions, the numbers planned for all grades during fiscal year 1970 will be less than in fiscal year 1969, reflecting the shift from building up our NCO strength to maintaining an essentially level NCO strength in fiscal year 1970. The numbers provided do, however, offer good promotion opportunity—essential if we are to retain sufficient numbers of high-caliber marines.

Retention of enlisted marines is a matter of continuing concern. Current reenlistment rates are below those we experienced before the Vietnam conflict. We need improvement in first-term reenlistment if we are to maintain the career force at adequate levels. And, within the total rate, we have to do far better in retaining marines with hard, long-leadtime skills. It is at this group that our enlisted retention program is especially directed. The financial incentives of variable reenlistment bonus and proficiency pay are awarded to highly qualified marines

who possess vital skills. Our budget requests would continue these re-enlistment incentives at about the same level as in the present fiscal year. Some adjustments in eligible skills have been made in order to better meet our retention goals.

During the past year the Commandant of the Marine Corps has directed increased emphasis on retention efforts from the Headquarters Marine Corps level to battalion and squadron level to ensure that the Marine Corps is doing everything within its means to improve retention—both officer and enlisted. We believe we are making progress. We also believe, however, that these efforts must be reinforced by improved military compensation and housing if we are to be fully successful.

A unique aspect of both our fiscal years 1969 and 1970 manpower programs is that they both, of necessity, require the release of large numbers of Vietnam veterans before their enlistments expire.

Let me explain: In fiscal year 1970 we require an input of 8,000 new enlisted accessions per month, principally to support the deployment of almost one-third of the Marine Corps in Southeast Asia. To maintain a level strength would require that we have 8,000 enlisted losses per month to offset the required monthly gains. Unfortunately, we cannot obtain losses of this size since most of our losses during fiscal year 1970 come from marines who enlisted during fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968—years in which our recruit input was lower than today. Thus, to maintain an essentially level strength we must artificially generate additional losses by voluntarily releasing marines up to 12 months prior to the time their enlistments expire. We are limiting this early release program to marines who have served in Vietnam. Our fiscal year 1970 program provides for the early release of 17,000 Vietnam veterans. During fiscal year 1969 we will release early about 26,000 Vietnam veterans.

The net effect of this early release program in combination with a constant monthly input of recruits is the reason that our average strength in fiscal year 1970 is some 2,800 man-years more than those required for a level program.

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, to sum up, this request is \$35 million higher in direct obligations than the revised fiscal year 1969 plan, but it includes the funds required for an increase in average strength of 3,800 marines.

Provision of the funds requested will permit us to support our marines in combat and to maintain nondeployed forces in an adequate status of readiness throughout the fiscal year.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, General Platt.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the general a question before you proceed?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

#### POSSIBLE CHANGES TO PERSONNEL PICTURE

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, do you know of any actions that are about to take place or will take place which would change the figures which have been submitted in your statement today.

General PLATT. No, sir; I know of none at all.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. So your statement applies not only today but in the future; you know of no actions that will be changed?

General PLATT. I know of no program changes. The estimates, of course, will vary; estimates will change from time to time but no program changes.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. And the Marine Corps knows of no amendments to your personnel budget that may be submitted by the Secretary of Defense?

General SIMMONS. We expect very minor amendments as a result of Mr. Packard's current review.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Would it affect the statement as read, in any way?

General PLATT. Yes, sir, in one instance. We are expecting as a result of that review to be authorized 900 more sergeants and 1,600 more corporals which would mean more promotions and a slight increase in the top six ratio. Outside of that, I know of no changes. There would be no change in the total strength. It is just that they would allow us to have more sergeants and corporals than we have in this budget.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is there a change in your monetary situation?

General SIMMONS. About \$3 million decrease.

Admiral GADDIS. The tentative adjustments that have been spoken to and which have not been decided upon as yet involve the increase in enlisted grade structure which the general spoke to, a small adjustment in servicemen's group life insurance, and a small adjustment in the cost of operational rations in Southeast Asia for a net of -\$3 million.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It is my understanding that the Secretary was going to be testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee today.

Admiral GADDIS. But he is testifying, sir, on the basis that this is the program which he has recommended to the President and which he has not had opportunity to discuss with the President yet. As such, he has told the services that this amendment is subject to adjustment. That is why we cannot say that it is firm, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did you say it was a decrease of \$3 million?

Admiral GADDIS. A net decrease of \$3 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you change these figures.

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. But as of right now the figures before the committee are what you are requesting?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

#### RATIO OF OFFICERS TO ENLISTED MARINES

Mr. ANDREWS. General Platt, I notice you say in your statement that the percentage of our total strength in the officer ranks remains at 8.3 percent.

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that in line with the other services or is it lower?

General PLATT. Sir, I cannot cite the percentages of the other services. It is lower, but it is lower, among other reasons, because they furnish their own doctors, chaplains, dentists, which are furnished to us by the Navy.

Admiral GADDIS. In answer to your question, sir, it is significantly lower than the other three services. All the other three services' averages are above 10 percent.

## INDUCTEES

Mr. ANDREWS. Traditionally, the Marine Corps has had a fine esprit de corps. How do these inductees fit into your family of marines, so to speak?

General PLATT. Sir, we detect no differences on the inductees in training or in combat. The only significant difference is the reenlistment rate. They had no intention of becoming professional marines.

Mr. ANDREWS. Or of making a career of it?

General PLATT. That is right. Their reenlistment rate has been about 1 percent, first term reenlistment rate, as opposed to 12 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is understandable, and I am sure it does not surprise you.

General PLATT. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. They have proved very, very satisfactory?

General PLATT. They have, Mr. Chairman.

## INCREASED FUNDS REQUESTED

Mr. ANDREWS. General, why will an increase of only 3,800 in the average strength require an additional \$35 million in funding?

General PLATT. Basically, sir, the 3,800 increase in man-years requires \$35 million and the thrust of the increase is all in pay and allowances for enlisted, and a small portion in pay and allowances for officers.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is true, according to the information presented in the justification book, but why would only 3,800 require an additional \$35 million in funding?

General PLATT. It stems from all aspects of the pay and allowances for officers and enlisted. Our enlisted NCO ratio is higher principally on the average from 1969 to 1970, which also accounts for some of this increase.

General SIMMONS. I have a fairly precise increase and decrease schedule that I could either read into the record—

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would read it into the record.

General SIMMONS. Very well, sir.

Activity 1, Pay and Allowances of Officers:

\$5.6 million increase in basic pay, due to 991 more man-years, plus \$223,000 incentive pay due to added pilot man-years more nearly meeting the requirements. Then there is a reduction of \$1.3 million in basic allowance for quarters. This is a function of a younger Marine Corps Officer where the marriage factor decreases due to reversions of temporary officers, most of whom have dependents, and a slight increase in occupancy of Government quarters.

Plus \$570,000 basic allowance for subsistence, a function of increased man-years.

Minus \$1.4 million separation payments, due to a decreased average amount per payment based on lower unused leave payments.

Plus \$829,000, social security tax, employer's contribution, due to man-years increases, again.

Activity 2, pay and allowances of enlisted personnel:

Plus \$27.5 million, basic pay, due to 2,810 more man-years and improved grade distribution.

Plus \$659,000, incentive pay, due to increased number of personnel assigned to parachute jumping duty and flying duty.

Minus \$1.3 million, special pay, due to decrease in hostile fire payments.

Plus \$2.4 million, reenlistment bonus, due to payment of variable reenlistment bonus installments contracted in fiscal years 1966-68.

Plus \$569,000, clothing allowance, due to higher recruit input.

Plus \$1.7 million, basic allowances for quarters, due to higher percentage of married enlisted marines.

Minus \$554,000, family separate allowances. Fewer married marines at duty stations without their dependents.

Plus \$1.5 million, social security tax, employer's contribution, due to man-years increase.

Activity 4, subsistence of enlisted personnel:

Plus \$1.3 million, basic allowance for subsistence, due to increased man-years of leave and more marines authorized to mess separately.

Minus \$3.9 million, subsistence in kind, due to Southeast Asia stock and consumption levels.

Activity 5, permanent change of station.

Minus \$393,000, accession travel, due to rate decrease in recruit travel, using more group travel.

Minus \$423,000, training travel, due to drop in enlisted language training and lower household goods rate.

Plus \$312,000 operational travel between duty stations. More officer reassignments prompted by rise in separations; enlisted moves related to higher end strength.

Plus \$3.4 million, separation travel, due to more separations and increased trailer allowances.

Activity 6, other military personnel costs:

Minus \$950,000, death gratuities, due to lower estimate of Southeast Asia fatalities.

Minus \$783,000, servicemen's group life insurance program. Lower premium rate projected at this time, a function of reduced casualty estimate.

Mr. ANDREWS. So those pluses and minuses equal \$35 million?

General SIMMONS. Yes, sir.

#### MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you explain how you determined your manpower requirements for fiscal 1970? Specifically, we would like to know what rationale was used in determining the need for the increase of about 3,800 in your average strength.

General PLATT. Yes, sir. We determined the total billets that we require in our organization based on manning criteria when they are applicable to certain types of billets. For example, you need so many cooks for so many men in a messhall, so many clerks for so many men on your rolls, and then we apply a judgment factor in those areas which are principally tactical in nature. In other words, how many men in a rifle squad, how many companies in a battalion. That determines the organizational billet part of our total Marine Corps, what is commonly called the structure.

Then from that we determine for the given fiscal year how many men we need in nonorganizational billets to fill that structure at its prescribed level. I am referring to how many men we need in training, how many men we need in schools, how many patients, how many transients, how many prisoners. We put the total together and that adds up to the total Marine Corps for the given fiscal year.

## DEPLOYMENT OF MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS

Mr. ANDREWS. How many divisions do you have now, General?

General PLATT. We have four.

Mr. ANDREWS. Two of those are in Vietnam?

General PLATT. Yes. The first and the third, plus one regimental landing team from the 5th Division. The 5th Division is based at Camp Pendleton. There is also one of its battalion landing teams at Kaneohe in Hawaii. Then on the east coast we have the 2d Marine Division based at Camp Lejeune, with a battalion landing team in the Mediterranean, one in the Caribbean and a reenforced battalion at Guantanamo, on a rotational basis.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many men do you have in South Vietnam?

General PLATT. 82,200.

## CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. How many losses have you had over there, casualties? Supply it for the record if you do not have it here.

General PLATT. I have it. Our casualty count through the 12th of March was 10,789 killed, 71,498 wounded. Of the wounded, 30,560 returned to duty in Vietnam and 40,938 were hospitalized either in the Western Pacific or in the continental United States. We have a total of 103 either missing or listed as captured.

## AVERAGE STRENGTH

Mr. ANDREWS. General, if for 1970 you have a beginning strength of 313,370 and an ending strength of 314,471, which is an increase of only 1,101, how did you arrive at an estimated average man-year of 316,771?

General PLATT. Mr. Chairman, that is the interaction between fixed monthly new accessions of 8,000 per month, plus reenlistments, against our pattern of losses during the fiscal year. In order to maintain that fixed input we, of necessity, need a higher average strength than our beginning and ending strength.

## EFFECT OF DRAFT ON RECRUITMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. I notice you stated you were getting about 10,000 inductees. If it were not for the draft do you think your needed enlistment requirements would be met?

General PLATT. No, sir. We shifted to the draft principally, however, in order to have a regular monthly input of recruits, instead of curving our input in accordance with the recruiting climate.

However, amongst our volunteers, Marines who come in not as inductees, a high percentage of them are draft-motivated.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you try to have a constant flow coming in each month?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is that number, again?

General PLATT. It is 8,000 new accessions per month, 7,900 male and 100 women.

Mr. ANDREWS. But for the draft you couldn't meet that 8,000?

General PLATT. Not every month, no, sir; not in the poor recruiting months. In the good months we do, but in the poor recruiting months we couldn't.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you mean by "good months"?

General PLATT. Good months traditionally are June, July, August, and September.

Mr. ANDREWS. Following school?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. Then when schools reconvene, they are poor. January is traditionally a fair recruiting month. Then February, March, and April and also May are poor months.

#### EDUCATIONAL LEVELS OF MARINES

Mr. ANDREWS. Are most of your recruits high school graduates? Have they finished high school?

General PLATT. No, sir. I don't have the figure. I would have to furnish it for the record. We have significant numbers of nonhigh school graduates.

(The information follows:)

As of March 15, 1969, the percentage of high school graduates among Marine volunteers in fiscal year 1969 is 55.4 percent, and among inductees for the same period is 71.5 percent. Overall, the percentage is 58.0 percent for a total of 30,607 high school graduates.

Mr. ANDREWS. How about college graduates?

General PLATT. We are taking in a small number of college graduates, Mr. Chairman, principally through the draft. Right now we have on board as of the end of calendar 1968, 1,071 college graduates in our enlisted population.

Mr. ANDREWS. But the majority of your people, new inductees, are high school graduates?

General PLATT. Yes, sir; the majority.

Mr. ANDREWS. How does a college graduate who would be 4 or 5 years older than those high school recruits—how does that college graduate fit into the picture?

General PLATT. As a rule, he does very well. Now, in his assignment, we handle them as special cases. They are assigned on an individual basis. They are interviewed, we are very interested in what the man's college background is. We want to get him into the jobs that we do have that correlate with certain specific college backgrounds.

Mr. ANDREWS. But when he first goes in for basic training he goes through with the younger recruits?

General PLATT. Oh, yes, sir. He goes right through recruit camp at San Diego or Parris Island like everybody else does.

Mr. ANDREWS. There is no problem because of the difference in ages?

General PLATT. I know of no problem.

Mr. ANDREWS. But when you do get around to giving him an assignment, you do go into his background and his college experience?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. In this individual assignment process, we may put him on a job and bypass a service school that we feel he does not need, or we could accelerate him through certain schools because of his background and its relationship to the job.

#### OFFICER PROCUREMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. What about your OCS program, do you have enough applicants?

General PLATT. Sir, we are having procurement problems with officers, which generally started last fall. Right now we are about 300 under plan and we project by the 30th of June we could be at least 700 under plan.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is purely voluntary service, is it not, going into OCS?

General PLATT. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. So if you do have a college graduate, you could not force him to go into OCS?

General PLATT. No, sir. We interview those college graduates and we are very interested in getting high caliber men into our officer candidate programs. But most of our college graduates are inductees who are in for 2 years. We have gained about three commissioned officers through our induction system since January 1, 1968.

#### DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REVIEWS OF MARINE CORPS STRENGTH

Mr. DAVIS. General, what reviews have you had of your overall Marine Corps strength requirements for fiscal year 1970 up to this time?

General PLATT. First, sir, the Commandant of the Marine Corps formulates his manpower program and it is submitted, of course, to the Secretary of the Navy for review. Upon completion of review by the Secretary of the Navy, it is submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense where it undergoes a detailed review before the authorized figures are published.

Mr. DAVIS. Have you had the proposed strength of the Corps for the fiscal year 1970 reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense recently?

General PLATT. Yes, sir; as part of the budget process, and also our 1969 and 1970 authorizations were reviewed in some detail starting last March and extending through about the end of the calendar year.

Mr. DAVIS. But since January 20, has there been any review of your projected strength by the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

General PLATT. No, sir; not since then.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you anticipate there will be?

General PLATT. No, sir; I do not.

#### EFFECT OF VIETNAM ROTATION ON ACCESSIONS AND EARLY RELEASES

Mr. DAVIS. On page 6 of your statement, General Platt, you discuss the early-out program and state that you need 96,000 accessions in fiscal 1970 principally to support the deployments to Vietnam. Since you only would have to replace an average of about 77,000 enlistees in Vietnam during 1970, how do you reconcile that figure with your 96,000 enlisted accessions?

General PLATT. Sir, the rate at which we replace men in Vietnam is dependent on a number of factors. First, of course, there is the 13-month tour. Then the tempo of operations and its impact on our casualties determines our replacement rate.

Furthermore, for a variety of emergency reasons men could be returned early. The average infantryman, for example, his tour, considering the casualties, is considerably less than 13 months. During fiscal year 1968 our average monthly replacement draft was about 7,300. But we had a monthly replacement draft at one time of 10,400 Marines.

Mr. DAVIS. You mentioned the projected 17,000 early-outs. Would it be good business to return them or some part of them to fill the vacancies for which you are now using additional enlisted accessions?

General PLATT. We cannot, sir. We have to maintain almost one-third of our strength in Southeast Asia, specifically 93,000 officers and men, with 82,000 in Vietnam. Now, these men are rotated out and back on a basic policy of a 13-month tour, portal to portal tour, if you will, from the west coast; and a policy of 24 months between Vietnam tours for our career men. In order to insure that we meet our monthly requirements in Vietnam, we have to put in 7,900 male recruits. Now, they do not all go immediately to Vietnam. Some replace losses in other skills. But that is what drives our whole manpower program. If we take a fixed authorized average strength and a fixed end strength and put into the structure that many new accessions plus the reenlistments which we need to maintain our career force, we have to artificially create vacancies in order to maintain that input.

Mr. DAVIS. That gets down to this question: Are you releasing some of these men early in order to make room for a fixed input?

General PLATT. Exactly, sir; exactly. The only alternatives would be to take these men who have been to Vietnam and send them back with less than 24 months between tours, and this we do not want to do.

It would be either that or extend the 13-month tour in Vietnam, and we do not want to do that either. So we are letting out the man who has been, in order to make room for a man who can go.

Admiral GADDIS. Also, the man they are letting out, Mr. Davis, is a man who has less than 12 months left to do in the Marine Corps and therefore would not be eligible for a full tour outside the continental United States.

General PLATT. Yes.

Mr. DAVIS. You are not taking advantage of the fact that through Selective Service and other means you have a guaranteed fixed input, are you? By not taking advantage of it, I mean using the existence of it as a tool or a vehicle for early release of these people.

General PLATT. Sir, we are using the draft system in order to insure that we can get the monthly input that we need to maintain our commitment in Vietnam under the ground rules of a 13 months' tour, 24 months between tours. The only alternatives that are available are to change the tour length, change the time between the tours or have a larger Marine Corps.

#### COST OF RECRUIT TRAINING

Mr. DAVIS. What is your best estimate of the cost to train the new recruit and retain him for a year in the Marines?

General PLATT. I would have to furnish that for the record.  
(The information follows:)

Depending upon a recruit's military speciality and his assignment, cost estimates for his training and retention for 1 year can vary from \$4,100 to \$6,100.

For example, the estimated first-year costs for the typical Marine infantry rifleman going into Vietnam are approximately \$5,700. This estimate includes pay and allowances including combat and overseas pay; travel and operational costs related to recruiting, training and sending the Marine to Vietnam; and support in Vietnam of him and his personal equipment.

#### MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

Mr. DAVIS. In the report of this subcommittee last year at the time the military personnel budget request for the fiscal year 1969 was

reduced, there was a recommendation that various management improvements be initiated in the administration of this appropriation. What report can you give us as to the implementation of these suggested management improvements for reducing military personnel costs during fiscal 1969?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. In the area of better management I believe it was suggested that we reduce permanent change of station moves. Since our manpower program is basically being driven by the size of our commitment in Vietnam, we are not able to reduce those moves.

Our principal management efforts have been focused on such things as trying to maintain 24 months between tours for careerists and developing the proper 2-, 3- and 4-year enlisted mix to sustain our commitment in Vietnam.

Specifically on that point, and officer-career rotation, we have not done anything, sir, in this environment.

Mr. DAVIS. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

#### PERSONNEL GAINS AND LOSSES

Mr. ANDREWS. General, will you prepare for the record a schedule showing the beginning strength, the number of accessions, the number of discharges, and the ending strength for fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970, for both officers and enlisted personnel?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### FISCAL YEAR 1968

	Begin	Total gains	Total losses	End STR
Officer.....	23,592	3,787	2,824	24,555
Enlisted.....	261,584	125,609	104,496	282,697
Marcad.....	93		93	
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>285,269</b>	<b>129,396</b>	<b>107,413</b>	<b>307,252</b>

#### FISCAL YEAR 1969

Officer.....	24,555	4,798	3,343	26,010
Enlisted.....	282,697	107,089	102,396	287,390
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>307,252</b>	<b>111,887</b>	<b>105,739</b>	<b>313,400</b>

#### FISCAL YEAL 1970

Officer.....	26,010	4,194	4,146	26,058
Enlisted.....	287,390	110,600	109,548	288,442
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>313,400</b>	<b>114,794</b>	<b>113,694</b>	<b>314,500</b>

	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970
<b>Includes reimbursables as follows:</b>			
Officer.....	21	26	27
Enlisted.....	1	4	2
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>29</b>

## STRENGTHS BY GRADE

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, the average strength of the Marine Corps is broken out by grade on pages 3-22 and 3-33 of the justification book. There are some significant variances between the estimated averages by each grade for fiscal year 1969 and those for 1970. For example, under "Officers" you estimated that for 1969 the Marine Corps would require 3,904 captains, and for 1970, 3,193; for first lieutenants, you estimated the requirements at 4,667 for fiscal year 1969, and for 1970 you are estimating 5,871. Under enlisted personnel, you estimated that for fiscal year 1969 the Marine Corps would require 32,414 E-5's, and for 1970 you are estimating a requirement of 38,734. How did the Marine Corps arrive at the estimated average strength, by grades, for fiscal year 1970?

General PLATT. Addressing first the change in captains, page 3-22 shows a requirement for 3,904 captains without enlisted service and 2,475 captains with enlisted service, for a total man years of captains of 6,379. Actual stated requirement for captains at end fiscal year 1969 is 6,468, the same as for fiscal year 1970. The reason that the man-year average is lower than the end-year requirement is due to the growth of some 1,500 officers during fiscal year 1969. In fiscal year 1970, pages 3-22 shows 3,193 captains without enlisted service, and 3,275 captains with enlisted service, for a total man years of captains of 6,468. This is a slight increase in captain man years of 89 over fiscal year 1969, and reflects the level officer strength in fiscal year 1970.

Now, addressing the first lieutenant question, page 3-22 shows 4,667 man years of first lieutenants without enlisted service and 1,549 man years of first lieutenants with enlisted service, for a total of 6,216 first lieutenant man years for fiscal year 1969. For fiscal year 1970 we show 5,871 man years of first lieutenant without enlisted service, and 727 man years of first lieutenant with enlisted service, for a total of 6,598 first lieutenant man years for fiscal year 1970. This is an increase of 382 first lieutenant man years in fiscal year 1970 over fiscal year 1969, and is a reflection of the large number of new officers coming in the Marine Corps in late 1968 and 1969 achieving the 15 months service required for promotion to first lieutenant.

Addressing the difference in sergeants, E-5, that is a difference of 6,320. This is a result of our being successful in getting permission to increase the authorized number of sergeants in the Marine Corps between 1969 and 1970. We sought this and it was granted. We needed more sergeants in order to meet our requirements.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you tell us why you needed more sergeants?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. We generate our requirements by the process which I described, what jobs we believe sergeants should have. We went to the Department of Defense and explained the justification for more sergeants and they allowed us to have it. We traditionally have a very low percentage of enlisted men in the grades of corporal E-4 and above. We feel the percentage is too low for reasonable promotion opportunity as well as to meet our requirements.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the highest NCO officer in the Marine Corps?

General PLATT. Sir, he is a sergeant major or a master gunnery sergeant in pay grade E-9.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they of the same rank or grade, the master gunnery sergeant and the sergeant major?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You state that planned promotion to all grades during 1970 will be less than for fiscal year 1969, except for promotions to first lieutenant and warrant officers W-2. Why is the Marine Corps cutting back on officer promotions during fiscal year 1970?

General PLATT. Sir, we did not change our grade distribution from the grade of captain up, between 1969 and 1970. We felt that the grade distribution that we had met our requirements. But as our officer population levels off the pattern of losses and gains against that grade distribution causes the promotions to decrease. We are in sum, out of the buildup phase in the officer population and we are maintaining a relatively level strength.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why are you cutting back on enlisted promotions for fiscal year 1970?

General PLATT. Basically, sir, it is the same process. That is, patterns of gains and losses against our authorized grade distribution reduces the numbers of promotions.

However, in 1969 we had a large number of promotions. Nineteen seventy reflects ample opportunity but a more normal situation insofar as the size of our commitment in Vietnam.

Mr. ANDREWS. Wouldn't the cutback in promotions have a direct effect upon your retention capabilities?

General PLATT. We don't believe that the cutback is that great, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. You are not worried about it?

General PLATT. No, sir. As I said earlier to Mr. Lipscomb, we requested 900 more sergeants and 1,600 more corporals, and we believe that we are going to get that authority. With that we don't anticipate any difficulty.

#### REENLISTMENT BONUSES AND PROFICIENCY PAY

Mr. ANDREWS. General, you state that the retention of enlisted Marines is a matter of continuing concern, but that you are taking steps to try and correct it. You further state that the financial incentives of the variable reenlistment bonus and proficiency pay are awarded to highly qualified Marines who possess only vital skills. Is it possible that you are placing too many restrictions on the skills in which enlisted personnel can receive proficiency pay and the variable reenlistment bonus?

General PLATT. The skills to which we can give the variable reenlistment bonus are determined by the Department of Defense as well as the skills that receive pro pay. This is a process of comparing the training investment in the man, that is, the amount of time and money it takes to train him, compared to your present inventory and your projected requirement. It is a weighted review that the Department of Defense goes through. They then tell us what skills we can give VRB pay to and what skills we can give pro pay to.

#### TERMS OF ENLISTMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. When a young man goes up and volunteers in the Marine Corps how much time does he obligate himself to serve?

General PLATT. An enlisted man, sir, can obligate himself for 2-, 3-, or 4-years' active duty.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are there any advantages for him taking 3 years or 4 years in preference to 2 years?

General PLATT. Sir, there are advantages in terms of the training he will get in the Marine Corps and the opportunity for further promotion the longer he stays, of course.

Mr. ANDREWS. When you take an inductee in through the draft, how long is he in for?

General PLATT. Two years.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you send them all through the same basic training?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

#### PERIOD OF TRAINING FOR VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. How long do you train a man before you send him to Vietnam?

General PLATT. It starts out with 8 weeks of recruit training, then he receives 3 weeks of individual combat training, then he receives the specialist training of approximately 4 weeks. It varies with the skill area in which he is going. Then prior to going to Vietnam he takes 2 more weeks of training. So he has a total of 17 weeks of training prior to the time he goes in.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is 18 weeks, is it not?

General PLATT. Eighteen weeks including a week of predeployment administrative time of our staging battalion.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think he is thoroughly qualified to go into combat at the end of that training?

General PLATT. Yes, sir; Mr. Chairman, I do.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had any bad results with men in combat that you felt were due to the fact that they had been inadequately trained or had not been trained long enough?

General PLATT. I know of none, Mr. Chairman; no, sir.

#### VARIABLE REENLISTMENT BONUSES

Mr. ANDREWS. General, you say that some adjustments in eligible skills to receive proficiency pay and the variable reenlistment bonus have been made in order to better meet your retention needs. However, the justification book indicates that you are reducing the number of enlisted personnel to receive these incentive payments. If you are trying to improve your retention needs, why are you reducing the request for these programs?

General PLATT. The total number of VRB payments goes down from 8,830 to 8,595; but within those figures the men who are receiving new variable reenlistment bonus payments actually go up because there is a carryover of those payments for previous years. So in 1970 the new payments will be 4,095 as opposed to 3,864 in 1969.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the number of men?

General PLATT. Number of payments or men, yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. How much are your reenlistment bonuses?

General PLATT. The reenlistment bonus for a first enlistment is 1 month's pay for every year that man reenlists. We allow it up to 6.

Mr. ANDREWS. Six years?

General PLATT. Yes, sir; 6 years. One month's pay, so he could get 6 months' pay for a 6-year reenlistment. Then his second reenlistment, it goes to two-thirds; the third reenlistment, by law it is one-third, and after that it is one-sixth. Now, the variable reenlistment bonus is a multiple of the basic bonus, either one, two, three, or four. So he can

get five total bonus payments if he is in a very long leadtime skill that is in very short supply.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the highest variable reenlistment bonus you pay?

General PLATT. The two combined, sir, I believe can go up as high as \$10,000.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is what the Navy told us theirs was.

Admiral GADDIS. It is a standard item throughout the Department of Defense.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many years would he have to reenlist for in order to get the \$10,000?

General PLATT. Sir, I would like to give an estimated answer and then a firm answer for the record. He would have to be a staff sergeant E-6 who would reenlist for six, I believe, to approach that figure.

Admiral GADDIS. And have a multiple of four in his skill.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you mean by a multiple of four?

General PLATT. Four basic reenlistment bonuses, Mr. Chairman. You see, there is a sliding scale depending upon the inventory position of the skill and the training investment in the skill. Where the training investment is high and our inventory is short, he could be authorized a multiple of four for VRB plus his reenlistment bonus, so that is five bonuses that he would get.

Mr. ANDREWS. You would consider a man who receives that kind of bonus to be a very important man to your organization?

General PLATT. We certainly do.

Mr. ANDREWS. We were told by the Navy that it was their way of competing with private industry.

General PLATT. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. You look on it the same way, do you?

General PLATT. The same way, sir.

#### SECOND TOURS IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. To what extent are you involuntarily sending enlisted marines back to Vietnam for a second tour?

General PLATT. Our basic policy, sir, is to maintain 24 months between involuntary Vietnam tours for both officers and enlisted men. The only time that we could not adhere to that policy is as a result of the emergency deployment of Regimental Landing Team 27, which occurred in February of 1968 as a result of the Tet offensive. We had to deploy about 1,200 marines to meet that commitment, who had been back less than 24 months. That is the only time we have deviated from it.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you get many complaints from the men when they receive orders to go back for the second tour of duty?

General PLATT. Not a significant number; no, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you get complaints from their wives?

General PLATT. I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that there are a number of wives who do not like it.

Mr. ANDREWS. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. ANDREWS. Speaking of these second tours of duty in Vietnam, are these mostly in the high enlisted categories?

General PLATT. They are careerists, sir. Most of them would be sergeant and above, the great majority.

Mr. ANDREWS. What effect is this having on your reenlistment rate? You touched on that.

General PLATT. There is no doubt in my mind that the return to Vietnam for the second time is playing a major role in the retention problem.

#### REENLISTMENTS

Mr. ANDREWS. For the record, will you prepare a schedule showing the number of reenlistments for fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970, for both first-term and career reenlistments?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.  
(The information follows:)

Number of reenlistments	Fiscal years		
	1968	1969	1970
1st term.....	3,675	3,721	4,299
Careerist.....	4,911	5,624	6,101
Total.....	8,586	9,345	10,403

#### PROFICIENCY PAY AND REENLISTMENT BONUSES

Mr. ANDREWS. Will you also prepare for the record a schedule showing the number receiving proficiency pay and reenlistment bonuses for fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.  
(The information follows:)

	Fiscal year—		
	1968	1969	1970
Proficiency pay: <sup>1</sup>			
P-1.....	1,227	1,339	1,261
P-2.....	2,032	1,742	1,742
P-3.....	617	1,378	1,279
P-1 (SP).....	2,635	2,850	2,850
Total.....	6,511	7,309	7,132
Reenlistment bonus payments:			
Regular bonus.....	6,370	6,451	8,242
VRB.....	3,924	8,830	8,595
(New payments) <sup>2</sup> .....	(2,595)	(3,864)	(4,095)

<sup>1</sup> Average strength receiving payments.

<sup>2</sup> All recipients of new VRB also receive regular reenlistment bonus; all recipients of regular bonus do not receive VRB

#### SUBSISTENCE FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Mr. ANDREWS. General, for subsistence for enlisted personnel, the original request for fiscal year 1969 was \$142,664,000. In the supplemental now pending you are requesting an additional \$6.5 million. This is a total of \$149,164,000.

The justification book shows, on page 3-14, that the actual estimate for fiscal year 1969 is \$154,138,000.

Between the amounts appropriated and the revised estimates there is a difference of about \$5 million. Where did you get these additional funds?

General SIMMONS. First, I would like to say the subsistence budget is highly susceptible to revision because of changes not subject to our

control. First, there is the increase and decrease in food prices. Second, there is the change in absentee rates here in the CONUS, primarily, personnel not availing themselves of going to the mess hall and eating food. Third, there is the increased or decreased use of operational rations as opposed to subsistence in kind.

This is a function of the numbers of people we have deployed to Vietnam and the intensity of combat. The more people, the more intense the combat, the greater the consumption of operational rations.

The \$6.5 million to which you refer is the residual of the extra Southeast Asia costs in this appropriation, a total of \$22.5 million which we have introduced into the fiscal year 1969 supplemental. I cannot guarantee the validity of this \$6.5 million. It was calculated last August. It was based on our best experience and projection of the population and intensity of combat at that time. We could require more operational rations. We could require less.

That figure of \$6.5 million represents only about one-fifth of the total number of operational rations that we are buying in the course of fiscal year 1969.

Have I answered all parts of the question, sir?

Mr. ANDREWS. What the committee is trying to develop is where you got the additional \$5 million between the original 1969 request, the supplemental funds of \$6.5 million, which total \$149.2 million, and the revised estimate for 1969 of \$154.1 million.

General SIMMONS. The total increase is in the Southeast Asia increase which I spoke of, \$11,474,000. We were able to meet \$4,974,000 of those dollars from the setaside resulting from Project 693, leaving this residual of \$6.5 million.

#### IMPACT OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE CONTROL ACT OF 1968

Mr. ANDREWS. Then, in effect, it was a reprogramming of the funds set aside under the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act?

General SIMMONS. These were applied against our Southeast Asia costs in accordance with the directions we received from the Department of Defense.

Mr. ANDREWS. What was the total amount set aside within the military personnel appropriation account for the Marine Corps which resulted from the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act?

General SIMMONS. The amount that we set aside as a result of Project 693, which was the DOD application of that act, totaled \$22 million in new obligational authority for fiscal year 1969.

I can give you the schedule if you would like.

(The information follows:)

#### *Schedule of Project 693 new obligational authority set aside for fiscal year 1969* (\$000)

	NOA reduction
Budget activity:	
1. Pay & Allowances Officers.....	\$546
2. Pay & Allowances of Enlisted.....	10,342
4. Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel.....	173
5. Permanent Change of Station Travel.....	1,527
6. Other Military Personnel Costs.....	412
Total .....	22,000

Mr. ANDREWS. That is not the total in military personnel, Marine Corps, is it?

General SIMMONS. The total Project 693 reduction, yes, sir. The congressional reduction was \$6 million, the reduction between the President's requested budget and that enacted, \$6 million.

Mr. ANDREWS. If I understand correctly, your budget was cut \$6 million by the Congress.

General SIMMONS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Then in addition to that, under the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of last year, you were required to give up \$22 million?

Admiral GADDIS. An additional \$16 million, making a total of \$22 million.

General SIMMONS. The \$22 million is the sum of the \$6 million congressional cut and the \$16 million set-aside.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you mean by "set-aside"?

General SIMMONS. Moneys which went, in effect, to escrow and were held by DOD.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, your total cut was \$22 million?

General SIMMONS. Yes, sir.

#### REPROGRAMING

Mr. ANDREWS. How much reprogramming is there within the military personnel appropriation for the Marine Corps?

General SIMMONS. Sir, I think that would depend upon your definition of reprogramming. We have had to make numerous adjustments within budget activities.

Mr. ANDREWS. Of the personnel account.

General SIMMONS. Of dollars to support the personnel, yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Take, for example, pay and subsistence. How much reprogramming have you had in that?

General SIMMONS. I am just speaking of reprogramming within the six budget activities of the MPMC appropriation. Some of this reprogramming was required by the congressional reduction of \$6 million. Some was required by the \$22 million Project 693 which we have just described. Some was required to meet the revised requirements of the revised manpower planning.

However, none of these adjustments reached the DOD threshold of a \$5 million increase. We have reductions which were greater than \$5 million, but we had no increases of \$5 million. We stayed within, of course, the total appropriation.

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask the question in a different way. Has anybody reached over into the personnel kitty to take money out of there for other purposes in the Marine Corps?

General SIMMONS. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. They could not, could they?

General SIMMONS. Not legally, sir; no, sir.

Admiral GADDIS. It could be done under the authority of section 535 by the Secretary of Defense with the permission of the Congress, and only under those conditions.

Mr. ANDREWS. They would have to report it to this committee?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. And the Armed Services Committees?

Admiral GADDIS. No, sir. Only this committee and the Senate Appropriations Committee, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I guess you have a pretty tight budget for personnel, do you not?

General SIMMONS. We like to think so, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is more or less a question of mathematics, so much per head.

Will you prepare for the record a schedule showing the amount of reprogramming which took place within this appropriation for fiscal years 1968 and 1969?

General SIMMONS. Yes, sir.  
(The information follows:)

REPROGRAMING ACTIONS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS, FISCAL YEAR 1968

Budget activity	Appropriation	Reprogramming actions	June 30, 1968, actual obligations	Transfer from other accounts <sup>1</sup>	SEA supplemental	Final actual program
1. Pay and allowances, officers.....	\$262,756	<sup>2</sup> -\$14,255	\$248,501	+ \$8,283	0	\$256,784
2. Pay and allowances, enlisted.....	884,414	<sup>2</sup> -2,828	881,586	+26,035	0	907,621
3. Pay and allowances, cadets.....	1,536	<sup>1</sup> -1,451	85	0	0	85
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel....	131,728	<sup>2</sup> +3,996	135,724	0	0	135,724
5. Permanent change of station travel....	104,651	<sup>2</sup> +3,698	108,349	71	0	108,420
6. Other military personnel costs.....	11,215	<sup>2</sup> +10,840	22,055	0	0	22,055
Total.....	1,396,300	0	1,396,300	+34,389	0	1,430,689

SUMMARY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Direct program	Congressional fiscal year 1968 submit, January 1967			Actual fiscal year 1968 submit, January 1969			Difference, man-years
	Planned begin	End strength	Man-years	Actual begin	End strength	Man-years	
Officers.....	24,193	25,211	25,024	23,565	24,534	23,788	-1,236
Enlisted.....	255,831	269,316	270,076	261,582	282,696	273,842	+3,766
Cadets.....	600	387	486	93	0	25	-461
Total.....	280,624	294,914	295,586	285,240	307,230	297,655	+2,069

<sup>1</sup> Pay raise enacted Oct. 1, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> Shortfall in officer man-years generated \$14,300,000 available for reprogramming.

<sup>3</sup> Reduced numbers of personnel reenlisting below that of the budgeted estimate generated excess funds even though enlisted man-years increased.

<sup>4</sup> The temporary suspensions of the cadet program produced \$1,500,000 in excess of needs.

<sup>5</sup> The excess funds generated in budget activities 1, 2, and 3 were reprogrammed into budget activities 4, 5, and 6 to fund the \$18,500,000 additional costs of Free World Forces, RLT 27, operational rations, servicemens group life insurance, and increased death gratuities.

REPROGRAMING ACTIONS, MILITARY PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS, FISCAL YEAR 1969

Budget activity	Appropriation	Reprogramming actions	Present plan*	July 1, 1968, pay raise supplemental	SEA supplemental	Revised estimate
1. Pay and allowances, officers.....	\$273,241	<sup>1</sup> -\$1,494	\$271,747	\$14,548	0	\$286,295
2. Pay and allowances, enlisted.....	938,365	<sup>1</sup> -7,210	931,155	49,512	0	980,667
3. Pay and allowances, cadets.....	0	0	0	0	0	0
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel....	142,664	<sup>2</sup> +4,974	147,638	0	\$6,500	154,138
5. Permanent change of station travel....	103,105	<sup>1</sup> -550	102,555	0	0	102,555
6. Other military personnel costs.....	16,625	<sup>2</sup> +4,280	20,905	440	0	21,345
Total.....	1,474,000	0	1,474,000	64,500	6,500	1,545,000

Footnotes at end of table.

## SUMMARY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

Direct program	Congressional fiscal year 1969 submit, January 1968			Revised fiscal year 1969 submit, January 1969			Difference, man-years
	Planned begin	End strength	Man-years	Actual begin	End strength	Man-years	
Officers.....	25,211	26,162	25,699	24,534	25,984	25,096	-603
Enlisted.....	276,684	280,246	289,205	282,696	287,386	287,874	-1,331
Total.....	301,895	306,408	314,904	307,230	313,370	312,970	-1,934

<sup>1</sup> Reduction in man-years from the congressional submit yielded sufficient funds to support transfer of funds to budget activities 4 and 6.

<sup>2</sup> Reprogramming was required to fund increased consumption of operational rations in SEA. Funds were transferred from budget activity 1, budget activity 2, and budget activity 5 to cover this requirement.

<sup>3</sup> Reprogramming was required to fund increased costs of death gratuities and servicemens' group life insurance. Funds were transferred from budget activity 2 to cover these funding requirements.

## CONTROL OF MILITARY PERSONNEL APPROPRIATION

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How do you control appropriations for military personnel?

**General SIMMONS.** Sir, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has vested financial management authority in the fiscal director of the Marine Corps. The fiscal director maintains centralized control of activity 1; that is, pay and allowances of officers, and activity 2, pay and allowances of enlisted personnel.

He also retains control of the basic allowance for subsistence portion of activity 4, which is subsistence of enlisted personnel. The subsistence in kind under activity 4 is allocated formally to the Quartermaster General. This transfer constitutes a transfer of legal responsibility to the Quartermaster General.

Activity 5, which is permanent change of station travel, is in a similar manner allocated to the Director of Personnel.

Other military personnel costs in activity 6 are held and controlled by the fiscal director.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is the fiscal director a civilian, or is he a military officer?

**General SIMMONS.** The fiscal director is a civilian. He could well be military. The present one is the first civilian to hold that office. I am his deputy.

**Admiral GADDIS.** This is Mr. James Wright, sir, who has appeared many times before the subcommittee.

**General SIMMONS.** Would you like some further detail on that?

**Mr. ANDREWS.** If you will.

**General SIMMONS.** All right, sir.

In the case of military personnel, we have in effect an open allotment which is held at Headquarters, Marine Corps. We send out accounting instructions to the field to insure that our disbursing officers charge the correct appropriation and activity when making payments. Obligations based on monthly personnel reports using the appropriate pay laws are computed at the headquarters level. These administratively determine the obligations which in turn approximate the payments made to the individual marines.

I can give you our performance figures to show how we have managed that.

Mr. ANDREWS. You may insert something on that for the record, General.

General SIMMONS. All right.  
(The information follows:)

(In millions of dollars)

	Direct program	Expenditures	Difference
Fiscal year 1966.....	978.2	976.0	2.2
Fiscal year 1967.....	1,250.4	1,250.4	0
Fiscal year 1968 <sup>1</sup> .....	1,430.7	1,405.4	25.3

	Total obligation authority	6-month plan	6-month obligations	6-month expenditure
Fiscal year 1969.....	1,458.0	776.9	770.1	701.4

<sup>1</sup> On June 30, 1968, \$21,000,000 was unpaid on military pay records. Expenditure of this amount, originally scheduled for January, has been deferred until March.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you set aside specific funds for the various activities within this budget program?

General SIMMONS. If I understand your question, yes, sir; they are allocated to us by quarter and, in turn, we allocate them by quarter.

#### SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES

Mr. ANDREWS. How much are you requesting for the support of free world forces?

General PLATT. In fiscal year 1970, we are requesting \$14.2 million to provide support for free world military forces.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who are those forces and where are they located?

General PLATT. Predominantly, sir; they are Korean Marines, and they are located in South Vietnam, the Korean Marine brigade which is based at Hoi An south of Danang.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many men in that brigade?

General PLATT. That brigade, sir, has approximately ——— officers and men.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they the only ones for whom you are providing support?

General PLATT. No, sir. We provide operational rations for the marines of the Republic of South Vietnam, just operational rations.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many are in that group?

General PLATT. ———, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, you have ——— down there that you are supporting.

General PLATT. Yes sir, ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have ——— Koreans?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us something about the operation.

General PLATT. That is an infantry brigade of ——— battalions, with reinforcing arms, such as tanks.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who furnishes them their equipment?

General PLATT. Their equipment is MAC-funded, but I cannot answer specifically how.

Can you, General Simmons?

General SIMMONS. We in the Marine Corps have a limited responsibility toward both procurement and operation and maintenance costs of the Korean marines.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does any other service make any contribution to that ——— South Korean brigade down there?

General SIMMONS. Their original equipment was done through the Army. We have assumed an increasing responsibility for this brigade.

#### METHOD OF SUPPORT PAYMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the U.S. Marine Corps ———.

General SIMMONS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you use your officers or their officers?

General PLATT. Their officers.

Let me back off from that a minute, Mr. Chairman. ———. I would have to furnish that for the record, whether it is through a U.S. officer or Korean officer. I cannot answer that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Give us a little information about how you support them.

General PLATT. I understand, sir, it is a transfer of funds to the country itself.

Mr. ANDREWS. You give your money to the country itself, South Korea?

Admiral GADDIS. Yes, sir.

General SIMMONS. We provide the money to AID, the Agency for International Development, and they, in turn, issue a special letter of credit to the Republic of South Korea.

(Off the record.)

Mr. ANDREWS. The U.S. Government, through the Marine Corps,

General PLATT. ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. How much is in this budget for fiscal 1970 for the payment of those services to the South Korean brigade in South Vietnam?

General PLATT. ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. For a total of how much?

General PLATT. \$14,196,000.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is for the South Korean marines?

General PLATT. Principally, sir. There is a figure in there for operational rations for the Vietnamese Marine Corps.

Mr. ANDREWS. I believe you said you have ——— South Vietnamese marines.

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. How much are you contributing, in one way or another, to that group?

General PLATT. We provide them with operational rations, sir, insofar as this appropriation is concerned, about ———, in this budget. All the other costs go to the Korean marines.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is not much money for ——— men.

General PLATT. That is just the operational rations, sir, not the normal food that they eat.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who pays for the normal food they eat?

General PLATT. That is paid by the Government of South Vietnam.

Mr. ANDREWS. You provide about \_\_\_\_\_ million to the South Koreans?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. How is that payment made? It is charged to this budget?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is in this budget?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. \_\_\_\_\_ million for 1970.

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you get \_\_\_\_\_ million, how will you dispose of it? What channel will you put it through?

General SIMMONS. We expect to make a transfer to AID, the Agency for International Development. They, in turn, would extend a letter of credit to the Republic of South Korea.

#### CAPABILITIES OF KOREAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE MARINES

Mr. ANDREWS. What has been your experience and observation of those South Korean marines?

General PLATT. They are good fighting men.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have they fought alongside our men?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. They have been in South Vietnam—it was in 1966, sir, that I was there. I am trying to recall the month.

Do you recall that, General Simmons?

General SIMMONS. About February or March when they first came.

Mr. ANDREWS. How is their morale?

General PLATT. Fine, sir. They were originally down below Chulai, and then they were moved up closer to Danang.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about the casualty rate?

General PLATT. I do not have the figures on their casualties. I would have to obtain that, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they equal to ours?

General PLATT. I do not know, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they right up front where \_\_\_\_\_ action is?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. They have an area around the city of Hoi An, south of Danang. That area is their responsibility. They operate under the operational guidance of the Commanding General, Third Marine Amphibious Force. They are not under his command.

Mr. ANDREWS. What type of officers do they have?

General PLATT. My observation is that they have very competent officers.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about their equipment?

General PLATT. Their equipment is good.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they have the M-16?

General PLATT. I would like to furnish that for the record, sir. My impression is that they do.

(The information follows:)

The information follows:)

Yes, however, issues of M-16 rifles have been made only to infantry units of the Korean Marine Corps in Vietnam. These issues which commenced in July 1967, are now complete.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about the South Vietnamese Marines?

General PLATT. They are good fighting men, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have they fought alongside our men?

General PLATT. Yes, sir, they have. They do not operate in a permanent area in I Corps such as the South Korean Marines do. Rather, they move from one part of South Vietnam to the other in accordance with what their staff views as the necessity of their deployment.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that the total number of South Vietnamese Marines?

General PLATT. Yes, sir, ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they well trained?

General PLATT. They certainly are, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who trained them?

General PLATT. A number of their officers, of course, have been trained here; and they, unlike the Korean Marines, have U.S. Marine advisers right with them, and have had for many years.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they have the M-16?

General PLATT. Again, sir, my impression is that they do have. I would like to verify it for the record.

(The information follows:)

Issues of the M-16 rifle to the Vietnamese Marine Corps commenced in July 1967 and are now complete.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is their morale high?

General PLATT. My observation is that it most certainly is; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you been with them?

General PLATT. I have watched them operate, yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you watched the South Koreans operate?

General PLATT. Yes, sir; I have.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you give a good report for both groups?

General PLATT. I certainly do.

#### COMPUTATION OF SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES

Mr. ANDREWS. How did you compute the requirement for support of free world military forces?

General PLATT. I will have to furnish that for the record, sir. We get the figures via CINCPAC, and we fund to their figures.

General SIMMONS. I think Mr. Troen can answer that. He has some computation.

Mr. TROEN. In the budget that we furnished, there is an overlap of about 10 percent, including ——— replacements going in and out every month, amounting to man-years of about ———. They have a specific allowance that is paid them when they are in combat. We compute that against the numbers, both officers and enlisted.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is a matter of mathematics, more or less, is it not?

Mr. TROEN. We also provide clothing. All this is computed out at the regular rates. We also give death gratuities and disability allowance if one of them loses a leg or arm. This is all computed out.

#### TRAILER ALLOWANCE

Mr. ANDREWS. Under accession travel for officers, why are you increasing the trailer allowance by \$210, from \$465 to \$675?

General SIMMONS. The allowed trailer allowance, up until recently, sir, was not enough to pay the commercial rate for moving trailers.

This represents a rate change, and gets it to a more realistic figure where we can, in fact, pay the commercial rate for trailer movements.

Mr. ANDREWS. How did you determine that you need as much as you are requesting here?

General SIMMONS. The increase in the average move represents a realistic price of the move.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, the price of moving a trailer has gone up?

General PLATT. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. In comparing your allowances for trailers, we note there are several different rates being paid, varying from a low of \$425 to a high of \$710. Will you explain why there would be such variances between these allowances?

General PLATT. I would like to ask Mr. Meade to answer that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Meade, can you answer that question?

Mr. MEADE. These are based on 1968 actual experience. Also, figuring in the increase that went into effect on 2 January of 1968.

Admiral GADDIS. This is an allowed increase per mile from 51 to 75 cents, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. This last question I asked: In comparing your allowances for trailers, we note there are several different rates being paid, varying from a low of \$425 to a high of \$710. Will you explain why there would be such variances between these allowances?

Mr. MEADE. Yes, sir. This is how it came out from actual expenditures for the type of travel. Rotation travel runs higher than the others.

General PLATT. The number of miles traveled is different.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is all based on mileage, is it not?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. In the different types of travel, the mileage for accession travel would be different than operational travel between duty stations. The average trip would be of different length. Because it is computed on a per-mile basis, that would affect the rate.

Mr. ANDREWS. That would not have any bearing on the average rate, would it?

Mr. MEADE. Yes, sir. One man goes across country and it costs him \$1,200. We pay him \$1,200. Somebody else might go 40 or 50 miles. This is an average rate for that type of travel, divided by the total number of people who moved in fiscal 1968 into the total amount of money spent.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you average it out, it looks like you would not have a low of \$425 and a high of \$710.

Mr. MEADE. You can get a low very easily. Some of these people do not move too far.

Mr. ANDREWS. We are talking about average.

General PLATT. The average for that particular type of move, sir, whether an accession move or a change in duty station in the continental United States, the average mileage is different, depending on where the man is going and in what direction he is traveling.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you mean by "accession mileage"?

Mr. MEADE. The average number of miles traveled in accession travel.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the man who comes into the Marine Corps?

Mr. MEADE. Yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is he paid only one way?

**Mr. MEADE.** No, sir. There are four different types. There is travel from home into the Marine Corps, either as an officer or as an enlisted man to the recruit depot. Then there is travel from there to the duty station. Then there is the officer candidate who comes in as an enlisted man and goes to Quantico. He travels under enlisted travel.

Then there are also the reenlistments, who come back into the Marine Corps from recruiting stations.

We have four different types of travel.

#### RECOUPMENT OF OVERCHARGES FOR TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Who audits your travel vouchers?

**Mr. MEADE.** The disbursing people, I suppose.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** In the Marine Corps?

**Mr. MEADE.** I think so.

Some of them go to GAO. GAO does a lot of that.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** GAO has saved the taxpayers a lot of money through their work on overcharges on the part of shippers and freight handlers.

**Admiral GADDIS.** I think there is a point here which came up the other day in the Navy, too, Mr. Chairman. Please correct me if I am wrong. It is my understanding that both the Navy and the Marine Corps in the various types of travel base their estimates for the coming year on the actual expenditures in fiscal 1968 or a base year, and, therefore, the rates differ based on actual experience in a prior year. On average, they would merely be an average rate for an average move, but they reflect in this particular case the actual expenditure experience of a prior year, adjusted for the number of moves that are to be made in the coming year.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Back to my question about who audits travel vouchers—

**Mr. MEADE.** The Examination Section of Marine Corps Disbursing Office in Kansas City examines a portion of the travel vouchers of Marines only for overpayments and insitutes checkages.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Have you found you have been overcharged on freight rates?

**Mr. MEADE.** I know it has been found, mostly in the movement of household goods, but they do not move by freight. They move via van and containers.

(Off the record.)

**Mr. ANDREWS.** I wish you would put something in the record about the experience you have had on overcharges, and how much has been recouped, in all fields of transportation, trailer hauling, transport by moving van, railroads, and travel of people.

**Admiral GADDIS.** We will do that, Mr. Chairman.

(The information follows:)

The Marine Corps in accordance with the General Accounting Office Policy and Procedures Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies, title 5, section 1020 relies on the General Accounting Office for audit of all travel vouchers paid to public carriers. All paid travel vouchers are sent to the Transportation Division of the General Accounting Office for such audit. Any recoupments realized from this source are consolidated with other recoupments and are therefore not susceptible to analysis for a definitive response to the request.

## MARINE CORPS TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS

Mr. ANDREWS. Why should there not be just one flat rate, regardless of the type of travel involved? Do you want to take that Mr. Meade?

Mr. MEADE. I will give you an example. We kept track in 1968 of the different number of people who traveled in each type of travel, and the total number of miles they traveled. We do this directly from the orders. We work in Headquarters, Marine Corps. My office gets a copy of every order which is issued by Headquarters, Marine Corps. From that we figure the number of miles these men will go.

In 1968, we had 23,881 people moving in operational travel. The total mileage was 25,033,812, or an average of 1,049 miles. The rate was \$62.49.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the base rate you pay for travel when a man travels in his own automobile?

Mr. MEADE. 6 cents per mile.

Mr. ANDREWS. For moving a trailer do you pay the regular trailer charges?

Mr. MEADE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You pay the going rate for the movement of household goods?

Mr. MEADE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would put in the record the total amount paid in 1968 by the Marine Corps for travel, with a breakdown of what it was for—household goods, duty station changes, et cetera.

(The information follows:)

*Permanent change of station travel military personnel, Marine Corps fiscal year  
1968 expenditures through Jan. 31, 1969*

	<i>Thousands</i>
A. Accession travel.....	\$15,435
B. Training travel.....	1,283
C. Operational travel.....	5,405
D. Rotation travel.....	71,663
E. Separation travel.....	9,638
<b>Total</b> .....	<b>103,424</b>
<hr/>	
A. Accession travel:	
1. Officers:	
(a) Travel of military member.....	943
(b) Travel of dependents.....	193
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	822
(d) Dislocation allowance.....	182
(e) Trailer allowance.....	67
(f) Nontemporary storage.....	30
Subtotal .....	2,237
<hr/>	
2. Enlisted	
(a) Travel of military member.....	13,062
(b) Travel of dependents.....	15
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	109
(d) Trailer allowance.....	9
(e) Nontemporary storage.....	1
Subtotal .....	13,196
<hr/>	
3. Marine aviation cadets: (a) travel of military member.....	2
Total accession travel.....	15,435

*Permanent change of station travel military personnel, Marine Corps fiscal year  
1968 expenditures through Jan. 31, 1969—Continued*

**B. Training travel:**

	<i>Thousands</i>
<b>1. Officers:</b>	
(a) Travel of military member.....	\$74
(b) Travel of dependents.....	84
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	643
(d) Dislocation allowance.....	0
(e) Traller allowance.....	0
(f) Nontemporary storage.....	10
Subtotal .....	902
<b>2. Enlisted:</b>	
(a) Travel of military member.....	106
(b) Travel of dependents.....	51
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	178
(d) Dislocation allowance.....	43
(e) Traller allowance.....	0
(f) Nontemporary storage.....	373
Subtotal .....	381
Total training travel.....	1, 283

**C. Operational travel between duty stations:**

<b>1. Officers:</b>	
(a) Travel of military member.....	153
(b) Travel of dependents.....	125
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	948
(d) Dislocation allowance.....	128
(e) Traller allowance.....	3
(f) Nontemporary storage.....	27
Subtotal .....	1, 384
<b>2. Enlisted:</b>	
(a) Travel of military member.....	1, 006
(b) Travel of dependents.....	281
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	1, 363
(d) Dislocation allowance.....	311
(e) Traller allowance.....	134
(f) Nontemporary storage.....	26
Subtotal .....	4, 021
Total operational travel.....	5, 405

**D. Rotation travel to and from overseas:**

<b>1. Land travel officers:</b>	
(a) Travel of military member.....	1, 519
(b) Travel of dependents.....	841
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	6, 530
(d) Dislocation allowance.....	849
(e) Traller allowance.....	73
(f) Nontemporary storage.....	318
Subtotal .....	10, 129
<b>2. Land travel enlisted:</b>	
(a) Travel of military member.....	14, 582
(b) Travel of dependents.....	1, 585
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	8, 800
(d) Dislocation allowance.....	1, 630

Permanent change of station travel military personnel, Marine Corps fiscal year  
1968 expenditures through Jan. 31, 1969—Continued

## D. Rotation travel to and from overseas—Continued

## 2. Land travel enlisted—Continued

Thousands

(e) Trailer allowance..... \$552  
(f) Nontemporary storage..... 200

Subtotal ..... 27,508

Total land travel..... 37,037

## 3. Across-sea travel officers:

## MSTS:

(a) Travel of military member..... 30  
(b) Commercial contract of member..... 50  
(c) Travel of dependents..... 0  
(d) Commercial contract of dependents..... 142  
(e) Transportation of household goods..... 103  
(f) Privately owned vehicles..... 207

## MAC:

(a) Travel ..... 1,222  
(b) Travel of dependents..... 05  
(c) Cargo ..... 328  
(d) Special airlift ..... 311

Port handling: (a) HHG's and POV's..... 132

## Commercial air:

(a) Travel of military member..... 52  
(b) Travel of dependents..... 55

Subtotal ..... 2,733

## Across-sea travel enlisted:

## MSTS:

(a) Travel of military member..... 98  
(b) Commercial contract of member..... 15  
(c) Troops ..... 533  
(d) Commercial contract of dependents..... 42  
(e) Transportation of household goods..... 98  
(f) Privately owned vehicles..... 204

## MAC:

(a) Travel of military member..... 14,979  
(b) Travel of dependents..... 535  
(c) Cargo ..... 526  
(d) Special airlift..... 13,644  
(e) Free world forces..... 0

Port handling: (a) household goods and POV's..... 109

## Commercial air:

(a) Travel of member..... 195  
(b) Travel of dependents..... 135

Subtotal ..... 31,203

Total rotation travel across sea..... 34,020

Total rotation travel to and from overseas..... 71,033

## E. Separation travel:

## 1. Officers:

(a) Travel of military member..... 164  
(b) Travel of dependents..... 121  
(c) Transportation of household goods..... 1,028  
(d) Trailer allowance..... 51  
(e) Nontemporary storage..... 4

Subtotal ..... 1,368

*Permanent change of station travel military personnel, Marine Corps fiscal year 1968 expenditures through Jan. 31, 1969—Continued*

E. Separation travel—Continued

2. Enlisted:

	<i>Thousands</i>
(a) Travel of military member:	
(1) Paid on final separation.....	\$5,170
(2) Cash payment on reenlistment.....	583
(b) Travel of dependents.....	370
(c) Transportation of household goods.....	1,083
(d) Trailer allowance.....	74
(e) Nontemporary storage.....	82
Subtotal .....	8,270
Total separation travel.....	0,038

SHIPMENT OF PRIVATE VEHICLES

Mr. ANDREWS. We note that you have increased the allowance for the shipment of privately owned vehicles by MSTs by about \$33, from \$212 to \$245. Why was there an increase in this rate?

General PLATT. This is privately owned vehicles by MSTs, for officers. I have the same rate for both 1969 and 1970—\$245.33.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am looking at the book, page 3-53. Your original request for privately owned vehicles for 1969 was \$212 and some cents. You revised that to \$245.33. I am looking at section D under paragraph 3.

General PLATT. Yes, sir. I do not have last year's request with me, Mr. Chairman, but that rate is the product of the cost per measurement for miles used, and the experience data obviously have changed since last year's submission to this year's submission.

Mr. ANDREWS. These rates are set by MSTs?

General PLATT. Yes, sir; but it depends on where we move the man to; the transfer pattern between the time we made that estimate and the time we make this estimate.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand that, but MSTs handles your shipments overseas.

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have their rates increased?

General PLATT. No; their rates have not increased.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would look into these figure you gave us.

Mr. MEADE. These are based on the actual 1968 costs to us. That is the reason the rate has changed.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you permit your officers in Vietnam to have their cars over there?

General PLATT. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. In Korea?

General PLATT. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where do you permit it?

General PLATT. Ninety percent of this movement by MSTs for privately owned vehicles is to Hawaii, Sir. The other 10 percent is in various places throughout the world.

The reason that figure changes is that we are moving people differently between the two estimates. The charge is the same.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you revised your 1969 rate as reflected in the jus-

tification book, showing the same figure for 1969 and 1970, for privately owned automobiles, why did you not revise your rate for trailer allowances?

Mr. MEADE. We did not know about the 1969 trailer allowances at the time it was put in the original budget. We were never given any additional money in 1969 for the trailer allowance.

Mr. ANDREWS. Were you given any additional money for the privately owned vehicles?

Mr. MEADE. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why did you revise your rate?

Mr. MEADE. We reprogramed permanent change of station to cover it.

#### WOMEN IN THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. ANDREWS. Colonel Sustad, I want to hear from you. What is the planned strength of your Women Marine Corps for fiscal years 1969 and 1970, for both officers and enlisted personnel?

Colonel SUSTAD. Our strength objectives for both the years are the same, 290 officers and 2,900 enlisted women.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the maximum number you can have in the corps, do you know?

Colonel SUSTAD. There isn't a maximum. There was at one time a legal restriction which was removed by legislation about a year and a half ago. A legal maximum does not exist.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have no legal maximum?

Colonel SUSTAD. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. General, what do you want to say about it?

General PLATT. The objective is determined by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, sir, generally at 1 percent of our enlisted strength, and then 10 percent of the women marine enlisted strength for officers.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any members of your corps serving in South Vietnam?

Colonel SUSTAD. Yes, sir. We have one officer and seven enlisted women.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do they do?

Colonel SUSTAD. They are all in administrative and clerical-type positions.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had a request for more over there?

Colonel SUSTAD. No, sir; not that I know of.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they go over voluntarily? I mean by that, is it voluntary service or mandatory service?

Colonel SUSTAD. I know that the initial group that went, I guess close to 2 years ago, all were volunteers. All replacements have been volunteers and it is intended to continue this policy.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is the morale of the members of your corps high?

Colonel SUSTAD. Yes, sir; I think it is as high as the whole Marine Corps.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is wonderful. Have you any problems with your corps that you would like to discuss with this committee?

Colonel SUSTAD. No, sir; none at all.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is fine.

## JOINT TRAINING OF WOMEN OFFICERS OF THE SERVICES

Since there are relatively few officers entering the four services' women's corps each year, would it not be feasible to combine their basic training and thus save substantial training costs? In other words, give all the ladies in our services the same basic training. The number is decreasing each year for each service. We have asked the other services that same question. We do not want to slight you.

Colonel SUSTAD. I do not know if it would be more economical or not. I have no idea. Perhaps it would be. However, I would hope that there would be other matters considered before any decision of that type was made.

## TRAINING OF WOMEN MARINES

Mr. ANDREWS. Where are your trainees trained?

Colonel SUSTAD. Our officers are trained at Quantico; the enlisted women at Parris Island.

Mr. ANDREWS. They do not take the same training that recruits do, do they?

Colonel SUSTAD. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I associate Parris Island with lost weight and mental fatigue.

Colonel SUSTAD. The women's training, of course, is not like the men's.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would hope not.

Colonel SUSTAD. The women's training area, I might say, is separated from the training areas of the men recruits.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is there any reason for that?

Colonel SUSTAD. The only men recruits the women see, I think, are when they participate in the joint parade. That's about it.

Mr. ANDREWS. You say they are all happy and their morale is high and you have them separated from the men.

Colonel SUSTAD. Yes, sir. They appreciate the men more when they finish training, sir.

Mr. RHODES. Absence makes the heart grow fonder.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Colonel.

## PROJECT ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

Mr. ANDREWS. General Platt, what is the Marine Corps' quota for Project 100,000 inductees in fiscal year 1970?

General PLATT. Our quota is expressed, Mr. Chairman, as a percentage of our new accessions. During the period October 1968 to June of 1969, we are required to take 24 percent of our new accessions as Mental Group IV's.

Mr. ANDREWS. What was the Navy's figure, Admiral? Eighteen percent, was it not? If I remember correctly, it was 18.

Admiral GADDIS. The number I recall, sir, is 23,900 or about 20 percent of the nonprior service male recruits Mental Group IV accessions.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have 24 percent?

General PLATT. Twenty-four percent Mental Group IV, and within that, 12 percent are the so-called new mental standards men who score on the Armed Forces qualification test from 10 to 20.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long have you had that imposed on you?

General PLATT. Since the 1st of October, 1966.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us briefly what experience you have had and what you look forward to in the future.

General PLATT. Originally, sir, our quota was 18 percent Mental Group IV and 6 percent new standards. Then it went to 21 percent in October of 1967, and half of that new mental standards, 10.5 percent. Now it is 24 percent, with 12 percent new mental standards.

We have conducted a study comparing the new mental standards men with a sample of Marines in all the other mental categories, IV, III, II, and I. We have about 2 years' experience. We find that our attrition in recruit training for new mental standards is 8.4 percent, as opposed to 4.1 percent for the control group. Our recycling or remedial training is 27 percent for new standards men, and 10.6 percent for the control group; that is, in recruit training.

In training that follows recruit training, the recycling rate is 4.6 percent for new mental standards, and 0.6 for the control group.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that good or bad?

General PLATT. It depends on how you look at it, Mr. Chairman. Certainly from the military viewpoint, when we recycle a man, he spends a longer time in training and, therefore, within the fixed, overall strength we have less productive manpower.

We also have checked on their promotions during this period, and we find of the new mental standards men, we have 27.2 percent serving as corporals, as opposed to 46.2 for the control group. This is the type of pattern that we found in our study.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you been able to use those men when they finish their training?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. Due to the nature of our organization—as you know, we are an air-ground team in our combat forces—we of necessity find that these men are channeled more toward the combat arms and toward supply, administration, food services, rather than in the long leadtime skills that you find in aircraft maintenance, electronics repair, or avionics.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you satisfied with the program?

General PLATT. We have complained about the method of assessing the quota, sir, on several occasions, because we feel that our accessions are high because of the size of our commitment in Vietnam. As I said before, the 8,000 recruits a month that we must of necessity take in to sustain that large commitment means, in effect, that we are being assessed a quota based on an artificial situation, a situation that is not directly comparable among all the services.

We asked for this method of assigning accessions to be reviewed, and specifically we said we did not want more than three-quarters of our phase 2 quota, the 21 percent; but the 24 percent was assessed.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do I understand that you get in about 8,000 men a month, and 24 percent of those must be of category IV? Is that correct?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. Technically, it is 7,900 males that we are accessing against. I used 8,000. Colonel Sustad has 100 women who are not included.

Mr. ANDREWS. Twenty-four percent of whatever number you take in each month must be category IV?

General PLATT. Yes, sir; and half of those must be the so-called new mental standards, or the lower half Mental Group IV, and, in turn, half of those must be of the lower part of that group.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you ever make a Marine out of that lower group?

General PLATT. Yes, sir, we make Marines out of a good number of them.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you give them remedial reading courses?

General PLATT. No, sir; we do not have remedial reading courses.

#### SPECIAL TRAINING FOR GROUP IV ACCESSIONS

Mr. ANDREWS. What special training do you give these people, over and above the regular recruit gets?

General PLATT. In our basic training, sir, we have had for some time a special training branch in both recruit depots, and men who are having difficulty for one reason or another are sent to that branch. If they are there over a short period of time, we recycle them back into recruit training. This is special help from the training aspect. If the man is having difficulty learning the subject he is supposed to learn or if he needs special attention to build up his strength, or if he perhaps has a motivational problem, depending upon what his problem is, we put him in this special training branch.

We do find a higher percentage of the new mental standards men being recycled or given this type of remedial training.

We also do it for other types if they have a problem.

After recruit training, we have redesigned several of our basic specialist training courses in an effort to simplify them to make them easier for men with lower mental scores.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had any disciplinary problem with these recruits?

General PLATT. When compared on the same basis that I stated before, certain areas of discipline, we find, for example, in the nonjudicial punishment, one time, one punishment, 9.4 percent of the new standards men had nonjudicial punishment once, as opposed to 8.6 percent of all others. For two nonjudicial punishments, it runs 9.2 percent versus 6.3 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. There isn't too much difference there, is there?

General PLATT. No, sir.

In the court-martials, one court-martial, 2.7 percent of the new mental standards, versus 1.4 percent for the control group. For two or more court-martials, it is 1.5 percent versus—here is a reversal—2.5 percent for the control group.

#### DESERTIONS

Mr. ANDREWS. We note in a report by the Senate Armed Services Committee that during fiscal year 1968, the Marine Corps had unauthorized absences for less than 30 days of 24,000; and unauthorized absences over 30 days of 8,104. Has the number of AWOL cases been increasing steadily the last few years?

General PLATT. First, I would like to address desertions, sir, that is, people we declare administratively as deserters.

Mr. ANDREWS. How long?

General PLATT. Thirty days.

Mr. ANDREWS. After 30 days AWOL, they are declared deserters?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

That rate currently is 10.1 men for every 1,000.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that up or down?

General PLATT. It is going up, sir, and has gone up during the Vietnam period. There is an upward trend.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you associate that upward trend with the Vietnam war?

General PLATT. I think it is related to it; yes, sir.

#### AGITATORS IN MARINES

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had any agitators in your ranks who have spoken out against our efforts in Vietnam?

General PLATT. I would like to supply that for the record, sir.

(The information follows:)

The Marine Corps has had some agitators, however, there have not been many. For example, in May 1968, two Marine deserters appeared on Moscow television to voice their opposition to the war in Vietnam. Several Marine deserters to Canada and Sweden have published interviews in newspapers expressing antiwar sentiments. Two marines in Hawaii, a marine in San Francisco, and a marine in Boston all chained themselves at various times to groups of pacifists to demonstrate against the war. Some black militant activity which sporadically appears has an antiwar theme. A small group attempting to organize a servicemen's union at a Marine Corps base has advocated disobedience to orders which assign marines to Vietnam since they consider the war "illegal and immoral". Most often the antiwar sentiment expressed by defectors has been expressed only after the marine has defected abroad and has been exploited by outside influence. In other cases the antiwar sentiment has been corollary to other issues as, for example, in the case of the union whose primary purpose is to organize enlisted men and to represent them. Antiwar sentiment expressed by black militants is always corollary as well. The question of antiwar agitation is really only part of the much larger problem of civil dissidence which affects all American life.

Mr. ANDREWS. Has there been anything similar to the pattern in the Army?

General PLATT. No.

I might add, on the desertion rate, compared to Korea, it was 29.6 percent per thousand.

Mr. ANDREWS. So, it is down in the Vietnam war.

General PLATT. As compared to Korea; yes, sir.

#### USE OF DRUGS

Mr. ANDREWS. Recent information indicates that the use of marijuana and other drugs has increased substantially in the Army, especially in Vietnam. Is the Marine Corp experiencing this same problem, and what are you doing about it?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. We are experiencing an upward trend in the number of investigations for marijuana, dangerous drugs, or narcotic offenses. From 1967 to 1968, there is a pronounced upward trend.

Specifically, worldwide, for calendar year 1968, we had 2,470 investigations of this type. Of that total, 728 took place in Vietnam. The other 1,621 took place in other areas. The rate for calendar year 1968 was 8.1 per thousand. The rate in Vietnam is 9.1 per thousand. There is a higher rate.

Since 1967, sir, we have had an intensified program for education with a dual thrust. One is to educate the men on the dangers and the inherent consequences of drug usage; and the other is to educate or train our investigative personnel in all aspects of this problem.

Mr. ANDREWS. I assume your program in that connection is similar to the Navy's.

General PLATT. Yes, sir. In Vietnam the program is even more focused, where we have specific orientation of the troops on the problem as it exists there, and the chaplains also include this in their character guidance lectures.

#### PROJECT TRANSITION

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you please describe for the committee the Marine Corps effort in Project Transition?

General PLATT. Yes, sir. We are participating in Project Transition and, as you know, it offers counseling and educational assistance and inservice training to men who have less than 6 months to do on their enlistment. We have eight transition sites within the continental United States. We have some three Government agencies and 19 civilian companies participating in this effort.

Currently, we have 965 marines who are actually taking vocational training or educational help under this program.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think it is a good program, General? Is it worth the time and effort on the part of the Marine Corps?

General PLATT. I think whatever we can do to assist the marine in the transition to civilian life is worthwhile, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. You say the spirit of the Corps is good, morale is high. That is true both in this country and in Vietnam?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

#### MEDICAL PROBLEMS IN THE MARINE CORPS

Mr. ANDREWS. Overall, how is the health of the Corps? Have you had any epidemics?

General PLATT. No serious epidemics that I know of, sir. We have had some cases of meningitis at the recruit depot at San Diego right now, but there is also a higher incidence right now of meningitis in that whole southern California area. That is the only one I know of, sir. We of course have a malaria problem in South Vietnam.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Rhodes?

Mr. RHODES. I have no questions.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Davis?

#### TEMPORARY RANK OF OFFICERS

Mr. DAVIS. General Platt, are substantial numbers of your officers serving and being paid in ranks higher than their permanent rank in the Corps?

General PLATT. Yes, Mr. Davis, they are.

Mr. DAVIS. Would you submit for the record the number of such officers now holding such temporary rank? If there are cases where they are serving in a temporary rank more than one higher than their permanent rank, would you indicate that also?

General PLATT. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

Marine Corps officers are serving and being paid in grades higher than their permanent grades because of a multiplicity of reasons. During fiscal years 1966 and 1967, the officer strength of the Marine Corps increased substantially to meet the Vietnam expansion. This necessitated the advancement of approximately 1,278 warrant officers and 2,775 staff noncommissioned officers to temporary commissioned grades. The majority of those appointed are still serving as temporary officers.

In addition, the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 5787 were exercised during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 for temporary promotions to the grades of lieutenant colonel and major to enable the Marine Corps to meet requirements in these grades.

The numbers of Marine Corps officers serving and being paid in grades higher than their permanent grades are indicated as follows:

Column I—Officer Grades.

Column II—Number of officers serving in grades shown in column I who hold temporary appointments, under the various provisions of law, higher than their permanent grades.

Column III—Permanent grade of officers in column II.

Col. I	Col. II	Col. III
General (10).....	1	08
Lieutenant general (09).....	8	08
Major general (08).....	3	07
Brigadier general (07).....	13	06
Colonel (06).....	139	05
Lieutenant colonel (05).....	901	(1)
Major (04).....	2,746	(2)
Captain (03).....	5,260	(3)
1st lieutenant (02).....	6,716	(4)
2d lieutenant (01).....	81	(5)

<sup>1</sup> Includes: 331 officers holding temporary appointments under 10 U.S.C. 5769; and 570 officers promoted under temporary wartime authority (10 U.S.C. 5787) to meet requirements in this grade, 36 of which are temporary limited duty officers with permanent warrant officer grades.

<sup>2</sup> Includes: 2,013 officers holding temporary appointments under 10 U.S.C. 5769; and 733 officers promoted under temporary wartime authority (10 U.S.C. 5787) to meet requirements in this grade, 10 of whom are temporary limited duty officers with permanent warrant officer grades.

<sup>3</sup> Includes: 3,441 officers in permanent grade 02 holding temporary appointments under 10 U.S.C. 5769; 913 officers in permanent 01 grade who must achieve 3 years in grade prior to appointment to permanent 02 grade; and 906 officers in permanent warrant officer grades promoted to meet the expansion for Vietnam.

<sup>4</sup> Includes: 4,036 officers in permanent grade 01 who must achieve 3 years in grade prior to appointment to permanent 02 grade; 401 officers in permanent warrant officer grades; and 2,279 officers in permanent enlisted grades promoted to meet the expansion for Vietnam.

<sup>5</sup> Officers in permanent enlisted grades promoted to meet the expansion of Vietnam.

Mr. DAVIS. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

#### EARLY RELEASE

Mr. RHODES. You had an early out program for fiscal 1969. What do you project for fiscal 1970? You released 26,000 people early in 1969. What would the comparable number be for 1970?

General PLATT. The number for 1970 is approximately 17,000, sir.

Mr. RHODES. Is this a program which you have adopted by necessity?

General PLATT. Yes, we have adopted it by necessity. As I say, we have no feasible alternative other than to allow these men to go home early.

Mr. RHODES. How much would it take in addition to your budget for fiscal 1970 so you would not have to release these people early?

General PLATT. I would have to furnish that for the record, sir, in terms of numbers and dollars. I could give an approximate figure.

Mr. RHODES. It will be satisfactory to furnish it for the record.

General PLATT. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

It would cost an additional \$35.2 million in MPMC funds to completely eliminate the Marine Corps early release program in fiscal year 1970. However, the elimination of only the most objectionable portion of the program, the early release of Marines from CONUS duty stations, would cost \$27.0 million in fiscal year 1970.

**Mr. RHODES.** Is it a good way to run the Marine Corps to have these early outs? If you could write the script, would you do it this way?

**General PLATT.** No, sir. We would like to see a higher Marine Corps so we could avoid, not the entire program, but part of the program. There are two parts to the program, and it is the second part that is giving us the biggest management problem. If I may, very briefly, we started last summer letting men out early when they came back from Vietnam. We always did if they had only 60 days to do on their enlistment; but we increased that up to 6 months early last fall.

Then in January, for certain skills such as infantry and aircraft repair and maintenance, we went up to 12 months. When those men come back from Vietnam, they are in a transient status, and this is a manageable program both from the standpoint of the individual marine and the corps. But that part of the program does not produce the losses we need.

Therefore, starting the first of this month, we have had to go into another phase where we offer the opportunity for early release from 3 to 12 months early to marines who are currently stationed in the continental United States, with some restrictions that we have to impose. This is a more difficult program to manage, as I am sure you can see. A small Marine barracks has a significant number of men going out early, and they have to be replaced in order for that barracks to do its job.

**Mr. RHODES.** It sounds like instead of encouraging people to stay in, you are trying to kick them out.

**General PLATT.** We are not trying to kick them out, sir. We are offering them the opportunity. We are working hard to keep our retention rate up, too.

**Mr. RHODES.** That is what I thought. It seems that you are working against yourself. I guess I just don't understand the early-out concept.

**General PLATT.** Sir; as long as we have to take 8,000 people a month against our present authorized average and end-year strength, the only alternative we have is a higher strength. Without that, we have to create the vacancies for these new deployable marines or change the tour in Vietnam or send men back in less than 24 months, both of which we feel are unacceptable.

**Mr. RHODES.** That is all, Mr. Chairman.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Thank you, gentlemen.

---

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1969.

## RESERVE PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

**Mr. ADDABBO.** The committee will come to order.

We will now take up the request for "Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps," and insert the summary tables at this point.

Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps

For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the Marine Corps Reserve and the Marine Corps platoon leaders class on active duty under section 265 of title 10, United States Code, or while undergoing reserve training, or while performing drills or equivalent duty, as authorized by law;

\$45,700,000

[\$31,100,000.] ✓

(10 U.S.C. 683, 1475-80, 6081-86, 6148; 37 U.S.C. 204, 206, 301, 305, 309, 402-04, 415-18, 1002; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

Program and Financing Summary (in thousands of dollars)

Identification Code 07-05-1108-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<b>Program by activities:</b>			
<b>Direct Program:</b>			
1. Reserve component personnel.....	33,878	39,053	43,650
2. Reserve officer candidates.....	1,997	1,947	2,050
<b>Total direct obligations.....</b>	<b>35,875</b>	<b>41,000</b>	<b>45,700</b>
<b>Reimbursable program:</b>			
1. Reserve component personnel.....	170	131	149
2. Reserve officer candidates.....	1	5	1
<b>Total reimbursable program.....</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>10 Total obligations.....</b>	<b>36,046</b>	<b>41,136</b>	<b>45,850</b>
<b>Financing:</b>			
<b>Receipts and reimbursements from:</b>			
11 Federal Funds.....	-153	-131	-149
14 Non-Federal sources <sup>1</sup> .....	-18	- 5	- 1
25 Unobligated balance lapsing.....	2,425	.....	.....
<b>Budget authority.....</b>	<b>38,300</b>	<b>41,000</b>	<b>45,700</b>
<b>Budget Authority</b>			
<b>40 Appropriation.....</b>	<b>38,300</b>	<b>31,100</b>	<b>45,700</b>

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

Program and Financing Summary (In thousands of dollars) - continued

Identification Code 07-05-1108-0-1-051	28 68 actual	28 69 estimate	28 70 estimate
New obligational authority -- continued			
44.30 Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases...	.....	1,600	.....
44.50 Proposed supplemental for increased costs of Per Diem for Reservists (P.L. 90-168) and to provide for the average strength required by Public Law 90-500		8,300	
Relation of obligations to Outlays:			
71 Obligations incurred net .....	35,875	41,000	45,700
72 Obligated balance, start of year.....	3,194	2,147	3,147
74 Obligated balance, end of year.....	-2,147	-3,147	-3,847
77 Adjustments in expired accounts.....	-315	.....	.....
90 Outlays excluding supplementals.....	36,606	30,700	44,400
91.30 Outlays from military pay act supplemental.....	.....	1,500	100
91.50 Outlays from per diem for Reservists supplemental and to provide for the average strength required by Public Law 90-500		7,800	500
1 Reimbursements from Non-Federal sources are derived from sale of clothing to regular Marine Corps personnel (10 USC 7601).			

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, MARINE CORPS

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 07-05-1108-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<b>Direct obligations:</b>			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military .....	25,730	28,344	31,644
12.0 Personnel benefits, military .....	2,119	2,300	2,600
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	3,253	4,500	5,500
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	4,733	5,800	5,900
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities.....	40	56	56
Total direct obligations.....	35,875	41,000	45,700
<b>Reimbursable obligations:</b>			
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	171	136	150
99.0 Total obligations.....	36,046	41,136	45,850

Department of the Navy  
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps

Groups	Drills	Paid Days of Active Duty for Training		1968 Actual			1969 Estimate		1970 Estimate	
				Begin	Average	End	Average	End	Average	End
A	48	15	Officer	2,435	2,401	2,304	2,382	2,434	2,507	2,575
			Enlisted	41,682	41,665	43,143	41,032	41,488	42,993	43,064
B	24	15	Officer	186	180	160	159	160	160	160
			Enlisted	45	44	38	42	46	44	46
F	0	90-180	Enlisted	3,185	3,903	955	3,589	6,841	3,785	2,104
Officer Candidate School/The Basic School						85		31		51
Paid Drill Training (Organized)			Officer	2,621	2,581	2,549	2,541	2,625	2,667	2,786
			Enlisted	<u>44,912</u>	<u>45,612</u>	<u>44,136</u>	<u>44,663</u>	<u>48,375</u>	<u>46,822</u>	<u>45,214</u>
			Total	<u>47,533</u>	<u>48,193</u>	<u>46,685</u>	<u>47,204</u>	<u>51,000</u>	<u>49,489</u>	<u>48,000</u>
D	0	15	Officer	1,025	1,025	1,025	641	641	611	611
			Enlisted	52	52	52	-0-	-0-	430	430
E	0	30	Officer							
			Enlisted	221	221	221	200	200	0	0
Other Paid Status Sub-Total			Officer	1,025	1,025	1,025	641	641	611	611
			Enlisted	<u>273</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>273</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>430</u>	<u>430</u>
				<u>1,298</u>	<u>1,298</u>	<u>1,298</u>	<u>841</u>	<u>841</u>	<u>1,041</u>	<u>1,041</u>
Total Paid Status			Officer	3,646	3,606	3,574	3,182	3,266	3,278	3,397
			Enlisted	<u>45,185</u>	<u>45,885</u>	<u>44,409</u>	<u>44,863</u>	<u>48,575</u>	<u>47,252</u>	<u>45,644</u>
			Total	<u>48,831</u>	<u>49,491</u>	<u>47,983</u>	<u>48,045</u>	<u>51,841</u>	<u>50,530</u>	<u>49,041</u>

Department of the Navy  
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps

Summary of Reserve Officer Candidate Strength  
(Average Numbers)

	1968 <u>Actual</u>	1969 <u>Estimate</u>	1970 <u>Estimate</u>
PLC	4,425	4,700	5,139
WOCC	<u>278</u>	<u>277</u>	<u>277</u>
TOTAL	4,703	4,977	5,416

APPROPRIATION INTRODUCTION

(In thousands)

	1968 <u>Actual</u>	1969 <u>Estimate</u>	1970 <u>Estimate</u>
Total direct obligations	35,875	41,000	45,700
Net adjustments	-0-	-0-	-0-
Appropriation	35,875	41,000	45,700

The mission of the Marine Corps Reserve is to provide trained units and qualified persons for active duty in the Marine Corps in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires. The purpose of the appropriation "Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps" is to maintain an efficient, balanced Marine Corps Reserve component responsive to the initial mobilization requirements of the Marine Corps to expand to a full mobilization force level.

The FY 1969 total direct obligations shown above include the estimated effects of revised subsistence and clothing rates, the impact of the military pay raise approved for FY 1969, per diem payments to reservists approved by PL 90-168, the impact of PL 90-500, and reflects \$400,000 adjustment related to congressional action (P.L. 90-580).

The FY 1970 estimate provides for an authorized end strength of 48,000 in a paid status and a average strength of 49,489.

## EPWC SUMMARY - ALL COSTS

	Number	FY 1969 Av Rate	Amount	Number	FY 1970 Av Rate	Amount
1A - Training FGA	41,705	656.08	\$27,362,000	43,705	699.76	\$30,583,000
1B - Training FGB	210	1,285.71	270,000	210	1,400.00	294,000
1C - Training FGD	641	847.11	543,000	1,041	618.64	644,000
1C - Training FGE	200	360.00	72,000	-0-		-0-
1D - Training FGF	7,178	1,223.60	8,783,000	7,570	1,308.45	9,905,000
1E - School Training	2,610	613.03	1,600,000	2,725	671.93	1,831,000
1F - Special Training	593	247.89	147,000	686	224.49	154,000
1G - Administration & Support			276,000			239,000
<b>Sub-Total Act 1</b>			<b>\$39,053,000</b>			<b>\$43,650,000</b>
2C - Junior ROTC	3,400	55.88	190,000	4,550	35.82	163,000
2D - FLC or Res Off Candidates	4,977	353.02	1,757,000	5,416	348.41	1,887,000
<b>Sub-Total Act 2</b>			<b>1,947,000</b>			<b>\$2,050,000</b>
<b>Total Obligations</b>			<b>\$ 41,000,000</b>			<b>\$45,700,000</b>

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS

(In thousands)

	1968 Actual	1969 Estimate	1970 Estimate
1 Reserve Component Personnel	33,878	39,053	43,650
2 Reserve Officer Candidates	1,997	1,947	2,050
<b>Total Direct Obligations</b>	<b>35,875</b>	<b>41,000</b>	<b>45,700</b>

Mr. ANDREWS. The request is for \$45.7 million, an increase of \$4.7 million over the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

We are pleased to have with us to present this request, Brig. Gen. Charles F. Widdecke, Director of Marine Corps Reserve.

#### BIOGRAPHY

General, I believe this is your first appearance before the committee, and as such, we will place your biographical sketch in the record at this point.

(The material follows:)

#### BRIG. GEN. CHARLES F. WIDDECKE, U.S. MARINE CORPS.

Charles Fred Widdecke, holder of the Navy Cross and Silver Star Medal, was born May 11, 1919, in Bryan, Tex., completed high school in Dallas in 1937, and graduated from the University of Texas at Austin in June 1941.

Having enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in May 1941, he was assigned active duty the following month at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. On November 1, 1941, after completing Officer Candidate School, he was commissioned in the Marine Reserve. In June 1942, he was ordered overseas, serving on Samoa with the 22d Marine Regiment. He was promoted to first lieutenant in October 1942, and to captain in April 1943. In 1944, while commanding Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Marines, he participated in the attacks on Kwajalein, Majuro, and Eniwetok atolls in the Marshall Islands and in the invasion of Guam. In March 1945, he was promoted to major and assigned duties at Headquarters Marine Corps with the Division of Reserve, where he remained until early 1948.

Major Widdecke completed the Amphibious Warfare School, junior course, in August 1948, and returned to Guam as assistant chief of staff, G-1, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade until May 1950. This overseas tour was followed by 2 years at Quantico, Va., as an instructor in infantry tactics for both the junior and senior courses, Amphibious Warfare School. During this period, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in November 1951. Lt. Col. Widdecke next completed the regular course at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. in June 1954.

Ordered to Korea in July 1954, he served as a battalion commander in the 1st Marine Regiment and as commanding officer, headquarters battalion, 1st Marine Division. Upon his return to the United States in July 1955, he assumed duties as Assistant Director, Marine Corps Institute in Washington, D.C. The following January, he was selected as aide-de-camp to the Commandant of the Marine Corps and served in this capacity through July 1958.

Transferred to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, Calif., in August 1958, he became commanding officer, 1st Recruit Training Battalion and executive officer, Recruit Training Command until July 1961. He was promoted to colonel in July 1960. In August 1961, Colonel Widdecke was assigned to the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and graduated in June 1962. While at the War College he completed off-duty educational courses at the George Washington University necessary to receive a master of arts degree in international affairs. During the next 3 years, Colonel Widdecke was engaged in the administration of military and economic aid to the South American countries as head of the military assistance, plans and policy, Joint Staff, USCINCSOUTH, with headquarters in Panama.

Colonel Widdecke assumed command of the 5th Marine Regiment on August 12, 1965, at Camp Pendleton, Calif., and deployed his Regiment to the Western Pacific area in early 1966. While commanding the 5th Marine Regiment, he was promoted to brigadier general in December 1966 with rank from November 3, 1966.

General Widdecke became Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in February 1967. After his return to the continental United States, he assumed his current assignment as Director, Marine Corps Reserve, Headquarters Marine Corps, on September 25, 1968.

A complete list of his medals and decorations includes: the Navy Cross, the Silver Star Medal, the Legion of Merit, the Joint Service Commendation Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal, the Purple Heart, the Navy Unit Commendation, the American Defense Service Medal, the American Campaign Medal, the Asiatic-

Pacific Campaign Medal with two bronze stars, the World War II Victory Medal, the National Defense Service Medal with one bronze star, the Korean Service Medal, the Vietnam Service Medal, the United Nations Service Medal, and the Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal.

General Widdecke and Mrs. Widdecke, the former Jane Perkins, have two children, James and Joan Ann.

#### GENERAL STATEMENT

Mr. ADDABBO. We shall be pleased to hear your statement.

General WIDDECKE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am Brig. Gen. Charles F. Widdecke, Director, Marine Corps Reserve. This is my first appearance before this committee since assuming my present duties in late September 1968.

The purpose of my appearance today is to present the fiscal year 1970 budget for the appropriation "Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps."

The appropriation is to provide for the pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, per diem, travel, and other related costs for Reserve personnel of the Marine Corps, including Reserve Officer candidates, Reserve Officers assigned to active duty under section 265 of title 10, U.S. Code and the Marine Corps Junior ROTC program.

Three recently enacted laws have directly influenced our fiscal year 1970 budget submission. I would like to briefly review them with you. The first is Public Law 90-168. This law provides for the payment of per diem allowances to reservists under essentially the same conditions as those allowances accrue to active duty members; it also requires that annual active duty for training shall consist of not less than 14 days, exclusive of travel time.

The second Law, 90-207, resulted in a pay raise effective on July 1, 1968. The third Law, 90-500 approved on September 20, 1968, requires that we maintain in the Organized Reserve an average drill pay strength of not less than 47,204 during fiscal year 1969.

At this point, I must tell you, we in the Marine Corps believe that this latter requirement, that we maintain an average drill pay strength of 47,204, is a fine thing for our Reserve. Compliance will enable us to more nearly attain the necessary trained reservists in a drill pay status to support the mobilization requirements of the Marine Corps.

In order to attain the required average paid strength of 47,204, it would have been necessary for us to enlist and send to training some 7,400 additional recruits during January and February of the current fiscal year. However, since our recruit facilities would not support such a large input in 2 months, the Marine Corps has had to adopt a spread input of 1,100 or more new enlistees per month. With this input, we will not attain a paid average strength of 47,204 but will have an end paid strength of 51,000 as planned for fiscal year 1969. The fiscal year 1970 plan provides for a beginning paid strength of 51,000 and an end paid strength of 48,000 on June 30, 1970. This will produce an average paid strength of 49,489. This budget request will support that strength.

The enacted budget for fiscal year 1969 was \$31.1 million. Subsequent to this, it was necessary to submit supplemental requests in the amounts of \$1.6 million for the pay raise resulting from Public Law 90-207 and \$8.3 million for the new enlisted input required by Public Law 90-500.

The fiscal year 1970 budget request is for \$45.7 million. This is \$4.7 million greater than the revised fiscal year 1969 budget. The major portion of the \$4.7 million is attributable to increased numbers of reservists undergoing initial active duty for training, increased drill attendance which has reached an alltime high of 97 percent, additional days of annual training duty required by Public Law 90-168 and enlisted promotions.

There is one major program change in this budget. Formerly, members of units which had been deactivated were required to fulfill their military obligation by performing 30 days of annual training duty. In lieu of this, these reservists now only will be required to perform 15 days of annual training duty.

The Marine Corps Reserve has the mobilization mission of providing the IV Marine Expeditionary Force, plus certain other units to support the in-being regular forces. This Expeditionary Force is a fully structured organization, similar to an active force Marine Expeditionary Force. It is composed of the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and supporting units. Our readiness posture is high.

Gentlemen, this completes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to endeavor to answer any questions you have about this budget or our program.

Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you, General.

#### READINESS STATUS OF MARINE CORPS RESERVE

What is the current readiness status of the Marine Corps Reserve?  
General WIDDECKE. Sir, I would say the readiness posture of our organized Reserve is high.

Mr. ADDABBO. How high is high? Would it be in the 90 percent category?

General WIDDECKE. Our posture is such that in the 4th Marine Division Wing Team, our plans call to be prepared for deployment overseas on mobilization plus 60 days.

Mr. ADDABBO. Will it take much additional training to bring them up to immediate readiness?

General WIDDECKE. We have very detailed plans at our stations of initial assignment to put each and every unit in its proper billeting area, training area, and to put them on the approved training schedule.

#### MARINE CORPS STRENGTH IN 1970

Mr. ADDABBO. What is the total strength you are requesting to be authorized for fiscal year 1970?

General WIDDECKE. We are requesting for fiscal year 1970—and this budget supports our request—sufficient personnel for an end strength of 48,000, with an average strength of 49,489.

Mr. ADDABBO. Since you did not attain your average strength for fiscal year 1969, do you believe you will be able to attain it during fiscal year 1970?

General WIDDECKE. Yes, sir, I do.

Mr. ADDABBO. Where will these recruits be obtained?

General WIDDECKE. Our recruits are obtained from civilian life. They are enlisted for individual units in the area where the recruit

resides. They are enlisted for a particular billet. We have units distributed in some 193 different locations throughout the United States.

Mr. ADDABBO. The law requires you to achieve your average strength during the fiscal year. Since you could not attain it in 1969, what else will you be doing to try to attain it in fiscal year 1970?

General WIDDECKE. Sir, the basic reason that we did not and will not attain our average strength in fiscal year 1969 is the capacities of our recruit training facilities and our subsequent infantry training facilities that follows immediately after recruit training. We can handle our planned input in fiscal year 1970 adequately in our recruit training facilities.

Mr. ADDABBO. Since the Marine Corps anticipates training approximately 96,000 enlistee accessions during fiscal year 1970, do you honestly believe the Reserves will be able to funnel the 3,800 new reservists for which funds are being requested, into active duty during fiscal year 1970?

General WIDDECKE. We have planned this very carefully, sir. We believe that our recruit training facilities will permit us to attain the necessary average strength in fiscal year 1970.

Mr. ADDABBO. What makes 1970 a greater possibility over 1969 when this could not be achieved in 1969?

General WIDDECKE. Sir, in 1969 we had to input approximately 7,400 to attain the average strength in 2 months, that is, January and February. But in fiscal year 1970, based on our plan, we will spread the input throughout the fiscal year.

General SIMMONS. I would like to add one thought to that. We got off to a late start in 1969 because we did not get the funding assurances from OSD until well along in the program budget review cycle, that is, about Christmastime. We could not even begin to recast our Reserve manpower plan until January. If we had gotten to an earlier start, that is, October, then we would have started the input earlier and we would not have had this effect.

Mr. ADDABBO. The committee sincerely hopes that we will have this appropriation passed by July 1, but assuming we do not and that, as in previous years, it goes over until September or possibly October, would that not mean you would again be behind 6 months?

General SIMMONS. No, sir; because we are now embarked on this program, and it will continue over into the new fiscal year. Instead of having it completed by July 1, it will be completed several months after July 1.

Admiral GADDIS. And with the program as now constituted, sir, the continuing resolution would allow this operation. Last year, Public Law 90-500 was not passed until after the start of the fiscal year and, therefore, did not fall under the continuing resolution.

Mr. ADDABBO. Do you anticipate being able to retain the trained personnel, the permanent personnel, to be able to train the new recruits?

General WIDDICKE. Yes, sir.

#### INCREASE IN DRILL ATTENDANCE

Mr. ADDABBO. You state that part of the additional funds being requested is the result of increased drill attendance, which has reached an alltime high of 97 percent. We were under the impression that the Marine Corps always attained 100 percent of its goal. What has been the actual attendance during the last 3 years?

General WIDDECKE. During the past 5 years, sir, the average drill attendance percentage-wise has increased from approximately 90 percent to our current figure of 96 to 97 percent actual attendance.

Mr. ADDABBO. This is one of the few places the Marine Corps does not reach 100 percent.

Why are you eliminating group E category reservists?

General WIDDECKE. Pay group E has been transferred to pay group D by direction of the DOD.

Mr. ADDABBO. Why are you substantially increasing your enlisted strength in group D over the number that will be transferred from group E?

General WIDDECKE. In group D we substantially increase the number. This was based on the probability during our continuing restructuring of the Reserve that one of our units may have to be moved or be deactivated.

Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you, General.

Mr. Lipscomb?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. No questions.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. Basically, what is the difference between group D and group E?

General WIDDECKE. Group D provides for 15-day training tours. It is primarily for class III or ready reservists, that is, people who are not in the class II organized Reserve. Pay group E is for 30-day training tours. We have previously been assigning enlisted men to that pay group for 30-day tours who could not fulfill their obligation for service due to the fact that the unit to which they were assigned was deactivated.

Mr. DAVIS. Was this a matter of substantive law coming out of the legislative committees that placed a floor under your fiscal year 1969 average drill pay strength?

General WIDDECKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Have you discussed with the Armed Services Committee your practical inability here to attain the average strength that the law provides, apparently?

General WIDDECKE. Our legislative assistant to the Commandant discussed this matter with certain committees.

Admiral GADDIS. This is also contained in the proposed budget amendment which has been submitted by Mr. Laird to the President, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. As a practical matter, you just were not able to fulfill, because of unavailable training facilities, as I understand it, the mandate that they put into that law.

General SIMMONS. To summarize, sir, we thought the legislation was a fine thing, but the legislation came a little late, and then the funding assurances from DOD came a little late, so we were halfway through fiscal year 1969 before we were able to implement the program.

Mr. DAVIS. If I recall correctly, the Army indicated a slightly higher percentage of drill attendance than we see before us this morning. There is only a percentage difference, or something like that, but they were anticipating something in excess of 98 percent.

Mr. GARRITY. For the Selected Reserve, yes.

Mr. DAVIS. It is not a significant difference, I suppose, but I guess we have gotten in the habit of expecting a little more from the Marine Corps. In this case, apparently you have slipped a little in comparison.

General WIDDECKE. Sir, our requirements and our regulations are 100 percent. That is our objective. We are getting there very orderly. We are supervising this program very closely.

At the same time, we have a real judgment factor in it that if a man in fact is ill or has an emergency, he is excused. The emergency may be family or weather conditions or something else. When he is not excused, we have a system where he makes up the drill by equivalent instruction.

Admiral GADDIS. I would offer, sir, that the difference is probably more administrative than real, in that the Marine Corps 97 percent allows for this illness-emergency factor where there is the possibility that the make-up would be incorporated in a higher percentage in another administrative organization.

Mr. DAVIS. You think the Army may possibly be using a figure that includes make-up?

Admiral GADDIS. I only offer as a possibility, sir, that the administrative rules contribute to the percentage figure.

#### 4TH MARINE DIVISION READINESS POSTURE

Mr. DAVIS. General, will you tell us a little bit more about the individual units within the 4th Marine Division and the readiness posture of it?

General WIDDECKE. Yes, sir.

The Organized Reserve is based on a division wing team, structured as similar as possible to our regular establishment under a Maritime Expeditionary Force Headquarters. As for the division, it is composed of three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and the necessary combat and combat support units.

The wing is composed of fixed-wing, helicopters, transport aircraft, and the necessary command and control and supporting elements, again structured very similar to its counterpart in the regular establishment.

It is the basic concept, sir, under which the Navy Marine Corps team operates, and in the Marine Corps the air-ground team.

Mr. DAVIS. Do you have any comments to make relating to the readiness posture of each of these units within the 4th Marine Division?

General WIDDECKE. Yes. As a mentioned earlier, sir, our evaluation of the readiness posture is that it is high. That is based on not only the normal reporting procedures, but personal observation from many senior officers in the Marine Corps. We believe that we have a fine training program. It is closely supervised and monitored and analyzed. It is tested by evaluation during training periods and in the summer.

Insofar as our materiel readiness is concerned, it is improving. I would like to give you an example. We have introduced into the 4th Marine Division the PRC-25 radio, which is the basic communications equipment used in infantry units in Vietnam. We are introducing into it now a multifuel vehicle. Our engineer equipment in the Reserve is being improved by new equipment.

In the wing we are increasing the number of helicopters. We have introduced in fiscal year 1969 the OV-10 aircraft, which is a reconnaissance aircraft, and have plans for introduction in 1971 of additional new helicopters.

**Mr. DAVIS.** Is every member of your Reserve component as now organized automatically a member of the 4th Marine Division?

**General WIDDECKE.** Everyone who comes into Class II Organized Reserve is enlisted for duty in a particular unit in the 4th Marine Expeditionary Force. Some of them are in the division, of course. Some of them are in the wing. We have certain combat and combat support units in addition to the division and wing per se that will be available for mobilization.

**Mr. DAVIS.** In your structure, then, you do not contemplate, except in perhaps isolated cases, the individual callup of Reserve personnel. Is that correct?

**General WIDDECKE.** That is correct, sir. It is a division wing team concept.

**Mr. DAVIS.** That is all. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### REDUCTION IN 1969 FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Admiral, during your discussion with Congressman Davis, you mentioned a budget amendment which is proposed.

**Admiral GADDIS.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Would you explain that?

**Admiral GADDIS.** The proposed budget amendment which has been submitted to the Bureau of the Budget by Mr. Laird and spoken to in general yesterday on the Hill, contains a reduction in this appropriation of \$3.1 million for the 1969 supplemental, which reflects the monetary shortfall compared to the personnel shortfall in average strength spoken to earlier.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What about fiscal year 1970 then?

**Admiral GADDIS.** There is no change in the 1970 estimate in that amendment proposal.

**General SIMMONS.** Because we will expect to have achieved our end strength objective of 51,000. Therefore, we will be at the right starting point for fiscal year 1970, even though we will not have achieved the man-year average of 47,204.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What was your original request for fiscal year 1969 for this account?

**Admiral GADDIS.** The appropriation request last spring, sir, was for \$31.5 million, subsequently reduced to \$31.1 million by Project 693. The 1969 supplemental request was for \$9.9 million. This adds up to \$41.0 million in the President's budget. If the President approves the new budget amendment, this would be reduced to \$37.9 million—a \$3.1 million reduction.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Are you speaking of just the basic training of enlisted personnel?

**Admiral GADDIS.** No, sir; I was speaking of the total appropriation.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** That was \$41 million?

**Admiral GADDIS.** That was for the total appropriation, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** In other words, the \$3.1 million proposed amendment to the budget is directed specifically to basic training of enlisted personnel?

**Admiral GADDIS.** And the total reduction of the appropriation is due to the shortfall in man-year average. The 1969 supplemental request for this line item was \$8 million, sir. That will be revised in the amendment, then, to \$4.9 million.

## VALIDITY OF 1970 ESTIMATES

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What are you asking for fiscal year 1970?

**Admiral GADDIS.** There is no change in the 1970 request of \$45.7 million.

Did you want the specific line item for recruit training of Reserves?

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Yes. That is what we are discussing. If you had a \$3.1 million reduction in fiscal year 1969, what do you plan for fiscal year 1970?

**Admiral GADDIS.** I would like to provide that for the record, sir, unless you have it specifically there, General Simmons.

**General SIMMONS.** For 1970, we would expect to input 7,570 recruits. The average rate is \$1,308.45. The total amount in the 1970 budget is \$9.905 million.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What makes you expect to do so much better in fiscal year 1970 than 1969?

**General SIMMONS.** Because of the starting point, sir. We did not get started on this program until January. Because of the recruit loading situation, we could not take in a significant number of people in January or February, so we are a late starter.

Once the program is started, there is no problem in recruiting for this program. It is a very popular program. The problem was the recruit load to be handled at Parris Island and San Diego.

As was explained yesterday by General Platt, we have gone to a level recruit input, both for the Regular Establishment and the Reserve Establishment, so we can make optimum use of our recruit capability.

## READINESS OF MARINE CORPS RESERVE

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** General, in a couple of answers you said your readiness is high.

**General WIDDECKE.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** You have officers who are continually examining these units for their readiness. Do they submit written reports as to percentages, or how to these come back to headquarters?

**General WIDDECKE.** With our Reserve units, sir, we have what are called in our program inspector instructors. They have a staff. They are officers on active duty. They work with, supervise, and report on the Reserve activities.

In addition to that, we get periodic reports from the Reserve activities and the conduct of their affairs is monitored by extensive visits. The Reserves are under the immediate control, inspection, and supervision of the district director. We have six districts in the continental limits of the United States. They visit them and report on them.

In addition to that, sir, our Reserve, for inspection purposes, falls under the Marine Corps Inspector General, and he inspects each of these units and reports to the Commandant on them.

Lastly, we have a very close evaluation when they are on active duty for training each summer, and those reports are sent in to headquarters.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** When you speak of the Reserves as being high in readiness, are you speaking only to military personnel, or equipment or the operation and maintenance problems? Are you including the whole spectrum of the Marine Corps Reserve?

General WIDDECKE. Yes, sir; I am referring to the full spectrum of the Organized Reserve.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. From this testimony we can be led to assume that the Marine Corps has no problem as to equipment or anything else; that every unit is up to strength and is completely ready in case it is called?

#### SHORTAGE OF RESERVE AIRCRAFT

General SIMMONS. As General Widdecke said earlier, on the ground side we are in very good shape, perhaps not quite to the standard of our active divisions, but very close to it. On the air side, in the wing we have a continuing problem which has been somewhat aggravated by the Vietnamese war. The cost of providing the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing with first-line aircraft would be nearly prohibitive. This is an objective of ours, but the price tag would come very high. Ordinarily, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing is equipped with essentially second-line aircraft. As it is pushed out of the inventory of the regular wings by more modern types, these aircraft in the same series, but older models, move into the Reserve.

This effect has been slowed and in some cases reversed by the Vietnamese war, where we have had to draw down on Reserve aircraft assets. So, we do have a substantial shortfall in the aircraft inventory in the types and numbers that we would like to have.

#### IMPROVEMENT IN RESERVE EQUIPMENT POSTURE

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Do you have in the ground forces all the modern weapons you need?

General SIMMONS. Substantially.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are your troops completely equipped? Are you in a high state of readiness or a low state of readiness?

General SIMMONS. On the ground side, our materiel readiness is very high.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What does that mean? You see, we have had some experience with the Army where they thought they were trained and had the equipment, and then they go into active training and callup, and they find they are not ready for combat; that they have been trained with the wrong kind of weapons, older weapons, and when they get hold of the newer weapons, they are not combat ready. We have seen this happen over the past 9 months. You are aware of this, I presume.

There is no possible chance, if the situation should occur that the Marine Reserves were called for combat, that they would run into a similar situation? If the Marines have a problem in the Reserve, now is the time for you to tell us about it. If it is all right, that is what we want to know.

General SIMMONS. In previous years' testimony, primarily from our logistics people, we have testified to shortfalls in some communications and electronic items, some motor transport items, some engineer support items. As indicated earlier, we are making progress in those three areas so we do have radios in the Reserve that are completely compatible with those used in the Active Force. The same is true for our vehicles and engineer support equipment. They are not quite up to the material standards of our Active Forces, and we would not expect

them to be, but there is no material reason why the ground reserve cannot meet its mobilization deadline.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The only thing we can take from your testimony—and I am very pleased with it—is that the Marines are in a high state of readiness, and that you are actually adequately funded for fiscal year 1970. You have no problem.

General SIMMONS. And we are closing the gap in these three areas that we mentioned.

I should say, sir, that I am talking to appropriations which are outside of General Widdecke's purview. I am speaking to O. & M., Marine Corps, appropriation and procurement, Marine Corps, appropriation.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In your position you will be testifying to the whole budget, so what you are telling us is that the Marine Reserves are ready to go.

General SIMMONS. Yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Rhodes?

Mr. RHODES. I have no questions.

Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your appearance.

---

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1969.

## MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

### WITNESSES

MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG, DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DCS/PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES

BRIG. GEN. DUDLEY E. FAVER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL, PLANNING, DCS/PERSONNEL

MAJ. GEN. GEORGE S. BOYLAN, JR., DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE PROGRAMS, DCS/PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES

BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM F. PITTS, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE

COL. DANIEL H. BULL, CHIEF, PROGRAMS DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF PERSONNEL PLANNING

COL. JEANNE M. HOLM, DIRECTOR OF WAF, DCS/PERSONNEL

ROBERT H. HENSHAW, MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL BRANCH, DIRECTORATE OF BUDGET

### MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

For pay, allowances, individual clothing, subsistence, interest on deposits, gratuities, permanent change of station travel (including all expenses thereof for organizational movements), and expenses of temporary duty travel between permanent duty stations, for members of the Air Force on active duty (except members of reserve components provided for elsewhere), cadets, and aviation cadets;

\$5,959,000,000

~~\$5,680,000,000~~ (10 U.S.C. 501-09, 518-19, 555-65, 683-84, 687, 701-04, 744, 906, 1035, 1037, 1040, 1212, 1475-80, 2101-05, 2421, 2632, 2634, 8012, 8033-34, 8036, 8066, 8201-15, 8251-58, 8281, 8284-89, 8293-8303, 8305-10, 8312-13, 8441-42, 8444-52, 8491-92, 8494-8504, 8531, 8687, 8722, 9306, 9331-37, 9341-55, 9441, 9561-63, 9621-23, 9741-43; 12 U.S.C. 1715m; Chapters 3, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11 of title 37, United States Code; 49 U.S.C. 1657; 50 U.S. C. App. 2201-16; 80 Stat. 1165; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 Justification of Estimates for FY 1970  
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Appropriation: Military Personnel, Air Force

07-05-3500-0-1-051

	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>			
Direct program:			
1. Pay and allowances of officers.....	1,639,970	1,755,400	1,699,800
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted.....	3,228,743	3,524,000	3,467,430
3. Pay and allowances of cadets.....	8,194	9,300	10,020
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel.....	331,816	332,800	324,350
5. Permanent change of station travel.....	421,936	431,600	415,200
6. Other military personnel costs.....	46,806	44,900	42,200
Total direct program.....	5,677,465	6,098,000	5,959,000
Reimbursable program:			
1. Pay and allowances of officers.....	5,444	7,574	7,574
2. Pay and allowances of enlisted.....	3,337	6,018	6,018
4. Subsistence of enlisted personnel.....	24,307	24,000	24,000
5. Permanent change of station travel.....	119	200	200
Total reimbursable program.....	33,207	37,792	37,792

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 Justification of Estimates for FY 1970  
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Appropriation: Military Personnel, Air Force

07-05-3500-0-1-051	= 68 actual	= 69 estimate	= 70 estimate
10 Total obligations.....	5,710,672	6,135,792	5,996,792
<u>Financing:</u>			
Receipts and reimbursements from:			
11 Federal funds (-).....	- 13,667	- 15,554	- 15,554
14 Non-Federal sources (-) <sup>1/</sup> .....	- 19,540	- 22,238	- 22,238
25 Unobligated balance lapsing.....	6,835	....	....
Budget Authority.....	5,684,300	6,098,000	5,959,000
Budget authority:			
40 <u>Appropriation</u> .....	5,684,300	5,680,000	5,959,000
44.30 <u>Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases</u> ...	....	267,600	....
44.40 <u>Proposed supplemental for Southeast Asia support</u> .....	....	150,400	....
<sup>1/</sup> Reimbursements from non-Federal sources are derived from sales of meals and clothing to service member (10 U.S.C. 4621).			

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 Justification of Estimates for FY 1970  
Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Appropriation: Military Personnel, Air Force

07-05-3500-0-1-051		19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
Relation of obligations to outlays				
71	Obligations incurred, net.....	5,677,465	6,098,000	5,959,000
72	Obligated balance, start of year			
	72.40 Appropriation.....	220,372	150,311	188,311
	72.49 Contract authorization.....	1,559	....	....
74	Obligated balance, end of year (-).....	- 150,311	- 188,311	- 217,311
77	Adjustment in expired accounts.....	- 93,635	....	....
90	Outlays, excluding supplementals.....	5,655,451	5,644,900	5,927,100
91.30	Outlays, from military pay act supplemental.....	....	267,600	....
91.40	Outlays from Southeast Asia supplemental.....	....	147,500	2,900
Status of Unfunded contract authorization				
	Unfunded balance, start of year.....	1,559	....	....
	Administrative cancellation of unfunded balance.....	- 1,559	....	....
	.....	....	....	....
	Appropriation to liquidate contract authorization.....	....	....	....

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
MILITARY PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE  
Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

07-05-3500-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	1970 estimate
<b>Direct obligations:</b>			
11.7 Personnel compensation:Military.....	3,885,876	4,242,095	4,153,575
12.1 Personnel benefits, military.....	1,225,855	1,293,664	1,264,656
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	181,471	176,951	172,172
22.0 Transportation of things.....	215,232	210,803	206,404
25.1 Other services.....	63,514	53,092	44,425
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	93,693	106,556	102,950
41.0 Grants, subsidies, and contributions.....	7	6	6
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities.....	3,727	3,815	3,758
43.0 Interest and dividends.....	8,090	11,018	11,054
<b>Total direct obligations.....</b>	<b>5,677,465</b>	<b>6,098,000</b>	<b>5,959,000</b>
<b>Reimbursable obligations:</b>			
11.7 Personnel compensation:Military.....	7,202	11,145	11,145
12.1 Personnel benefits, military.....	1,580	2,447	2,447
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons.....	53	90	90
22.0 Transportation of things.....	65	110	110
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	24,307	24,000	24,000
<b>Total reimbursable obligations.....</b>	<b>33,207</b>	<b>37,792</b>	<b>37,792</b>
<b>99.0 Total obligations</b>	<b>5,710,672</b>	<b>6,135,792</b>	<b>5,996,792</b>

SUMMARY OF MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH

	FY 1968 Actual		FY 1969 Planned		FY 1970 Planned	
	Man- Years	End Strength 30 June 1968	Man- Years	End Strength 30 June 1969	Man- Years	End Strength 30 June 1970
<u>DIRECT PROGRAM</u>						
Officers.....	137,145	139,132	136,992	133,236	133,936	134,436
Enlisted.....	757,536	761,097	743,535	729,979	722,083	721,102
Academy Cadets.....	<u>3,192</u>	<u>3,652</u>	<u>3,414</u>	<u>3,874</u>	<u>3,724</u>	<u>4,151</u>
Subtotal.....	897,873	903,881	883,941	867,089	859,743	859,689
<u>REIMBURSABLE PROGRAM</u> <sup>1/</sup>						
Officers.....	460	468	507	564	564	564
Enlisted.....	<u>425</u>	<u>410</u>	<u>947</u>	<u>947</u>	<u>947</u>	<u>947</u>
Subtotal.....	885	878	1,454	1,511	1,511	1,511
<u>TOTAL PROGRAM</u>						
Officers.....	137,605	139,600	137,499	133,800	134,500	135,000
Enlisted.....	757,961	761,507	744,482	730,926	723,030	722,049
Academy Cadets.....	<u>3,192</u>	<u>3,652</u>	<u>3,414</u>	<u>3,874</u>	<u>3,724</u>	<u>4,151</u>
TOTAL.....	898,758	904,759	885,395	868,600	861,254	861,200

<sup>1/</sup> Military personnel assigned to agencies outside of Department of Defense on a reimbursable basis under the provisions of 10 USC 8230 (Air Force).

**SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS BY BUDGET PROGRAM**  
(In Thousands of Dollars)

TITLE	FY 1968 Actual	FY 1969 Estimate	FY 1970 Estimate
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<b><u>DIRECT PROGRAM</u></b>			
Pay and Allowances of Officers.....	\$1,639,970	\$1,755,400	\$1,699,800
Pay and Allowances of Enlisted.....	3,228,743	3,524,000	3,467,430
Pay and Allowances of Cadets.....	8,194	9,300	10,020
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel.....	331,816	332,800	324,350
Permanent Change of Station Travel.....	421,936	431,600	415,200
Other military personnel costs.....	<u>46,806</u>	<u>44,900</u>	<u>42,200</u>
Total direct program.....	5,677,465	6,098,000	5,959,000
<b><u>REIMBURSABLE PROGRAM</u></b>			
Pay and Allowances of Officers.....	5,444	7,574	7,574
Pay and Allowances of Enlisted.....	3,337	6,018	6,018
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel.....	24,307	24,000	24,000
Permanent Change of Station Travel.....	<u>119</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>200</u>
Total reimbursable program.....	33,207	37,792	37,792
<b><u>TOTAL PROGRAM</u></b>			
Pay and Allowances of Officers.....	1,645,414	1,762,974	1,707,374
Pay and Allowances of Enlisted.....	3,232,080	3,530,018	3,473,448
Pay and Allowances of Cadets.....	8,194	9,300	10,020
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel.....	356,123	356,800	348,350
Permanent Change of Station Travel.....	422,055	431,800	415,400
Other military personnel costs.....	<u>46,806</u>	<u>44,900</u>	<u>42,200</u>
Total Obligations.....	\$5,710,672	\$6,135,792	\$5,996,792

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS BY PROJECT  
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Title	FY 1968 Actual	FY 1969 Estimate	FY 1970 Estimate
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Basic Pay . . . . .	\$1,142,780	\$1,239,398	\$1,206,287
Incentive Pay . . . . .	162,870	161,345	153,591
Special Pay . . . . .	26,162	28,921	29,089
Basic Allowance for Quarters. . . . .	133,559	135,309	129,934
Basic Allowance for Subsistence . . . . .	79,063	79,002	77,278
Station Allowances, Overseas. . . . .	13,283	12,822	12,420
Uniform Allowance . . . . .	4,100	3,116	3,652
Family Separation Allowance . . . . .	7,000	7,330	6,930
Separation Payments . . . . .	31,302	38,302	30,900
Social Security Tax - Employer's Contribution. . . . .	38,900	46,339	45,476
Missing in Action & Prisoner of War (80 Stat. 625) . .	6,395	11,090	11,817
: Total Obligations . . . . .	1,645,414	1,762,974	1,707,374
:Less Reimbursements. . . . .	5,444	7,574	7,574
: Total Direct Obligations. . . . .	\$1,639,970	\$1,755,400	\$1,699,800

29-803 O-69-pl. 1-23

Mr. SLACK. The next appropriation is "Military personnel, Air Force." For this appropriation the Air Force is requesting \$5.959 billion, a decrease of \$139 million from the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

We are pleased to have with us this afternoon to discuss this request, Major General Berg, Director of Manpower and Organization, and Brigadier General Faver, Deputy Director of Personnel Planning.

We welcome you, gentlemen, and also your supporting witnesses.

As I understand it, General Berg, this is your first appearance before the committee.

General BERG. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SLACK. It is customary to insert in the record a biographical sketch and, without objection, your biographical sketch will be placed in the record.

#### BIOGRAPHY OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG

Major Gen. William W. Berg was born March 14, 1918 in Logansport, Ind. He is a graduate of the University of Maryland (BS) and the George Washington University (MA). He has completed the Air Force advanced management course in the Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of Pittsburgh and the residence course at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Washington, D.C. His military career began when he enlisted in the infantry, U.S. Army, in November 1936 and served for 3 years. In January 1942 he reenlisted in the Army, and in June 1943 graduated from officers candidate school and was commissioned a second lieutenant. The next 4 years he served in the Mediterranean theater of operations. From 1952 to 1956, following tours of duty at Pope Air Force Base, N.C., and Mitchel Air Force Base, N.Y., General Berg served as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel for the 12th Air Force at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Subsequent assignments were in Headquarters, USAF Personnel and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. From 1963 to 1968 he served in the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy. General Berg's assignments in Headquarters, USAF Personnel and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense included the development and presentation of legislative proposals to the cognizant committees of Congress. He assumed his present position as Director of Manpower and Organization, DCS/Programs and Resources, Headquarters, USAF in August 1968. His military decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Army Commendation Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, and the Italian Cross for War Merit.

Mr. SLACK. General, have you a prepared statement?

General BERG. I have, sir.

Mr. SLACK. Will you please proceed.

#### STATEMENT, DIRECTOR OF MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION

General BERG. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this is the first time that it has been my pleasure to appear before this committee to report on the Air Force manpower program. Although this hearing is principally concerned with military personnel, my statement will cover both the military and civilian manpower resources which are made available by the annual budget and the Department of Defense to accomplish the Air Force mission. Military and civilian personnel are integral factors in the management of our work force.

First, I will review the fiscal year 1969 program presented last year and comment on the adjustments made to the program during the year. Then, from the revised end of fiscal year 1969 position I will cover the program for fiscal year 1970.

In presenting our requirements for fiscal year 1970, I will examine the distribution of our manpower resources by major program, the impact of Southeast Asia operations, rated and external manpower requirements, and actions to improve manpower management and organization.

General Faver and other witnesses will follow me to discuss the effect of the manpower program on the military personnel budget.

FISCAL YEAR 1969 MANPOWER PROGRAM

Table I shows the fiscal year 1969 total program submitted to the Congress last year. The projections include military authorizations for personnel assigned to agencies outside of the Department of Defense. Last year, it was reported that the Air Force manpower program for fiscal year 1969 would decrease from about 1,228,000 at the end of fiscal year 1968 to around 1,215,000 at the end of fiscal year 1969. From the last column you will note that a decrease of approximately 13,500 was programmed which represented a decrease of 16,000 military and an increase of about 2,500 civilian authorizations. The military reduction was programmed primarily as a result of changes in force structure and training requirements. The projected civilian increase was due to changes in depot maintenance and a number of comparatively small and varied adjustments.

**TABLE I.--FISCAL YEAR 1969 MANPOWER PROGRAM PROJECTIONS PRESENTED DURING HEARINGS ON FISCAL YEAR 1969 BUDGET**

	<u>End Fiscal Year 1968 Projection*</u>	<u>End Fiscal Year 1969 Projection*</u>	<u>Net Fiscal Year 1969 Change</u>
<b>MILITARY:</b>			
Officers	137,128	133,977	- 3,151
Airmen	743,425	730,290	-13,135
Cadets	3,575	3,874	+ 299
<b>TOTAL MILITARY</b>	<b>884,128</b>	<b>868,141</b>	<b>-15,987</b>
<b>CIVILIAN:</b>			
Direct Hire	316,856	318,906	+ 2,050
Indirect Hire	27,394	27,800	+ 406
<b>TOTAL CIVILIAN</b>	<b>344,250</b>	<b>346,706</b>	<b>+ 2,456</b>
<b>AGGREGATE</b>	<b>1,228,378</b>	<b>1,214,847</b>	<b>-13,531</b>

\*Includes reimbursable military authorizations of 946 in fiscal year 1968 and 1,511 in fiscal year 1969.

NOTES

- (a) Direct hire includes both US and non-US citizens who are paid by the US directly.  
 (b) Indirect hire are non-US personnel hired by contract with foreign governments. Determination as to whether we will use direct hire is made by agreement with host country.

The next table, Table II, shows the adjustments made to the fiscal year 1969 program. The first column shows the projection for end fiscal year 1969 that was made last year. The middle column shows the current projection for end fiscal year 1969. The aggregate indicates an end authorized strength of about 1,219,000. Of this number, about 868,000 are military and 351,000 are civilian.

Significant manpower reductions were made as a result of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-364). Reductions were influenced by two aspects of the law. First, decreases in manpower authorizations, both military and civilian, were made to support the Air Force's share of the expenditure reductions for fiscal year 1969 imposed on the Department of Defense. Spaces were decreased primarily within the areas of administration, proficiency pilot training and activities in Europe. Second, limitations on the hiring of civilians affected to some degree virtually all Air Force activities except those in Southeast Asia. The cumulative reductions amounted to approximately 10,000 military and 11,000 civilian authorizations.

There was an increase of about 17,500 civilian authorizations added to our ceilings to accommodate the Air National Guard technicians federalized in January 1969 by Public Law 90-486.

The fiscal year 1969 totals do not include the mobilized Air National Guard and Reserve forces. These forces were not in our fiscal year 1969 budget projection last year and will be demobilized prior to the end of the year.

TABLE II.-MANPOWER PROGRAM PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1969

	End Fiscal Year 1969 Projected in FY 69 Budget*	Current End Fiscal Year 1969 Projection	Net Change to Fiscal Year 1969 Program
<b>MILITARY:</b>			
Officers	133,977	133,800	- 177
Airmen	730,290	730,926	+ 636
Cadets	3,874	3,874	-
<b>TOTAL MILITARY</b>	<b>868,141</b>	<b>868,600</b>	<b>+ 459</b>
<b>CIVILIAN:</b>			
Direct Hire	318,906	325,930	+7,024
Indirect Hire	27,800	24,835	-2,965
<b>TOTAL CIVILIAN</b>	<b>346,706</b>	<b>350,765</b>	<b>+4,059</b>
<b>AGGREGATE</b>	<b>1,214,847</b>	<b>1,219,365</b>	<b>+4,518</b>

\*Adjusted to reflect 1,511 reimbursable military authorizations.

**FISCAL YEAR 1970 MANPOWER PROGRAM**

Table III summarizes the Air Force manpower program for fiscal year 1970. The authorized military strength will be about 861,000 or 7,400 less than the adjusted fiscal year 1969 strength. The difference is attributable to the reductions in B-52 squadrons, European support forces, Air Defense ground environment and recruit and specialized training.

The civilian authorizations of 347,000 show a decrease of about 3,500 which is the result of the budget decision that anticipated increases in the productivity of employees.

TABLE III.-MANPOWER PROGRAM AND PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970

	Current End Fiscal Year 1969 Projection	End Fiscal Year 1970 Projection	Net Fiscal Year 1970 Change
<b>MILITARY:</b>			
Officers	133,800	135,000	+ 1,200
Airmen	730,926	722,049	- 8,877
Cadets	3,874	4,151	+ 277
<b>TOTAL MILITARY</b>	<b>868,600</b>	<b>861,200</b>	<b>- 7,400</b>
<b>CIVILIAN:</b>			
Direct Hire	325,930	322,472	- 3,458
Indirect Hire	24,835	24,709	- 126
<b>TOTAL CIVILIAN</b>	<b>350,765</b>	<b>347,181</b>	<b>- 3,584</b>
<b>AGGREGATE</b>	<b>1,219,365</b>	<b>1,208,381</b>	<b>-10,984</b>

Table IV summarizes the transactions by program which account for the net changes between the fiscal year 1969 and fiscal year 1970 programs. I will now cover the significant changes in these programs.

TABLE IV.-ESTIMATED CHANGES IN THE MILITARY MANPOWER PROGRAM BETWEEN  
END OF FISCAL YEARS 1969 AND 1970

	Increases	Decreases	Net Change
Strategic Forces	+ 5,200	-10,800	-5,600
General Purpose Forces	+ 8,400	- 7,300	+1,100
Intelligence and Communications	+ 1,000	- 3,200	-2,200
Airlift and Sealift	+ 4,800	- 2,200	-2,600
Guard and Reserve Forces	-	-	-
Research and Development	+ 100	- 300	- 200
Central Supply and Maintenance	+ 600	- 200	+ 400
Training, Medical and Other General Personnel Activities	+ 5,800	- 8,800	-3,000
Administration and Associated Activities	-	- 500	- 500
Military Assistance Activities	-	-	-
<b>TOTAL AIR FORCE</b>	<b>+26,000</b>	<b>-33,400</b>	<b>-7,400</b>

#### STRATEGIC FORCES

Manpower for our strategic forces continues to decline. There is a net reduction of about 1,900 spaces in strategic offensive forces. Reduced requirements for munitions handlers, crew augmentation and a variable sortie rate associated with B-52 aircraft eliminated 2,500 authorizations. Reduced flying hours for the KC-135 aircraft decreased 500 spaces. Other decreases amounting to 3,100 are primarily in base operating support. Off-setting these decreases is an increase of about 4,200 related to FB-111 squadrons, satellite basing, the SRAM program and Minuteman III.

In the strategic defensive forces, 3,700 spaces were reduced. In activities associated with our air defense ground environment, there were reductions of 4,700 in combat centers, direction centers, long range radars and DEW radar. Changes in Spacetrack and over-the-horizon radar resulted in an increase of 1,000 spaces.

#### GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The over-all increase of 1,100 spaces in this program is principally related to force structure changes. An increase of 6,600 spaces included revisions necessary to support F-111, F-4, A-37 and RF-4 aircraft. Other actions which added 1,800 spaces are the augmentation of aerial port activities, the addition of a night attack capability by modification of some B-57 aircraft, and more aircraft for combat crew training in the continental United States. Reductions of 7,300 spaces were caused primarily by decreases in the number of F-100, F-102 and C-130 squadrons and in our forces in Europe.

#### INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS

Reductions of about 2,200 spaces occurred in the Intelligence and Communications program. The principal reductions were in the phase-out of manual systems and converting to an Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN).

#### AIRLIFT

The airlift forces reflect a net increase of 2,600 spaces for fiscal year 1970. The continued phase down of C-124 units is more than off-set by the phase-in of C-5 units. Changes in support functions result in a zero balance, except in base operating support where there is an increase because of the transfer of a base to the Military Airlift Command from another command. The manpower requirements to fly our airlift aircraft at higher flying rates to support Southeast Asia continue to be reflected in the fiscal year 1970 figures. This project is called "COMBAT PACER."

#### PERSONNEL SUPPORT

Reduced manpower requirements of about 3,000 spaces in the Personnel support area are predominantly in Recruit and Specialized training. For the most part, this decrease reflects previously programmed actions.

#### IMPACT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA ON MANPOWER PROGRAM

The Southeast Asia operations continue as a predominant influence on our manpower program. The manpower ceilings in effect in Southeast Asia have necessitated, in most cases, trade-offs in lieu of increases. Although our total commitment remains essentially the same for fiscal year 1970, significant changes in equipment are projected.

Many of the manpower changes, both increases and decreases which I mentioned under our major programs were related directly or indirectly to our mission to support U. S. objectives in Southeast Asia.

#### RATED OFFICER REQUIREMENTS

Last year, it was reported that there would be a small increase in rated officer requirements for fiscal year 1969. The net increase which included a decrease in pilots and an increase in navigators was due mainly to the change in the crew composition of the F-4/F-111 force. Thirty percent of the second seat requirements for these aircraft was converted from pilots to navigators in fiscal

year 1969. The gradual phase down of Air Force F-4/F-111 manning to one pilot and one navigator per crew is projected to continue through fiscal year 1971. The final decision on the optimum crew composition for these aircraft is dependent upon tests still being conducted.

Table V depicts the Air Force pilot and navigator requirements as stated by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1969 and fiscal year 1970. It also includes our requirements for flight surgeons.

**TABLE V.-RATED OFFICER REQUIREMENTS (LIEUTENANT COLONEL AND BELOW)  
FISCAL YEAR 1969 AND 1970**

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Pilots</u>	<u>Navigators</u>	<u>Flight Surgeons</u>	<u>Total</u>
1969	37,626	15,334	1,031	53,991
1970	36,159	14,860	1,003	52,022

The decrease in pilot and navigator requirements for fiscal year 1970 is primarily the result of changes in our aircraft force structure.

Comments on our rated officer inventories and training will be made by General Faver.

#### EXTERNAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

Our manpower commitment to activities outside the Air Force is in two categories. First, we have approximately 15,000 military authorizations primarily in other Defense Department activities. Second, we have approximately 1,500 military authorizations in other governmental agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Federal Aviation Agency. Funds for personnel in this latter category are reimbursable. Authorizations in both categories are in our manpower ceilings.

#### MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

We are continually striving for optimum utilization of our manpower resources. In order to satisfy new and changing requirements and remain within our established ceilings, we are searching for improved techniques to measure what we need and to manage what we have. Our management engineering program and our manpower data systems and analysis are examples of our efforts in this area.

The management engineering program uses the latest industrial engineering techniques to make accurate determination of the quantities of manpower and skills required to perform the work loads in the many functions of the Air Force.

This program, which is in operation in all our major commands, is conducted by teams of professionally trained management engineering personnel - both military and civilian. It is centrally directed to facilitate the most effective use of the team's capability to meet over-all Air Force priorities.

In computing our requirements, we use the manpower determinants-standards, criteria, and estimating equations-which have been developed through the management engineering program. We now have determinants for 66 percent of the total Air Force measurable manpower resource. This not only gives us a sound basis for stating manpower needs in relation to work loads, but produces work efficiencies that increase personnel utilization. Since 1961 the program has resulted in more than 24,000 authorizations being redistributed to satisfy other mission requirements.

The teams will continue to review work operations to develop new standards and to update existing standards so that they reflect the manpower required to perform current work needs. Management improvement studies also are being emphasized to improve work operations and

to increase manpower utilization.

With such viable, diverse functions to support in an environment which is constantly changing, we must have a capability to get accurate information rapidly if we are to effectively and economically manage our manpower resources.

We are increasing our use of modern techniques and tools of data automation and system analysis to accelerate and improve our manpower programming. The aim is to make our manpower system more responsive to changing requirements and to give us more positive over-all control of our resources. For example, in 1968 we replaced 21 unique Command Manpower Accounting Systems with one standard system which is used by all major commands to account for manpower authorizations in detail.

In 1968 our military analysts developed a tool, the first of its kind, for study of aircraft pilot requirements to fight limited wars. Such factors as attrition, tour and rotation policies, duration and intensity of war, costs, and training policies can be taken systematically into account. As a result, our planning of future pilot requirements is now sharper, broader, and more responsive to changing needs.

### ORGANIZATION

It is essential that we constantly reevaluate the way our units are organized. We endeavor to organize in peacetime so that minimum change will be required for wartime operations. We try to standardize whenever possible so that like units have the same structure and identity. We stabilize the organization of our units as much as possible consistent with changing command and control techniques, new weapon systems and varying contingencies.

In our Southeast Asia operation, we have made several changes in the command and control structure for tactical airlift. The three tactical airlift wings of C-130 aircraft have been reassigned to the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces for more effective management and materiel and personnel resources. The Airlift Control Center and the Western Transportation Office have moved from Japan to Hawaii to permit more effective response to airlift requirements of the Pacific Command. As a result of these changes, the 315th Air Division will be inactivated on April 1, 1969.

We have recently realigned the European airlift forces to parallel the Pacific airlift organizational posture. The changes in Europe have permitted the inactivation of the 322nd Air Division.

Significant changes have been made in the organization of the Air Force Reserve which were covered previously by General Marchbanks, Chief of Air Force Reserve.

Other changes of varying size and significance also have been made in our continuing search for better ways to organize.

### CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks on the Air Force manpower program. I shall be pleased to respond to any questions you may have; however, since General Faver will discuss the Military Personnel program which is closely related, you may wish to hear him first.

**Mr. SLACK.** Thank you very much, General.

General Faver, is this your first appearance before the committee?

General FAVER. Yes, it is.

**Mr. SLACK.** Without objection, we will insert at this point in the record your biographical sketch.

(The sketch follows:)

Biographical sketch of witness: Brig. Gen. Dudley E. Faver was born in Sweetwater, Tex. on August 17, 1916. He received his B.A. degree at Abilene Christian College in 1937. In 1940, he resigned as high school principal to enter the Army Air Corps. He graduated from flight training in 1941, remaining at Mather Field, Calif. as a flight instructor until 1943. A member of the initial cadre forming the Instrument Flying Instructor School, he remained with that unit until 1945. He then served Alaskan Air Command as Director of Operations and Training. In 1949, he entered the Command and Staff School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. After graduating, he commanded the U.S. Air Force Instrument Instructor Pilot School, Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla. In 1951, he was a member of the initial cadre to design and implement the B-47 transition program for SAC's bomber force. Upon Air War College graduation, he became Director of Operations, 68th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, USAFE. Later he became Director, Ballistic Missiles, Headquarters, USAFE. In 1964, he was Commander of the 3500th Pilot Training Wing, Reese Air Force Base, Tex. In July 1966, he was assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force as the Deputy Director of Personnel Training and Education, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel and later reassigned to this present duty.

**Mr. SLACK.** It is my understanding, General Faver, that you will speak to us on details of the 1970 request for military personnel.

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

**Mr. SLACK.** Have you a statement on this subject matter?

General FAVER. I do, Mr. Chairman.

#### STATEMENT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL PLANNING

**Mr. SLACK.** Will you proceed?

General Faver.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Air Force Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) request and to discuss our proposed personnel programs for fiscal year 1970.

#### MILITARY PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1969

The fiscal year 1969 budget program approved by this committee last year had a beginning strength of 884,128 and a programmed end strength of 868,141. The current program for fiscal year 1969 shows a beginning strength of 904,759 and a programmed end strength of 868,600. The higher beginning strength of the operating program as compared to the budget program was due primarily to the Air National Guard and Air Reserve call up. Of the strength decrease shown in the current operating program, 20,517 were due to changes in force structure, training requirements and reductions as a result of the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-364). The other 15,642 reduction will result from the demobilization of the Guard and Reserve units called up during fiscal year 1968.

#### MILITARY PERSONNEL PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1970

The military personnel strength for fiscal year 1970 will further decline by 7,400 from a beginning strength of 868,600 to an end strength of 861,200. This reduction is also attributable to force structure changes. Table I relates the strengths for the fiscal year 1969 program, and the proposed strengths for fiscal year 1970.

TABLE I  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Total Military Strengths

	Fiscal Year 1969 President's Budget Strengths		Fiscal Year 1969 Current Program Strengths		Fiscal Year 1970 President's Budget Strengths	
	Beginning	End	Beginning	End	Beginning	End
Officers	137,128	133,977	139,600	133,800	133,800	135,000
Airmen	743,425	730,290	761,507	730,926	730,926	722,049
Cadets	3,575	3,874	3,652	3,874	3,874	4,151
TOTAL	884,128	868,141	904,759	868,600	868,600	861,200

The estimated cost of this program for fiscal year 1970 is \$5.959 billion.

The individual elements making up this request will be discussed beginning with the officer program.

#### THE OFFICER PROGRAM

Last year we presented a budget program that was scheduled to reduce 3,151 officers from the planned end position of 137,128 in fiscal year 1968 to 133,977 by end of fiscal year 1969.

The call up of Air National Guard and Reserve units and other minor adjustments increased our officer ranks by 2,472 officers at the end of fiscal year 1968 to a strength of 139,600.

The fiscal year 1969 officer end strength is now programmed to be 133,800 officers. The reduction from our peak level of 139,600, a decrease of 5,800, is caused by the release of all mobilized units, force structure revisions and reductions resulting from the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act.

For fiscal year 1970, the officer force end strength has a small increase of 1,200, bringing us to a total of 135,000.

#### OFFICER LOSSES

The majority of officer losses occur as career officers retire or young officers separate voluntarily at the end of their specified commitments. Voluntary loss rates of line officers with less than 15 years commissioned service have more than doubled during the last four years and are forecast to reach 13.4% by end of

fiscal year 1969. For example, there were 3,289 such losses during fiscal year 1965 and 6,575 are predicted for fiscal year 1969.

As reported to this committee last year, we attempted to reduce these increasing voluntary losses during fiscal year 1968 with policy actions designed to conserve the experience level of the force. These actions included a temporary continuation program to allow captains to remain on active duty following their failure of selection to major for the second time; a liberalized policy to permit reserve officers to remain on active duty beyond the 20 year point; and a selective retention program for regular officers in certain skills, not permitting their retirement or resignation for up to one year.

Our currently approved fiscal year 1969 program reduces force levels and no longer affords us this latitude. We have had to increase losses to remain within the approved strength. This was done by: (1) Suspension of the selective retention program for regular officers. Those officers already extended under the program have been given an opportunity to reapply for new retirement or separation dates in fiscal year 1969. (2) Return to the up or out concept relative to promotion. Continuation was not offered to those officers who failed selection to the grade of major for the second time during the fiscal year 1969 promotion cycle. (3) Acceleration of some of our anticipated fiscal year 1970 losses into fiscal year 1969.

Thus far we have not had to involuntarily separate captains already in a continued status nor retire our 20 year plus reserve officers. We do not anticipate any special action will be needed to induce losses next year. Table II outlines losses for fiscal years 1968 through 1970.

TABLE II  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Officer Losses

Type of Loss	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
End of Obligation	3,142	6,516*	2,655
Career Separation	795	1,341	1,270
Retirements (20 years +)	4,556	5,073	5,224
Attrition	1,265	1,324	1,245
Medics (All Types)	2,867	3,503	2,780
Other Losses	1,001	767	657
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>13,626</b>	<b>18,524</b>	<b>13,831</b>

\*Includes release of ANG and Reserve personnel.

Definition of Terms for Table II

End of Obligations:	Includes losses at the end of initial service commitment. Six years service or less
Career Separations:	Losses occurring (resignation and request for release) over 6 years of service and less than 20 years of service
Attrition:	Death or physical disability, Board Action, e.g., AFR 36-2, POW and courts-martial
Other Losses:	Includes promotion pass overs and warrant officers.

OFFICER GAINS

The bulk of our officer force accessions are provided from the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) and Officer Training School (OTS) programs. An important part of our accession program is the opportunity for deserving young airmen and career noncommissioned officers to obtain commissions through our college

education and commissioning programs. Our total officer procurement, by source, is indicated in Table III.

TABLE III  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Officer Gains

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
Academies	624	698	728
AFROTC	4,992	4,325	4,885
OTS	6,512	4,716	5,941
Airmen Education & Commissioning Program	(399)*	(358)*	(400)*
Bootstrap Commissioning Program	-	(171)*	(200)*
Recall & Direct Appointment	301	179	339
Line Officers	(205)*	(65)*	(199)*
Legal Officers	(8)*	(11)*	(20)*
Chaplains	(88)*	(103)*	(120)*
Medics	3,199	2,931	3,200
Other	2,223**	-	-
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>17,851</b>	<b>12,849</b>	<b>15,093</b>

\*Parentheses indicate inclusion in preceding amounts.

\*\*Includes ANG/Reserve call up.

The reduction in the OTS program during fiscal year 1969 relates to the declining officer strength during fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1969.

#### OFFICER PROMOTIONS

Officer promotions for fiscal years 1968 through 1970 are shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Officer Promotions

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
General	62	57	60
Colonel	995	1,160	1,216
Lt Colonel	3,642	3,136	4,150
Major	4,379	4,528	5,639
Captain	12,248	8,570	11,321
1st Lieutenant	9,339	14,255	10,990

Promotions during this period are planned to remain relatively constant except for projected increases to major and lieutenant colonel during fiscal year 1970. Such increases result from projected losses in these grades and continuing requirements within the ceilings provided by law. These conditions will permit a one-year acceleration in the major promotion phase point from the eleventh to the tenth year, and a six-month acceleration in promotion to lieutenant colonel to a point between the sixteenth and seventeenth years. This will bring the Air Force more nearly in line with the other services. Table V shows projected fiscal year 1970 promotion phase points for active duty officers, their promotional opportunities in the primary zone and the earliest phase points for promotion from the secondary zone.

TABLE V  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Opportunities and Phase Points  
Fiscal Year 1970

Grade	Opportunity	Primary Zone Points	Secondary Zone Points
First Lieutenant	Fully Qualified	18 months	--
Captain	Fully Qualified	3 years	--
Major	90 percent*	10 years	7th year
Lt Colonel	75 percent*	16-17 years	10th year
Colonel	50 percent	21 years	12th year**

\*Fully qualified for dental and veterinary promotion categories

\*\*To be promoted to colonel in the 12th year, an officer would have to receive secondary zone promotion to major and lieutenant colonel upon first consideration.

Public Law 89-606, enacted on September 26, 1966 provides increased ceilings in the grades of major through colonel for a six-year period, terminating in fiscal year 1973. This law has made possible for this period of time a predictable officer promotion pattern and provided a more reasonable promotion opportunity.

#### RATED OFFICER PROGRAMS

Table VI shows the actual inventory of rated officers for fiscal year 1968 and the programmed inventories for fiscal years 1969 and 1970.

TABLE VI  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Rated Officer Inventories

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
Active Inventory			
Pilots	37,086	36,057	35,435
Navigator/Observers	15,290	14,717	14,641
Flight Surgeon	509	574	1,000
TOTAL	52,885	51,348	51,076
Flight Waivers			
Pilots	5,058	4,707	4,122
Navigator/Observers	1,696	1,486	1,244
Flight Surgeon	59	60	60
TOTAL	6,813	6,253	5,426

The continuing personnel turbulence caused by Southeast Asia has been aggravated by a declining rated force. While we were taking all practicable actions to reduce losses during fiscal year 1968, the voluntary loss rate for pilots with less than 15 years service was 4.3% (838) and for navigators, 3.6% (419). In fiscal year 1969, we expect the voluntary loss rate for the same year groups to be 8.6% (1,500) and 7.2% (725), respectively. The rated officers voluntarily leaving the Air Force continue to cite the same reasons for their departure: (1) numerous, extended periods of family separation, (2) inadequate living conditions, and (3) civilian employment opportunities.

Our approach to this difficult problem has focused on the motivational elements that influence human behavior: the SEA tour has been maintained at one year; one combat tour for all eligibles before returning involuntarily a second time; direct personal assistance to officers by the Military Personnel Center and development of visible career patterns which show progression through a full career. In regard to pay, we are awaiting results of the First Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation.

We have received DOD approval to increase our pilot production from the fiscal year 1968 level of 3,143 to 3,450 in fiscal year 1970. Navigator production of 800 per year for fiscal years 1968 and 1969 is scheduled to increase to 1,000 in fiscal year 1970. Table VII shows the total Air Force pilot production for fiscal years 1968 through 1970.

TABLE VII  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Undergraduate Jet Pilot Production

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
USAF	3,092	3,143	3,450
USMC	15	107	225
ANG	157	137	145
MAP	65	86	120
	3,329	3,473	3,940

In addition to adjusting production rates, one of the primary tools in the management of our rated officer resource is the flight waiver provisions of Section 514, Public Law 90-580. We are requesting that the waiver provision be continued without change in the fiscal year 1970 Appropriation Act. This provision applies to a group comprised primarily of pilots and navigators who are 45 years of age with 22 or more years of rated service. At the end of fiscal year 1968, we had 9,395 pilots meeting the criteria for waiver status, but only 5,058 were waived while the remainder continued to perform flying duties to meet our world-wide commitments. In fiscal year 1970, we anticipate that of the 7,827 pilots eligible for waiver, 4,168 will be waived and 3,659 will continue in active flying assignments. The availability of this waived resource has been extremely beneficial to the Air Force. We are continuing to employ some of the waived group in combat operations supervision and other rated staff positions. Others are occupying middle and upper management positions in the support and technical fields equally as essential to the Air Force mission.

This concludes my remarks relating to officers. The airman program will now be discussed.

#### THE AIRMAN PROGRAM

Table I portrayed detailed airman strengths for fiscal years 1969 and 1970. You may observe from that table that our programmed fiscal year 1969 end strength will be reduced from the beginning strength of 761,507 to 730,926. This was brought about by some 17,097 reductions related to the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act and to force structure and training requirement changes and an additional 13,484 related to the demobilization of the Air National Guard and Reserve units. The fiscal year 1970 end strength is programmed to drop an additional 8,877 to 722,049.

#### WAF

One changing characteristic of our military strength is the expanding role of women in the Air Force. This is consistent with Executive Order relating to equal employment opportunity. By the end of fiscal year 1970, we have programmed for a strength level of 8,000 enlisted women, which will be an increase of 60% in three years. We are planning for greater increases and are studying the possibility of achieving an enlisted WAF strength of 13,700 by fiscal year 1974. We are expanding the number of career fields and assignments open to women, thus increasing their opportunity in the Air Force.

#### AIRMAN LOSSES

Table VIII shows our airman losses for fiscal years 1968 through 1970.

TABLE VIII  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Airman Losses

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
Total Losses	113,499	157,236	123,643
Attrition	20,527	21,683	21,607
Retirement	18,854	20,797	16,130
To Officer Status	6,479	4,716	5,941
Other Losses*	1,296	1,422	-
Non-Reenlistment	66,101	95,134	79,965
First Term	(56,701)	(84,148)	(71,381)
Career	(9,400)	(10,986)	(8,584)
ANG/AFRes Recall	242	13,484	-

\*Includes adjustment.

We anticipate some 157,200 airmen leaving the Air Force in fiscal year 1969 and 123,600 in fiscal year 1970. These losses include early release programs involving 57,000 airmen in fiscal year 1969 and 62,000 in fiscal year 1970. These programs serve a twofold purpose. They will assist the Air Force in achieving the cost reductions required by the Expenditure Control Act of 1968. They will also alleviate the overloading of our training facilities which would have occurred in fiscal year 1970 as a result of replacing the large number of airmen recruited in fiscal year 1966, incident to the SEA buildup.

#### AIRMAN GAINS

As shown in Table IX, the bulk of our gains in fiscal year 1970 will be first-term airmen.

TABLE IX  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Airman Gains

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
Total Gains	116,358	126,655	114,766
Nonprior Service	87,637	114,951	100,993
WAF	2,906	3,900	2,769
Prior Service	4,504	819	5,000
OTS	5,332	4,464	5,574
Academy Preparatory	148	128	130
Other*	2,105	2,393	300
ANG/AFRes Recall	13,726	-	-

\*Includes adjustments.

#### AIRMAN REENLISTMENTS

Table X portrays our airman separation and reenlistment data.

TABLE X  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Airman Separations and Reenlistments

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
Total Airmen Separated			
First Term	92,597	125,279	118,232
Career	87,712	114,179	80,184
	180,309	239,458	198,416
Separations Eligible to Reenlist			
First Term	58,695	98,841*	94,684
Career	64,523	78,104	60,054
	123,218	176,945*	154,738
Reenlistments			
First Term	10,594 18.0%	14,693 14.9%	23,303 24.6%
Career	56,458 87.5	67,118 85.9	51,470 85.7
	67,052 54.4%	81,811 46.2%	74,773 48.3%

\*Includes 36,000 early release losses.

Reenlistment rates of first-term airmen for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 are affected by the early release of 36,000 airmen during fiscal year 1969 whose normal dates of separation would have been fiscal year 1970. This has the effect of depressing the reenlistment rate in fiscal year 1969 and inflating it in fiscal year 1970.

We have increased emphasis on first-term reenlistments through our "top three" program being conducted by our senior noncommissioned officers. This program consists of using the 65,000 top three graders as retention advisors to discuss Air Force careers with qualified first-term airmen. Reenlistments are enhanced by three major interrelated financial programs - promotions, variable reenlistment bonuses and proficiency pay, which I will now discuss.

#### AIRMAN PROMOTIONS

The overall promotion outlook for airmen continues to be favorable. Fiscal year 1970 concludes a program started in fiscal year 1966 to increase grade ceilings to match established manpower requirements. During this five-year period, we will have promoted approximately 900,000 noncommissioned officers. This represents a significant increase over the 600,000 promotions made during the previous eight-year period. The Congress has been very helpful in this respect and, as a result, we have improved the morale of our airmen and the overall effectiveness of the Air Force.

We will promote approximately 235,000 airmen to or within the top six grades during fiscal year 1969 and 193,000 in fiscal year 1970. The lower number of promotions in fiscal year 1970 is due to fewer retirements and fewer losses in these grades. Table XI indicates the number of top six grades programmed for the two fiscal years.

TABLE XI  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Top Six Grade Program

	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
Number of Top Six Grades	504,505	525,305
Percent of Top Six Grades	69.0%	72.8%

Fiscal year 1970 variable reenlistment bonus (VRB) and proficiency pay programs were developed according to new DOD eligibility criteria. These are: (1) career

manning level, (2) training investment, and (3) the projected manning improvement to be achieved through the award. Analyses support the decision that the VRB should be the principal financial incentive for attaining adequate career manning in designated specialties.

#### VARIABLE REENLISTMENT BONUS (VRB)

In keeping with established eligibility criteria, 103 airman specialties are identified for the VRB during fiscal year 1970. Ninety-eight were approved for fiscal year 1969.

Our findings indicate higher retention effectiveness through use of the higher VRB multiples. We are, therefore, proposing a higher number of specialties for multiples 3 and 4. In fiscal year 1969, there are 73 specialties at these two multiples; in fiscal year 1970, there will be 87. The program approved by DOD will permit lump sum payment to approximately one-third of the estimated 15,000 first-term VRB reenlistees in fiscal year 1970.

#### PROFICIENCY PAY

Proficiency pay is now used to supplement VRB in attaining career manning objectives. The favorable career manning in 22 specialties no longer warrants continuation of proficiency pay, and, accordingly, proficiency pay in these specialties will be terminated. The adverse impact on the airmen concerned will be moderated by a phased termination which will prevent sudden loss of the entire proficiency pay amounts. For example, those specialties now receiving the P-2 \$60 rate will go to a reduced rate of \$40 during fiscal year 1970, \$20 during fiscal year 1971, and payment will be stopped completely in fiscal year 1972. It was also determined in the specialty evaluation process that one specialty would receive the P-3 \$100 rate and 41 specialties would be designated for the P-2 \$75 rate. Ten specialties will be continued at the \$30 rate in fiscal year 1970.

Aircraft maintenance is not being designated for proficiency pay because the career manning deficit in this skill is not sufficient to justify the award. We have been authorized by DOD to raise the aircraft maintenance specialty to the highest VRB rate, multiple 4, in fiscal year 1970.

Before leaving the airman area, there are two more programs of interest that I would like to mention - Projects 100,000 and Transition.

#### PROJECT 100,000

As you are aware, the objectives of Project 100,000 are first, to broaden the manpower pool by increasing the opportunities for military service, and second, to utilize the capability of the military training establishment to enable these men to become fully satisfactory servicemen. Under this program we accept some men who previously would have been rejected for mental or physical reasons.

Those accepted in the mental program come from the lower half of Mental Group IV which is defined as those scoring 10 through 30 on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). They are referred to as New Standards men. Those accepted in the Medical Remedial program are volunteers with specified physical defects which are susceptible of correction within a six-week period.

In compliance with DOD quotas, we enlisted 13,735 of these men during the first two years of the program ending September 1968 and we expect to enlist an additional 9,000 by June 30, 1969.

The initial results of Project 100,000 have been better than anticipated. Basic training was completed by 91.5% of New Standards men as compared to an overall Air Force rate of 96.8%. The disciplinary rate is somewhat higher for New Standard personnel - 1.29% for a group of 10,117 compared to 0.3% for 12,938 men in a contemporary control group.

As would be expected, these men progress at a slower rate. For example, in the same time period 24% of a group of Project 100,000 men reached the fully qualified skill level versus 37% of a control group. In the same group, 91% were promoted to pay grade E-3 versus 97% of the control group. The long-range impact on unit performance of considerable numbers of these men cannot be ascertained until more data are available for evaluation. We will continue to closely monitor this program.

## PROJECT TRANSITION

The objective of Project Transition is to offer each airman separated from the service the opportunity to acquire a skill which can be used in the civilian labor market. Airmen within six months of their dates of separation are eligible to participate. Assistance in obtaining employment upon separation is rendered by referral to appropriate governmental agencies. Training is provided based upon individual need and is conducted primarily during off-duty periods.

In view of the fact that approximately 96% of Air Force technical skills have a relationship to civilian occupations, the major part of our effort has been devoted to providing career counseling service and job placement assistance. Since January 1968, approximately 129,000 airmen were queried regarding job counseling. Of this number, some 36,000 desired counseling and job resume service and about 6,000 entered training courses.

## THE AIR FORCE ACADEMY CADET PROGRAM

There has been no change in fiscal year 1969 cadet programmed end strength since our presentation to this committee last year. The end strength for fiscal year 1970 is programmed for 4,151 which reflects an increase of 277.

For your information, Table XII shows cadet strength data.

TABLE XII  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Air Force Academy Strengths

	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program
Graduates	614	678	716
New Entries	1,250	1,359	1,359
End Strength	3,652	3,874	4,151

Public Law 88-276 of March 3, 1964 authorized a cadet strength objective of 4,417 which we are programmed to reach in fiscal year 1971. The Air Academy will then produce approximately 900 graduates per year.

I will now discuss the Permanent Change of Station program.

## PERMANENT CHANGE OF STATION (PCS) PROGRAM

The PCS program continues to be affected by Southeast Asia activities. One other factor affecting the fiscal year 1969 program is the demobilization of Air National Guard and Reserve units. As a management action to reduce personnel turbulence and expenditures, a voluntary oversea tour extension program was implemented on June 29, 1968. This program authorized and encouraged officer and airman personnel, in skills not critical to Southeast Asia needs, to extend in long-tour oversea areas. The response to this policy produced an estimated 12,950 fewer PCS moves in fiscal year 1969. In addition, major air commands were required to restrict PCS moves to those absolutely essential to satisfy basic operational requirements. This accounted for an additional savings of some 10,000 moves. These programs are continued for fiscal year 1970.

Table XIII updates the information we furnished last year and provides a five-year comparison of military strength, PCS moves and the number of personnel moving.

TABLE XIII  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Comparison of Strength, PCS Moves and Personnel Moving  
(Numbers in Thousands)

Fiscal Year	Air Force End Strength	Permanent Change of Station Moves	Military Individuals Moving Overseas During the Year
1966	886.4	860.7	61
1967	896.5	912.9	
1968	904.8	807.3	
1969	868.6	926.8	
1970	861.2	870.8	65

PCS MOVE PROGRAM - FISCAL YEAR 1969

The current fiscal year 1969 program forecasts a net increase of some 2,200 more moves than predicted a year ago. This was caused by the release of the Air National Guard and Reserve personnel from active duty and the early release programs which created more separation moves. This increase would have been larger had we not implemented the tour extension policies I described.

Table XIV reflects a comparison of moves by type for fiscal years 1968 through 1970.

TABLE XIV  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
Comparison by Type of PCS Moves

Type of Move	Fiscal Year 1968 Actual	Fiscal Year 1969 Program	Fiscal Year 1970 Program	FY 1970 Compared to FY 1969
Accession	117,639	138,686	130,918	- 7,768
Training	160,353	197,806	185,793	-12,013
Operational	73,147	76,389	76,832	+ 443
Reassignment				
(Individual)	(44,962)	(58,499)	(56,709)	(- 1,790)
(Unit Action)	(28,185)	(17,890)	(20,123)	(+ 2,233)
Overseas Rotational	326,843	341,980	335,978	- 6,002
Separation	117,665	160,476	130,240	-30,236
Organized Units	11,695	11,472	11,077	- 395
	807,342	926,809	870,838	-55,971

PCS MOVE PROGRAM - FISCAL YEAR 1970

As indicated in Table XIV, military moves for fiscal year 1970 are programmed to decrease by some 56,000. Compared with fiscal year 1969, accession and training moves are programmed to decrease because of the reduction in airman procurement. The slight increase in the operational reassignment area is attributable to a slight increase of units programmed to be activated, inactivated and reorganized.

Overseas rotational moves are also programmed to decrease as a result of continuing the voluntary overseas tour extension program in fiscal year 1970.

Fiscal year 1970 separation moves are programmed to decrease by a substantial number from fiscal year 1969. This decrease is due primarily to the release of the recalled Air National Guard and Reserve units in fiscal year 1969 instead of 1970 and the fiscal year 1969 early release program.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we in the Air Force are striving to assure the most prudent management of our military personnel resource.

We appreciate your continued support of the Air Force personnel program.

This completes my statement. I am prepared to answer your questions.

## END STRENGTH DETERMINATION

Mr. ADDABBO. General Berg, in your prepared statement you discuss at some length the various gains and losses over the revised request for 1969 which purport to be the means of arriving at the number of personnel required for 1970.

Were these gains and losses determined by the Air Force as the initial step in developing the 1970 budget request, or were they the result of taking the target figure supplied by the OSD as a limitation on the number of Air Force personnel for 1970, and the gains and losses worked backwards from that point? In other words, how was the end strength of 861,200 at June 30, 1970, determined?

General BERG. The way in which it was accomplished, Mr. Chairman, is that we prepare our budget in the 10 force programs that the Office of Secretary of Defense specifies, and then we go through a series of hearings with the OSD and the BOB analysts, and eventually "Program the Budget." Decisions come out which reflect approval of, or raising or lowering of particular programs, together with the associated manpower.

The way in which the end strength was arrived at is a tabulation of all those particular "Program Budget Decisions," including the people to support the approved programs.

Mr. ADDABBO. How close is your end figure of 861,200 to your original proposal?

General BERG. In our original budget request to OSD, there was a request for approximately 915,000 military personnel. This is the manpower related to all the programs that we requested. As specific programs were deleted, of course, the manpower to go with those programs was reduced.

Mr. ADDABBO. Does the Office of the Secretary set the priorities, or does your office set the priorities of where these cuts should be made?

General BERG. When OSD publishes the "Program Budget Decisions," it approves specific programs.

General BOYLAN. Reallocation authority between program elements is residual in the Department of Defense.

## EARLY RELEASE

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 13 of your statement you refer to the fact that the Air Force will have 57,000 early releases in 1969 and 62,000 in 1970, for a total of 119,000 early outs. You go on to state the benefits of this early release program. On the other side of the coin, however, if you are releasing people early do you not, in fact, have to speed up the number of people going through training in order to maintain your average strength? And since training costs money aren't you, in fact, increasing your total cost by releasing people early?

General FAVER. No, sir; we are not increasing training costs, as we are not training more people than otherwise would have been trained. The overall costs are reduced by virtue of the difference in pay for the 4-year man as opposed to the basic recruit.

Mr. ADDABBO. What is the average cost of training an airman?

General FAVER. Through basic, \$1,240.

Mr. ADDABBO. In computing this average cost of training and the early releases, isn't the end result an actual increase in appropriation?

General FAVOR. No, sir.

Mr. ADDABBO. The saving comes in salary?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. It comes out of the salary, the difference between the 4-year men and the recruit.

Mr. ADDABBO. Will you supply for the record the grade and rank of those in the early out program?

General FAVER. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

The following represents the number and grades of airmen programed to be released under the early release programs for fiscal years 1969 and 1970:

Grade	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970
E-5.....	1,083	1,178
E-4.....	46,147	50,195
E-3.....	9,263	10,075
E-2.....	507	552
Total.....	57,000	62,000

Mr. ADDABBO. Why did you decide to release the 57,000 airmen early during fiscal 1969? Were these early outs a result of reductions in your 1969 budget request for military personnel?

General FAVER. Not entirely, sir. The early release program was primarily undertaken to level out the load on our training facilities in the fiscal year 1969 and 1970 time frame. The Air Force took in some 159,000 new airmen in fiscal year 1966. These airmen complete their service in fiscal year 1970 and have to be replaced. Had we not taken the early release action our training load would have been approximately 80,000 new airmen in fiscal year 1969 and 165,000 during fiscal year 1970. The early release program created the headroom within the approved strength in fiscal year 1969 to initiate the training against the losses which otherwise would have occurred in fiscal year 1970. Through this action, and, the effects of the decreasing strength in both 1969 and 1970, our training load for new airmen is now programed to be 114,000 in fiscal year 1969 and 101,000 in fiscal year 1970. It precludes the need to build capacity, instructors and facilities, in our training command for a 1-year period.

This action did result in a reduction in our budget requirements resulting from the salary savings between 4-year men and new recruits. However, no additional training costs were incurred as we are not training more people than otherwise would have been trained.

Now, as a part of the Expenditure Reduction Act, we went then through the exercise of increasing the number which brought us to the 57,000 figure, to save dollars.

#### RECOMMENDED MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

Mr. ADDABBO. In reducing military personnel funding in fiscal year 1969, the committee recommended that various management improvements be initiated. Have you implemented any management improvements which will reduce personnel cost?

General FAVER. Yes; we have.

Mr. ADDABBO. What management improvements have been initiated?

General FAVER. I will not be talking to the management-engineering standard improvements that we worked through fiscal 1969 but I will talk to some of the changes that have happened within the personnel system. The first one I would like to refer to would be a change that we made within our pilot training.

In an attempt to increase utilization of our people we have increased the number of entries into the pilot training classes from eight per year to 24 per year which gives us a graduation every 2 weeks of 150 people instead of 450 every 6 weeks. This gives us a better flow into our follow-on courses that these new graduates have to go into. We have estimated that by that change alone we have gained 275 pilot man-years.

When we did that it tied in better to our graduation from OTS. Formerly the OTS graduate had to wait as long as 30 days in order to enter into pilot training, since entries were on a 6 weeks cycle instead of the 2 weeks that we now have.

We estimate that as a consequence of that change alone that we have gained 90 officer man-years.

We have increased the entry of graduates from undergraduate pilot training into SEA units from 51 percent to where we are now putting in something like 74 percent of the new graduates into those units. We estimate this change saved us 350 pilot man-years because we used the graduate who is going to be on the move in any event, thus eliminating the withdrawal of a pilot from an operational unit. Stated another way, we will have eliminated a number of these double moves resulting in the stated savings.

Now, from the standpoint of the airman, we have had some improvements which I think are rather significant. The first one is that on February 1, 1969, we put into effect our new airmen data system which automates more information on the airman than we have ever had before, from both the major command standpoint and the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force standpoint.

In doing this we have automated many of the manual reports and we also have automated the response that goes out to the airman relating to an oncoming assignment or a pending retirement, for example. Certain other things have been automated rather than requiring manual operation.

#### DECISION ON EARLY RELEASE

Mr. ADDABBO. It is the desire of this committee in recommending that the various management improvements be initiated that this be where we would have the military personnel reduction and not in the actual reduction of manpower. So the reason for my previous question: Who decided to release the other 57,000 airmen early during 1969? Was this an order by OSD in budget cutbacks, or was there a misinterpretation of our recommendation?

General FAVER. Sir, I would say that the 57,000 was a desire of the Air Force to level our training load in 1970 as opposed to what it would have been had we not changed it. There was also a need for a dollar reduction.

Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you.

General PITTS. That dollar reduction was occasioned in part by Public Law 90-364, the Revenue and Expenditure Control Act, where we had to take reductions in the Department of Defense totaling some \$3 billion. Fortunately, the early release performed two functions—it solved our fiscal year 1970 training problem and satisfied a part of the Economy Act reduction.

#### MANPOWER MANAGEMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. General Berg, on page 12 of your statement you discuss what the Air Force has been doing in the way of its manpower management program during fiscal years 1968 and 1969 and what is planned for fiscal year 1970. In this discussion, you refer to the fact that you now have determinants for 66 percent of the total Air Force measurable manpower resource. However, on page 382 of last year's military personnel hearings the statement was made with regard to standards for the manpower resource of the Air Force that, for all intents and purposes, you were approximately two-thirds of the way through and that you would hope to accomplish the residual within the forthcoming year or two. If at this time last year you had standards for two-thirds of your people and you now still only have standards for two-thirds of the people, what has caused the slippage in this program? Have you stopped in the development of your standards?

General BERG. No, sir, we have not.

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you discuss that question?

General BERG. When you talk about manpower determinants, there are two kinds that we generally use. One of them is called standards and one is called criteria. The standards generally refer to a situation where you take people who are qualified as industrial engineers and you go into a specific work center and measure the work that is actually being accomplished and relate that to how many people are required to do it. That is the best kind of manpower determinant that you can have because it measures the people right on the job.

Then you measure that same work center at several locations and come up with a figure for the number of people required and that is called a standard.

The other determinant is criteria and takes historical data or statistical information and uses that to determine how many people you need.

There are certain jobs that simply do not lend themselves to being measured in either of these two ways.

Mr. ANDREWS. Such as what?

General BERG. Well, one of them that we have had difficulty in getting ahold of is what we call the plans and programming function in the Air Force, which is a big function. You cannot go to a plans and programming directorate and say that they are required to do this and this and this particular specific function. If you contrast that, for example, with the aircraft maintenance function where you know precisely what jobs have to be performed and how they are performed, it is very easy to come up with some kind of a standard for how many people are required.

What I am saying in reality, sir, is that when we say we measured 66 percent of the total people and we keep on trying to measure the remainder, there is a point beyond which it is kind of difficult to go. In other words, you cannot measure 100 percent of the force.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have a lot of jobs that are almost tailor made, have you not?

General BERG. Tailor made? Yes, sir. The crew force is one of them, where you have an airplane, it has so many people—I see what you mean. Yes, sir; you are right—tailor-made.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you made any progress in this program, General? That is what we are asking.

General BERG. We have, sir. We have made a lot of progress. One of the things that does not show up in the kind of question that we are discussing here is the fact that once you establish standards you cannot walk away and leave them because equipment changes, the work center changes, and you constantly have to be updating those particular standards. We have done a lot of work in that area.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think you have gone about as far as you can in the field of establishing standards for the jobs that you do have?

General BERG. The area that we are going to progress in from here on is pretty difficult.

Mr. ANDREWS. That answers the question.

Are these standards primarily performance standards or are they productivity standards? In other words, are they standards that you use only to measure the performance of your people or are they standards that can be used in determining overall manpower requirements for the Air Force?

General BERG. Standards fall in the latter category, sir, factors to determine how many people you need.

For example, probably the simplest standard that we have in the Air Force relates to commissary stores. We take the standard of how much dollar sales they have and based upon that we can figure out how many people they will need in order to run a good commissary store.

Mr. ANDREWS. Were manpower standards used in the development of the 1970 budget?

General BERG. They were used in the determination of how many people we needed in roughly two-thirds of the force where the standards do exist; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREW. You don't want to get too standardized, do you? Does that have anything to do with destroying initiative, ambition, things like that?

General BERG. No, sir; we do not. One of the things that we attempt to do all the time is when we go into a functional area such as motor vehicle maintenance, we go in and get the cooperation of the people in charge of the motor vehicle maintenance to show them that what we are really trying to do is to help them figure out what the proper number of people is that they need, regardless of whether it is a smaller number than they have or a larger number. If we go in there and say, "We know more about your business than you do, and this is how many people you need," then obviously they are not going to be very receptive to whatever standards we come up with.

Mr. ANDREWS. Unfortunately, certain branches of the Government have done that to many businesses in America.

General BERG. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. They go ahead and take a look and then say, "We can tell you how you can better run your business." There is a lot of resentment to that, but the average man with a small business cannot buck the Federal Government.

Now, you do not have that problem in your shop because you are all part of a big family.

General BERG. That is right.

Mr. ANDREWS. What effect does the transfer of air depot functions have on your standards?

General BERG. I don't believe I understand what you mean.

Mr. ANDREWS. For instance, you just transferred depot maintenance function for overhaul and air rework of your aircraft from SAAMA to Oklahoma. What effect does that have on your standards that you have established?

General BERG. I would think it does not have any effect on them unless there is a tremendous difference in the physical plant that you had at one place and then you moved to another where it would have some impact on the work to be performed.

Mr. ANDREWS. It would have an impact only through the training stage?

General BERG. That is generally right; yes.

#### STANDARDS FOR AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

Mr. ANDREWS. In the hearings last year we discussed the development and implementation of standards for people involved in intelligence. The committee was specifically concerned with regard to the lack of standards for people engaged in this type of activity. During the past year have you done anything further in the way of putting intelligence personnel under standards?

General BERG. In the preparation for coming over here, sir, I reviewed the hearings last year and the testimony that was given. I would like to make the following statement with regard to intelligence field and the determination of standards.

As I mentioned previously, there are two kinds of determinants: standards and criteria. There are two separate ways in which they are developed. One of them is for application Air Force wide, regardless of what major command an individual may be in. Then separate and distinct from that, we have what are called command standards and command criteria. This is where they apply just within a specific major Air Force command.

With that background, sir, we have 31,760 people—officers, airmen, civilians—working in what we call the intelligence field.

Mr. ANDREWS. 31,000 plus?

General BERG. 31,760; yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Isn't that an unusually large number?

General BERG. Well, sir, I might indicate to you, for example, that 13,000 of these people belong to what we call the Air Force Security Service. Although that is coded as an intelligence function, I think someone would not think of it in the common term of intelligence.

Mr. ANDREW. What do those 31,000-plus people do?

General BERG. ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are these people you are talking about military or civilians?

General BERG. A lot of them are military; yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Give us the breakdown between civilian and military. Supply it for the record, if you do not have it.

General BERG. It is 4,991 officers, 23,781 enlisted people, and 2,988 civilians.

Mr. ANDREWS. They are scattered throughout the whole field of your operations?

General BERG. Yes, sir; and a lot of them are overseas.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do some of these other people do? You have accounted for 13,000 of them. They are employees concerned with communications, is that right?

General BERG. ———; yes, sir.

Another large number of them are in the Office of Special Investigations, OSI. These are the people that conduct all of the investigations.

Mr. ANDREWS. Comparable to naval intelligence?

General BERG. Yes.

General PITTS. It would be the Office of Special Investigations in naval intelligence, sir, looking into things like alleged narcotic rings, things like that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you investigate through this intelligence office all applicants for a commission?

General BERG. Yes, sir; security check.

Mr. ANDREWS. The Navy does that pretty thoroughly. I would think the Air Force would, too.

General BERG. Yes, sir; that is done.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us something else about your intelligence community.

General BERG. As I started to mention, of the 31,000 people, 14,000 plus are covered by what we call command standards and command criteria.

In other words, somewhere in the neighborhood of 40-plus percent are actually covered by standards.

There is a small group of people in there, about ——— that are included in the 31,000 who do not actually work directly for the Air Force. They work for the National Security Agency outside of the Air Force.

Mr. ANDREWS. I was going to ask you if you had any of these people assigned to CIA or what they call the national intelligence community.

General BERG. These in the NSA are in that environment; yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have combat intelligence officers?

General BERG. Yes, sir; we do.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is their duty, General?

General BERG. For example, the largest concentration we have is in the Strategic Air Command and they are right down, in a great majority of the cases, with the actual squadron, the bombardment squadrons and groups and, in some cases, wings. They actually prepare the target folders for the crews and keep the target folders up to

date, put new information in there, and make sure that the crews are properly briefed on them.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they brief the crewmen when they get back from a mission?

General BERG. Yes, sir; brief and debrief.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have a need for quite a few of those type officers?

General BERG. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does this intelligence group have exclusive jurisdiction over briefing and debriefing combat missions?

General BERG. No, sir; only for the intelligence portion of the briefing. Operations personnel brief the operational aspects of the mission, weather personnel, the weather, and so forth.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many of these people do you have in South Vietnam?

General BERG. It is not broken out with respect to South Vietnam, but in the Pacific Air Force we have approximately 3,000. That would include Vietnam, Thailand, Korea.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are all debriefing and briefing officers rated? I do not mean rated. I think you have a definition of a rated officer as being one who flies, don't you?

General BERG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, are all people in your intelligence community, engaged in briefing and debriefing work, officers?

General BERG. No, sir; I don't believe they are.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have some enlisted men?

General BERG. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Give us a breakdown on your military people, officers and enlisted men, and supply it for the record.

General BERG. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### PERSONNEL BREAKDOWN FOR DEBRIEFING

Many of our intelligence personnel in various activities spend a portion of their time in briefing and debriefing functions. Since personnel are not engaged exclusively in briefing and debriefing, but have other duties as well, they are not readily identifiable by any reporting system. In a typical bombardment wing, approximately one officer and one airman of a total of six officers and 11 airmen spend a majority of their time in work associated with briefings and debriefings. However, in the case of a typical tactical wing, approximately three officers and three airmen are basically engaged in squadron briefing and debriefing activities. The number of personnel and the amount of time will vary dependent on the type and level of the organization.

#### SLOW PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING IMPROVED STANDARDS

Mr. ANDREWS. You have 2,988 civilians?

General BERG. Yes. Plus 4,991 officers and 23,781 airmen.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, what we are trying to find out is this: The committee last year was concerned about a lack of standards for people engaged in intelligence work. We are now wondering what has been done during the past year, at least up to this time, in putting intelligence under some standards. Has there been anything done?

General BERG. It is my understanding that the impression was left last year that none of the people in intelligence was under standards. I think if that is the impression that was left it was erroneous because

there were some who were under at that time. The combination of the ones who were under some kind of standards, command standards and command criteria, plus the ones who have been put under since then totals 14,883, which I mentioned. In addition to that, we have three commands—

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, before we get too far off, what have you done in the last year to establish standards that we felt did not exist a year ago?

General BERG. I was just going to mention that.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I did not get the impression that you were bringing us up to date.

General BERG. In the Strategic Air Command there are 1,881 spaces that we have had under study and the standards will be implemented. In other words, it has been approved and will be implemented in August of this year, 1969. In the Security Service, where I mentioned the large number of people were, 3,317 additional manpower authorizations will come under standards at the same date, August of 1969.

In the Systems Command where we have people involved in technology, technical intelligence, 1,200 spaces are also due to be placed under standards in August of 1969, for a total of 6,398.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What does that leave undone?

General BERG. Some of these I don't know precisely how many, but some of this 6,000 is an update of existing standards and there is a little bit of redundancy between the 14,000 that I mentioned that are under standards, and this 6,000. As a rough estimate, the number that will be under standards will be approximately 18,000 by the end of August.

Now, there are certain numbers there that fall in the category I described before, where it would be difficult to put them under standards. For example, we have about 2,185 people who are on headquarters staffs where it is difficult to go in and actually apply a standard.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What are your plans for fiscal year 1970 in developing standards?

General BERG. I don't have that information with me. I would be glad to supply it.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You have been working on standards in the intelligence field for 7 years now; isn't that right?

General BERG. I think that was the information that you got last year, that we had been working on them 6 years then.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Am I wrong in assuming that you are about half done?

General BERG. The number 18,000 related to 31,000 would give that impression, but again I would like to stress the point that it is not possible for us to completely cover the 31,000 people by standards. For example, we do not have a standard for any of the functions, including intelligence, in the Headquarters, Department of the Air Force and the number of people that are assigned there in the intelligence field is 276.

Unless we come up with some new way to develop a standard for them they would not be covered by a standard.

General PIRTS. That percentage would be about 60 percent which would relate to the 66 percent overall throughout the Air Force. It is not too far off, therefore, in the intelligence field.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Our interest is to improve intelligence. This committee, as you know, has been studying this and has had a special study made in which intelligence showed up not too well.

Now, one of the areas that we found needed correcting was the area of standards. You say you are going to put these into effect in August, but does that indicate putting a lot of emphasis on it?

**General PITTS.** I think General Berg has brought out that they have been putting emphasis on it during the past year and it will come to fruition this summer.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** As you point out, it is now only about 40 percent plus. Why don't you give us what you feel you cannot do and do not intend to do and what you are going to do in the next year? You implied or said that there are areas in the intelligence community that you cannot cover with standards.

**General BERG.** Yes, sir.

**General BOYLAN.** Or it is exceedingly difficult to do so. I think we can categorize these functions, a description of these functions, to give you what you want, Mr. Lipscomb.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Some time—and I know you are trying—but some time we are going to have to show some improvement in our intelligence community. It is not all bad. I don't mean that, but we want to show some improvement.

**General PITTS.** I understand. As General Boylan pointed out, we will insert in the record a categorization of those areas in which we feel it is difficult to establish a standard.

(The information follows:)

#### INTELLIGENCE STANDARDS

Currently, we have approximately 14,883 spaces (47 percent) of the 31,760 spaces under standards or criteria. We anticipate that we will be able to place another 4,129 (13 percent) under criteria or program estimating equations by December 31, 1969. Further, it is our plan to place another 4,188 spaces under standards by December 31, 1970. The above will provide the USAF with 73 percent coverage by standards, criteria, and program estimating equations in the intelligence function. The remaining 8,560 spaces (27 percent) which are in HQ USAF/Field Extensions and USAF Security Service/National Security Agency will not be covered by manpower determinations per se. They are either in staff functions which cannot be effectively measured or in activities which are not controlled by the Air Force. They will continue to be monitored by other established controls; e.g., headquarters ceilings, consolidated intelligence program, or consolidated cryptologic program.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Would you please supply for the record a table regarding your management engineering performance standards similar to the table provided on page 383 of last year's hearings?

**General BERG.** Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

## MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Manpower authorizations covered by standards:						
Annual.....		108,670	2,774	7,141	5,671	18,546
Cumulative.....	191,172	299,842	302,616	309,757	315,428	333,974
Authorizations redistributed as a result of application of standards:						
Annual.....	4,100	2,710	2,684	7,154	7,808	3,988
Cumulative.....	9,189	11,899	14,583	21,737	29,455	33,533

## PILOT PRODUCTION

Mr. ANDREWS. General Faver, we note that the Air Force intends to increase pilot production in 1970 by 307 pilots, from 3,143 to 3,450. On what basis did the Air Force compute this increased production?

General FAVER. The increased production was based upon the difference between the inventory of pilots, lieutenant colonel and below, projected for fiscal year 1973 and the requirements which had been arrived at in negotiation with the OSD staff. Increases in production were approved in fiscal years 1968 and 1969 as well as in fiscal year 1970. In each case the increase was related to our projected inventory position as compared with OSD recognized requirements.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many pilots do you have as of some recent date? Is this 3,143 figure correct?

General FAVER. Our total pilots in the Air Force, active and excused for fiscal 1969 are 36,114, lieutenant colonels and below.

Mr. ANDREWS. 36,114?

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. And 3,143 are in training during fiscal 1969?

General FAVER. Yes. We expect to produce during this fiscal year 3,143.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is your attrition rate, General? I believe you refer to an inventory of 36,114. You will add to that in fiscal 1969 3,143 for a total of 39,257. How many do you plan to lose from that figure during 1969 through resignation or retirement, or for other reasons? What will be the picture in fiscal 1970?

General FAVER. For fiscal 1969 we anticipate that our voluntary pilot losses will be some 1,500.

Mr. ANDREWS. For all causes?

General FAVER. No, sir. To that I would add retirements of about 1,700 people. In addition, there will be losses for other reasons.

Mr. ANDREWS. For a total number of what? How many do you estimate will leave the service for one reason or another during 1969? You will put into your inventory 3,143. Supply those figures for the record.

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

## PILOT GAINS AND LOSSES

The Air Force ended fiscal year 1968 with 37,574 pilots in the grades of lieutenant colonel and below. During fiscal year 1969 it is planned to train 3,143 new pilots. We expect to lose during this same period 4,603 pilots, leaving an estimated inventory of 36,114 at the end of the fiscal year.

The 4,603 losses that are expected are for the following reasons: 1,500 will leave the service voluntarily; 1,750 will retire from active service; 393 will be lost to active service due to death, missing in action, and other attrition

factors; 252 will be permanently suspended from flying status due to disabilities; 708 will be promoted to the grade of colonel.

During fiscal year 1970 we expect to train 3,450 new pilots while losing about 4,300 for the same reasons shown previously for fiscal year 1969. We will end fiscal year 1970 with approximately 35,250.

#### APPLICANTS FOR PILOT TRAINING

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Are you getting plenty of applicants for pilot training?

**General FAVER.** Yes, sir; we are.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Have you lowered your standards any?

**General FAVER.** No, sir; we have not, not at all.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Do these people come to you as volunteers?

**General FAVER.** Yes, sir; they do.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the chief source of your input into your pilot training program?

**General FAVER.** Our heaviest input of any group comes out of OTS, but we have a heavy input from ROTC also.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** OTS is comparable to the Army's OCS training program, officer candidates school?

**General FAVER.** Yes.

#### PILOT TRAINING PROGRAM

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How long does a training course last with respect to a pilot?

**General FAVER.** Fifty three weeks, sir. That is, after they report to the undergraduate pilot training school. I have not included the time necessary for them to get their commission.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Now, here is a young man who gets a commission as a second lieutenant in the Air Force through the ROTC program. Now, please take us briefly through the trip that he will take until he gets his wings and becomes a full-fledged pilot in the U.S. Air Force.

**General FAVER.** All right, sir.

He would report into one of 10 undergraduate pilot training bases within the Air Training Command.

He would be in training there for 53 weeks.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** At one spot?

**General FAVER.** Yes, sir; at one spot without moving. We went into that program some 10 years ago and we have found it serves us well.

So he reports in and he flies approximately 30 hours in a T-41 which is a Cessna, light airplane.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Fixed wing?

**General FAVER.** Yes, sir; fixed wing. Then he will move from that to the T-37, which is a jet aircraft, which he will fly for 90 hours. Then from that he will go to the T-38 which he will fly for approximately 120 hours.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Tell us for the record what is the difference between the T-37 and T-38. They are both jets?

**General FAVER.** Yes. The T-37 is a subsonic twin-engine two-place jet trainer with a ceiling of about 19,000 feet and it will move along at about 200 knots.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** We just want the record to show what training you are giving your pilots.

General FAVER. The T-38, of course, is the most advanced training that he gets prior to his graduation. That is a supersonic trainer. It has a ceiling of about 45,000 feet. It is put out by Northrop, and is a very fine trainer. It is the training version of the F-5.

Mr. ANDREWS. All right. At the end of 53 weeks he graduates, and he is fully qualified?

General FAVER. Yes, sir; he is given his pilot's wings.

Mr. ANDREWS. He has flown up to that time only the Cessna fixed wing, the T-37 and T-38?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where does he go from there? What do you call him then?

General FAVER. We call him a pilot.

Mr. ANDREWS. A pilot?

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. What can he fly without additional training?

General FAVER. We would have to give him crew training in whatever airplane is utilized by the command to which he is assigned. Let's presume that he is one of the 70-odd percent that has the opportunity to go to Southeast Asia. We will put him through the F-4 program at Davis-Monthan. Now, as a new graduate, second lieutenant, his assignment would probably be in the back seat of an F-4. So he would be in training about 7 months prior to his movement over to Southeast Asia.

Mr. ANDREWS. So that is about 60 weeks—

General FAVER. It is about 1 year and 7 months.

Mr. ANDREWS. One year and 7 months before he would go overseas as a combat pilot?

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you think that is enough training for him? Is he fully qualified?

General FAVER. Our record shows that he is fully qualified; yes, sir. Now, it depends on which aircraft he would go into as to the length of his training. I would say it would run from 6 to 9 months and he is actually fully qualified in the aircraft to which he is assigned.

Mr. ANDREWS. General Boylan, do you agree with his statements?

General BOYLAN. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have anything to add?

General BOYLAN. On the other side of this new pilot assignment and training problem take, for example, the Airlift Command. There they receive new pilot graduates, all single-engine jet-trained—actually, these aircraft are twin-engine. The young officer would be assigned to a formed crew in the Airlift Command. He would begin his upgrade training by squadron familiarization. At the first opportunity, depending on schedule and inputs, the Airlift Command would send him through the MAC training unit, which is now at Altus, Okla., having been at Tinker. There he would receive specialized training in the C-141 lasting something over 16 weeks. He would receive ground simulator-classroom training on systems, fly the airplane with a top flight instructor pilot, back to the unit, and immediately go on missions with the Airlift Command, accumulate hours in the aircraft in the order of 1,000, and at that point he would be qualified for aircraft commander, with his own crew.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have different pilots for different missions?

General BOYLAN. That is correct, sir, and they have specialized training for that mission. In no case does the Air Force violate that rule. It works in reverse, Mr. Andrews, because the pilot levies for Southeast Asia take a number of pilots who have spent years flying four-engine jet transports. They have come out of that Command, through a combat crew training school into an F-105 or some other aircraft, and then to Southeast Asia.

#### WASHOUT RATE FOR STUDENT PILOTS

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask one final question: What rate of retention do you have with your pilot students? Here you go off with 3,500 at the beginning of the training period which takes him over a year. How many of them will graduate and get their wings?

General FAVER. We have a 26-percent washout rate.

Mr. ANDREWS. Seventy-four percent will get their wings?

General FAVER. Seventy-four percent of those who enter will get their wings; yes, sir. Based upon the expected attrition, we will enter a number sufficient to produce 3,450 pilots during fiscal year 1970.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that record getting better or worse, or is it static?

General FAVER. It is pretty static. It varies a little bit between classes and it varies a little bit between the mix of people that you put into the class.

Mr. ANDREWS. You more or less handpick him, don't you? You want to be sure he has what you are looking for when you put him in that class.

General FAVER. We do our best, yes.

Now, for the last 8 years, to my knowledge, our washout rate has run around 25 to 26 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is what it is in the Navy, approximately?

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is about as good as you can hope for.

General FAVER. I think so.

Mr. ANDREWS. It takes a man to go through there and learn how to use all those gadgets and fly those sophisticated planes.

Mr. Lipscomb?

#### PHASEDOWN OF B-52 AIRCRAFT

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, in each of recent years the committee has expressed its interest and concern over the actual and possibly premature phasedown of B-52's.

A year ago in presenting the fiscal 1969 budget, the planned fiscal year 1969 manpower reductions associated with the B-52 phasedown as then planned came to a grand total reduction of 5,006 personnel. Is it still estimated that a reduction of 5,006 personnel will take place in fiscal year 1969?

General BOYLAN. Mr. Lipscomb, may we possibly answer that question in two parts? Let me address the B-52 unit part of that and perhaps General Faver can translate that into personnel changes.

The B-52 force that is being changed is composed of B-52C through B-52F series aircraft. At the end of fiscal 1969 the Air Force will have 13 of those units authorized in its inventory.

In addition, we will have certain nonoperating active aircraft in Southeast Asia, plus some aircraft that are nonoperating active, meaning we have no maintenance or crew authorization for them, though we keep them in flyable condition, maintained in the SAC force.

The fiscal year 1970 budget decisions with respect to the B-52's through B-52F's authorizes the Air Force to retain \_\_\_\_\_ B-52C through B-52F units and at the same time to operate \_\_\_\_\_ aircraft for Southeast Asia operations.

Now, the net change here is really some \_\_\_\_\_ airplanes that are being phased out of the Force.

I can give you the number specifically by series C, D, E, and F; but there is a reduction in the Force structure.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For fiscal year 1970?

General BOYLAN. During fiscal 1970; yes, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You are figuring \_\_\_\_\_ will be phased out some place?

General BOYLAN. That is correct.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What was our planned strength in the B-52's for fiscal year 1969 in numbers of planes?

General BOYLAN. At the end of fiscal year 1969 we would be operating in units a total of 30 squadrons, 450 of all types, including the C's through F's, G's, and H's. Now we would have in active storage or, to put it another way, nonoperating active, 111 aircraft.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That is at the end of fiscal year 1969, planned?

General BOYLAN. That is right. In addition, a few aircraft in extended storage, 21 in number, in Arizona, as well as \_\_\_\_\_ aircraft for command support.

Now the comparable figures for end fiscal year 1970 will be \_\_\_\_\_ squadrons, operating \_\_\_\_\_ aircraft; \_\_\_\_\_ nonoperating active; \_\_\_\_\_ total to go to extended storage.

That would be a change, then, in our storage position of \_\_\_\_\_ aircraft.

Of these \_\_\_\_\_ aircraft, moving to nonflyable storage would be \_\_\_\_\_ B-52E's and \_\_\_\_\_ B-52F's. In addition, there are \_\_\_\_\_ command support aircraft for end fiscal year 1970. We also estimate three aircraft losses due to attrition.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What was the original request for your B-52 posture to the Secretary of Defense—Air Force?

General BOYLAN. The Air Force request was to maintain its end fiscal year 1969 B-52 position for fiscal year 1970.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. That is to maintain the 450?

General BOYLAN. That is right; in addition to the assets that we have operating in Vietnam.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What was the total funds requested, and how much were they reduced?

General BOYLAN. May I submit that for the record?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Yes.

(The information follows:)

**COST OF RETAINING B-52's IN ACTIVE INVENTORY**

The following tabulation reflects total costs for B-52 posture included in the fiscal year 1970 budget estimate to OSD and the total amounts approved by OSD:

(In millions of dollars)

	Military personnel	O. & M.	A/C procurement	Total
Fiscal year 1970 request to OSD.....	242.2	606.2	221.2	1,069.6
OSD approved.....	223.0	538.8	221.2	983.0
Difference—Net reduction.....	-19.2	-67.4	0	-86.6

The net reduction considered the total B-52 force including (a) the reduction of \_\_\_\_\_ squadrons, (b) \_\_\_\_\_ and (c) the reduction from an 1,800 to 1,000 monthly sortie rate.

The fiscal year 1970 budget estimate for "Operations and maintenance, Air Force," is based on a basic program of 1,000 B-52 sorties, excluding the effect of the dollar reduction associated with the estimated decrease in Southeast Asia activity rates. The "military personnel, Air Force," appropriation has funds for manpower to support 1,800 sorties. However, approximately \_\_\_\_\_ of the \_\_\_\_\_ squadrons to fly the sorties are not part of the approved force structure.

Subsequent to the fiscal year 1970 budget decisions, the Air Force recommended the restoration of the \_\_\_\_\_ squadrons to the B-52 force which would reconstitute \_\_\_\_\_ B-52 aircraft to the force structure. No additional funds will be required over the current fiscal year 1970 budget estimate to support these \_\_\_\_\_ squadrons. If this action is accomplished, we would place \_\_\_\_\_ additional aircraft in extended storage for a total of \_\_\_\_\_. We would also retain \_\_\_\_\_ aircraft in active storage with the squadrons.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Now we go back to the question about the proposed reduction in personnel of 5,006 which is to take place in fiscal year 1969. Is this estimate still valid? This is contained on page 440 of the fiscal year 1969 hearings, volume 5.

**General BERG.** Mr. Lipscomb, is your question: Did those people actually phase out? Or are you asking what the equivalent number is for 1970?

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** You told us last year you were going to phase out 5,006 of these people as contained on this chart. That is what the chart says.

**General BERG.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** What I am asking is, is it still estimated that the reduction of 5,006 personnel will take place in fiscal year 1969?

**General BERG.** Yes, sir.

**General BOYLAN.** I think those figures are substantially correct.

**Mr. LIPSCOMB.** Would you place in the record an update of this chart?

**General BOYLAN.** We would be happy to, Mr. Lipscomb.

(The information follows:)

**PERSONNEL REDUCTION**

The manpower reductions associated with the phasedown of the four B-52 squadrons in fiscal year 1969 were 5,006 personnel as we projected last year. These reductions were:

	<i>Fiscal year 1969</i>
<b>Aircrew and direct-support personnel:</b>	
Officers.....	- 728
Airmen.....	- 3, 376
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>- 4, 104</b>
<b>Base operating support personnel:</b>	
Officers.....	- 82
Airmen.....	- 574
Civilians.....	- 246
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>- 902</b>
<b>Grand total.....</b>	<b>- 5, 006</b>

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What is happening to these highly trained, qualified B-52 crews?

General BOYLAN. Mr. Lipscomb, we have a number of simultaneous force changes that are current. B-52 crew authorizations are determined by the number of B-52 squadrons we are authorized to maintain in active status. Those personnel who, because of a decrease in force structure, become excess, move into other crew requirements as they exist in other force elements of the Air Force.

For example, to my personal knowledge, a number of SAC personnel have moved into the Airlift Command as well as into the Tactical Forces.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Over the past years, this committee has tried to slow down or stop the phasedown of the B-52s.

General BOYLAN. The Air Force is appreciative of those efforts.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. We have always been told that we are losing a very valuable asset in these crews being dispersed. The reason I was asking the question is that the largest reduction we have had in the last 3 years is 5,006, and I was just wondering how they were dispersed. From your testimony, I gather that they are just scatter-shot all over the globe in different units.

General BOYLAN. Looking only at the end fiscal year, which is a line on a chart, you tend to get an incomplete picture; but in the phasedown in 1970 that I have touched on, personnel from B-52 units are required for the FB-111 activations that are occurring in fiscal year 1970.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You do not need many crews for that.

General BOYLAN. You are probably very correct, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It may be less.

General BERG. Mr. Lipscomb, could I make the comment—this is a little bit out of my area, but I have worked in it before—when an action like this is programed, all the time there are certain crews leaving SAC for a number of normal reasons. They get promoted. They go to school, and so forth. Certainly those crews simply would not be replaced and the force would go down by a certain amount of attrition, which is another impact.

General FAVER. We have had a great number of them who are withdrawn from SAC to use in our Southeast Asia cycle over the years, at the same time we feed into SAC a part of our new graduations crop, the new pilots who come out each year. As the B-52 people complete their tour in Southeast Asia, the center will exercise care to reenter those who have made the Southeast Asia cycle into our SAC complex.

I think General Boylan answered it well. We are very careful to try

to preserve this resource, but pilots have to move in and out to maintain a viable force.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is it still the case that you are not authorized any additional crews for the planes that you have in active storage?

General BOYLAN. That is right.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. In what time period could the Air Force take the B-52's from storage and assemble the required numbers of personnel to fly and sustain them in combat operation?

General BOYLAN. I will give you a qualified answer. It will depend on what, if any, actions we take to prepare ourselves for such a circumstance. If the aircraft were put in dead storage, then a considerable time would be required to refurbish the aircraft and fully qualify all of its systems.

At the same time, many of these people who have previously had B-52 experience would have to be identified and retrained in the B-52.

I would say on the average that the better part of 1 year would be required to reconstitute aircraft and previously trained personnel into an active and combat-effective B-52 unit.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. When you use the term "active storage," it is my understanding that some of these ships are flown occasionally.

General BOYLAN. I meant extended storage and refurbishing. If they are in active storage, then the problem will center on finding the aircrew and maintaining personnel to form the unit, and that would be, I would say, markedly less, provided we could identify them. On the order of 6 months.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You may provide an estimate on that for the record.

General BOYLAN. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### ACTIVATION OF B-52 FROM STORAGE AND ASSEMBLING CREWS

It should be noted that the personnel problems associated with the reconstitution of additional B-52 squadrons are the same regardless of the storage status of the aircraft; that is, regardless of "active" or "dead storage" status of the aircraft.

The reduction of SAC bomber squadrons over the past few years has released qualified bomber crews and maintenance personnel for duties in other aircraft systems. Those who remain in the Air Force can be rapidly identified through our personnel data system.

The problem stems from the fact that these personnel are vitally required in their present duties and their return to a bomber force of increased size, on short notice, would impact adversely on such priority missions as military airlift, tactical fighters, trainers, and rescue operations.

The magnitude and nature of the problem will vary with the speed and scope of reconstitution. As an example, each B-52 squadron of 15 aircraft requires 52 pilots, 78 navigators and electronic warfare officers, 25 enlisted gunners, and approximately 750 support personnel, dependent upon the location of the squadrons; that is, joint basing or separate basing. If there is time to procure and train replacements for these numbers of personnel, the reconstitution can be done without serious disruptions to other missions. The time required varies from 18 months to produce an operationally ready pilot to 9 months to produce a trained maintenance airman.

Lacking that time, however, we have only the two options of:

(a) Demanding longer work hours from those personnel in the units from which withdrawals are made.

(b) Eliminating other priority missions and redistributing our personnel resource so as to free the bomber experienced personnel for bomber duty in the reconstituted units.

The requalification of previous bomber crews and maintenance personnel would require approximately 6 months for a squadron to become operationally ready.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I do not say this is the case, but what I am thinking is if for any reason we do not have an adequate force of FB-111 and, in case of emergency, if we would have to reactivate a larger B-52 force to fill the gap, I would think some planning or programing is now required to fill this.

General BOYLAN. The circumstances you describe is crystal clear to me, but, as General Berg previously described the manpower authorization process, the circumstances are such that there is very little manpower or air crew or maintenance flexibility within the Air Force.

These people who are transferred from phased-out B-52 units are committed to another mission. To reverse it, then, will uncover some other necessary mission or some other necessary function like a fighter unit or an airlift unit or perhaps an FB-111 unit. We are definitely restricted in our manpower, pilot, and maintenance authorization.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This is a very critical strategic area, and I should think some good advance planning would be going on in this area. There must be some thought given to maintaining or being able to put your fingers on enough strategic crews to get the job going in the shortest time possible.

General BOYLAN. That is being done, but in the absence of authority and budget support, they are performing other missions.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. If the situation is such that we should be planning, maybe the case could be made better for budgetary support. I am not saying anything you do not know, but in view of the fact that there are certain rumors around about a change in our bomber situation, we will have to give it some serious thought.

General BOYLAN. The Air Force has consistently urged retention of a higher number of B-52's and the resources to support them. We did this again this year.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. This committee has consistently put money in the budget to maintain that.

General BOYLAN. I appreciate that.

Mr. ANDREWS. And this committee begged, back in 1962, October and before, when your last B-52 went off the line, not to close that line, but our voice was like that one in the wilderness. This committee has also begged for many years that they take the money that the committee gave them and spend it for the new AMSA program, and it has dragged and dragged and dragged.

I agree with Mr. Lipscomb; you ought to begin to prepare to have enough pilots to take whatever new aircraft you get in the bomber field. In October of 1972, your newest B-52 will be 10 years old. By all the standards we have ever heard before this committee, that is an obsolescent and unsafe plane. If you had not beefed up what you have now, you would not have as many as you have.

General BOYLAN. That is quite true.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am not lecturing you. I am trying to help you.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. It is hard to see light at the end of the tunnel.

#### FLIGHT SURGEONS

One further question. On page 9 of General Faver's statement, "Flight surgeons," fiscal year 1968, 509; fiscal year 1969, 574; and fiscal year 1970, 1,000. What makes this dramatic increase?

General FAVER. Sir, that was a change in the standard for awarding the designation of "Flight surgeon." Where it had been previously 2 years of active duty and 200 hours of flying time, they have now changed it to where it is 1 year and 100 hours, which means that it is the same number of people, but they are awarded faster.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Does this have any effect on the quality of the flight surgeons?

General FAVER. No, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Mr. Chairman, it is now past 4 o'clock, and I have finished for now. Thank you very much.

Mr. ANDREWS. We will adjourn until 10 o'clock Monday morning.

MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1969

Mr. ANDREWS. The committee will come to order.

We will continue the Air Force personnel budget request.

#### PILOT PRODUCTION

Your original budget request for 1969 contemplated production of 3,247 pilots. You now indicate a production of only 3,143. This is about 100 less than planned. If you cannot meet your planned production during 1969, how will you be able to meet it in 1970?

General FAVER. Mr. Chairman, that figure we originally presented regarding pilot production was prior to the time that we changed our graduation schedule from every 6 weeks to a graduation every 2 weeks. As a consequence of that adjustment, one group fell over into the next fiscal year. We will be able to meet our programmed schedule.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us a little about changing that graduation schedule. Why did you do it?

General FAVER. As I discussed, we had made an analysis of our utilization of the pilot graduates and found that there were, at times, delays between the time they graduated and the time that they were able to enter into the subsequent crew training courses. By changing from eight graduation classes per year to 24 per year that gave us about 150 pilot graduates available to enter into other courses every 2 weeks. In that way we were able to save considerable number of man-years by getting them into training closer to their graduation times.

Mr. ANDREWS. By having more classes did you cut down on the number in each class?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. Instead of having approximately 450 graduating every 6 weeks we now have about 150 graduating every 2 weeks.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have smaller classes and therefore the students can get better instruction, I would think.

General FAVER. No, sir. It meant that the individual base is having its graduation at the same time but all the bases don't graduate on the same day.

#### PILOT NAVIGATOR RATIO F-4/F-11

Mr. ANDREWS. General Berg, you mentioned that the pilot-to-navigator ratio study for the F-4/F-111 is still being conducted. We were advised last year that it would be completed around last September. What is delaying the completion of this study, and when will it be completed?

General BERG. Mr. Andrews, it actually has been completed. I think the Chief is to be briefed on the results of the findings either tomorrow or the next day. When I said it had not been completed, what I meant was that he had not received the results of the study and approved it. But it is all ready to be presented to him.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the ratio today?

General BERG. In the 1969 time period, fiscal 1969, the ratio is 1.7 to 0.3, that is, 1.7 pilots to 0.3 navigators in the total force.

In 1970 it changes slightly to 1.35 to 0.65. The objective, if we decide to go that way, would be to go in fiscal year 1971 to 1 to 1, that is one pilot and one navigator, which assumes that we will have enough navigators available to do that.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the length of training of a navigator as compared to a pilot?

General FAVER. The pilot course is longer, sir. It would depend on which of the three training courses he is going through; whether he is going to come out as a basic navigator or become a navigator-bombardier or a navigator-bombardier-electronics officer. The navigator courses are shorter than the pilot course.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think those courses today with all of your sophisticated electronic gear in the planes are much more complicated than they were back during World War II.

General FAVER. Yes, sir; they are more complicated. But we have, I am convinced, much better courses than we had then. We have more sophisticated simulators. I think our training techniques are improved.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the length of a training course for a navigator-bombardier? Put a little something about it in the record.

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### TRAINING COURSE FOR NAVIGATOR-BOMBARDIER

The length of the training course to qualify a navigator-bombardier is approximately 28 weeks. Instruction includes the fundamentals of radar navigation and bombardment in trainers and aircraft equipped with typical bombing-navigational systems.

To be eligible for entrance into the course, an officer must be a graduate of the undergraduate navigator training program (approximately 38 weeks) and possess the rating of navigator. No officer who will have reached age 35 before entry into the navigator-bombardier course may attend without a waiver from Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.

#### COST OF EXPANDING PILOT PRODUCTION

Mr. ANDREWS. In the 1969 budget the Air Force had \$65 million for increased pilot production above the 3,247 contemplated. Since your production has actually decreased, what happened to the additional funds provided?

General PITTS. Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answer to that question but I would be happy to supply it for the record, if we can do a little research on it.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would assume you did not spend it. What happened to it?

General PITTS. Mr. Henshaw, can you answer that question?

Mr. HENSHAW. You asked a question, Mr. Andrews, that I cannot answer. I was not aware that there was that much of an increase. Now, the military personnel cost here did not really change because

we really kept the same number of people in our schools and we kept the same number of people on the staff.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the question. You kept the same number but you had more money.

Mr. HENSHAW. This is one that I cannot really address in that context because my knowledge of the situation is that we operated generally the same number of schools and trained the same number of people. I am not aware of that amount of difference.

Mr. ANDREWS. But you had more money, \$65 million—which ain't hay.

Mr. HENSHAW. No, sir. That would have to include O. & M. costs as well as military personnel costs and probably aircraft procurement and military construction also.

Now, one of the things affecting this production decrease is the fact that we have simply counted production in a different fiscal year. As I understand from General Faver, we have taken a graduating class that would have graduated, let's say, on the 20th of June 1969 and moved them over to maybe the 5th or 6th of July 1969. That has no significant impact on costs. However, it does show up when you look at the production originally planned for fiscal year 1969. Actually we have just taken credit for the production in a different year—fiscal year 1970.

Now, we will also add one additional training base at Columbus, Miss. That is included in the increase and that particular adjustment has happened.

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me read to you from page 1020 of last year's record. Mr. Lipscomb asked this question:

Mr. LIPSCOMB. For clarification, the justification shows the production of 3,247 pilots for fiscal year 1969. The \$65 million that you spoke of, General Crow, is for the additional 625 if the study is approved?

General CROW. Over and above that; yes, sir.

General PITTS. This is to develop the capacity; yes, sir.

General CLAY. That money will provide the increased capacity between the ninth plant and a new base, and will give us, by fiscal year 1971, 625 more in annual production capacity for the Air Force.

General CROW. It will really be in the 1970 program and the 1971 program before we could achieve full production, Mr. Lipscomb. The leadtime for undergraduate pilot production is considerable.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What does the \$65 million cover?

General PITTS. \$48.5 million for aircraft procurement for 54 T-38 and 15 T-37 aircraft.

Were they purchased?

General PITTS. This is in the aircraft procurement account, sir. I believe that type aircraft is under procurement now and that \$65 million—I am remembering now—was connected primarily with the opening up of the 10th undergraduate pilot training base at Columbus, Miss.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. General, you have a reprogramming action going through on some of those. Some of them are for the training of Vietnamese pilots and some of them for your own.

General PITTS. Yes, sir. Fourteen T-41's, I believe.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. But you are talking about the same school?

General PITTS. No, sir, not entirely. Seven of these T-41's are for use in training Vietnamese Air Force pilots. The T-37's and T-38's

were for Columbus, Miss. Seven of the T-41's are associated with, as you say, training of some of our own pilots at Columbus AFB, Miss. and seven are for use in the training of Vietnamese pilots, to be done at a different base.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What base is that?

Mr. HENSHAW. Keesler AFB.

General BOYLAN. Keesler AFB, yes.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I do not have the reprogramming action here, but as I remember it something was said about changing the training program at that base, too.

General PITTS. Yes, sir.

General BOYLAN. It is principally for free world forces.

General PITTS. Yes.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Isn't it connected with your pilot production, though?

General PITTS. At Keesler, principally with the free world forces—the T-41 training is for free world forces pilots.

Mr. ANDREWS. The \$9.3 million for military construction to provide the facilities to increase the capacity; has that been spent? Is it being spent this year?

General PITTS. Is this for 1970 you are talking about?

Mr. ANDREWS. We are talking about 1969.

General PITTS. That money should be obligated in 1969. General Faver, is Columbus AFB open now?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. We have instructors who are going into Columbus and, as I understand, the first students will be reporting in there in July. Now, part of this package, I am sure, was for a runway, second long runway at Webb and that has been accomplished.

Mr. ANDREWS. The next figure is \$7.2 million for fixed operating costs, of which \$3.2 million is for O. & M.

General PITTS. Those are the O. & M. costs associated with increasing the pilot production at both the 10th base, Columbus, as well as our other nine undergraduate pilot training bases.

Mr. RHODES. Wasn't there a runway at Williams in the 1968 program?

General PITTS. There was an additional runway provided for at Williams out of the fiscal year 1968 construction program. The \$65 million that the chairman is speaking about was mainly concerned with opening up that 10th UPT base at Columbus, Miss.

Mr. ANDREWS. General Pitts, I think it would be helpful if you would refer to the colloquy on page 1020 of last year's hearings and bring us up to date on what happened to the \$65 million.

(The information follows:)

#### PILOT PRODUCTION

Authorized USAF pilot production for fiscal year 1969 is 3,247. Because of adjustments necessary to arrange undergraduate pilot training (UPT) entry/graduation cycles to coincide with follow-on training, USAF UPT production for fiscal year 1969 will be approximately 3,143. The projected total UPT production for fiscal year 1970 is 3,941 (3,450 USAF) and 4,365 (3,875 USAF) for fiscal year 1971. The \$65 million submitted in the fiscal year 1969 budget was primarily for long leadtime items required to increase the total UPT capacity to 4,400 per

year (including ANG, MAP and USMC production) by fiscal year 1971. It covered the following requirements:

	Millions
15 T-37 aircraft.....	\$4.6
54 T-38 aircraft.....	43.9
Military construction program (MCP).....	9.3
Subtotal.....	57.8
Fixed operating costs (\$3.2 O. & M. plus \$4 military personnel) for anticipated increase of approximately 200 production in fiscal year 1970.....	7.2
Total.....	65.0

Subsequent to the submission of the fiscal year 1969 budget, the 15 T-37 aircraft buy (\$4.6 million) was canceled and the funds were reprogrammed. The proposed T-38 buy was reduced from 54 to 16 aircraft costing \$16.9 million. OSD determined this to be the minimum procurement quantity necessary to provide 4,400 per year total in fiscal year 1971. The savings resulted from the reduction of T-38 procurement from 54 to 16 aircraft were applied to offset requirements as indicated in reprogramming action dated January 13, 1969, now before Congress. However, additional aircraft will be required to sustain that production beyond fiscal year 1971. The fiscal year 1970 aircraft procurement program proposed purchase of 38 T-38 at a cost of \$36.6 million.

The MCP submission (\$9.3 million) was primarily for the conversion of Columbus Air Force Base to UPT (\$5.8 million) and construction at Ellsworth Air Force Base (\$1.2 million) necessary to accommodate the SAC Wing that had to be moved from Columbus Air Force Base. Funds (\$2.3 million) for a third runway to increase the capacity of Webb Air Force Base were also included. Total capacity then would be increased by 625 plus per year. All of this construction is proceeding as planned, except for the Webb runway which is being held in abeyance. The third runway at Williams was funded from fiscal year 1968 construction program. It is expected that this runway will be in operation in the fall of 1969.

The fiscal year 1969 student entries have been increased to assure the 200 additional production in fiscal year 1970. Our total production in fiscal year 1970 will be 3,941 and includes the 200 additional plus the carry over adjustment from fiscal year 1969. This will utilize the \$7.2 million fixed operating costs.

The programmed production goal for fiscal year 1971 is 4,365, just short of the 4,400 total capacity of the 10 base plant.

#### AVERAGE STRENGTH BY GRADE

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, the funds being required for 1970 are to support an average strength of 861, 254. The average strength is broken out by grade on pages 12 and 36 of the justification book. How did the Air Force arrive at the estimated average strength, per grade, for fiscal year 1970?

General FAVER. Mr. Chairman, the computation of our average strengths for fiscal year 1970 was followed in the same manner that we did for fiscal year 1969, which was to take the beginning position, the end position, and then work through forecast losses and accessions to come up with average per month to give the average strength for the year.

#### SLIPPAGE IN C-5A PROGRAM

Mr. ANDREWS. General Berg, on page 9 of your statement you say: "The airlift forces reflect a net increase of 2,600 spaces for fiscal year 1970. The continued phasedown of C-124 units is more than offset by the phase-in of the C-5 units." Now that the delivery schedule of C-5 aircraft has been slipped, what reductions can be made in this budget request?

General Boylan. May I address part of that?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

General BOYLAN. Currently we are looking at the facts of life as pertain to C-5 production. There will be something on the order of 6 months' delay in the initial operational capability.

Mr. ANDREWS. When do you expect delivery now? December of 1969?

General BOYLAN. We were forecasting a unit to be operational in December of 1969, I am certain. Now it has moved ahead of us for about 6 months.

Mr. ANDREWS. So you won't get delivery then until calendar 1970?

General BOYLAN. In calendar 1970 for the first operational unit. Now, to offset that, certain squadrons which will be leaving the force, C-133's and C-124's, will be retained so as to maintain the same airlift position and absorb the C-5 slip.

Mr. ANDREWS. You won't phase out your C-124's and C-133's until you get the C-5 in hand?

General BOYLAN. That is correct, sir. Now, the number of units that are affected are not sizable. I think there is the unit at McChord in addition to the three C-133 units. The part of the question that bears on numbers of people perhaps can be answered in this fashion: The C-5 squadron with this big jet requires more personnel than a C-124 squadron and because of the difference in squadron manning and the relationship of the squadron slip to the C-5 slip, there will be no net change in our personnel requirements in this time frame.

#### TRAINING OF AIR CREWS FOR C-5A

We have C-5 people entering training right away to man those unit even though the slip has occurred, but we have to absorb it.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will you have to give your pilots much additional training for the C-5?

General BOYLAN. Mr. Andrews, the concept that the Military Airlift Command will follow on the C-5 training is a mirror of what they did on the C-141's. In that case, they took initially the high experienced people out of their C-135 jets, moved them into the C-141's. The same will be true for the C-5. In this case, the first C-5 units will be manned by experienced C-141 pilots, air crew and maintenance people.

They will receive transition from the C-141 equipment to the C-5 at Altus, Okla., when the training aircraft are available to start that training.

Mr. ANDREWS. They will have to have experience in the C-5 before they can take over?

General BOYLAN. And that will be gained at Altus, Okla., on the training aircraft, C-5's.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many training C-5's do you expect to have?

General BOYLAN. I believe the number is eight that will be at Altus.

#### STATUS OF C-5A PRODUCTION

Mr. ANDREWS. How many have been rolled out, flown, as of this date?

General BOYLAN. I believe Lockheed has rolled out the third or fourth aircraft.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have they flown them all?

General BOYLAN. As of this date, Lockheed has rolled out 5 aircraft and 4 of these have been flown.

Mr. ANDREWS. The flights, if I remember, were very successful.

General BOYLAN. Yes, sir. Just as an aside, the airplane is going to be a real fine machine. It is unfortunate that it has been surrounded with some difficulties of other natures, such as costs.

#### COST OF C-5A

Mr. ANDREWS. I was going to say the greatest difficulty is the cost.

General BOYLAN. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Won't that program double from the original estimate?

General BOYLAN. I don't think that is the total current estimate of the program, a 100-percent increase.

Mr. ANDREWS. It would be up 35 or 40 percent from the original?

General BOYLAN. Yes, somewhere on that order.

Mr. ANDREWS. Of course, that doesn't come under your shop.

General BOYLAN. I could not provide you the exact figures but I have a good feel for them.

Mr. ANDREWS. I mean you are not the man to ask the reason for the costs, and so on.

#### C-5A DEPLOYMENT AND USE

Of course, it is a cargo ship but where will you use these when you get them?

General BOYLAN. The C-5's will be based both on the east and west coasts. It will participate in the full range of cargo missions that the Airlift Command supports now. In addition, it will bring to the Airlift Command some capabilities previously not realized. The C-5 will have, as compared to the C-141, a short field capability. Therefore, the number of airfields that are open to it will be considerably increased.

It will have, of course, the unique characteristic of its very size. Practically all Army equipment can be moved with the C-5 which is now in the hands of an infantry or mechanized division. I think there are two exceptions; their flying crane helicopter and, I believe, a piece of bridging equipment which cannot be accepted. But it will give the Airlift Command the capability to move practically anything. It will routinely operate worldwide.

Mr. ANDREWS. And you are on top of the manpower situation as far as transition from the cargo planes today going into the C-5?

General BOYLAN. Yes, sir.

#### REASSIGNMENT OF OLDER CARGO AIRCRAFT

Mr. ANDREWS. As you acquire the C-5 you will phase out all your other old cargo planes?

General BOYLAN. The propeller planes, Mr. Andrews. The C-133 is a turboprop. It has a jet powerplant. The other active airlift aircraft are C-124's. They are moving completely out of the Air Force, the Active Air Force, into the Reserve Forces. During the overall conversion period it is planned to equip Reserve C-119 and C-124 units with C-130's. When that happens they will all be in the tactical end of the business as opposed to the strategic airlift end of the business.

As a substitute for the Reserve Forces as we discussed here on Thursday, the Airlift Command is forming associate units, Reserves who will fly C-141's and C-5's.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you plan to convert any C-124's to gunships?

General BOYLAN. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you planning to convert any of the cargo ships to gunships?

General BOYLAN. We have a C-130 currently in Vietnam modified as a gunship. The program, to my knowledge, may include one other aircraft but that would be the extent of C-130's. Now, the C-119, we have converted two squadrons. One is a Reserve unit currently in Vietnam. The other C-119K is scheduled for deployment about \_\_\_\_\_.

#### AIR FORCE PILOT AND NAVIGATOR REQUIREMENTS

Mr. ANDREWS. General Berg, on page 11 of your statement you set forth a table depicting the Air Force pilot and navigator requirements as stated by the Department of Defense for fiscal years 1969 and 1970. If these are the requirements as stated by the Department of Defense, what are the requirements as stated by the Air Force, or do they differ in any way?

General BERG. Mr. Chairman, in the case of navigators, the statement of requirements by the Air Force is essentially the same. In the case of pilots there is a difference. The difference runs on the order of 850 for 1970. We state that we have a requirement for 850 more. The difference is in the area where we say that we need a pilot in what we call a supervisory requirement and the people who look at the statement of requirements in OSD do not agree with our statement that that number should be in there.

Mr. ANDREWS. Did they always prevail?

General BERG. Well, the reason for the examination is that our statement of requirements versus theirs finally comes out in what our pilot production is. As you know, we have some 200 increase in pilot production this year and then we have another increase of 400-plus in 1971.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the 650 we were discussing a few minutes ago?

General BERG. Yes, sir. So our production keeps going up all the time.

#### PILOT PROCUREMENT

Mr. ANDREWS. You don't have any problem getting pilots, do you; that is, candidates for pilots?

General FAVER. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. From where do you get your men, mainly? Through ROTC?

General FAVER. Yes, sir, that is correct. In 1968 we had most of our pilot candidates who were commissioned through ROTC.

The next was Officer Training School, and then of course from the Air Academy. Now, for this last fiscal year we have had a reversal of OTS and ROTC. We have had more of them coming through the Officer Training School than we have had through ROTC.

Mr. ANDREWS. What percentage of the graduates from the Air Force Academy become pilots?

General FAVER. For fiscal 1969 our forecast is 65 percent.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that good? Is that about what you expected?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. That is about what we have been getting for about the last 5 or 6 years. Of course, we have to consider that not all of the graduates are qualified physically to become pilots. Some of them become navigators. I think that the percentage of the graduation group is good.

Mr. ANDREWS. What percentage of the graduates become either pilots or navigators or bombardiers? That is, how many of them are connected with the flying of a plane?

Supply that for the record, and also say something about it.

(The information follows:)

#### AIR FORCE ACADEMY GRADUATES—PERCENT IN CREW TRAINING

The percentage of Air Force Academy graduates who enter flying training is shown on the table below. The graduates of one fiscal year enter flying training during the following fiscal year.

	Academy graduates		Entering flying training	Percentage
<b>Fiscal year:</b>		<b>Fiscal year:</b>		
1966.....	463	1967.....	340	73
1967.....	517	1968.....	339	66
1968.....	607	1969.....	1 443	73
1969.....	1 672	1970.....	1 471	79

<sup>1</sup> Estimated

Normally all the Academy graduates that meet the physical qualifications go on to flying training. Those who cannot meet these qualifications are placed in positions where best use can be made of their education and training. We believe that the percentage going into flying training is good since we need officers with the Academy background in the nonflying areas.

Mr. RHODES. What percentage of your Air Force ROTC graduates go on to take some kind of air crew training?

General FAVER. About half are ROTC.

Mr. RHODES. Are more than half usually able to go into crew training? In other words, do the ones who are able usually do it or are there quite a few who just prefer to go into some other slot in the Air Force?

General FAVER. I would say that the majority of the ROTC lads who are qualified physically are interested in pilot training.

Mr. RHODES. Now, would it be possible to get the converse of that, the breakdown of the origin of the students who go into pilot training? In other words, to show how many of them are from ROTC, how many come from Colorado Springs, how many come from some other source?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. I can give you the breakout of our pilot production by source.

Mr. RHODES. If you would, for the record, I would appreciate it.

General FAVER. We have that information here now.

For fiscal year 1968 from ROTC, 45.8 percent; Air Force Academy, Military Academy, Naval Academy, 8.2 percent; Officer Training School, 29.1 percent; from within the Air Force, nonrated source, 7.2 percent.

Navigators who wish to come back and retrain as pilots, 9.7 percent.  
(Additional information follows:)

#### FLYING TRAINING AND PILOT PRODUCTION BY SOURCE.

The percentage of Air Force ROTC graduates who go on to take some flight training; that is, pilot or navigator training, is shown in the following table. Bombardier training is now an integral part of the navigator-bombardier course.

Fiscal year:	ROTC graduates brought to active duty	Fiscal year:	ROTC graduates entering flying training	Percentage
1966.....	5,093	1967.....	2,084	41
1967.....	5,493	1968.....	1,713	31
1968.....	5,087	1969.....	1,712	34
1969.....	4,100	1970.....	1,732	42

As shown in the table, generally ROTC graduates brought to active duty in one fiscal year enter flying training the following fiscal year (graduate in June from ROTC -enter flying training in July or later). Fiscal year 1969 total graduates from ROTC are lower than prior years due to our efforts to stabilize annual AFROTC production. In fiscal year 1970 we expect to level off at 4,500 per year and hold near that level thereafter.

Pilot production by source is shown in the following table:

Student source	Fiscal year 1969 production	Fiscal year 1970 production
ROTC.....	1,326	1,190
Air Force Academy.....	256	341
Officer training school.....	1,268	1,637
Rated navigators.....	91	71
Nonrated officers.....	202	221
Total.....	3,143	3,450

#### OFFICER RETENTION RATES

Mr. ANDREWS. General Faver, on page 3 of your statement you discuss the serious decline in officer retention rates that you have been experiencing over the past few years. It would therefore seem that the increases in pay received by the services, not only this past year but during the past several years, as well as the stepped-up promotion rate, has not had any appreciable effect on your retention rates. Has the Air Force explored to any degree the possibility that retention may be affected by things other than monetary considerations?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. The bulk of our effort during recent month has been in what we would call behavioral aspects, what would influence the behavioral aspects of the human being.

About 12 months ago we set up a section at the personnel center at Randolph to work the area, letting our officer force know that we were interested in them and to let them know that the door was open to personalize a career for them, to show our interest in their behalf.

Within the last 12 months our figures show that some 3,500 officers have called at this unit in the personnel center, to talk about their careers.

We have sent out some 13,000 letters to various officers making suggestions in behalf of their future. We have had letters initiated by some 10,000 officers. All of this adds up to a growing feeling among our officer force, we think, that will be good for us in that they will feel that there is a concern about them as individuals. I think it is going to have a good impact on our retention rate.

#### TOUR OF DUTY IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you started sending people back to Vietnam on second tours of duty?

General FAVER. No pilots have gone back. Some officers in the support areas such as civil engineers and, transportation, will be going back this fiscal year on a nonvoluntary basis for a second tour.

Mr. ANDREWS. You don't think that Vietnam, then, has had any effect on the retention rate of officers and enlisted men?

General FAVER. Well, sir, I suspect it might have, but the fact that we have held to our policy that every officer will have an opportunity to serve in his turn and that we have not sent back anyone on a nonvoluntary basis until others in the same skill have served, I think has been very satisfying to the officer force. But to say how Vietnam might relate to our retention, I don't think I could develop that point.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you had many volunteers to go back for a second tour of duty?

General FAVER. Yes, sir; we have, among both our pilot force and our nonrated force.

#### EARLY RELEASE

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 4 of your statement you go on to state that you have had to increase losses to remain within the approved strength. If you are forcing men to leave the service early, aren't you in effect reducing your retention rate potential?

General FAVER. For those who had requested a date of separation, we gave them an opportunity to ask for early release. Now, if they do shift from fiscal 1970 to fiscal 1969 that increases our loss rate, of course, but it should make it look better in fiscal 1970.

All of these young men that we released under this program had asked to leave. I don't believe that that would actually change the percentage.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is your policy now about early release of people in the first tour of duty?

General FAVER. For fiscal 1970 we do not plan any early release for officers. We did permit some who had a date of separation in fiscal 1970 to come out in 1969.

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, take a man who wants to get out of the Air Force and go to school. He lacks 2 or 3 months of service. If he stays on until the end of his obligated term of service he misses the beginning of a new semester at college. Do you try to accommodate him and let him get out so he can go on to college?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. I would say under the policy that we would consider his case on an individual basis. He would apply for an early release and probably if it were less than 120 days to the beginning of his school term, we would approve it.

## OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOL

Mr. ANDREWS. General Faver, on page 6 of your statement you show a table setting forth the planned officer gains for fiscal year 1970. In this table you show an increase in fiscal year 1970 of approximately 1,200 officers to be gained through the OTS program. Are there sufficient applications for the OTS program so that you can realistically expect to meet this 1,200-man increase?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. We were able to have about four applicants for every man that we select.

Mr. ANDREWS. In OTS?

General FAVER. In OTS.

Mr. ANDREWS. That speaks well for the OTS program.

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many students do you have in that program?

General FAVER. For fiscal year 1969 we are planning on 4,700. I will have to provide for the record how many there are in each class. (The information follows:)

SIZE OF OTS CLASSES—FISCAL YEAR 1969 CLASSES

Class No.	Number of students	
	Entering	Graduated
6901.....	300	277
6902.....	679	614
6903.....	596	543
6904.....	733	667
6905.....	730	653
6906.....	723	1 652
6907.....	1 746	1 666
6908.....	1 691	1 644
Total.....	5,198	4,716

<sup>1</sup> Class 6906 will graduate in May making the 652 graduates a projected figure. Figures for class 6907 and 6908 are projected.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many training spots do you have for your OTS program?

General FAVER. The capacity in Officer Training School is 6,100 per year.

Mr. ANDREWS. How many centers do you have?

General FAVER. Only one, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where is it located?

General FAVER. Lackland.

Mr. ANDREWS. What are the qualifications for entrance into the program?

General FAVER. For an individual who is applying to come in as a pilot the requirement is at least a bachelor's degree in any discipline. For a man who wants to come through OTS and work in a nonrated capacity, he will have to be in specified disciplines against projected needs.

Mr. ANDREWS. Upon graduation does a man receive a second lieutenant's bars?

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. And it is a good source of officer procurement for you?

General FAVER. Yes, it is. It is the one that we have that remains flexible. Our source from the Air Academy and from ROTC remain reasonably fixed. But from OTS we are able to vary it as our requirements vary.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the length of training? Put a little into the record about the course, and so forth.

(The information follows:)

#### OTS TRAINING

The purpose of the Air Force Officer Training School (OTS) is to train and commission selected college graduates to supplement officer procurement from the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) and the Air Force Academy (AFA). The 12 week OTS provides a short leadtime commissioning program capable of meeting the fluctuating annual requirement for newly commissioned officers.

The OTS curriculum consists of 480 hours of instruction, including 98 hours of nonacademic processing, designed to prepare the student to work effectively upon his initial entry into the Air Force. A somewhat shorter curriculum is provided for female students (future WAF's) who are not required to participate in field training activities and have fewer hours devoted to physical training and drill and ceremonies.

A new class enters every 6 weeks with the annual programmed production divided among eight entering classes. Due to differences in annual production requirements, class size will vary from year to year.

#### EFFECT OF PROMOTION ON RETENTION RATES OF OFFICERS

Mr. ANDREWS. General Faver, on page 7 of your statement you show a sizable increase in the number of majors and lieutenant colonels to be promoted during 1970. Do you anticipate that this will have any effect on your retention rates or are individuals at this grade level more or less career officers anyway?

General FAVER. I think the increased promotion for major will have a good impact because, as I have shown in the table presented in my speech, we do have some losses, quite a number of losses up to the 15th year. Now, after that 99 percent of our people will stay on until retirement. So I think that one particularly will have an impact on our retention. Now, lieutenant colonels, they are pretty well committed.

#### FLIGHT SURGEONS

Mr. ANDREWS. General Faver, on page 9 of your statement, in the table showing the rated officer inventories, you show an increase for 1970 in flight surgeons. How were plans developed for adding 426 flight surgeons to the rolls in 1970? Will you be drafting them?

General FAVER. Mr. Chairman, the reason that we reflect the increase in flight surgeons for the next fiscal year is not a change in people but it is a change in criteria for the award of the flight surgeon rating.

Previously, the requirement had been for them to fly 200 hours and serve 2 years before the doctor becomes a flight surgeon. But the change gives the award after 1 year and 100 hours. So it is the same people but they will actually be getting the award a year sooner.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about your doctor problem? Are you getting plenty of doctors?

General FAVER. Yes, sir; we are.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have to resort to the draft?

General FAVER. No, sir. There is only one area that we had to request an allocation from the draft, and that is for 10 optometrists.

Mr. ANDREWS. Optometrists?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. How do you get your optometrists? Do you draft them?

General FAVER. We take them through the same program that we get our veterinarians and our doctors. However, for this next fiscal year we are 10 short and those will come through the draft.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the tour of duty for a doctor who comes into the Air Force?

General FAVER. Two years.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you follow the Berry plan as the other services do?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the Air Force have a program under the Berry plan?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. And I was going to ask you if the Air Force has a program whereby they help finance the medical education of a young doctor, a medical student?

General FAVER. Yes, sir. There are two aspects of that. One is the Reserve and the other is the Regular. We are getting enough candidates to fill up both of them. We like the program because we will get up to 3 years of return for each year training that they take.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, if you finance 2 years of training you get as much as 6 years of service from them?

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is a good deal for you and for him.

General FAVER. We think so, and we are getting a good response.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have an intern program and a residency program for young doctors?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

#### MEDICAL PERSONNEL

Mr. ANDREWS. Are all your Air Force hospitals adequately staffed with doctors, nurses, technicians, et cetera?

General FAVER. They are adequately staffed; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Adequately?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. No problem about nurses?

General FAVER. No, sir. Our recruiting program for nurses, particularly in the past year, has been very successful and we are forecasting just a little bit of a drop in our nurse requirements in 1970 over 1969.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is that due to—

General FAVER. And that will make it easier for us, actually.

Mr. ANDREWS. To what is that drop in your estimated needs, due?

General FAVER. I think that would be related to our change in strength, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. It could be that more nurses remain in service after you get them?

General FAVER. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. It has always been hard for the committee to understand why the other services all have trouble getting nurses and the Air Force never seems to have a problem with them. Of course, you don't care about—

General FAVER. I wouldn't very well be able to judge what happens to the other services, sir.

General PITTS. We are just happy to be in that position, Mr. Chairman.

#### WOMEN IN THE AIR FORCE

Mr. ANDREWS. Colonel Holm, we want to hear from you now.

We note that by the end of fiscal year 1970 the Air Force has programmed a strength of 8,000 enlisted women, which will be an increase of 60 percent in 3 years. You are studying the possibility of achieving an enlisted WAF strength of 13,700 by fiscal year 1974. Can you realistically expect to recruit and retain this many additional women?

Colonel HOLM. Present indications are that we can. However, I do feel that is probably the maximum we could recruit and retain.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is there any ceiling on the number of officers and enlisted personnel you can have in your corps?

Colonel HOLM. No, sir. There was at one time. There was a 2-percent ceiling on the Regular force, both officers and enlisted. In November 1967 when they removed the promotion restriction on women they also removed the strength ceiling. So at the present time there is no legal ceiling on the program.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you turning down any qualified women at this time who would like to enlist in the Air Force?

Colonel HOLM. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have more applicants than you have openings?

Colonel HOLM. Yes.

#### WAFS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Mr. ANDREWS. Are any WAFs now serving in Vietnam? How many do you plan to have there during 1970?

Colonel HOLM. We have about 27 serving in Vietnam itself.

Mr. ANDREWS. What type of work are they doing?

Colonel HOLM. A wide range of jobs. Of course, you must appreciate they are interchangeable with the men. We have no corps as such. We have intelligence officers, administrative officers, logistics officers, also clerk-typists, enlisted people, data processors. We also have WAFs in Thailand for a total of 80 in Southeast Asia.

Mr. ANDREWS. Eighty in Southeast Asia?

Colonel HOLM. Yes; at the various bases there in Southeast Asia, mostly officers.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you have any in any other place in Southeast Asia?

Colonel HOLM. No, sir. Those are the only two places. But we have them in the Philippines.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have far more women serving in Southeast Asia than any of the other services?

Colonel HOLM. Yes, with the exception of nurses. The Army and Air Force both have large nurse forces over there.

Mr. ANDREWS. Nurses are not under your command?

Colonel HOLM. No. There are about 200 nurses there.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is Vietnam service voluntary for the WAFs?

Colonel HOLM. No, sir. We come under the same policies as the men do.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, you can order them to go and it is mandatory that they go?

Colonel HOLM. Yes, sir.

#### WOMEN'S REENLISTMENT RATE

Mr. ANDREWS. How does the reenlistment rate for WAFs compare with the rest of the Air Force?

Colonel HOLM. The reenlistment rate, of those who are eligible, today is good and it has been getting better every year. At the present time approximately one out of every three who are eligible to reenlist are reenlisting. Now, this is before the early release policy. I don't know how that policy will affect the rate. It would have a tendency to depress reenlistment rates, I would think, temporarily.

#### COMBINED TRAINING OF WOMEN OFFICERS

Mr. ANDREWS. Since there are relatively few officers entering the four services' Women's Corps each year, would it be feasible to combine their basic training and thus save substantial training costs? For example, the Army in 1970 will have 251 accessions, the Navy 148, the Marine Corps 75, and the Air Force 125, for a total of 599. What do you think about giving them all the same basic training at the same spot?

Colonel HOLM. I am not sure what would be gained or what the advantages would be since our officer training today is coeducational. The WAF are in the OTS program and they are part of the numbers that General Faver has been talking about. I am not sure they would go for that cloistered environment, quite frankly. The Air Force just is not like that. They are going to be working with men, they are promoted with men, they are assigned interchangeably. I am not sure it would serve any useful purpose, really, sir. Whether it would be economical, I cannot see that since we do not have our own training base.

Mr. ANDREWS. You would not like to see it take place?

Colonel HOLM. No; I would not, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. You are just as loyal to the Air Force as the head WAVE was to the Navy and the head WAC was to the Army.

Colonel HOLM. I like the coeducational system, frankly.

Mr. ANDREWS. You ladies don't want to put your trainees together even though it might save a little for the taxpayers?

Colonel HOLM. Well, I cannot understand where it would be a saving since we don't have our own base.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, we don't know definitely that it would save. We are just grabbing at straws like a drowning man, trying to save the poor overburdened taxpayer a little money. Personally, I don't know if it would work. I think it might kill some of the esprit de corps that you have in these organizations.

## ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN AIR FORCE

What are the problems that you have with the WAF corps?

Colonel HOLM. First of all, we don't have a corps. We are fully integrated into the Air Force personnel structure. I think the problems are probably the same as we would have for the Air Force as a whole.

Mr. ANDREWS. They are all under your command, though, aren't they?

Colonel HOLM. No, sir, they are not.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are they under the command of the commanding officer at each post to which they are assigned?

Colonel HOLM. Yes, sir. We do not have any superstructure like the WACs.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you do, keep your eye on all of them?

Colonel HOLM. I am basically a member of the air staff, I advise the staff and I talk to the individuals themselves.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do all WAF problems come to your desk?

Colonel HOLM. No, sir; they do not.

Mr. ANDREWS. As far as you know, then—

Colonel HOLM. They come to my attention when it is required, but generally they are handled by the staff officer who handles the men who would have the same problems.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do they have good morale?

Colonel HOLM. I think the morale is good. I think the reenlistment rate indicates it is good.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is that reenlistment rate?

Colonel HOLM. Thirty-two percent of those eligible last year.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thirty-two percent?

Colonel HOLM. Of those eligible.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Colonel.

## TEMPORARY PROMOTIONS OF OFFICERS

Mr. DAVIS. Before we get into the enlisted men, generally, I would like to ask what the situation is in the Air Force with respect to the number of your officers who are serving in, and being paid in, ranks exceeding the permanent ranks of the officers involved.

General FAVER. The matter of the grade in which the man is serving—

Mr. DAVIS. And being paid; yes.

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. I am speaking of the ranks of the officers.

General FAVER. Yes, sir. We have three separate systems.

A permanent system for Regular officers, a temporary system that applies to all officers on active duty, and a permanent system for Reserve officers.

Now, if you would like I could have a detailed description of each section put in the record, or I could talk to it now.

Mr. DAVIS. I think if you would put it in the record so that we have actual figures it would be helpful. I would like to know how many of your officers in the various ranks are serving in ranks under temporary promotions which are one level above the permanent rank of the officer involved, and any cases where they might be serving two levels above their permanent rank. I think we would like to know that, as well. I think those figures, if inserted in the record, would suffice.

(The information follows:)

PERMANENT, TEMPORARY, AND RESERVE OFFICER PROMOTION SYSTEM

The distribution of USAF regular (male and female) line and other than line commissioned officers by permanent grade and temporary grade in which serving is as follows:

GRADE IN WHICH SERVING (AS OF DEC. 31, 1968)

Permanent grade	Lieutenant General		Major General	Brigadier General	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Captain	1st Lieutenant	2d Lieutenant	Total
	General	General	General	General	Colonel	Colonel	Major	Captain	Lieutenant	Lieutenant	
Major general.....	12	43	81								136
Brigadier general.....			73	72							145
Colonel.....			2	142	4,418						4,562
Lieutenant colonel.....			1	9	1,691	4,375					6,076
Major.....					282	8,780	8,779				17,841
Captain.....					5	89	9,741	10,452			20,287
1st lieutenant.....							31	12,561	21		12,613
2d lieutenant.....								436	1,934	1,219	3,589
Total.....	12	43	157	223	6,396	13,224	18,551	23,449	1,955	1,219	65,249

A summary of regular officers serving in grades other than permanent grades is:

Serving 1 grade above permanent grade.....	34,065
Serving 2 grades above permanent grade.....	865
Serving 3 grades above permanent grade.....	6
Serving 4 grades above permanent grade.....	0

The distribution of USAF nonregular (male and female) line and other than line commissioned officers by permanent grade and temporary grade in which serving is as follows:

GRADE IN WHICH SERVING (AS OF DEC. 31, 1968)

Permanent grade	General	Lieutenant General	Major General	Brigadier General	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Captain	1st Lieutenant	2d Lieutenant	Total
	General	General	General	General	Colonel	Colonel	Major	Captain	Lieutenant	Lieutenant	
Major general.....			2								2
Brigadier general.....			1	5							7
Colonel.....					217	377					594
Lieutenant colonel.....					5	2,628	658	26			3,317
Major.....						194	9,860	1,679			11,733
Captain.....							541	12,046	271		12,858
1st lieutenant.....							2	8,566	2,137	5	10,710
2d lieutenant.....								410	14,171	17,027	31,608
Total.....			3	5	223	3,199	11,061	22,727	16,579	17,032	70,829

A summary of nonregular officers serving in grades other than permanent grades is:

Serving 1 grade above permanent grade.....	23,478
Serving 2 grades above permanent grade.....	412
Serving 1 grade below permanent grade.....	2,991
Serving 2 grades below permanent grade.....	26

Mr. DAVIS. However, as a general proposition, do you have a large number of officers who are serving in ranks above permanent grade?

General FAVER. I would say there are several of them. For example, under the permanent systems our officers are promoted to captain at the seventh year point. The temporary system permits us to promote at an earlier point, at the 3-year point. Now, under the permanent systems, we promote to major at the 14th year; on the other hand, in the temporary system the numbers of people we have aboard and our requirements permit us, for fiscal year 1970, to promote to temporary major at the 10th year. Promotion to permanent lieutenant colonel is

at the 21st year. We are hopeful that in fiscal year 1970 the program will permit us to promote to temporary lieutenant colonel at about the 16½-year point.

Mr. DAVIS. There is legislation on the books which dates back to about 1953 or thereabouts, if I recall, that does place ceilings on the number of officers in permanent grades.

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Now, is there legislation which places ceilings on the number of officers overall who may hold the various ranks that are involved through temporary promotion?

General FAVER. Yes, sir, that is correct. There is control on how many you can have.

Mr. DAVIS. What is that control? As a practical matter, is it just the appropriation act where the justification is submitted and the money provided, or is that permanent legislation that covers that matter as well?

General FAVER. Permanent legislation.

Mr. DAVIS. Was this a part of the 1953 act or thereabouts, or has there been some separate legislation since that time?

General FAVER. The temporary promotion system is authorized by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. The Regular Air Force system is also authorized by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947. The permanent system for Reserve officers is the Reserve Officer Personnel Act of 1954. Thus, there are different segments to the legislation.

Mr. DAVIS. Would you put the citations of those statutes in the record?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The information follows:)

#### CITATION OF STATUTES GOVERNING CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS

The citations for appointments in the promotion systems just described are:

Chapter 835, 10 U.S.C., Appointment as Regular Officers.

Chapter 837, 10 U.S.C., Appointment as Reserve Officers.

Chapter 839, 10 U.S.C., Temporary Appointments.

With respect to the controls imposed on these promotion systems, they are specified in chapter 831, 10 U.S.C., Strength. Specific citations are:

10 U.S.C. 8202. Air Force: Officers in certain commissioned grades.

10 U.S.C. 8210. Regular Air Force: Strength in grade; general officer.

10 U.S.C. 8211. Regular Air Force: Strength in grade; promotion list officers.

10 U.S.C. 8218. Reserves: Strength in grade; general officers in an active status.

10 U.S.C. 8219. Reserves: Strength in grade; commissioned officers in grade below brigadier general in an active status.

Mr. RHODES. General, can an officer serve in a temporary grade which is more than one step higher than his permanent grade?

General FAVER. Yes, sir, he can.

Mr. RHODES. How many grades above the permanent grade can he go? Any number?

General FAVER. There is no legislation or policy, but as a practical matter he is just not able to get promoted very far ahead of his permanent grade.

Soon after the end of World War II when we were setting up our Regular force, there were several who were newly integrated at a

much lower grade than their temporary grade, but that does not happen to us, any more.

#### PROFICIENCY PAY AND VARIABLE REENLISTMENT BONUSES

**Mr. ANDREWS.** General, on page 17 you state that aircraft maintenance is not being designated for proficiency pay because the career manning deficit in this skill is not sufficient to justify the award. However, you also go on to say that you have been authorized by DOD to raise the aircraft maintenance specialty to the highest variable reenlistment bonus, multiple 4, in fiscal year 1970. If there is no career manning deficit in this skill, why are you then paying the highest possible reenlistment bonus?

**General FAVER.** In the establishment of the authorization for variable reenlistment bonus, the directives under which we now work take three things into account. First, what is our current manning status in that particular career field? Second, what are the training costs for training the man to enter the career field? Third, what the forecast manning improvement is for that particular field.

In the setting up of the authorization for awarding VRB and the proficiency pay, our manning is such that we are authorized for VRB at the first time the man makes his reenlistment, but that is the only time we are able to give him VRB; whereas pro pay may come at some later time.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** What is the highest VRB that the Air Force pays?

**General FAVER.** Sir, it would be a multiple of 4, which would be four times his monthly basic pay times the number of years for which he is reenlisting.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** In dollars and cents, what is the highest pay? Other services say they go as high as \$10,000. Is that the figure for the Air Force?

**General FAVER.** For example, an E-4, sergeant, receiving a multiple 4, would be able to draw a check of \$5,035.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is that the highest? Have you any \$10,000 bonuses?

**General FAVER.** I have one, \$8,088.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is that the highest?

**General FAVER.** Yes, sir. That was a skilled AFSC-30474, radio communications technician, multiple 4 specialty.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** That man, by that description, is a very highly trained, efficient electronics expert; is he not?

**General FAVER.** Yes, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** How long would he have to reenlist for in order to get that \$8,080?

**General FAVER.** Four years, sir.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** You justify that, I assume, on the basis that that is the only weapon you have to counter the—

**General FAVER.** It is purely an incentive measure.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** To keep him rather than letting private industry get him?

**General FAVER.** That is correct.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** I am surprised that some of the other services go to \$10,000 and you can go only to \$8,080. That is the first time I have ever known the Air Force to undercut the other services.

General FAVER. I think I have the answer to that, sir. We only reenlist for 4 years. If we were to reenlist for 6 years, as some of the other services do, we would be able to pay the additional amount.

Mr. ANDREWS. Give us the story of the experience you have had with the VRB's, how many you had in 1966, 1967, 1968, and 1969 to date.

General FAVER. In our program for last year we had 26,400 drawing VRB. We are proposing with this year's program during fiscal 1970 that we will have 35,600. The figures I have given were 1969 and 1970.

To go back to fiscal 1966, we awarded 5,013; in 1967, 8,976, with a carryover of 5,013; in 1968, 8,483, with a carryover of 10,993.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am sure you feel the Air Force is getting a bargain if you can get a man to give you 4 years' additional service for your top premium of \$8,080.

General FAVER. Mr. Chairman, since we went into this program in 1966, we have kept statistics on this very carefully, and we have established the fact that the use of VRB and pro pay is giving us about a 6-percent greater reenlistment than we are getting from the skills that have no VRB or pro pay.

Mr. ANDREWS. Tell us a little something about pro pay. What does it amount to? Who gets it? How long does he agree to stay in for proficiency pay?

General FAVER. The proficiency pay is an incentive, also, but instead of being given only at the reenlistment point at the end of the first enlistment, proficiency pay will be given a career individual as long as he serves and as long as his particular skill warrants the award. That relates to what our career manning is and what it is forecast to remain.

Although we are having a decrease in the numbers that we will be giving in pro pay in fiscal 1970, the over-all cost will increase because we are planning to increase the award to more people at the \$75 a month P-2 rate where we had not previously been awarding to anyone at that level. For the coming year we plan to pay 41 skills at that P-2 rate. So, the numbers of people will lessen, but the price will go up.

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me rephrase the question I originally asked you and state it this way: Since there is so much training cost involved in aircraft maintenance, why do you not pay them proficiency pay in order to be sure they will remain in the Air Force? Can you keep them by just VRB or do you have to have the proficiency pay?

General FAVER. Sir, our manning is such in that particular skill that the Defense Department will grant us VRB; but it is not low enough, according to the scale we now have, to give us the award of proficiency pay in addition.

#### WELFARE PAYMENTS TO SERVICEMEN

Mr. ANDREWS. Do you know whether or not any of your people have applied for welfare benefits as Army people did at Fort Dix not long ago? Officials at the welfare office said they were entitled to it.

General FAVER. I read that in the newspaper, Mr. Chairman. To my knowledge, none of our people have done so.

Mr. ANDREWS. Only Army people, that I know of, have applied for it. It poses quite a problem. Here is a man in service with 2 or 3 children. According to the new rules of poverty, he is eligible for wel-

fare checks. Beginning the first of July, unless action is taken to stop it, any man in America can go to the welfare office and say, "I want it. I am entitled to it," and he will get it, without even the slightest investigation. Did you know that?

General FAVER. I knew that to be the case; yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is good news to poverty stricken people. They just say, "I want it, and I am entitled to it," and no investigation will be made beginning the first of July.

If you can find out whether or not any of your people have applied for welfare, I wish you would put something in the record on it.

General FAVER. I will check that, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. They are certainly eligible for it. I think the new rule on poverty will be \$5,000. If a man with 2 or 3 children hasn't an income of \$5,000, he is ipso facto poverty stricken and eligible for the benefits—free food. It will pose a serious problem to all the services. It has already. Those county officials in the county where Fort Dix is located were screaming to high heaven, because under the rule, all a man has to do is move into the community and he is considered eligible.

Some States have a residency requirement of a minimum of 12 months before they are eligible for relief.

Mr. DAVIS. Is that not what the Supreme Court knocked out, Mr. Chairman? Is that not one of the things that is causing the problem?

Mr. ANDREWS. I know the Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia knocked it out. I do not know if it has reached the Supreme Court of the United States. I know the attitude they have taken in many other matters. I do not know whether they would take the same attitude toward poverty. A person can move into the District of Columbia and be here one day—in fact, he can get off the bus or the train and go to the welfare office. If I understand the ruling correctly in that circuit court of appeals case, he automatically becomes eligible for relief. I assume that is one reason why relief costs are skyrocketing as they are in many communities and States.

(The information follows:)

#### ENTITLEMENT TO WELFARE

The extent of participation of military families in local welfare assistance programs, nationwide, is not known by the Department of the Air Force. The relationship between the local welfare agency and the individual client is usually a confidential matter.

However, a recent case was cited in an article in the National Observer on March 24, 1969. The case involved a married airman first class stationed at McGuire Air Force Base, N.J. The article stated that "The Airman is one of several married servicemen stationed or living in New Jersey who has gone on the relief rolls as 'underemployed' under a new State law, because their low military pay and allowances don't cover the high cost of living."

Welfare eligibility rules are established by local, county and State governments. The criteria vary greatly between States and within States from one locality to another. In application, they are subject to local interpretation.

While it may be possible for some military families to qualify for welfare assistance from local governments, the situation would normally be limited to enlisted members of the lowest pay grades with large families. Service enlistment policies and selective service regulations severely restrict and discourage the entry into military service of members with dependents. Consequently, the eligibility of a military family for welfare assistance normally results from unusual circumstances and therefore is the exception rather than the rule. Further, all the military services have provisions for the discharge of a member when it can clearly be demonstrated that his continuance in service will result in undue hardship for himself and his family.

The adequacy of military pay and allowances has been a matter of continuing concern to the President, the Congress and the Department of Defense, as demonstrated by the fact that there have been adjustments in pay of service personnel in each of the past 6 years. The Federal Pay Act of 1967 provides for a further increase in military basic pay of approximately 12.6 percent effective July 1, 1969.

#### PHASED TERMINATION OF PROFICIENCY PAY

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 10 of the budget justification, you say the favorable career manning in 22 specialties no longer warrants continuation of proficiency pay and, accordingly, proficiency pay in these specialties will be terminated.

You go on to say that the adverse impact on the airmen concerned will be moderated by phased terminations. This phased termination is represented on page 41 of the justification by the 15,000 airmen who will be receiving reduced payments.

Is it safe to assume that the reenlistment probability of these same 15,000 airmen will be almost zero when their current enlistment expires?

General FAVER. Sir, I am sure that will have an impact on those individuals. However, it would depend on how they are promoted in the interim. I have no way to forecast, actually.

#### MISSING IN ACTION—PRISONERS OF WAR

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 10 of the budget justification, there appears an item entitled "Missing in Action and Prisoner of War." For this item you are requesting \$11,817,000 in 1970. Since it has never appeared in the budget before, would you please explain what this item is and how you arrived at the specific dollar amount for 1970?

General FAVER. Previously, this particular entry had been entered in the costs by grade. This time we have brought it out as a separate entry.

Mr. ANDREWS. Is that because the figure is becoming greater each year?

General FAVER. Yes, sir, it is bigger.

#### AIR FORCE CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would insert in the record at this point the number of casualties the Air Force has suffered in the Vietnam war.

(The information follows:)

#### AIR FORCE CASUALTIES IN VIETNAM

Air Force casualties from 1961 to the present time in the Vietnam conflict are: Captured, 139; suspected captured, 129; missing, 437 for a total of 705. Deaths due to hostilities number 641 and deaths due to accidents and other causes are 548 for a total of 1,189.

#### MISSING IN ACTION—PRISONERS OF WAR

Mr. ANDREWS. Why is this item not included in the narrative justification, the same as all other items that appear on page 10?

Mr. HENSHAW. Mr. Chairman, this is a matter of policy because we are concerned about the classification. In an effort to keep this par-

ticular item at an unclassified level in the justification book, we have avoided the traditional personnel detail which could get us into the classified area.

Mr. ANDREWS. What do you mean by classified and unclassified areas? You are talking about missing in action and prisoners of war. They give a total every week on television, of the number of people killed. There is nothing classified about that.

Mr. HENSHAW. The Department of Defense has considered this to be an area which they do not desire us to break out. Although we put it in as a single line item, we did not want to discuss the facts in detail.

For example, we have funded ——— officer man-years, for a total of 806, that we foresee as being the fiscal year 1970 program. Strengthwise this involves 880 officers which is an increase——

Mr. ANDREWS. You mean that many are missing in action?

Mr. HENSHAW. Either missing in action or prisoners of war. It is this type of information which would normally be carried into the detailed justification. We thought it at least questionable as to whether we want to give that type of detail.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think the American people ought to have all the horrible details of this war. Maybe some interest will be stimulated in this country to see that this war is brought to a conclusion.

From what I see, it looks like no one except those who have relatives over there in Vietnam are concerned about this war. Business as usual.

Mr. HENSHAW. I appreciate what you say. I have a 17-year-old son who is pretty ripe for the draft.

If you would like, sir, we can enter additional data in the record.

Mr. ANDREWS. Put it in.

(The table follows:)

**DETAIL OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION OR PRISONERS OF WAR**

Normal budgeting detail used to justify military personnel costs provide a variety of data which could be used to the disadvantage of personnel who are prisoners of war. ——— The following table provides comparative data regarding the number of officers and airmen who are either prisoners of war or are missing in action:

**NUMBERS OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION AND PRISONERS OF WAR**

	End fiscal year 1968 actual	End fiscal year 1969 estimated	End fiscal year 1970 estimated
Officers.....	582	837	880
Airmen.....	30	55	60
Total.....	612	892	940

**Mr. ANDREWS.**

Why is the Air Force the only service to include this item in their budget request? We are talking about missing in action and prisoner of war. Do they want to keep it out of print?

**Mr. HENSHAW.** In the review processes with the Secretary of Defense Office particularly, different individuals there address the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force estimates. Each one works with the service in determining how the justification can best be presented. I have also discussed with Mr. Garrity some other changes which I think are peculiar to Air Force and which do not show in the other services' justification books. These changes are an attempt to improve the justification books.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** That list you gave a few minutes ago of 800-some-odd missing in action or prisoners of war—does that include enlisted men, too?

**Mr. HENSHAW.** No sir. That list covered officers only. Comparatively, we have far less enlisted men in the prisoner of war or missing in action status at this point. The reason, of course, is that the type of aircraft generally operated north of the DMZ did not carry enlisted crews.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Is the \$11,090,000 shown in the 1969 column of the 1970 budget a result of internal reprogramings? If you can reprogram money into this account at will, can you not likewise reprogram money out for other uses?

**Mr. HENSHAW.** If I understand your question correctly sir, the fiscal year 1969 President's budget, when submitted, contained approximately a like amount. However, it was not broken out. The policy this year is to break that out since we do not include man-years or end strengths in our manpower program for these dollars. This meant that another part of this budget—for example, the basic pay portion, where the main portion would be—has been reduced a like amount. So, it is not reprogramming in the sense that we have adjusted our appropriation. It is only rearranging some of the pieces of the officer pay and allowances.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** In cases where officers are reported missing in action, does the Air Force keep up their pay accounts?

**Mr. HENSHAW.** Yes, sir. We send their pay account to Denver to our Air Force Finance Center, where they are administered. They are administered under the provisions of the Missing Persons Act. All the wishes of the man at the time that he was lost, for example, on allotments, and so forth, are complied with. In addition, should there be hardship to his dependents, if they needed an allotment change for example, we would consider each one of those. We keep in very close contact with the dependents involved.

**General FAVER.** Another aspect of that in which I think you might be interested, Mr. Chairman, is that these men who are missing or are known to be in confinement are considered for promotion right along with their contemporaries.

**Mr. ANDREWS.** Thank you.

## SPECIAL PAY

On page 17 of the justification book, you are showing 18,000 officer man-years of special pay; and on page 40 of the justification book, you are showing 65,000 enlisted man-years of special pay. This is a combined total of 83,000 drawing this allowance.

If you have an average man-year strength in Vietnam of only 61,000, where are the other 22,000 located that are drawing this pay?

General FAVER. The awarding of this hostile fire pay is for those who are participating in combat operations within the Vietnam zone. It may be air crews operating in the area but stationed outside of the area, or people who are TDY but also stationed permanently outside of the area. So, the award is for those who qualify for hostile fire duty, either in the area or above the area.

Mr. ANDREWS. It seems to me those people going in and out of there should be included in the average, General. You have 78,000 drawing that pay, but you actually have an average of only 61,000 people there.

General FAVER. May I ask Colonel Bull to respond.

Mr. ANDREWS. Colonel Bull, will you explain that to the committee?

Colonel BULL. The award of the pay entitlement is broader than covering just those who are stationed in Vietnam. Those who are participating in airlift or air combat operations, who are stationed outside of Vietnam itself, become entitled to the award by virtue of the fact that they have participated in an air operation. So, the total man-years reflected, which are based upon our most recent experience for the payment, include those crews stationed outside of Vietnam and includes those people who may be performing ground duties on a temporary duty basis in South Vietnam.

Mr. ANDREWS. You are paying a total of 78,000.

Colonel BULL. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have only 61,000 in Vietnam.

Colonel BULL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where else are people serving and receiving special pay?

General PITTS. I can give you an example, sir. Let us take the C-130 crews that rotate into Vietnam and pull a tour of temporary duty there. They can be stationed permanently at a base such as Ching Chuan Kang on Taiwan. When these people deploy into South Vietnam down in-country and perform combat missions there they are entitled to this pay. They are based up in Taiwan and are shown in the strength figures in Taiwan.

Mr. ANDREWS. If they spend 10 days down in Vietnam, are they paid 10 days of special pay?

General PITTS. No, sir, they receive the \$65 monthly payment regardless of time involved. But they are not shown in the pay of people permanently stationed there.

Mr. ANDREWS. But they are included in the total 78,000?

General PITTS. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. What about Korea? Are there any people in Korea receiving this pay?

Colonel BULL. No, sir, no Air Force people in Korea.

Mr. ANDREWS. Only Vietnam and those who go there on TDY or go there for permanent duty?

Colonel BULL. Yes, only those involved in the Vietnam war.

Another example is the B-52 crews stationed at Guam.

General BOYLAN. The fighter wings that we have based in Thailand is another example.

General PITTS. You have those people permanently stationed in-country.

#### SUPPORT OF FREE WORLD FORCES

Mr. ANDREWS. Is any part of this estimate for 1970 in support of free world forces?

Mr. HENSHAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Whom does the Air Force support down there?

Mr. HENSHAW. We provide limited support costs for Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea.

Mr. ANDREWS. What—Air Force?

Mr. HENSHAW. Also the Philippines. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Air Force?

Mr. HENSHAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. The Navy told us they support Marines for Korea and Vietnam and Thailand, I believe. In other words, each service supports its counterpart in the free world forces.

General PITTS. Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam are the four countries that we support on a very limited basis from this appropriation.

Mr. ANDREWS. My next question is: How much is included in your 1970 military personnel budget for the support of free world forces?

General PITTS. There is \$200,000, sir, ———.

Mr. ANDREWS. Who pays the subsistence of these Air Force people?

Mr. HENSHAW. My understanding is that this may come through the AID program and is administered through or with the State Department and the Department of Defense. We probably supply a few meals to visiting personnel.

Mr. ANDREWS. But who pays AID?

Mr. HENSHAW. I guess the word there is the taxpayers. This is strictly appropriated funds.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does the Air Force pay AID for personnel costs?

Mr. HENSHAW. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. The Navy told us they paid AID for the marines.

Mr. HENSHAW. There are different ground rules in each case.

[———.]

Mr. ANDREWS. Are these people from other countries helping our Air Force down there, or do they operate separately?

General BOYLAN. The question is, do people from other countries help us in Vietnam?

Mr. ANDREWS. Yes.

General BOYLAN. As Mr. Henshaw has said, the Vietnamese Air Force at the moment is a relatively small organization. General Crow

before this committee touched on the growth that we expect in that program over the succeeding years. Currently they are participating in \_\_\_\_\_ squadrons, which includes \_\_\_\_\_ F-5's and \_\_\_\_\_ A-37's.

The participation by Australia and Korea, I would prefer to submit for the record, if I may.

(The information is classified and was provided the committee.)

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would. Tell us, if you can, who pays for the services of the Air Force people in the free world forces in South Vietnam.

General BOYLAN. I understand your question.

Mr. ANDREWS. And also explain how it is paid. Do you pay it directly or through AID.

General BOYLAN. I understand.

(The information is classified and was provided the committee.)

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Henshaw, you said \$200,000 is included in the budget this year.

Mr. HENSHAW. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where does that \$200,000 appear in this budget?

Mr. HENSHAW. It does not appear as a line item. Based on experience in the past which has indicated these funds will be \$200,000 or even less, we look on this as something we can absorb as the need arises. We have nothing to base any estimate on, except that occasionally a paper comes in that tells us to disburse a very small amount of money. So, we did not try to elaborate any place in the justification book.

#### HOUSING AND TEMPORARY LODGING ALLOWANCES

Mr. ANDREWS. On pages 26 and 27 of your budget justification, for housing allowance and temporary lodging allowance you show the same amount for 1970 as you did for 1969. If your total officer man-years in 1970 are decreasing, why do both of these accounts remain the same?

Mr. HENSHAW. The housing and temporary lodging allowance is a function of the oversea location to which a relatively small number of individuals is assigned. We project our costs for these locations on the basis of experience. Each year we reevaluate our experience in these areas because of changes.

In the absence of any known price changes, and knowing of nothing that would affect the level of activity that we have for fiscal year 1969, we have simply projected a level estimate.

#### TERMINAL LEAVE PAYMENTS

Mr. ANDREWS. General Faver, on page 5 of your statement you show that the officer losses for 1970 will be 13,831. However, on page 32 of the justifications you show that 13,821 will receive terminal leave payments in 1970, 10 less than the number that will be leaving the rolls. Is not the 13,821 high in view of the fact that many of these officers will use up their accrued leave prior to going off the rolls, rather than taking a lump sum terminal leave payment?

General FAVER. Sir, that is a matter of what our experience in the past has been. The bulk of them have terminal leave due.

#### SIZE OF LUMP-SUM PAYMENT IN VARIABLE REENLISTMENT BONUS

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 43 of the justification you show an increase of 4,400 enlistees who will receive a lump-sum payment in connection with their variable reenlistment bonus, at an increased cost of \$11.3 million. Why are you expanding the use of lump-sum payments as opposed to the normal incremental payment in connection with a VRB?

General FAVER. Sir, if we were able to maximize on the variable reenlistment bonus, we would pay a much higher percentage in lump sum, because it seems to have a greater attraction to the young man to get him to stay with us than the smaller amount. However, in the process of gaining additional experience in this, we moved from where we were at about 12 to 15 percent award lump sum to a request where we are planning in 1970 to pay 35 percent.

#### SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL ALLOWANCES

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 56 of the justification you are showing 132,051 people receiving special supplemental allowances for clothing. If in 1970 your average enlisted strength decreases by over 21,000, why is there not some decrease in the number of enlisted people drawing this allowance?

General FAVER. Those forces that are eligible for this special allowance do not show a change across the 2 years, Mr. Chairman. Therefore, the number remains reasonably constant.

#### SUBSISTENCE ASHORE

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 66 of the justification book you show an increase in gross man-years of approximately 2,300 in the number of enlisted people to be maintained ashore in messhalls overseas. If your average enlisted strength decreases by over 21,000 in 1970, why is there not a corresponding decrease in the number of enlisted people to be subsisted in messhalls overseas?

General FAVER. Our overseas strength remains constant between these 2 years, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Put something in the record about the cost of your messes overseas and in the continental United States.

General FAVER. Yes, sir.  
(The information follows:)

#### COST OF MESS HALLS

The rates projected for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 in this budget are \$1.32 per man per day within the contiguous United States and \$1.42 for overseas. These represent the average costs incurred during the period January-June 1968.

The actual cost of food per man per day incurred during the period of July through December 1968 was \$1.38 within the continental United States and \$1.44 overseas.

#### ACCESSION TRAVEL

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 71 of the justification under accession travel, you show that 15,093 officers will be covered in 1970. Along with these

15,000 officers there will also be 16,377 dependents. Why are there so many dependents in connection with accession travel? Are not most of the officers coming into the service single?

Colonel BULL. Between the 2 years, as you notice, Mr. Chairman, there is an increase in the number of officers to be gained in the Air Force. Our factors indicate that a large number of these officers do have dependents. They are married at the time they enter active duty and proceed to their first duty station.

The forecast is based upon the same basic considerations as affected the fiscal 1969 computation.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have no control over whether or not a man gets married.

Colonel BULL. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. If he gets married while in service, you have to pay to move his dependents.

Colonel BULL. Yes, sir.

#### SHIPMENT OF PRIVATE VEHICLES

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 81 of your budget justification, you show the number of privately owned vehicles to be shipped to or from overseas by MSTs expressed in terms of measurement tons. How many privately owned vehicles will the Air Force be shipping to or from overseas by MSTs in 1970? What are the rates paid for the shipment of these vehicles?

General FAVER. May I supply that one for the record, Mr. Chairman?

(The information follows:)

#### RATES PAID FOR SHIPMENT OF VEHICLES

The Air Force estimates that 34,574 privately owned vehicles will be shipped to and from overseas by MSTs in fiscal year 1970. The average cost for shipment per privately owned vehicle is \$264.50.

#### USE OF COMMERCIAL AIR TRAVEL

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 82 of the justification book, you show that in 1970, 2,249 officers and 19,589 enlisted men will be traveling to or from overseas by commercial air. Is not this number exceptionally high? In other words, why are you not making better utilization of MAC?

General FAVER. Sir, this number reflects the use of commercial transportation to areas that are not regularly serviced by MAC. Turkey is an example.

Mr. ANDREWS. Are you still sending men into Turkey?

General FAVER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Where else? You are not sending 19,589 enlisted men and 2,249 officers to Turkey.

General FAVER. Mr. Chairman, may I give you a full breakout for the record on that?

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would.

(The information follows:)

## TRAVEL BY COMMERCIAL AIR

The Air Force has personnel authorized in over 100 countries. Regular scheduled MAC flights are not made to all of these countries since it is not economical. Commercial flights at the reduced set rates are utilized to Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, France, all Iron Curtain countries, most South American countries, and small countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. A breakdown of moves by area is as follows:

	Officer	Enlisted	Total
European countries.....	897	6,758	7,655
Middle East and Africa.....	996	9,834	10,830
All other.....	356	2,997	3,353
Total.....	2,249	19,589	21,838

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you thought about flying them to Paris by MAC and then commercial from there on?

General BOYLAN. Mr. Chairman, there is basic policy which underlies this question. That policy is that the necessary air movement of DOD personnel will be under the management of the Military Airlift Command utilizing commercial contract flights. It is only when the MAC cargo aircraft itself, U.S. Air Force-owned cargo aircraft, is termed to be necessary because of peculiar circumstances—the location, a contract charter not available—that the cargo aircraft will be used for routine passenger service.

Mr. ANDREWS. Explain that a little more.

General BOYLAN. The Military Airlift Command is responsible in airlift for two principal functions: One, the movement of cargo and troops, and the movement of passengers. The U.S. Air Force aircraft—C-141, C-124, the new C-5—have been procured and are largely operated to satisfy the cargo and the troop movement. The movement of all other Department of Defense personnel under the category of passengers—the replacement to Europe, the individual replacement, his family, others on official business—those people are moved by commercial airlines, TWA, Pan American, and others, under contract with the Department of Defense through MAC, the executive agency.

Mr. ANDREWS. Under contract by the Defense Department, through MAC?

General BOYLAN. Yes, sir. MAC is executive agent for the Department of Defense for the performance of the contract.

Mr. ANDREWS. You have a MAC flight to Paris, and there is space available. Why do you not send your people headed for Turkey on a space available basis with MAC to Paris and then by commercial aircraft from Paris down to Turkey or any other place in Europe, rather than send them all the way commercial?

General BOYLAN. Mr. Andrews, to answer that question you would have to know several things. I am not trying to evade the question. You have to know what the requirement is, when it is, what schedules MAC is committed to, and whether or not there is a commercial charter available at the same time. Again, the basic airlift policy guides the Air Force and MAC.

Mr. ANDREWS. Does not MAC have regularly scheduled flights to and from Paris as the central focal point for Europe?

General BOYLAN. MAC operates on regular schedule flights into England and Germany. On occasion I think they have a schedule into Paris.

Mr. ANDREWS. Do we have any agreement with the airlines, that you know of, to send all independently traveling servicemen to places like Turkey, Greece, and Italy?

General BOYLAN. I know of no agreement with the airlines, Mr. Andrews. I have been trying to make clear that to insure proper utilization of specialized equipment, the Department of Defense has a policy which I have previously enumerated. There are occasions where there is space available on a MAC military aircraft, and that space is utilized. In those cases where there is neither in the sense of time nor in the sense of quantity a requirement for a full aircraft load, then MAC buys a ticket for an individual traveler that perhaps would take him to Turkey.

Mr. ANDREWS. Have you read the recent GAO report on nonutilization of MAC space from Europe?

General BOYLAN. No, sir, I do not believe I am acquainted with that report, but I am acquainted with a number of surveys of MAC utilization.

Mr. ANDREWS. The only thing we are interested in, General, is trying to save some money.

General BOYLAN. I agree with you.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you have space available on MAC planes, we think you ought to use it as much as possible, instead of sending these people all the way by commercial airlines. Have you had any occasion to charter a commercial plane for Vietnam to send troops over there, or does MAC do that exclusively?

General BOYLAN. MAC is responsible for those passenger flights which carry service personnel into Vietnam. The port of entry is principally Tan Son Nhut.

Mr. ANDREWS. Put whatever you can in the record to clear up this question for us.

General BOYLAN. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### UTILIZATION OF MAC FOR TRANSPORTING PASSENGERS, ETC.

It is DOD policy to utilize the most economical and direct route in transporting passengers to and from overseas. If regular scheduled MAC passenger flights serve an area, this mode of transportation is utilized.

MAC has agreements with the U.S. international air carriers for procurement contracts covering movement of DOD passengers in plane load increments. DOD passengers departing for Italy, Greece, and Turkey are provided movement on regular scheduled U.S. commercial air carriers at a reduced set rate negotiated by MAC and specified in published military tariffs (category Z). MAC is not involved in this category of movement since all arrangements incidental to travel are the exclusive responsibility of the individual service sponsoring the travel. Payment for category Z travel is outside the industrial fund and is made by the sponsoring military service directly to the air carrier concerned. Due to the relatively small monthly Air Force passenger requirements to these and other specified areas, the use of MAC contract commercial airlift would prove uneconomical and would preclude the degree of flight frequency commensurate with personnel rotational requirements of the using service.

The principal means of sending troops to Vietnam is via commercial carriers under contract to MAC (category B airlift). In calendar year 1968, 495,385 (99.0 percent) troops were moved to Southeast Asia by this means. The remainder traveled to Southeast Asia by category Z.

The GAO referred to nonutilization of MAC cargo space from Europe. The Air Force has taken action to achieve more effective utilization of MAC cargo capability by procedural changes within existing regulations.

Mr. ANDREWS. The number of dependents traveling by commercial air also seems to be quite high. Is there any reason why more of these dependents could not be traveling by MAC? You may answer that question for the record.

General BOYLAN. I will, sir.  
(The information follows:)

#### DEPENDENT TRAVEL BY COMMERCIAL AIR

The forecasted number of dependents traveling by commercial air at the reduced rates is directly related to the number of military sponsors traveling by the same mode and is our best estimate of what might transpire in fiscal year 1970. Air Force dependents normally travel with their sponsor when concurrent travel is authorized. MAC airlift is used whenever possible; however, regular scheduled MAC flights are not made to all countries in which Air Force personnel and their dependents are stationed.

#### UNIFORMED SERVICES SAVINGS DEPOSIT PROGRAM

Mr. ANDREWS. On page 90 of the justification book, you are requesting \$11.5 million for interest payments in connection with the uniformed services savings deposit program. In 1970, you show that 18,306 officers will receive an average interest payment of \$320. At a 10 percent a year interest rate, this would mean that the average account per officer is \$3,200. In the case of an officer sent to Vietnam for 12 months, starting out at a zero deposit when he arrived, receive interest of \$320 during his year there, assuming he deposits about the same amount each month, he would have to have deposited \$6,400 by the end of the year.

Is it possible that some servicemen are abusing this privilege by drawing money out of their private savings accounts and redepositing it into the uniformed services savings program?

General FAVER. No, sir. This is a worldwide program. No more than the unallotted portion of a man's pay can be deposited in the program in any one month.

Mr. ANDREWS. You may elaborate on that for the record.

General FAVER. All right.  
(The information follows:)

#### USE OF UNIFORMED SAVINGS PROGRAM

Public Law 89-538, August 14, 1966, established the uniformed services savings deposit program. A member of the Armed Forces who is on permanent duty assignment outside the United States or its possessions may deposit during his tour of duty not more than his unallotted current pay and allowances in the amounts of \$5 or more. The maximum amount upon which interest may be paid is \$10,000. Unallotted pay and allowances are defined as the amount of money the individual is entitled to receive on the pay day immediately before the date of deposit, less authorized deductions and allotments for dependents, insurance, etc.

We are of the opinion this privilege is not being abused. As of December 31, 1968, the average balance per officer participating in the program was \$3,413. This includes those individuals stationed in Vietnam whose tours of duty are for 12 months and those in other areas whose term can be for as much as 48 months.

Mr. ANDREWS. Would you please supply for the record a breakdown of these 18,306 officers, showing the number whose deposit is

between zero to \$1,000; the number whose deposit is from \$1,000 to \$2,000, and so on, by \$1,000 increments?

General FAVER. All right, sir.

(The information follows:)

**DEPOSITS TO UNIFORMED SAVINGS PROGRAM**

The numbers of deposits by \$1,000 increments is not available. Data is available as follows:

<i>Deposits</i>	<i>Number of officers</i>
\$2,000 and under.....	7, 775
\$2,001 to \$5,000.....	4, 946
\$5,001 to \$10,000.....	3, 631
Over \$10,000.....	77
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>16, 429</b>

This information is as of December 31, 1968. Interest is not paid on amounts which exceed \$10,000 in an account.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Rhodes?

Mr. RHODES. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Davis?

Mr. DAVIS. I have no additional questions.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you gentlemen.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MAHON. I want to join Mr. Andrews in thanking you gentlemen for your appearance here. I want to take special note of the appearance of Brig. Gen. Dudley E. Faver, a longtime friend of mine, formerly the commanding officer of Reese Air Force Base in my hometown, and a very distinguished Air Force officer. We are glad to have you before us, General.

General FAVER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mission accomplished. We tell all witnesses who come before this committee: "Don't thank us yet. Wait and see what you get."

THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1969.

**RESERVE PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE  
AND  
NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE**

**WITNESSES**

**MAJ. GEN. TOM E. MARCHBANKS, JR., CHIEF, AIR FORCE RESERVE,  
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE**

**MAJ. GEN. WINSTON P. WILSON, CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU**

**MAJ. GEN. GEORGE S. BOYLAN, JR., DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE PROGRAMS, DCS/PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES**

**BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM F. PITTS, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET, COMPTROLLER OF THE AIR FORCE**

**COL. ORLANDO P. LORETTI, CHIEF, RESERVE FORCES BRANCH, DIRECTORATE OF BUDGET**

**MAJ. HAROLD L. MAXWELL, PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION DIVISION, DIRECTORATE OF PERSONNEL TRAINING AND EDUCATION**

### RESERVE PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the Air Force Reserve on active duty under sections 205 ~~or~~ 8033 of title 10, United States Code, or while undergoing reserve training, or while performing drills or equivalent duty, and for members of the Air Reserve Officers' Training Corps, as authorized by law; ~~\$71,800,000~~ (10 U.S.C. 261-80, 591-95, 597-600, 651, 671-85, 687, 1475-80, 2031, 2101-11, 2511, 8012, 8062, 8076, 8221-23, 8259-60, 8351-54, 8356, 8358-63, 8365-68, 8370-81, 8392-95, 8491, 8687, 8722, 9301, 9411-14, 9561-63, 9741, 9743; 37 U.S.C. 204, 206, 209, 301, 305, 309, 402-04, 415-18, 1002; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)

, 8019 and  
\$ 87,700,000

The inclusion of section 8019 is considered necessary in order to include authority for paying the Chief of the Air Force Reserve out of the appropriation, Reserve Personnel, Air Force. The position, Chief of the Air Force Reserve, was established by Public Law 90-168.

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code: 07-05-3700-0-1-051		1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>				
Direct program:				
	1. Reserve component personnel .....	53,898	63,169	76,406
	2. Reserve officer candidates .....	9,743	10,531	11,294
	Total direct obligations .....	63,641	73,700	87,700
Reimbursable program:				
	1. Reserve component personnel .....	20	20	20
10	Total obligations .....	63,661	73,720	87,720
<u>Financing</u>				
14	Receipts and reimbursements from: Non-Federal sources <sup>1/</sup>	-20	-20	-20
25	Unobligated balance lapsing .....	7,979	.....	.....
	<u>Budget authority</u> .....	71,620	73,700	87,700
<sup>1/</sup> Reimbursement from non-Federal sources derived from sale of meals to officers from enlisted messes (10 U.S.C. 9621).				

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE**

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)--Continued

Identification code: 07-05-3700-0-1-051		1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<b>Budget authority:</b>				
40	Appropriation .....	72,300	71,800	87,700
41	Transfer to other accounts .....	-680	.....	.....
43	<u>Appropriation (adjusted)</u> .....	71,620	71,800	87,700
44.30	Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases .....	.....	1,900	.....
<b>Relation of obligations to outlays:</b>				
71	Obligations incurred, net .....	63,641	73,700	87,700
72	Obligated balance, start of year .....	6,350	7,178	12,878
74	Obligated balance, end of year .....	-7,178	-12,878	-23,578
77	Adjustments in expired accounts .....	-348	.....	.....
90	Outlays, excluding pay increase supplemental .....	62,465	66,300	76,800
91.30	Outlays from military pay act supplemental .....	.....	1,700	200

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
RESERVE PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code: 07-05-3700-0-1-051	1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<b>Direct obligations:</b>			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military .....	44,252	49,200	60,200
12.2 Personnel benefits: Military .....	9,626	10,400	11,500
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons .....	3,590	6,900	7,100
22.0 Transportation of things .....	15	40	100
25.0 Other services .....	4	40	40
26.0 Supplies and materials .....	6,142	7,090	8,720
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities .....	12	30	40
<b>Total direct obligations .....</b>	<b>63,641</b>	<b>73,700</b>	<b>87,700</b>
<b>Reimbursable obligations:</b>			
26.0 Supplies and materials .....	20	20	20
99.0 Total obligations .....	63,661	73,720	87,720

**SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS (In Thousands)**

Program No.	Title	FY 1968 (Actual)	FY 1969 (Estimate)	FY 1970 (Estimate)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
720	Reserve Personnel .....	\$ 53,898	\$ 63,169	\$ 76,406
780	Reserve Officer Candidates .....	9,743	10,531	11,894
<b>TOTAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (OBLIGATIONS) .....</b>		<b>\$ 63,641</b>	<b>\$ 73,700</b>	<b>\$ 88,300</b>
Less Actual/Anticipated Reimbursements .....		20	20	20
<b>Total Direct Obligations/Appropriation .....</b>		<b>\$ 63,661</b>	<b>\$ 73,720</b>	<b>\$ 88,280</b>

COMPARISON SUMMARY

Pay Group	Authorized Paid Drills	Authorized Paid Days of Active Duty for Training		FY 1968 (Actual)			FY 1969 (Current Year)		FY 1970 (Budget Request)	
				Begin	Average	End	Average	End	Average	End
A	48	15	Officers	8,353	7,858	7,188	7,752	8,562	9,089	9,030
			Enlisted	31,752	32,079	31,126	31,397	34,138	35,140	34,944
B	24	15	Officers	2,328	2,312	2,326	2,414	2,510	2,516	2,520
			Enlisted	1,610	1,604	1,697	1,813	1,910	1,910	1,910
Y	0-	4 mos minimum	Enlisted	2,222	1,179	710	1,938	1,665	2,506	1,900
			Drill Pay + Non-Prior Service	Officers	10,681	10,170	9,514	10,166	11,072	11,605
			Enlisted	35,584	34,862	33,533	35,148	37,713	39,556	38,754
			Total	46,265	45,032	43,047	45,314	48,785	51,161	50,304
D	0-	15	Officers	2,692	2,427	2,427	2,220	2,220	2,280	2,280
			Enlisted	223	179	179	250	250	380	320
E	0-	30	Officers	57	37	37	60	60	-	-
			Enlisted	461	48	48	70	70	-	-
			Officers	2,709	2,464	2,464	2,280	2,280	2,280	2,280
			Enlisted	684	227	227	320	320	320	320
			Total	3,393	2,691	2,691	2,600	2,600	2,600	2,600
Total Paid Participants			Officers	13,390	12,634	11,978	12,446	13,352	13,885	13,630
			Enlisted	36,268	35,089	33,760	35,468	38,033	39,876	39,074
			Total	49,658	47,723	45,738	47,914	51,385	53,761	52,904

AIR FORCE RESERVE SECTION OFFICERS

Air Force Reserve officers performing full time active duty under Sections 265, 8019 and 8033 of Title 10, U. S. Code:

	FY 1968 (Actual)			FY 1969 (Current Year)		FY 1970 (Budget Request)	
	Begin	Average	End	Average	End	Average	End
Section 265 Officers	27	32	38	54	58	92	121
Section 8019 Officers	-	1	1	1	1	1	1
Section 8033 Officer	9	8	8	7	7	7	7
Total	36	41	47	62	66	100	129

PROGRAM 720: Reserve Personnel

SUMMARY REQUIREMENTS BY PROJECT (In Thousands)

Project No.	Title	FY 1968 (Actual)	FY 1969 (Estimate)	FY 1970 (Estimate)
(1)		(2)	(3)	(4)
721	Training, Pay Group A .....	\$ 36,489	\$ 40,222	\$ 46,863
722	Training, Pay Group B .....	3,248	4,103	4,428
723	Training, Pay Group D .....	1,494	1,760	1,877
724	Training, Pay Group E .....	101	146	-
725	Training, Pay Group F .....	4,801	5,086	6,892
726	School Training .....	2,278	4,483	7,300
727	Special Training .....	4,645	5,924	6,817
728	Administration and Support .....	862	1,465	2,249
TOTAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (OBLIGATIONS) .....		\$ 53,918	\$ 63,189	\$ 76,426

NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

For pay, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses for personnel of the Air National Guard on duty under sections 265, 8033, or 8496 of title 10 or section 708 of title 32, United States Code, or while undergoing training or while performing drills or equivalent duty, as authorized by law; ~~\$88,000,000~~ \$ 101,600,000 *Provided*, That obligations may be incurred under this appropriation without regard to section 107 of title 32, United States Code. (10 U.S.C. 261-81, 510, 591-95, 597-600, 651, 671-85, 2511, 3015, 8012, 8033, 8062, 8077-80, 8224-25, 8261, 8351-54, 8356, 8358-63, 8365-68, 8370-81, 8392-95, 8491, 8495-96, 8722, 9301, 9561-63, 9741; 31 U.S.C. 698; 32 U.S.C. 101-11, 301-05, 307-08, 312-33, 501-07, 701; 37 U.S.C. 201, 203-06, 301-10, 401-11, 414-19, 501-02, 901, 1002; 50 U.S.C. App. 2201-16; Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969; additional authorizing legislation to be proposed.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code: 07-05-3850-0-1-051		1968 actual	1969 estimate	1970 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>				
	Direct program: Reserve component personnel .....	84,071	91,400	101,600
	Reimbursable program: Reserve component personnel .....	93	110	110
10	Total obligations .....	84,163	91,510	101,710
<u>Financing:</u>				
Receipts and reimbursements from:				
11	Federal funds .....		-10	-10
14	Non-Federal sources <sup>1/</sup> .....	-93	-100	-100
25	Unobligated balance lapsing .....	329		
	<u>Budget authority</u> .....	84,400	91,400	101,600

<sup>1/</sup> Reimbursements from non-Federal sources are derived from sale of meals to officers from enlisted messes (10 U.S.C. §621).

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)--Continued

Identification code: 07-05-3850-0-1-051		19 68 actual	1969 estimate	19 70 estimate
<b>Budget authority:</b>				
40	Appropriation .....	87,600	88,000	101,600
41	Transferred to other accounts .....	-3,200	.....	.....
43	<u>Appropriation (adjusted)</u> .....	84,400	88,000	101,600
44.30	Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases .....	.....	3,400	.....
<b>Relation of obligations to outlays:</b>				
71	Obligations incurred, net .....	84,071	91,400	101,600
72	Obligated balance, start of year .....	11,657	7,091	12,491
74	Obligated balance, end of year .....	-7,091	-12,491	-15,091
77	Adjustments in expired accounts .....	-492	.....	.....
90	Outlays, excluding pay increase supplemental .....	88,144	83,100	98,500
91.30	Outlays from military pay act supplemental .....	.....	2,900	500

STANDARD FORM 3  
APR. 1941, Bureau of the Budget  
Circular No. A-11, Revised  
8-104

Type of  
Fund  
Account

Use for all 2-column budget schedules  
except detail of personnel services

16-77000-1

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
 NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

Object Classification (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code: 07-05-3850-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<b>Direct obligations:</b>			
11.7 Personnel compensation: Military .....	66,869	76,130	85,467
12.2 Personnel benefits: Military .....	7,986	6,886	7,564
21.0 Travel and transportation of persons .....	2,270	2,047	1,996
22.0 Transportation of things .....	336	276	309
26.0 Supplies and materials.....	6,560	5,996	6,194
42.0 Insurance claims and indemnities .....	50	65	70
<b>Total direct obligations .....</b>	<b>84,071</b>	<b>91,400</b>	<b>101,600</b>
<b>Reimbursable obligations:</b>			
26.0 Supplies and materials .....	93	110	110
<b>99.0 Total obligations .....</b>	<b>84,163</b>	<b>91,510</b>	<b>101,710</b>

STANDARD FORM 3  
 Apr. 1961, Bureau of the Budget  
 Circular No. 4-1-61 Revised

Type of  
 report  
 118

Use for all 2-column budget schedules  
 except detail of personnel services

PROGRAM 520: National Guard Personnel

SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS BY PROJECT (In Thousands)

: Program	:	:	:	:	:
: No.	Title	FY 1968	FY 1969	FY 1970	
:	(1)	Actual	Estimate	Estimate	:
:	:	(2)	(3)	(4)	:
521	Training, Pay Group A.....	\$ 64,938	\$ 69,334	\$ 75,054	
522	Training, Pay Group F.....	9,349	9,769	13,939	
523	School Training.....	5,407	7,358	7,622	
524	Special Training.....	2,887	3,173	3,197	
525	Administration and Support.....	1,582	1,876	1,898	
TOTAL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS (OBLIGATIONS).....		\$ 84,163	\$ 91,510	\$ 101,710	

PERSONNEL SUMMARY

Pay Group	Authorized Paid Drills	Authorized Paid Days of Active Duty for Tng.		FY 1968 (Actual)			FY 1969 (Current Year)		FY 1970 (Budget Request)	
				<u>Begin</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>End</u>
A	48	15	Off	10,566	10,130	9,292	9,733	11,183	11,501	11,853
			Enl	69,486	67,662	62,521	64,458	69,159	69,899	69,757
F	-0-	4 mos minimum	Enl	3,706	3,493	3,448	3,919	3,918	4,071	5,006
Total Paid Participants			Off	10,566	10,130	9,292	9,733	11,183	11,501	11,853
			Enl	73,192	71,155	65,969	68,377	73,077	73,970	74,763
			Total	83,758	81,285	75,261	78,110	84,260	85,471	86,616

AIR NATIONAL GUARD SECTION OFFICERS

Air National Guard officers performing full time active duty under Sections 265, 8033 and 8496 of Title 10, and Section 708, Title 32, U.S. Code:

	FY 1968 (Actual)			FY 1969 (Current Year)		FY 1970 (Budget Request)	
	<u>Begin</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>End</u>
Section 265 Officers	35	38	39	42	44	44	44
Section 8033 Officers	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Section 8496 Officers	27	27	27	27	27	27	27
Section 708 Officers	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Total	73	76	77	80	82	82	82

Mr. ADDABBO. The committee will come to order.

We will now consider the fiscal year 1970 request for Reserve and National Guard Personnel, Air Force.

We have before us today two distinguished gentlemen associated with the Reserve and National Guard programs for the Air Force: Maj. Gen. Tom E. Marchbanks, Jr., Chief of the Air Force Reserve; and Maj. Gen. Winston P. Wilson, Chief, National Guard Bureau.

We welcome you and your supporting witnesses.

The request for the Air Force Reserve Personnel for 1970 is \$87.7 million. This is an increase of \$14 million over the current estimate for 1969.

The National Guard is requesting \$101.6 million, an increase of \$10.2 million over the current estimate for fiscal year 1969.

#### GENERAL STATEMENT

We will hear the statements of General Marchbanks and General Wilson before asking any questions, General Marchbanks will you please proceed?

General MARCHBANKS.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:

As Chief, Air Force Reserve, it is a pleasure and privilege to appear before this Committee again to discuss the requirements of the Air Force Reserve Personnel Appropriation for Fiscal Year 1970.

We appreciate your interest in the Air Force Reserve and the support you have given us. Since our appearance before you last year, members of the Air Force Reserve have again demonstrated their capability to respond to national defense requirements.

#### ACCOMPLISHMENTS

For the third and fourth time since the end of the Korean conflict, Air Force Reserve units have been mobilized to augment and strengthen the active force during a critical period. In January and May 1968, fourteen Air Force Reserve units were mobilized because of increases in the level of Communist aggression in Korea and South Vietnam and a need to support our world-wide commitments. The response and performance of these units was fully professional, as expected, and once again proved the effectiveness of our Reserve training programs.

I think you will be interested in hearing what these mobilized units have accomplished. The following were involved: two Wing Headquarters with five Airlift Groups of C-124s, one HC-97 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron, one C-119 Tactical Airlift unit, three Aerial Port Squadrons, one Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron and one Medical Service Squadron. Within four hours after mobilization one Military Airlift Group was flying a C-124 carrying supplies to Southeast Asia.

Sixteen C-124s with crews and support personnel are currently on rotational temporary duty at Mildenhall, England, supporting our units in Europe and freeing an active force C-130 squadron for other missions. Other C-124s are operating in the United States, the Pacific and Southeast Asia. From the January mobilization date through December 31, 1968, the mobilized Military Airlift units flew 1,148 missions, 328 of them to Southeast Asia. Of the nearly 15,187 tons of cargo they airlifted during that time, approximately 2,000 tons were to Southeast Asia. Total flying time for all these missions was 33,664 hours. A portion of the personnel of the C-119 Tactical Airlift Group at Bakalar AFB, Indiana, was sent to Lockbourne AFB, Ohio for advanced training in the C-1190 Special Operations Mission (Gunship). Transition training was not required because of the vast experience of the unit in the C-1190. They are now in Vietnam providing close combat support. This is the first Air Force Reserve unit to fly armed combat missions since the Korean conflict, and also represents the first utilization of the C-1190 Gunship in combat.

The mobilized Reserve HC-97 Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron stationed at Selfridge AFB, Michigan has been to many parts of the world. The unit has had two aircraft stationed in Iceland, where they stand around the clock alert, since shortly after mobilization. Other HC-97s have covered such locations as Spain, Okinawa, Libya and the Philippines. The Aeromedical Evacuation unit from Kelly AFB was moved to Yokota, Japan, and its personnel have been flying medical evacuation routes from Vietnam to the United States. The three Aerial Port Squadrons were assimilated into Military Airlift Command port operations at their home stations at McGuire, McChord, and Travis Air Force Bases until their demobilization last December. However, during this period members of the 88th Aerial Port Squadron at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, were deployed on temporary duty to the Republic of Korea in July to augment the aerial port functions there. Prior to the Pueblo incident, the 315th Air Division

oper  
airl  
port  
Rese  
aeri  
perm  
the  
315t  
Rese  
sonn  
they  
the  
McCh  
also  
pati  
with  
acti

div  
fly  
Asia  
air-  
unit  
help  
ment  
pen  
tion  
of  
par  
comb

Squa  
res  
thr  
C-11  
Crew  
tra  
led  
for

exe.  
at  
trew  
thi  
tic  
air  
oper  
175  
our  
men  
Schc  
Sam  
nor  
pat.  
rel  
Res.

operated only two aerial ports in Korea. The post-Pueblo increased airlift requirements necessitated opening of three additional aerial ports. From mid-July to December, these mobilized Air Force Reservists represented more than 50 per cent of the entire military aerial port work force in Korea. In addition to augmenting the two permanent ports, the Reservists provided 100 per cent of manning at the three newly opened terminals. Here is what the Commander of the 315th Air Division had to say about the performance of these Reservists: "The professional effort rendered by all of these personnel during their entire tours of duty, and the rapidity with which they became oriented to the Korean aerial port operation attests to the excellence of their training in the 88th Aerial Port Squadron at McGuire AFB, New Jersey." The Medical Service Squadron at Scott AFB also remained at its home station helping to handle the increased patient load there. All of the Air Force Reserve units still serving with the active force are scheduled to be released from extended active duty in June of 1969.

#### NON-MOBILIZED UNITS

Non-mobilized Reserve flying units have also compiled an impressive record. Our crews and support personnel have been utilized to fly critical cargo to various parts of the world, including Southeast Asia, while performing their training missions as part of the Military Airlift Command. The readiness of our Aerospace Rescue and Recovery units has been demonstrated often as they responded to requests for help in performing actual search and rescue missions. The accomplishments of our dedicated Reservists are numerous, and I should like to spend a few moments with you on some of their more noteworthy contributions. I want to emphasize the fact that these accomplishments, while of great value to the active Air Force, were produced primarily as part of the required training so essential to keep our Reserve units combat ready.

#### TRAINING SUPPORT

In 1968, the Air Force Reserve formed a Combat Crew Training Squadron for training C-130 aircrew members - active as well as reserve forces. From the beginning of this operation last April through the end of 1968, the training squadron graduated 142 qualified C-130 pilots and 35 flight engineers. Also, we are operating a Combat Crew Training Squadron to train active force crews in the C-119 aircraft. From 1 April through 31 December 1968, the C-119 CCTS graduated 61 pilots, 82 navigators and 53 flight mechanics for the active force.

#### JOINT EXERCISES AND ARMY SUPPORT

Our Air Force Reserve units participated in three major joint exercises during FY 1968. One was a joint airborne exercise conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In that operation, Air Force Reserve crews airdropped 1,897 troops for the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. This was followed by the Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) practice/field exercise "Run-Awake" and the operation "Combat Fox". Sixty aircraft (C-119s and C-124s) were used in airlift and air mobility operations for these important exercises. The units flew more than 175 missions in support of Tactical Air Command and the U.S. Army. Our Air Force Reserve also responded to Tactical Air Command requirements and furnished C-119 aircraft and crews to support the Army Jump School, Fort Benning, Georgia, and Army Airborne Divisions at Fort Campbell, Kentucky and Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During FY 1968, more than 126,000 paratroopers were dropped by our C-119s. Participation by our Reserve crews, in support of Army requirements, has released C-130 aircraft for higher priority missions and provided the Reserve units with realistic training.

### AIRLIFT FOR MAC AND OTHER AGENCIES

While the active Air Force was increasingly preoccupied with Southeast Asia, Air Force Reserve airlift units contributed significantly to fulfillment of Air Force obligations. Reserve crews flew 17,571 hours airlifting cargo and passengers directly to Southeast Asia in FY 1968.

Air Force Reserve crews flew to most of the European countries, the Canal Zone, Labrador, Greenland, Africa, South America, Australia, Okinawa and Japan. We completed 1,880 such missions airlifting almost 13,000 tons of cargo plus priority support personnel.

The Air Force Reserve performed 6,692 missions, airlifting more than 52,000 passengers and 8,000 tons of cargo in support of the major air commands, Southern Command Europe, NASA, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and the Department of Interior.

### SUPPORT OF ACTIVE AERIAL PORTS

Our Air Force Reserve Aerial Port Squadrons repeatedly demonstrated their capability to augment and perform functions of MAC air terminal facilities. Eight of the 9 remaining squadrons completed their annual active duty tours away from their home stations, two at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Reserve personnel were integrated with their active duty counterparts and worked as reserve crews under active duty supervision. This type performance has maintained a high degree of mutual respect between the reserve units and their host organizations.

### AEROSPACE RESCUE AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES

Air Force Reserve Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadrons flew 259 missions totaling 1,523 hours in support of the active Air Force and NASA during FY 1968. The vast majority of these missions fell into two major categories - actual search and rescue or precautionary orbits. These missions took reserve crews to such diverse locations as Grand Turk Island in the Atlantic; Vancouver, British Columbia; Guaymas, Mexico; Panama Canal Zone; and other off-shore locations in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico.

### MOVEMENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES DURING CIVIL DISTURBANCE ACTIONS

The series of civil disturbances last summer created an extensive and immediate need for airlift. Under "Operation Garden Plot" the Air Force Reserve quickly and effectively responded to the requirement and provided about 35 per cent of the airlift necessary to move troops and supplies into the major cities affected. As part of this effort, our command post kept some crews and aircraft on a standby status during the critical periods, subject to call if needed, but not on a pay basis. This produced another total force capability at a minimum cost and without the need for mobilization.

### A NEW CONCEPT

During FY 1968, we implemented a new concept in total force utilization when we established the first C-141 Associate Unit. Under this program, Reservists fly and perform maintenance on modern active force equipment. These personnel provide increased utilization and a mobilization surge capability. These crew members train in such a way that they can fill in on active crews, or fly as an all reserve crew. The first C-141 airlift mission to Southeast Asia flown by an all-reserve crew took place in August 1968, less than five months after the first unit was formed.

I will now review the developments in the FY 1969 program since our last appearance before you.

#### FY 1969 RESERVE PROGRAM

Our current FY 1969 Reserve Personnel Appropriation, Air Force, requirement is 73.7 million dollars, which includes 10.5 million dollars for AFROTC. This has provided funds for the retention of four C-119 tactical airlift groups previously scheduled for inactivation during FY 1969 and excludes funding for those units mobilized in January and May 1968 while on active duty.

#### FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGE

During FY 1969, in addition to the return from active duty of those units mobilized, the following force structure changes are programmed as indicated in Table I:

a. Four C-119 groups are to convert to C-141 Military Airlift Squadrons (Associate).

b. Three C-119 groups are to convert to Tactical Air Support Groups.

The three Tactical Air Support Groups (TASG) to be activated during the 4th quarter of FY 1969 are for the purpose of supporting Army Reserve forces just as active force forward air controller units support active Army forces. They will provide Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP), with ground and air equipment, for detailed coordination and control of tactical air support. These units will utilize U-3 aircraft until the O-1 and O-2 "Bird Dog" type aircraft become available.

#### FY 1970 RESERVE PROGRAM

The appropriation request of 87.7 million dollars submitted to you in January will provide military personnel costs to support the force structure as reflected in Table I.

TABLE I  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
AIR FORCE RESERVE UNIT FORCE STRUCTURE

Flying Units	End FY 68	End FY 69	End FY 70
C-119 Tactical Airlift Groups	17	11	5
C-124 Military Airlift Groups	14	19	14
C-130 Tactical Airlift Groups	1	1	3
C-130 Tactical Airlift Sq (CCTS)	1	1	1
C-141 Military Airlift Sqs (Assoc)	1	5	11
Tactical Air Support Groups (TASG)	-	3	3
C-9A Aeromedical Evacuation Group (Assoc)	-	-	1
Aerospace Rescue & Recovery Sqs	4	5	5
Non-Flying Units	185	189	187

As reflected in above table the following force structure changes are programmed for Fiscal Year 1970:

a. One C-119 group will be converted to a C-130 Tactical Airlift Group and one other C-119 group will convert to an Associate C-141 Military Airlift Group. In addition, in accordance with the FY 70 Appropriation Request, four C-119 groups are scheduled for inactivation.

b. Five of the C-124 Military Airlift Groups are also programmed for conversion to new missions. Three will convert to Associate C-141 Military Airlift Groups, one will convert to a C-130 Tactical Airlift Group and one to an Associate C-9A Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron.

c. The six additional C-141 associate units in the program include the four conversions and two newly activated units.

In addition we will have 187 non-flying units for FY 1970 which consist of: aeromedical evacuation, medical service, aerial port squadrons, military airlift support, maintenance and supply squadrons, air postal groups and censorship squadron. These units have a wartime mobilization assignment to major air commands, and receive the same supervision, training, and inspection as the active force units.

#### NEW UNIT MISSIONS

In the FY 1970 program we have identified valid and essential new missions to be performed by the Air Force Reserve in support of the overall Air Force requirement. In addition to increasing the number of units in the C-130 Tactical Airlift Groups and the C-141 Associate program, we are planning to institute a C-9A Aeromedical Evacuation Associate program. The C-9A Associate program will be similar in concept to the C-141 Associate program. The Reservists will train directly with the active force unit to which it will be associated. They will use the same modern aircraft, facilities, and training equipment as the active force units. These personnel will augment the active force unit in aircrews, maintenance and support type activities, and will allow the unit to increase its flying activities by 250 flying hours per month.

#### TOTAL FY 1970 FUNDING SUPPORT

The average strength required in FY 1970 for the manning of all Air Force Reserve units is 45,719. In addition to providing funding support for the reservists assigned to units, the request for the Reserve Personnel Program also includes funding requirements for:

a. 8,042 Air Force Reservists in the individual program, including 2,600 who are paid only for their annual active duty tour.

b. Approximately 344,000 training days for special and school tours for transitional, proficiency training and special support activities.

c. Approximately 100 Air Force Reserve officers on extended active duty who are responsible for reserve affairs as authorized by Title 10, U.S.C.

#### UNIT MANNING

Another significant change in our program for FY 1970 is the approved increase in drill pay manning, which will help to improve the readiness and capability of our units. All of the flying units except the C-119 groups are authorized 100% manning for FY 1970, and all of our other units will be authorized a minimum of 90% drill pay manning.

#### AIR FORCE RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS

Also included in this Appropriation Request are funds associated with the Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps (AFROTC).

The mission of the Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps is to commission career-oriented second lieutenants in response to Air Force requirements, through a college campus program. Approximately one-third of our new Air Force officers are trained and commissioned through this program.

In FY 1970 the Air Force ROTC program will be offered in 175 colleges and universities, with a programmed beginning enrollment of 67,150 AFROTC cadets. Of this total 56,000 will be in the General Military (Basic) Course and the remaining 11,150, in the Professional Officers (Advance) Course. Included in this total enrollment are approximately 4,750 cadets in the financial assistance or scholarship program. It is estimated that 4,500 officers will be commissioned from this enrollment.

A separate division of the Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps is the Air Force Junior ROTC program. The mission of this program is to acquaint secondary school students with the aerospace age, to develop informed citizens, strengthen character, and to motivate students for careers in the Air Force. We have included in our estimate 28,000 cadets, from 200 units, to be enrolled in the Junior ROTC program in FY 1970. We presently have 153 firm commitments for Junior AFROTC units.

The funds included in the Reserve Personnel Appropriation for the AFROTC program will provide for uniforms, subsistence allowances, pay while attending summer field training, and associate travel costs. The FY 1969 revised estimate in this appropriation for the AFROTC program is 10.5 million dollars, and the estimated cost for FY 1970 is 11.3 million dollars. The additional requirement of eight hundred thousand dollars in FY 1970 supports an increase of 750 students in the financial assistance program, and also provides for expansion of the Junior ROTC program.

#### ADJUSTMENT TO FY 1970 APPROPRIATION REQUEST

Subsequent to the submission of the budget estimates in January, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has approved new missions for four Air Force Reserve C-119 groups which previously had been scheduled for inactivation in FY 1970. These new missions are:

- a. One Tactical Air Support Group.
- b. One Tactical Air Support Combat Crew Training Squadron.
- c. Two AC-119 Special Operations Groups (Gunship).

The Air Force Reserve is presently authorized three TAS groups. One additional group is required to provide support for one Army National Guard division. The establishment of a Reserve TAS CCTS would add sufficient training capability to support the proposed eight Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard TAS groups. At present, the combat crew training capability is limited to a small CCTS in the active establishment. The AC-119 Gunship units are to augment the overall Air Force requirement in contingency situations or complete mobilization. They will be trained to provide close combat support fire-power for ground forces.

The drill strength and related costs for three of these units are presently included in the January estimates in anticipation of retention and or conversion. The additional requirement in the Reserve Personnel Appropriation for the conversion of these four units to the new missions is an increase of 266 drill pay space average and 1.5 million dollars.

SUMMARY

In summary, the revised FY 1970 estimate for this appropriation is 89.2 million dollars of which 11.3 million dollars is required for the AFROTC program. The balance, 77.9 million dollars will provide training for the reserve personnel assigned to 47 flying units, 187 non-flying units, 8,042 individual augmentees and supporting schools, special tours and administration type costs.

## GENERAL STATEMENT

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson will you please proceed.  
General WILSON.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

Once again it is my privilege to appear before this Committee to present the Air National Guard Personnel requirements for the coming fiscal year and to give you a report on the accomplishments and progress made by the Air National Guard.

The past year has been recorded as another challenging, but rewarding period for the Air National Guard. The individuals and units comprising the force have continued to excel in every respect, by achieving new accomplishments and establishing unprecedented milestones. First and most significant, which I covered in quite some detail with this Committee last year, was the Air National Guard mobilization. I am sure all of you are well aware of this event. On January 25, 1968, the President ordered to active duty eight Tactical Fighter Groups and three Tactical Reconnaissance Groups. Then in May two F-86 Groups and one C-121 Aeromedical Group were mobilized. These mobilizations resulted in 10,511 personnel being called to active duty including 560 pilots. The F-100 units that had been authorized 100% manning as part of our designated priority forces were immediately available for overseas deployment within 36 hours of mobilization; whereas the non-priority units required an extensive draw down of personnel and equipment from the resources of the active Air Force requiring a minimum of thirty (30) days prior to attaining a sustained combat capability. We emphasize high manning for the critical skills at the expense of having no guaranteed ability to sustain full operations for a prolonged period if an emergency did dictate their recall. The mobilization of last year is now almost history with the units either returned to State status or scheduled to return in the next few months. I would be remiss if I did not dwell for a few minutes on what happened to these units and the personnel comprising them. Of the fourteen (14) units mobilized, nine (9) served with distinction overseas, four (4) accomplished vital combat crew training missions for the Air Force and the Aeromedical Evacuation Group augmented the capability of Military Airlift Command in the Continental U.S. freeing faster, longer range aircraft for Southeast Asia evacuation support. Of the 4,903 men serving overseas, 2,782 were with their parent units in Vietnam, Korea or Japan. The remainder were individually assigned to one of the 39 foreign bases that hosted Air National Guardsmen. Personnel remaining in the U.S. were about equally dispersed. Approximately 2,750 remained with their parent unit and approximately 2,130 were reallocated to some 347 different locations.

Notwithstanding a certain amount of disagreement with their circumstances, announced vocally or through any available media, morale has remained surprisingly high among the recalled personnel. We are anticipating a fairly rapid reconstitution of our units. Mobilization is, of course, the ultimate potential of the Air National Guard, however, I would like to continue with a brief discussion of other accomplishments provided by Air National Guard personnel. Examples are many and include such events as Aeromedical Evacuation, Airlift Support, Round-the-Clock ADC Alert, Refueling Support in Europe, Pacific Fast Race, Guard Strike and Participation in JCS exercises. I would like to spend a few minutes on these examples. While training is a continuing and often almost invisible benefit, some significant outputs of the training activities become reportable and beneficial by-products of the training and reflect steps on how to get double duty from the training dollar.

#### AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION PROGRAM

In August of 1965, the Air National Guard and Hq MAC inaugurated the live Aeromedical Evacuation Program for the Air National Guard. This program makes further productive peacetime utilization of selected airlift units by augmenting the regular MAC program on a continuous basis. In February 1968, the first of four airlift units was redesignated to Aeromedical Airlift units, one unit being recalled to active duty in this capacity. These Aeromedical Evacuation units and Aeromedical Airlift units have been integrated with the Active Program and fly ZI and near off-shore missions on a regular and routine basis. Crews are comprised of volunteers who are able to adjust their civilian pursuits to permit their participation in this important function. In FY 68, these units flew 386 missions involving patients and passengers. In the first half of FY 69, they accrued over 100 additional missions. The manner in which the Air National Guard airlift fleet responded to the many and varied commitments, while enjoying an accident free year, indicates the dedication of all airlift personnel to the accomplishment of the tasks assigned and also their high degree of skill and job qualification which enabled them to perform their tasks as professionals.

## AIRLIFT SUPPORT

In Calendar Year 1968, the 24 airlift units of the Air National Guard transported 13,463 tons of revenue cargo for Military Airlift Command. Of this, 3,572 tons were to SEA. In addition to these regularly scheduled missions, the airlift units flew flights within CONUS in support of Guardlift and Guardstrike missions. In my opinion, this is a remarkable accomplishment for part-time airmen and represents the epitome of the true American who stands ready to serve when needed.

## ROUND-THE-CLOCK-ADC ALERT

All 22 of our fighter interceptor units continue to provide 24 hour a day Aerospace Defense alert. The Air National Guard has been performing this function routinely since 1955, which is an ideal mission for the ANG. Optimum returns from the training dollar have been the result of this effective and productive employment of a Reserve component to help carry a part of the active load.

## OPERATION CREEK PARTY

Operation Creek Party which originated 1 May 1967 has continued through calendar year 1968 and to the present in 1969. To support Hq USAFE fighter/recce air refueling training requirements, the five Air National Guard tanker groups maintain five KC-97L tanker aircraft at all times. Crews and support personnel serve on a volunteer basis and are rotated as necessary. The support tendered by the Air National Guard has released additional SAC KC-135 tanker aircraft for SEA.

## PACIFIC "FAST RACE"

In June of 1968, the Air Force Logistics Command asked the National Guard Bureau to provide 18,000 ANG volunteer mandays to augment the Pacific GEEIA region. GEEIA is the Ground Electronics Engineering and Installation Agency, an intermediate command under AFLC with three regions in CONUS, one in Europe and one in the Pacific area. The GEEIA mission is the installation and maintenance of all ground communications-electronics and weather equipment and systems. The National Guard Bureau notified AFLC it would support the proposed participation to the maximum extent possible. We agreed to fund for mandays for those personnel who had not attended annual field training for the year. All other costs were to be borne from AFLC resources. We requested volunteer participation from the 19 ANG GEEIA Squadrons located in 15 states. To date, approximately 300 Air Guard personnel have volunteered for 9,000 mandays. Additional personnel will volunteer as Pacific GEEIA identifies other skills required. Periods of duty range from 31 to 89 days. Air National Guard GEEIA personnel are presently located at Hickam AFB, Hawaii; Kadena AB, Okinawa; Tachikawa, Japan; and Clark AFB in the Philippine Islands. Comments from the regular GEEIA personnel have been quite favorable concerning the work being accomplished by the Guard augmentees. Our personnel are receiving invaluable training while actually performing duties and utilizing skills currently needed by the Regular forces. This work is a follow-on of the same type project I reported to you last year when our GEEIA personnel worked on "Fast Race" in France, removing valuable communications and navigation equipment.

## GUARD STRIKE

The Air National Guard planned and executed a combined exercise in July and August 1968 called Guard Strike II. This exercise employed two Tactical Control Groups; four Communications Groups; elements of five Fighter Wings; three Tactical Reconnaissance Wings; two Air Refueling Wings; three Aerospace Defense Wings; seven Military Airlift Wings; three Air Commando Groups; and one Weather Squadron. These units comprised two Task Forces deployed in the Northeast and the northern Midwest sections of the Continental U.S. The two Task Forces exercised with approximately 16,000 troops of the Army Guard at five locations in the East and Midwest. In addition, Navy, Coast Guard, and Army and Air Reserve Forces were integrated into the exercises on a limited basis. The purpose of this exercise was to test the capability of men to deploy equipment to field locations, install and operate communications and electronics systems and to fly aircraft through the system for realistic testing. A total of 4,569 flying hours were expended and the exercise was considered a tremendous success. Another exercise is being planned for July and August of 1969 on a reduced scale. This is considered advisable for this year to permit more concentration on the training of Communications-Electronics requirements. This exercise will take place in the southeastern and western U.S.

## JCS EXERCISES

During the past year, Air National Guard tactical forces have participated in eight JCS approved exercises, and are scheduled for three more during FY 69. Three of the exercises, PUNCH CARD III, PUNCH CARD IV, and PUNCH CARD V, were conducted in Alaska in support of assigned U.S. Army units.

Two exercises were performed in Hawaii, also in conjunction with Army maneuvers. During these exercises, our F-84F fighter aircraft dropped live ordnance on the majority of the missions flown. The largest exercise supported was DEEP FURROW 68, a NATO exercise conducted in Greece. Thirty-six Air National Guard fighter aircraft were deployed, using KC-135 tankers to refuel enroute to Greece. The employment phase of the exercise was five days during which our fighter aircraft flew simulated close air support missions in joint operations with Greek Army units. BOLD SHOT/BRIM FIRE 2-69, conducted in Puerto Rico, used ANG RF-84s to provide photo reconnaissance.

#### EFFECTIVENESS OF UNITS AND PERSONNEL

All of our organizations are tested by the same standards that apply to like units in the active establishment, through the media of Operation Readiness Inspections (ORIs) and General Inspections. During CY 1967, our units received a total of 55 ORIs and 709 General Inspections, and attained a passing rate of 93% and 98%, respectively. We also have a program in the Air National Guard for testing our response capabilities. Each unit is required to perform test surprise alerts during the year. I need not dwell on the results; the response capability evidenced by the mobilization represented the ultimate test of the Air National Guard to respond when called. Since the quality of productive effort is determined by the quality of personnel, strict attention is continually focused on the individual Guardsman in terms of physical fitness and job qualification. The Air National Guard criteria for an individual's physical capability is the same as the active establishment. Constant screening is accomplished to maintain a physically qualified force. Job qualification as well as physical fitness is of paramount importance. Criteria is established by the active establishment and is rigid by any standard. Gentlemen, thus far, I have covered some of the outstanding accomplishments as well as the effectiveness of the Air National Guard. I would like to spend the remainder of the time on the fiscal aspects of FY 1970. I believe that I can best do this by a brief comparative analysis of FY 1970 and the current year FY 1969.

#### NATIONAL GUARD PERSONNEL, AIR FORCE

The programmed strength for the Air National Guard in FY 70 is 86,616 personnel (ending) with an average of 85,471. This compares to an average strength of 78,110 and ending strength of 84,260 programmed in FY 69. This drill strength considers the return of all the units that were mobilized by the end of this fiscal year. We are requesting \$101.6 Million in the National Guard Personnel, Air Force appropriation to support the drill strength that I have just mentioned. This will provide pay and allowances of officers and airmen on active duty training, unit training assemblies, basic military training, school training, special tours of active duty in support of active force exercises, clothing, subsistence, travel and other personnel expenses. The FY 70 appropriation request of \$101.6 Million compares with \$91.4 Million for FY 69, a difference of \$10.2 Million.

Gentlemen, I will next discuss the scope of the Air National Guard activity to include an explanation of the differences in costs between FY 70 and FY 69.

#### ANNUAL FIELD TRAINING (P521)

This Annual Field Training program is, of course, legislative in nature. It provides that each Guardsman perform 15 days field training each year. This program is designed to integrate the training of the individual with the training of the unit to which he belongs. The FY 70 increase of \$1.4 Million for field training reflects the increase in average drill strength of 7,361 spaces resulting principally from the early demobilization.

#### UNIT TRAINING ASSEMBLIES (P521)

This program, like field training, is legislatively designed. It provides that each Guardsman participate in 48 drills each year; further, each Guardsman on current flying status performs 36 additional drills each year. These are referred to as AFTPs or additional flying training periods. During these drills, the Guardsman has the opportunity to increase his skill level which contributes to the overall combat effectiveness of his unit. The unit training assembly program is \$4.3 Million higher in FY 70 than in FY 69 to support the increased average drill strength as previously mentioned.

#### NON-PRIOR SERVICE BASIC AND TECHNICAL TRAINING PROGRAM (P522)

The Air Guardsman receives his initial basic training at Lackland Air Force Base along with recruits of the regular establishment.

Hence, the stringent and rapid pace established for the regulars is equally applicable to the Guardsmen. Within the last year, over 16,711 individuals were upgraded by OJT; over 18,647 individuals were enrolled in correspondence courses. The program has resulted in an overall increase in skill manning from 69% as of December 31, 1967 to 70.5 as of December 31, 1968. Further, we take maximum advantage of formal training for non-prior service personnel by seeking and filling the maximum number of Air Training Command school quotas commensurate with the requirements of the job, the individual's ability to progress, and the availability of approved funds. About 70% of the recruits enter technical training schools immediately upon completion of basic military training. The remainder are required to complete their active duty through home station "on the job training."

During the current year, we will enter 9,272 non-prior service individuals into training. For FY 1970, we will enter 12,671 into training. There is a net increase of \$4.2 Million in the program accounted for by the increased input of 3,399 basics over FY 1969. This increase in program and cost relates principally to the recruitment necessary to fill vacancies that we expect to occur as a result of individuals in the mobilized units having completed their obligated service.

#### SCHOOL TRAINING (P523)

This program is designed to enhance the skills of Air Guardsmen through attendance at formal courses of instruction offered by Air Training Command. These courses include flight training, service schools, and technical schools. At the officer level we have taken maximum advantage of the professional schooling offered by the Command and Staff College and Air War College, keeping in mind at all times the skill requirements, the individual's potential, and the availability of funds.

The flight training program reflects an increase of \$.3 Million over the current year. This represents an increase in advance flying training due to a higher grade of prior service pilot procurement that will require qualification or requalification in Guard aircraft, and aircraft conversions during FY 1970.

#### SPECIAL TRAINING (P524)

This program provides the Air Guardsmen with training not included in field training, unit training assemblies, basic military training or formal schooling. It includes, but is not limited to, overwater training flights for personnel in our airlift units, readiness training, simulator training, physiological training, etc. FY 70 and FY 69 are comparable.

#### ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

This program provides for the pay and allowances of ANG officers serving under Section 265, 8033, 8496 of Title 10, United States Code, as well as Section 708 of Title 32, United States Code, death gratuities paid to Air Guard survivors, disability pay and the employer's contributions to the Service Group Life Insurance program. FY 70 and FY 69 costs are comparable.

#### NEW MISSIONS

At this time, Gentlemen, I would like to introduce a change to the Military Personnel Budget I have been discussing. The OSD/BOB review and approval of the ANG program, as presented, included only 85 flying units in FY 1970 which would represent a reduction of seven (7) units from our current force structure. Subsequently, a package for seven new missions for the ANG was approved by OSD. These seven (7) new missions are as follows:

1. One additional TASG - FY 1/70.
2. Two additional KC-97 Air Refueling Groups - FY 1/70.
3. One additional F-100 TFG - FY 3/70.
4. One F-100 CCTS - FY 1/70.
5. Two additional C-141 Associate Groups - one in FY 4/70 and one FY 4/71.

The new missions enumerated above will replace the following:

1. Two F-89 ADC units.
2. Three F-102 ADC units.
3. Two C-97 Airlift units.

Because the military strength and related costs for five of these units were already included in the Budget in anticipation of these mission conversions, the additive dollar requirement in the Military Personnel Appropriation is a nominal \$1.5 Million. Of this amount, \$1.4 Million is required in P521 for field training and unit training assemblies and \$.1 Million is required in P524 for special training.

The inclusion of the above amount brings the total Military Personnel requirements up to an adjusted amount of \$103.1 Million.

The additional funds will provide for 1,528 average drill strength and 1,855 end strength. Most importantly, the ANG force structure would remain at the current desired level of 92 flying units.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION**

In summary, I have covered the highlights of our FY 1970 Military Personnel requirements generally by a brief comparison with FY 1969. The trust and support of this Committee over the past years has permitted the Air National Guard to progress to its present high state of readiness. I trust that our accomplishments will warrant the continued confidence and support of the Committee. This concludes my statement. I will now endeavor to answer any questions you may have.

## CHANGES TO RESERVE BUDGET

Mr. ADDABBO. General Marchbanks, in your statement you discuss an upward revision to the budget now before us of 266 drill space averages and \$1.5 million. Are you aware of any other changes to this budget?

General MARCHBANKS. Yes, sir. There is pending \$1 million reduction due to reduced manning of some of our nonflying units. This will reduce average drill strength by 652, and end strength by 749. This reduction, coupled with the increase of \$1.5 million for 266 average drill strength and 505 end strength for retention of four C-119 units and conversion to new missions, will reflect a net change in the budget of \$500,000, and decrease of 386 average drill strength and 244 end strength.

Mr. ADDABBO. Has that been taken into consideration in the preparation of this budget?

General MARCHBANKS. No, it has not been included.

## CHANGES TO NATIONAL GUARD BUDGET

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, in your statement you discuss an upward revision to the budget now before us of 1,528 drill space averages and \$1.5 million. Are you aware of any other changes to this budget?

General WILSON. No, sir. This is the primary change. It was due to the retention of units scheduled for inactivation. That is about the only change.

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, is the related drill strength included in your authorization request now pending before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees?

General WILSON. Yes. The average strength is in that bill.

## ADJUSTMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH NEW MISSIONS

Mr. ADDABBO. In a letter from the Department of the Air Force dated March 18, 1969, the new changes to the Reserve and Guard which you both discussed in your statements are outlined in some detail. In this letter, the net effect on the Reserve and Guard is said to be a decrease of 1,457 drill pay spaces.

General Marchbanks, how does this tie to your requested increase of 266 drill spaces?

General MARCHBANKS. A total drill space strength of 1,376 is required for the retention of the four C-119 units in their new mission. Of this total 1,110 spaces have been included in the January estimates in anticipation of retention and or conversion. The 266 drill pay spaces represent additional requirements for the conversion of these units, which requires \$1.5 million. In the letter of March 18, the differences in drill pay represents the net difference due to conversion, which is plus 99 drill pay spaces for the Air Force Reserve.

Mr. ADDABBO. In other words, without this decrease of 1,457 personnel there would have been an increase of \$1,500,000?

General MARCHBANKS. The net increase would be only \$500,000.

General PITTS. If I might clarify, Mr. Chairman, the apparent discrepancy of a decrease in end strength and an increase in dollars is a net-out of the increase in end strength necessary for the retention of the four Reserve units, and the decrease in end strength associated with the nonflying units. The dollar effect is \$1,500,000 increase for the new missions for the four C-119 units that are being retained, and the \$1 million decrease for nonflying units giving you a net of \$500,000 which was requested. The result is a reduced end strength but in an increased dollar requirement because of higher costs of manning in flying units.

Mr. ADDABBO. This letter of the Air Force of March 18 does not really reflect a reduction. We are still talking about increases, in the overall picture.

General PITTS. What was the date of that letter?

Mr. ADDABBO. March 18, 1969.

Colonel LORETTI. Are you referring to the news release?

Mr. ADDABBO. No. I am referring to a letter from the Department of the Air Force, Office of the Secretary, dated March 18, 1969.

Colonel LORETTI. This is the letter sent to Members of Congress announcing the new missions for the units that were scheduled for inactivation. In the Air Force Reserve there were four units identified. It refers to the four units scheduled for inactivation that will be retained and the drill pay spaces associated with them.

In the Air Force Reserve, the dollar figure for this adjustment is \$1,500,000 to retain these units. That is the figure we are talking to with an average strength increase of 266 and an end strength increase of 505.

The \$1 million is another action that took place. This is in the overall adjustment of the Air Force budget.

Mr. ADDABBO. We are speaking of the Reserve. The letter relates to the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard. The Air Force Reserve is your budget, your presentation.

General WILSON. It is both of them.

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, how would this decrease tie to your request for 1,528 additional drill spaces?

General WILSON. In the President's budget there are drill spaces for 90 units. Two of the units that are on the conversion schedule are not included in the budget. The 1,528 increase in the average drill strength is the increase required for these two units.

Mr. ADDABBO. Again I say, then, this letter is not factual. In other words, there is no reduction.

General WILSON. In some of these units there is a reduced unit manning authorization from that of current missions.

Mr. ADDABBO. But on the overall plan it did not increase.

General WILSON. No, sir. The 1,528 increase we are requesting primarily results from the fact that the President's budget did not include drill spaces for two of the seven units now scheduled for new missions.

Mr. ADDABBO. So there is no reduction in Air Force Reserve or Air National Guard? We actually have an increase.

General WILSON. We actually have an increase in the Air Guard over the President's budget.

Colonel LORETTI. That does not apply to the Air Force Reserve. There is a decrease there.

Mr. ADDABBO. How could there be a decrease if you are asking for 266 additional drill spaces?

General PITTS. I tried to explain that by saying that the dollar increase associated with the retention of four C-119 units was greater than the decrease associated with nonflying units. Therefore, there is a net dollar increase of \$500,000, although there is a net decrease in average drill strength and in end strengths.

Mr. ADDABBO. In the Air Force Reserve what is the reduction of the nonflying units?

General PITTS. There is an average drill strength reduction of 652, and an end strength reduction of 749 spaces. That would leave you a reduction, net reduction, in the Air Force Reserve end strength, of 244. That is a net between the increase for the flying units and the decrease for the nonflying units. I think I might clarify this by saying I have not seen that letter, Mr. Chairman, but I don't think that the letter addresses the nonflying units. I think that is where the discrepancy lies.

General WILSON. This letter addressed only these 11 units that we are discussing. The pluses and minuses, including the manning of two units in the Guard adds to 1,528 additional averages drill spaces.

Mr. ADDABBO. This letter is a catchall. It says: "This will permit a reduction in the total number of Reserve units required to supplement the active airlift fleet," which could be flying or nonflying.

General WILSON. Sir, they are converting these units to other missions. There is a reduction in some missions and corresponding gains to the active force in other missions.

Mr. ADDABBO. General Marchbanks, does the budget now before us reflect a loss of drill pay spaces as a result of the inactivation of the 349th Military Airlift Wing at Hamilton Air Force Base?

General MARCHBANKS. The fiscal year 1970 budget reflects a loss of 126 drill pay spaces as a result of this inactivation and a concurrent action to activate a C-141 (associate) Wing and Group at Travis Air Force Base.

Mr. ADDABBO. What about the loss of drill pay spaces as a result of the relocation of the 908th Tactical Airlift Group at Brookley Air Force Base, Ala.?

General MARCHBANKS. The relocation and conversion to a Tactical Air Support Group of the 908th Tactical Airlift Group results in a loss of 66 drill pay spaces. This loss is reflected in the fiscal year 1969 revised strengths. This action is to occur in April 1969.

#### READINESS OF AIR FORCE RESERVE UNITS

Mr. ADDABBO. What is the current readiness posture of the Air Force Reserve?

General MARCHBANKS. I will convert our manning status into readiness posture. For fiscal year 1969 our readiness posture in a manning level is 90 percent for all of our Tactical Airlift Groups, 100 percent for our C-124 Military Airlift Groups, 100 percent for the C-130 Tactical Airlift Groups, 100 percent for our C-141 Military Airlift Groups, 100 percent for the Tactical Air Support Groups, 90 percent for the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadrons, 90 percent for our Aeromedical Evacuation Groups, 66 percent for our Medical

Service Units, 91 percent for our Aerial Port Squadrons, 90 percent for our Military Airlift Support Squadrons, and 90 percent for our Maintenance and Supply Squadrons, and 92 percent for our Air Postal Groups and Censorship Squadrons.

For fiscal year 1970 we have very few changes, only that we go from 90 to 100 percent for our Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadrons, we go from 90 percent in our Medical Service Units—rather, we go from 66 percent to 90 percent in Medical Service Units, then we go from 91 to 100 percent in our Aerial Port Squadrons, from 90 to 100 percent in our Military Airlift Support Squadrons, from 90 to 100 percent in our Maintenance and Supply Squadrons, and the Air Postal Groups and Censorship Squadrons remain the same.

Mr. ADDABBO. This sounds like your manning posture. What would be your actual readiness in case of a callup tomorrow?

General MARCHBANKS. Our C status. I don't have that. I can supply that for the record.

Mr. ADDABBO. Place it in the record.

(The information follows:)

Operational Readiness of Air Force Reserve Units:

Thirty Units of the 38 flying units are combat ready (C-1 or C-2).

Two C-124 units are marginally combat ready (C-3) due to shortage of combat ready crew members.

One C-130 tactical airlift group is not combat ready (C-4) due to a lack of aircraft. Its assigned aircraft are used by a combat crew training school (CCTS) to train active Air Force crew members.

Four units are not combat ready due to recent conversion to C-141 associate units, and lack combat ready crew members.

One unit, the C-130 combat crew training squadron (CCTS), is not subject to C-rating.

Mr. ADDABBO. Explain the reason for the variations in the percentages, you cited a low of 66 percent and a high of 100 percent.

General MARCHBANKS. Many of these are newly formed units which it would be unreasonable to assume that we could, at their formation, man them at 100 percent. So we try to contain ourselves within an area of reasonableness with respect to how we would man them. Our manning increases should be expected from year to year as our unit grows in size and strength.

#### STRENGTH OF AIR FORCE RESERVE

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 6 of your justification, you are showing significant increases in pay group A and pay group F. Can you explain how you determined your requirements for fiscal year 1970 in these two pay groups? Specifically, we would like to know what rationale was used in determining this increase.

General PITTS. I will ask Colonel Loretto to answer that question.

Colonel LORETTI. The increased average strength is associated with the force structure changes, such as retention of Reserve units from active duty.

The revised 1970 budget has the impact of the retention of four units, adjusted by the \$1 million we were talking about. The determination with respect to the percentage of manning is determined by OSD/BOB review. Pay group F, nonprior service, is also considered at that time in the review. They actually base it on a formula of the low grades required to fill in for the attrition of those individuals that have completed their obligated tour.

Mr. ADDABBO. Who makes the determination of the strength of the Air Force Reserve? Also, tell us if it is reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

Colonel LORETTI. General Marchbanks' office has the responsibility. He works with Headquarters AFRES.

Mr. ADDABBO. Does anyone review this in the Office of the Secretary?

Colonel LORETTI. In the Office of the Secretary; yes, sir. The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs has that responsibility. They do review it before we submit it to OSD for review. This is after the Air Staff has scrubbed it down and reviewed it.

Mr. ADDABBO. General Marchbanks, on page 14 of your statement, you state, under "Unit Manning:"

All the flying units except the C-119 groups, are authorized 100 percent manning for fiscal year 1970 and all of our other units will be authorized a minimum of 90 percent.

Why not 100 percent?

General MARCHBANKS. These were DOD limitations on manning drill pay spaces.

Mr. ADDABBO. What type of limitations would those be?

General MARCHBANKS. The limitation is on the number of drill spaces authorized by priority for each weapon system.

#### AIR FORCE ROTC PROGRAM

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 15 of your statement you speak of your increased Air Force ROTC program and your hope for increased enrollments in the various colleges. Do you believe that the recent disorders at the colleges will result in reduction of those proposed increases?

General MARCHBANKS. Major Maxwell.

Major MAXWELL. Sir, we do not expect to have any decrease as far as our production goes, that is, the 4,500. We probably will have a decrease in the basic enrollment because of the schools going from the compulsory program to the elective program. Of course, the student unrest will have some effect; we do not know how much.

Mr. ADDABBO. Have you had any noticeable effect in the past year as far as the recruitment program is concerned?

Major MAXWELL. No, sir. At the present time we have an enrollment quota in the advanced program, which means we have more than we are able to take into the program.

#### READINESS—AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, what is the current readiness status of the Air National Guard?

General WILSON. Mr. Chairman, we presently have in the Guard, excluding those on active duty right now, 82 flying units. Fifty-five of them are completely operational ready. The other 27 are in a lesser readiness status due primarily to two things—recent conversions, and limitations on drill pay space.

## STRENGTH OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, we note that for fiscal year 1970 you are projecting an increase in average strength of 7,361, from a total 78,110 in fiscal year 1969, to a new total of 85,471 in fiscal year 1970. Would you please explain to the committee how you determined your requirements for fiscal year 1970? Specifically, we would like to know what rationale was used in determining this increase.

General WILSON. Mr. Chairman, the major part of this increase is the return of the units that have been on active duty during the Vietnam callup in January and May of 1968. The percentage of personnel to be maintained in the Guard units is dependent on the limitations placed on us by the Department of Defense.

For example, some of our units, our C-130, C-124 and F-100 units, are authorized 100 percent. Other units are authorized at 82 percent up to 90 percent. Our drill strength, therefore, represents the percentage of manning approved by OSD for the various weapons systems.

## OFFICE OF AIR FORCE RESERVE AND RESERVE MANAGEMENT

Mr. ADDABBO. General Marchbanks, on page 7 of the justification you show that the number of Air Force Reserve officers performing full-time active duty will increase from 66 in 1969 to 129 by the end of 1970. What is the reason for this increase?

General MARCHBANKS. This was the impact of Public Law 90-168 which establishes the Office of Air Force Reserve and Reserve Management concept which we are instituting now, whereby Reserve officers not on extended active duty will be recalled for the administration of this program under title 10, United States Code.

## ABSENCE FROM PAID DRILL MEETINGS

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 13 of the justification in discussing your requirements for training, pay group B, you point out the fact that your pay costs are based on a participation factor of 84 percent for officers and 75 percent for enlisted personnel. The percentage absent in both of these cases seems to be fairly high. Does the Air Force Reserve recall people to active duty if they miss a given number of required training sessions?

General MARCHBANKS. Yes, sir; if they are obligated, we do. The nonobligated reservists are discharged or transferred to Standby or the Retired Reserve, if eligible.

Mr. ADDABBO. Can you explain for the record the reason for this 84 percent and 75 percent?

General MARCHBANKS. The participation factor, of course, is figured out through the year. The regulation itself specifies the number of drills that can be missed before he is recalled or transferred. So we could feasibly go down to this percentage factor and have satisfactory participation under the regulation. If he exceeds that, then we would have to recall or transfer him.

Mr. ADDABBO. Are reservists required to make up any lost days or missed days?

General MARCHBANKS. We encourage them to make up.

Mr. ADDABBO. But they are not required?

General MARCHBANKS. They are not required or forced to make up drills involuntarily. However, if they are not excused by their supervisors and they pass the point of unsatisfactory participation, then we must take administrative action to call them to extended active duty or transfer them to a nonpay status.

#### SCHOOL TRAINING

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 19 of your justification you request funds for school training. We note that in 1968 this amount was about \$2.3 million; in 1969, approximately \$4.5 million; and you are now requesting \$7.3 million for 1970. We also note in this connection that the real increase involved is not in the number of individuals to be trained but rather in the number of days training per individual. For example: Officers, fiscal year 1968, 12 days; fiscal year 1969, 26 days; fiscal year 1970, 32 days. Enlisted: Fiscal year 1968, 23 days; fiscal year 1969, 34 days; fiscal year 1970, 45 days.

Why is there such a significant increase in the number of days in training for each participant by year?

General MARCHBANKS. All of these are associated with natural growth and conversion of our program into other program elements where we have to retrain people in new weapons systems, conversion to the associate group, our tactical support squadrons—all of our new missions, we will have an increased training requirement associated with that.

Mr. ADDABBO. Aren't your men actually continually in training? Why would there be such a marked increase just because of new weaponry?

General MARCHBANKS. The increase in fiscal year 1970 estimate over 1969—and it is an increase, as you say, of 74,631 man-days—they are required to support the conversion of these units to the new missions, such as Tactical Air Support Squadrons, C-9A, and C-141.

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 22 of your justification, under the section for special training, the number of participants in the training programs remains relatively constant each year. However, the total number of man-days of training increases significantly each year. Why is the average length of time to complete a course increasing each year?

General MARCHBANKS. The increase in average length of training is due to retraining of our personnel in new missions.

Mr. ADDABBO. Do those new missions suddenly come upon you? Aren't they a day-to-day operation?

General MARCHBANKS. No, sir. They are not really a day-to-day operation.

General PITTS. General Boylan can address himself to this.

General BOYLAN. An example, Mr. Chairman, is the rather major conversion of our Air Force Reserve C-124 units to the C-141 associate. The air crew in particular and a number of maintenance specialists must attend the formal professional schools that provide that training. As that program, or conversion program slopes upward indicating quantity, then General Marchbank's program has to reflect those man-days of support for that training. That training in this particular case is provided by the active force in our training schools.

General PITTS. If I could amplify General Boylan's statement, Mr. Chairman, it is the difference between maintaining a level of proficiency for a given job, versus learning a new mission. The training required to learn a new mission prior to reaching and maintaining a level of proficiency is the increment here.

Mr. ADDABBO. Would this come under their normal all-year-round training?

General MARCHBANKS. This is additional.

General BOYLAN. It is specialized training to equip the individual to perform a new mission.

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, on page 14 of your justification, the section entitled "School Training," you had an actual cost of \$5.4 million in fiscal year 1968. You are planning \$7.4 million in fiscal year 1969, and requesting \$7.6 million in 1970. We note that this increase results not from the number of people being trained, but rather from the length of duration of their training. This is shown from the following table:

	Number of days school training	
	Officers	Enlisted
Fiscal year 1968.....	74	33
Fiscal year 1969.....	132	78
Fiscal year 1970.....	121	78

Why has the number of days training per participant increased by approximately 100 percent for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 over your actual experience for 1968?

General WILSON. Mr. Chairman, as you know, it is similar to the Air Force Reserve. We have new missions, changes in equipment, and changes in personnel coming into the program. This is the formal training that has to be given these people. The length of training time depends on the course in which they have to receive this training. These are selected people that go to these formal schools to receive this training. Mission and equipment changes require much longer courses of instruction than does refresher training in a pre-existing mission.

**COST OF AIR FORCE ROTC UNIFORMS**

Mr. ADDABBO. General Marchbanks, on page 31 you cover the cost of uniforms for AFROTC students. How much does the uniform cost for a basic student in zone I and a basic student in zone II?

General MARCHBANKS. Major Maxwell.

Major MAXWELL. The rates are established by the Department of Defense and may vary somewhat on location of school.

Mr. ADDABBO. Do you have any basic total cost for each uniform?

Major MAXWELL. In zone I it is roughly \$20; in zone II roughly \$26.

Mr. ADDABBO. Is this for a complete uniform, the \$20?

Major MAXWELL. That includes a shirt, trousers, boots, socks, yes; a basic summer uniform.

General PITTS. That is for the summer field training uniform, the shirt, trousers, shoes, not a full uniform like I am wearing.

Mr. ADDABBO. What would be the price of the full uniform?

Major MAXWELL. It goes up to approximately \$86.88 in zone I, and approximately \$115.14 in zone II.

Mr. ADDABBO. When a cadet completes Aerospace 200 he turns his uniform back to the school. The uniform is then reissued to an Aerospace 100 student entering the program. What is the average life of a uniform?

General PIRTS. Mr. Chairman, could we supply that information for the record?

Mr. ADDABBO. Yes.

(The information follows:)

#### AVERAGE LIFE OF A UNIFORM

It is estimated that the average life of the uniform is 5 years except for the shoes and socks which is 2 years.

Mr. ADDABBO. In the basic AFROTC, the monetary allowance system is used by all of the educational institutions except for 10 percent of the students, who are covered by issue of uniform-in-kind. In the Army basic ROTC program these percentages are almost exactly reversed. Why do 90 percent of the Air Force educational institutions elect to receive the monetary allowance, rather than receive the uniforms direct from the Air Force?

Major MAXWELL. Sir, I really cannot answer that particular question. It is an election of the school. They have the prerogative to go either way they prefer. All we do is provide whichever they request.

Mr. ADDABBO. In 1970, the Air Force will have 56,000 students entering Aerospace 100 and 200, and the total cost of uniforms for these 56,000 students will be \$1,894,372. This would equate to approximately \$34 per student. However, in the Army's budget for 1970, we note that they plan on having 113,500 students entering their basic MS-I and MS-II program and the total cost of uniforms for those 113,500 students will be \$2,008,084, or approximately \$18 per student. Since the basic Air Force and Army uniforms would cost approximately the same, why is the yearly cost per student for the Air Force almost twice the yearly cost for the Army?

Major MAXWELL. Sir, we will provide it for the record.

(The information follows:)

#### DIFFERENCE IN COST BETWEEN ARMY AND AIR FORCE UNIFORMS

The Secretary of each of the military services is authorized either to pay a clothing allowance, or to issue uniforms-in-kind to participating ROTC schools. The schools have the privilege of selecting either of these methods of procuring uniforms. Under the commutation system, the Government makes a monetary payment to the school and the school purchases the required clothing items. The commutation rates used by both the Air Force and the Army are prescribed by OSD, based on an annual review of uniform requirements and cost per item. These commuted rates, or allowances, paid to the school may vary, depending on the location of the school.

The issue-in-kind rates do not consider such costs as custodial care, maintenance, and administration. The cost for these requirements have been considered in the approved commutation rates.

Following is a summary of the total estimates and average costs included in the fiscal year 1970 estimates for the Air Force Aerospace 100 and 200 students, and the Army MS-I and MS-II students:

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Method of procurement	Estimate	Number of students	Average cost
Issue in kind.....	\$118,262	5,391	\$21.93
Commutation.....	1,728,896	50,609	34.16
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>1,847,158</b>	<b>56,000</b>	<b>32.98</b>

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Method of procurement	Estimate	Number of students	Average cost
Issue in kind.....	\$1,273,962	95,560	\$13.33
Commutation.....	759,900	17,040	42.35
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>2,033,862</b>	<b>119,500</b>	<b>17.65</b>

Since only 10 percent of the Air Force uniforms for the Aerospace 100 and 200 students are procured by the issue-in-kind method as compared to approximately 84 percent for the Army MS-I and MS-II students, the composite average rate for uniforms in the Air Force program exceeds the average rate for the Army.

Mr. ADDABBO. Would you please supply the following for the record for fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970:

(a) The number of aerospace 100 and 200 students entering the program;

(b) The total cost of uniforms for these students;

(c) The average cost of uniforms per student.

Would you also supply for the record the comparable figures for the Army and the Navy?

General PITTS. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

**AVERAGE COST OF UNIFORMS OF ALL SERVICES—NUMBER OF STUDENTS IN AEROSPACE PROGRAM**

Average cost of uniforms of all services for students in the basic ROTC program:

	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970
<b>Air Force program:</b>			
Aerospace students 100.....	28,128	35,003	35,000
Aerospace students 200.....	17,925	18,059	21,000
<b>Subtotal.....</b>	<b>46,053</b>	<b>53,062</b>	<b>56,000</b>
Total cost of uniforms.....	\$1,348,600	\$1,805,343	\$1,847,158
Average cost per student.....	\$29	\$34	\$33
<b>Army program:</b>			
MS-I students.....	78,126	72,200	72,200
MS-II students.....	49,787	41,300	41,300
<b>Subtotal.....</b>	<b>128,913</b>	<b>119,500</b>	<b>119,000</b>
Total cost of uniforms.....	\$2,577,400	\$2,169,370	\$2,033,862
Average cost per student.....	\$20	\$19	\$16
<b>Navy program:</b>			
1st year students.....	2,093	2,395	1,999
2d year students.....	1,199	1,463	1,513
<b>Subtotal.....</b>	<b>3,292</b>	<b>3,858</b>	<b>3,512</b>
Total cost of uniforms.....	\$913,000	\$1,040,000	\$1,084,000
Average cost per student.....	\$277	\$270	\$309

Rates between services are not readily comparable because Navy rates are based on the cost of a one-time issue for permanent retention by the member, whereas Army and Air Force issues are in the nature of organizational issues for the freshman/sophomore years. Army and Air Force personnel are issued a uniform for retention upon entry into the advanced course.

#### AIR FORCE JUNIOR ROTC PROGRAM UNIFORM

Mr. ADDABBO. On page 37 of your justification for the section on the Junior ROTC program, you state that during fiscal year 1970 it is estimated that there will be 200 units of the Air Force Junior ROTC with an average student enrollment of 140 per unit. If we are interpreting the table on page 37 correctly, in fiscal 1969 you have 112 units and during fiscal year 1970 you would be adding 88 additional units. Are these the correct figures?

Major MAXWELL. Yes, sir; they are basically correct.

Mr. ADDABBO. If you are adding 88 units at an enrollment of 140 students per unit, this would be a total of approximately 12,320 new students to be added to the rolls in fiscal year 1970. If you are adding 12,320 students to the program, why are you providing for 16,632 new uniforms?

Major MAXWELL. The estimate includes new uniforms for the students enrolled in the additional 88 units, plus a sizing factor of approximately twenty percent of the total requirements.

Mr. ADDABBO. This increase of new uniforms, are you taking into consideration the uniforms being turned back in, which we discussed earlier?

Colonel LORETTI. Yes, sir. It is taken into consideration in the formulation of the budget.

#### NATIONAL GUARD PILOTS AND PILOT TRAINEES

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, how many pilots do you have included in the 1970 budget and how many do you now have?

General WILSON. Right now, sir, we are programed for 4,000 in the 1970 budget, excluding those that are on active duty, and the exact figure is now at 3,600 as of today.

Mr. ADDABBO. How many pilots will the Air Force be training for you in fiscal 1970?

General WILSON. They will be training 145 pilots. They go to flying school and return to the units upon completion of their training.

Mr. ADDABBO. Are they already scheduled to go into the training base?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. I have personnel already scheduled for the next 3 years to fill those quotas.

Mr. ADDABBO. In the hearings last year you testified that you would have an output in fiscal year 1969 of 145 pilots. Do you still anticipate that that figure will be met?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

#### AIR NATIONAL GUARD AIRCRAFT INVENTORY

Mr. ADDABBO. During fiscal year 1969 have you lost any aircraft to the Air Force?

General WILSON. None other than those that were taken on active duty with the units when they were ordered to duty, sir.

Mr. ADDARBO. Have you gained any new aircraft during 1969?

General WILSON. Yes, sir, I think the only ones that we have gained in new aircraft were the 24 U-10's.

Mr. MINSHALL. What is a U-10?

General WILSON. A U-10 is a Helio courier, I believe that is the correct name. It is a single-engine plane that is used with our Special Operating Groups.

Mr. MINSHALL. Is that the thing which is made up here at Hagerstown?

General WILSON. No. It is similar to that, but it is made up in New York.

Mr. MINSHALL. Who makes this?

General WILSON. I will have to check. I don't know who makes it. I know it is a U-10.

Mr. MINSHALL. Just so you don't have any U-2's.

General WILSON. Well, we don't have any U-2's.

#### RELEASE OF AIR FORCE RESERVE UNITS FROM ACTIVE DUTY

Mr. ADDARBO. On page 4 of your statement you say "all the Air Force Reserve units still serving with the Active Force are scheduled to be released from extended active duty in June of 1969." Is that schedule being adhered to?

General MARCHBANKS. Yes, it is.

Mr. ADDARBO. Are most of the air reservists now out of the combat area or are they still in the combat area?

General MARCHBANKS. No, sir. At the present time our C-119 gunship people are still in the combat area.

General PITTS. They are stationed at Nha Trang in Vietnam. At other overseas locations, he has the 34th Air Medical Battalion stationed on Yokota Air Force Base in Japan. He has the 305th Aerial Recovery and Rescue Squadron, HU-97's, on rotational duty to Europe and in Iceland. In addition, there are the C-124 units that the General spoke about in his statement on rotation duty to Europe.

Mr. ADDARBO. Were all the units activated actually used?

General MARCHBANKS. Yes, sir; they were all used.

General BOYLAN. The U-10 is the Helio courier made by the Helio Co. I do not have the location of the company.

General WILSON. It is in New York.

Mr. ADDARBO. How many of the units were used overseas, General Marchbanks?

General MARCHBANKS. In respect to our rotation to Europe and Iceland?

Mr. ADDARBO. Yes.

General MARCHBANKS. We had a rotation group in Mildenhall, England; we had an air rescue organization operating all over the world, but particularly in Iceland; we presently have deployed our gunship program, the 71st Squadron, from Bakalar to Vietnam.

Mr. ADDARBO. Would that be the only unit sent to Vietnam?

General MARCHBANKS. The only one sent to Vietnam; yes, sir. In Japan we had our 34th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, and indi-

viduals from all of our units participated in the combat zone in Korea and Vietnam, and all over the world.

General PITTS. A total of eight units were involved in either a permanent change of station overseas or on rotational assignment, serving a portion of the time overseas.

#### RIOT CONTROL TRAINING

Mr. ADDABBO. General Wilson, do you have any riot control training in the Air National Guard?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. We have a normal program that is established—this does not mean for everybody. Each State has a plan in which they use the total National Guard, both Army and Air. For example, at many of our Air Guard units we have what we call a riot control section which may be composed of from 150 to 200 men who are fully qualified and trained to be on the street. Most of the time the Air Guard has been used for security-type missions, securing of police stations, waterworks, and so forth, whereas the Army Guard was actually on the street. But these people are trained and capable at each one of those locations.

Mr. ADDABBO. The committee will now stand in adjournment until 2 o'clock. Thank you very much.

#### AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. ADDABBO. The committee will come to order.

We will continue the questioning relative to the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.

Mr. Lipscomb.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Inasmuch as I missed part of the hearing this morning, if I repeat anything, please say we have covered it and we will go on to the next subject.

#### AIR FORCE RESERVES—EQUIPMENT INVENTORY

Last year the Chief of the Air Force Reserves told the committee of its concern with the equipment available to the Reserve forces. What is the situation today? Has there been any improvement in the situation from a year ago?

General MARCHBANKS. I will respond, Mr. Lipscomb, by saying there has been no improvement. I think we have to recognize the overall equipment problem that we have in the Air Force, and that our priorities must go to support our Southeast Asia commitment at the present time.

At a moment when we make an adjustment toward downphasing that activity, we expect to realize modernization of our equipment. As far as hoping for new equipment, we continue to do that, and we need new equipment. We need to sophisticate the skills that we have now. We can only maintain skills on semiobsolescent equipment. We need to update and sophisticate skills, but you cannot sophisticate skills on the equipment we have. At a point in time when it would be wise, we have to push very hard for modernization of the Air Force Reserve equipment.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Are you saying the testimony before the committee last year in regard to a serious concern about the equipment still exists today?

General MARCHBANKS. Yes, I am saying that.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You base the equipment situation upon the necessity, which is very valid, of getting adequate equipment to Southeast Asia, but how long can the Air Force Reserve—and I now talk to the National Guard—continue in this fashion? Have you examined it looking to the future?

General MARCHBANKS. Yes, sir; we have examined it looking to the future. We consider the future of the Air Force Reserve along with the future of the Air Force. So, I do not look to this thing in a myopic sense of only Air Force Reserve. It is a larger problem than that.

The Air Force daily looks at how it can accommodate roles and missions for the Air Force Reserve, and at the same time keep our skill levels at an acceptable level. We get back to the basic issue that the Air Force itself, the Active Air Force itself, has an equipment problem, and that we must expect in the Reserve Forces to get our equipment from this source. Until it is made available, we cannot modernize.

I do not want to downgrade my position from last year. I want to reiterate we are in a serious equipment problem in the Air Force Reserve.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. The thing we here must look at is that we maintain these Reserve and Guard forces for a purpose, and if they will not be able to respond properly in a national emergency when needed, then we are just marking time and are just fooling ourselves.

General MARCHBANKS. I think the Air Force recognizes this.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. What are we doing?

General BOYLAN. I am General Boylan, Director of Programs of the Air Force.

General Marchbanks put his finger on the key reason for the equipment status of our Reserve Forces, that is, the demands on the Active Force to support the contingency that is underway.

As you know, the policy and practice is to achieve modernization of our Reserve Forces by a flow of equipment from the Active Force. The aircraft procurement programs of the Air Force of the last several years have been quite heavy, but heavy to support the attrition that is occurring in the Active Forces, principally in Vietnam.

Consequently, the planned modernization programs for the Reserve Forces since about 1965, using that as a planning date, have slipped on the order of 2 years.

Let me use an example. Back in 1965, the Air Force was scheduled to phase out all of its F-100 aircraft by 1970. They would go to the Air National Guard. The current program does not permit this. It will be 1972 before the Air Force begins to lose the last of its F-100's. This means to General Wilson a 2-year slip in the previous program. Downstream, hopefully, if the fighter procurement programs of the Air Force are continued, General Wilson's forces can be substantially improved over what they are today. I do not think under existing circumstances that modernization rate can be substantially accelerated.

In the case of the Air Force Reserve, very much the same situation is occurring. There is one aspect of the Air Force Reserve program which casts a different picture. It is the associate unit program which

yo  
lat  
mi  
as  
N  
un  
olc  
un  
cr.

A  
wi

su  
of  
of

an

hi  
in  
b  
re  
A  
f  
ne  
p  
th

th  
ta  
F

C

t

c

you commented on earlier. This is a case where units are provided the latest equipment for training, for participation in regular day-to-day missions. It is a case in the C-141 units associated where they do have as modern equipment as the Air Force itself. I am speaking of the National Guard and the Air Force Reserve units. In the case of these units, it is a conversion from other types of equipment, such as the old C-124 and the C-97, and in some cases the C-119, to give these units the opportunity to train and operate the most modern cargo aircraft that we have.

I might add, that the associate unit program will continue, as the Air Force receives its C-5 aircraft. Reserve units will be associated with the aircraft.

In the case of fighters, in the case of other support-type missions, such as reconnaissance and tactical air support, the modernization rate of the Air Force is not high and, consequently, the modernization rate of the Reserve is not high.

#### AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE MISSIONS

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is there any difference between the National Guard and the Reserve mission, for instance, in the associate units?

General BOYLAN. I think the answer is basically yes, because of the history of the two programs. Following World War II, in the few intervening years, the Air Force Reserve program developed into basically a tactical airlift program of some 45 squadrons with five rescue units, a total of 50 squadrons. Over the years, as you know, the Air National Guard has progressively expanded its mission equipment from observation, principally, and Army oriented, to fighter, reconnaissance, and other missions oriented for Air Force use. Today, the program still has that basic characteristic, principally transport for the Reserves and transport and other for the Air National Guard.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Is there not a big difference between the Reserve and the National Guard missions inasmuch as the National Guard is attached to State operations and is geared to State operations, and the Reserve is really oriented toward the overall national mission?

General BOYLAN. Being neutral between General Marchbanks and General Wilson, who head the two programs, may I comment on that?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Yes.

General BOYLAN. From the Air Force program point of view, there is no difference in these Reserve Forces of the Air Force in application to the Air Force mission. The administrative aspects of the two programs are decidedly different, but at the principal interface; that is, man and machine with wartime mission, as far as the Air Force is concerned there is no difference.

Would you care to elaborate, General Wilson?

General WILSON. Sir, as you know, in the entire program the National Guard has a dual mission, both State and Federal. In the Army Guard as well as in the Air Guard, the forces are there primarily for their Federal mission, but they also assist in meeting the State mission.

As you know, we just went through a reorganization in the Army Guard. This reorganization was not tied to State requirements. It was tied to the Federal requirements. However, we satisfied the State requirements as best we could where it was militarily practical.

The Guard units, Army or Air, that are allotted to the States, are for the purpose of meeting a Federal requirement, and to the extent possible, to meet the State mission.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. I have been told that by setting up these associate units, and putting the National Guard in an associate unit, if the time should ever come of a State emergency, the equipment would not be available and they could not fulfill their mission.

General WILSON. It just so happens that California has two squadrons of transports. There are many States that have no transports. They use the Air Guard in their State missions the same as they do the Army Guard. But, it is not primarily because of the type of equipment that they need. It is because we have the trained soldier or airman who has discipline, who is able to do the job within the State.

When we had problems in California, or when we had the April riots last year, C-141's from the Air Force were used in transporting the people across the country, both active and Guard. If we got in a situation, and California had an associate unit, and had to move troops, I think the C-141's could be utilized. I am not convinced that they cannot be utilized.

Certainly, in the Federal Government, we have a responsibility for assistance to the States in meeting the crises we have had on the streets here lately.

General BOYLAN. As a matter of fact, sir, this basic problem of the availability of trained military, uniformed personnel for State needs has since last April tended to take on a national character, with the formation of a specific unit within the Department of the Army to plan for meeting such occurrences and, based on the particular circumstance, utilizing the appropriate personnel, whether they be State-oriented at that particular time or Active Forces, and transports.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. A difference in the concepts of the use of the National Guard associate units has been brought to my attention. Could you, for the record, give the position of the Air Force on this statement? It was made to me by people who I feel are well informed and vitally interested. They say that as a result of their analysis, they have reached the inescapable conclusion that the associate unit as now conceived is not compatible with the fundamental concepts and principles of the dual State-Federal missions upon which the National Guard has been established and organized.

You have explained it to some extent for the committee, but I would like to have this set forth in the record so there will not be any misunderstanding.

Another matter that might be helpful is an explanation of just how these associate units should operate, so there is no misunderstanding. I personally believe it is a good plan to have National Guardsmen learning the latest equipment and the use of it and having this type of training. There seems to be great concern, at least in my State of California, as to the use of the associate units.

Would that be possible?

General BOYLAN. Yes, sir.

(The information follows:)

#### BACKGROUND

The Associate Airlift concept and proposal was first presented to Headquarters, USAF in a formal Military Airlift Command (MAC) study of requirements for

Re  
MA  
T  
tion  
air  
ly  
C  
ma  
util  
Spe  
bo  
gen  
but  
whe  
T  
196  
C-  
C  
inc  
wit  
AF  
Air  
T  
aer  
nun  
(or  
suc  
tion  
ann

T  
uni  
rela  
T  
wit  
AN  
Go  
tal  
pos  
wit  
an

T  
ing  
res  
(F.  
res  
his  
T  
clai  
ac  
F  
on  
per

app  
per  
per  
sch  
com  
T  
MA  
AN

Reserve Force units assigned to MAC in 1970-75. This study was submitted by MAC in September 1966.

The objective of the associate unit concept is to provide manpower augmentation to the Military Airlift Command force of C-141's and C-5A's so that the airlift potential inherent in higher aircraft utilization rates can be realized quickly in contingency and wartime situations.

One of the key elements to such high utilization is people. But Active Force manning levels of MAC airlift units does not support the high level of flight utilization of which the C-141 (and soon to enter the force C-5A) is capable. Specifically, MAC C-141 squadron manning can support a sustained 8 flying hours per day per assigned C-141 by imposing a 6-day workweek during emergencies. However, the aircraft has the potential for even greater utilization—but the key need is for more aircrews, mechanics and related support personnel, when and as needed in wartime.

Thus, the associate airlift concept evolved in the MAC study of September 1966, as a means to provide these necessary personnel and resultant higher C-141/C-5A utilization as would be required.

Other objectives of this concept were: (1) a "ready now" capability for rapid increase of C-141/C-5A utilization when needed for national emergencies, but with low peacetime costs characteristic of Reserve Force organizations (ANG/AF Reserve); (2) an opportunity for selected Air Guard units to support an Air Force requirement in the latest state of the art equipment.

The basic ANG associate group will contain aircrew, maintenance, supply, aerial port and base operating support personnel in the appropriate skills and numbers to enable a postmobilization increase of 2 flying hours per day per C-141 (or C-5A) assigned to the MAC squadron. The MAC study pointed out that one such associate group, augmenting one C-141 squadron of 16 aircraft with 2 additional flying hours per day, can produce about 100 million ton-miles of airlift annually.

#### APPLICATION TO THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD

The military airlift group (associate) is organized, manned and equipped as a unit of the ANG. The only equipment not in possession of this unit is aircraft and related supporting equipment.

The ANG associate group is not organizationally merged with the MAC unit with which it is associated. Command jurisdiction lies clearly in the classical ANG channels from the ANG unit commander to the adjutant general to the State Governor. The fundamental principle of dual State/Federal purpose is maintained. The Governor of a State possessing an associate group retains the same positive ability to call these members for state duty under the code as he does with any existing unit in the National Guard system. Positive ANG unit identity and integrity is assured in peacetime.

#### CONCEPT OF OPERATION

The ANG associate group commander is directly responsible for all unit training except that directly related to the C-141 aircraft. He has full authority and responsibility for unit training assemblies (UTA's), flying training periods (FTP's), required collateral and/or general military training (GMT). He retains responsibility for administration, control and discipline of personnel assigned to his group when they are in nonmobilized status.

The commander of the active wing/squadron with which the ANG unit is associated has operational control of the ANG personnel when working on or operating active unit aircraft and related equipment.

Functionally, members of the ANG associate group will be trained, will work on and operate C-141 aircraft and equipment in concert with the active force personnel of the MAC unit.

Master planning and scheduling will be conducted by the active unit staff with appropriate ANG associate group representation. Schedules will be arranged to permit maximum time to train personnel during UTA and man-day training periods and will be consistent with associate group requirements. In all cases, schedules will be coordinated and approved through the associate group commander.

The ANG personnel will be qualified in accordance with U.S. Air Force and MAC standards, the same as active force members of the C-141/C-5A unit. All ANG pilots and flight engineers will complete the MAC C-141 Transition Training

Unit (TTU) qualification course. When ANG crewmembers are used on an individual basis, they will be assigned crew duties commensurate with their qualifications, including pilot-in-command of a crew containing active duty crewmembers.

The Wing Safety Council will include ANG representation in its membership and will supervise the entire wing/squadron/ANG associate group safety program.

Operational readiness of the C-141 squadron will depend upon both the Active and ANG training and qualification posture, and operational readiness reporting will be based on the combined readiness of both Active and ANG.

Upon mobilization, associate group personnel will be totally integrated into the MAC active wing within their functional areas and will occupy positions commensurate with their seniority and qualifications. Upon mobilization, the Air National Guard unit's identification and integrity will be maintained with at least one officer and one airman assigned to insure that the unit is retained for demobilization continuity.

#### ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Along the same line, in past years in our current record we have always asked if we could have a summary of the accomplishments of the Air National Guard during the past year, of what they have done in the national interest of our country. This always has been very informative and shows the great worth of the Air National Guard.

General WILSON. We shall be glad to put that in the record. We have covered that quite a bit in the statement, as to the missions we have accomplished, where our units have been on active duty, and so forth. We shall be glad to put that in short form and submit it for the record, sir.

General PERRY. Both General Marchbanks and General Wilson, in their prepared statements, sir, spoke of the accomplishments of the Guard and Reserve since their callup last year. It was thought to be appropriate to put it in.

(The information follows:)

#### MOBILIZED AIR NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

A summary of the accomplishments of mobilized Air Guardsmen reveals that four of our tactical fighter units, the first of which arrived in South Vietnam May 3, 1968, have completed more than 20,000 combat sorties through February 1969, an average per squadron of more than 5,000 sorties each. Each of our pilots upon completing a full tour, will have flown over 200 combat missions before returning home.

Each unit is averaging more than 400 combat missions per month—each has rolled up impressive bomb damage assessment figures in all categories and each has led its respective wing in several categories every month. Active Air Force commanders in the combat zone have had nothing but praise for the skill and efficiency of the men, their attitude and their performance, not only in flying, but in all the support functions such as medical, maintenance, and logistics.

They have performed on a level with the best in the Air Force.

Two Air National Guard units in Korea, coupled with more than 2,000 individually assigned Guardsmen from other mobilized units make up the bulk of the aerial force which would meet any new threat across the DMZ in Korea. Our jet fighters based in Korea have also been bolstered by three Air Guard tactical reconnaissance squadrons which have rotated on duty in Japan flying reconnaissance missions throughout the area.

Since last June the Air National Guard has provided the majority of personnel for duty in Korea, and the Guardsmen have assumed their share of top leadership posts throughout that command.

The units have been flying some 25-30 sorties each day since their arrival in midsummer last year. Once again, as in the Berlin crisis in 1961-62, the Air National Guard has been used to prevent a war, Korean mobilization. At the same time it has assisted in fighting one, Vietnam.

Two mobilized units have transferred pilots and personnel to man up 90 percent of the personnel strength of an active Air Force fighter squadron in South Vietnam and their combat record is on a par with our other combat units.

Two Guard units spent their mobilization period instructing regular Air Force pilots in an "Instant" fighter pilot course for forward air controllers.

Two other units have shouldered the burden of various Air Force training missions throughout the CONUS, including combat crew training for active Air Force pilots. The three Air Guard tactical reconnaissance units have shared the task of performing full-time reconnaissance duty from a base in Japan and each has in addition, performed many stateside reconnaissance missions for various Federal agencies. One unit, a reconnaissance technical squadron, remained at its home base and has processed thousands of feet of film taken by reconnaissance units.

Overall, the performance of our mobilized units this time has surpassed any previous mobilization and I think you will find a number of Air Force and Army officials that agree—the Air Guard is composed of a group of truly responsive, combat-ready professional airmen.

#### AIRLIFT SUPPORT

During calendar year 1968, the Air National Guard airlift fleet operating in support of the Military Airlift Command was composed of approximately:

C-97 Stratocruisers.....	100
C-121 Super Constellations.....	25
C-124 Globemasters.....	70

In addition to the 23 heavy transport squadrons, there is also the 144th Air Transport Squadron, Medium, based at Anchorage, Alaska, which is equipped with eight C-123J aircraft. Although part of the MAC fleet, the 144th is assigned to the Alaskan Air Command.

In calendar year 1968 the Air National Guard airlift fleet flew a total of 2,509 missions as a functional part of MAC of which approximately 300 were in support of Vietnam. During this period, 63,751 flying hours were logged while airlifting 17,798 tons of cargo and 22,864 passengers. The Air National Guard aeromedical evacuation missions were not only conducted in CONUS, but also in Alaska, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Bermuda, Labrador, Newfoundland, and the Canal Zone. Serving these areas, 538 patients were airlifted in C-97 aircraft, and 2,230 by C-121's.

Additionally, airlift in support of the National Guard's annual summer field training exercises produced the following statistics during a highlighted 6 month period:

Hours flown.....	7,736
Passengers airlifted.....	27,894
Tons airlifted.....	3,035
Aircraft utilized.....	651

With the increase in civil disturbance facing the Nation the ANG airlift fleet has assumed additional responsibility. During the April crisis following the King assassination, the airlift fleet transported 6,000 personnel and flew 567,000 cargo ton miles. Seventy aircraft flew 389 sorties during a 5 day period.

Airlift in support of JCS directed exercises was a highlight of the year. Cargo and personnel of ANG Tactical Forces were deployed and redeployed from various operations, among them "Deep Furrow" (NATO sponsored), "Guard Strike II," and "Creek Party."

#### AIR DEFENSE SUPPORT

Twenty-one ANG/ADC Fighter Groups, while assuming a larger share of the NORAD alert requirement, flew almost 100,000 sorties in all types of weather, day and night, while attaining an excellent flying safety record.

In direct support of the alert effort, Air National Guard Fighter Groups flew over 41,000 hours, made approximately 23,000 scrambles and accomplished over 55,000 successful intercepts.

During the year some ANG units were called upon to stand alert for regular ADC squadrons who were converting to new aircraft.

Even though no ANG/ADC units were called to active duty, the ANG/ADC units under the palace alert program provided the Air Force with 32 combat ready pilots since July 1, 1968. These pilots, serving on active duty tours of from 90 to 179 days throughout Europe and PACAF, have accomplished a much needed task for the Air Force while bringing a new wealth of experience to the ANG units.

In 1968, for the first time, ANG/ADC units were deployed to bases outside the Continental United States when a detachment of the 125th Fighter Group, Jacksonville, Fla., deployed to Puerto Rico, and the 163d Fighter Group of Ontario, Calif., made a highly successful deployment to Anchorage, Alaska, for field training.

ANG/ADC pilots also participated in ferrying several F-102's to Turkey at the request of the Air Force.

In Hawaii, the ANG's Fighter Group (F-102) and two ANG ground radar squadrons provide a full-time Air Defense System for the Islands. In addition, they are supporting SEA by providing requalification/proficiency training for weapons controllers assigned to PACAF.

The Puerto Rico ANG supports the Antilles Defense Command with an F-104 fighter group and two radar sites which provide a daylight alert force, 7 days a week. During the past year the island radar coverage was improved by the replacement of an obsolescent radar with a modern, more powerful set which was obtained from a deactivated ADC site in the CONUS. The dismantling, airlift from California to Puerto Rico, and installation of this radar were all accomplished as an in-house effort by ANG forces.

#### CREEK PARTY OPERATION

A requirement for emergency aerial refueling was established by headquarters USAFE in December 1966, when the USAFE assigned fighter/recce units were denied use of previously assigned French bases. Aircraft returning from Wheelus Air Base, Africa, to home bases in Germany and England could not return to Africa if weather conditions prevented landing.

Headquarters USAF and headquarters SAC responded to headquarters USAFE's request by suggesting use of ANG KC-97L tanker aircraft since KC-135 tankers were not available for assignment to Europe.

The National Guard Bureau agreed to provide two KC-97L tankers, in Europe, to conduct a refueling compatibility test between the F-4 and KC-97L. The test was conducted in February 1967, and proved successful. The National Guard Bureau agreed that daily continuation training would be required by USAFE pilots to insure a successful refueling operation during emergency condition.

The National Guard Bureau agreed to provide three sorties per day based on a 5-day week, for a total of 15 sorties per week. Additionally, one tanker would be placed on a 30-minute alert whenever weather was determined to be marginal and fighter/recce aircraft were flying.

Five KC-97L tanker aircraft were deployed to Rhein Main Air Base, Frankfurt, Germany, April 28, 1967, and the Creek Party Operation started May 1, 1967.

From May 1, 1967 through December 31, 1968, the tankers flew 915 sorties, provided 10,634 receiver hookups and off-loaded 20,539,930 pounds of fuel (approximately 3,000,000 gallons).

#### TOW TARGET SUPPORT

The dart tow target system that was perfected for the F-4 aircraft proved unacceptable thereby rendering the F-4 incapable of towing the air-to-air dart. Air Force asked that the ANG F-105, F-84, and F-86 units provide 1,209 sorties to support the dart aerial gunnery training requirements of the F-4 units located at MacDill, Eglin, Homestead, and George Air Force Bases. The Air National Guard had 13 units capable of providing this support, however, with the activation of our two F-86 units in May 1968 the task of providing the 1,209 sorties fell to and was supported by the remaining 11 ANG Tactical Fighter Units.

#### ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE AIR FORCE RESERVE

The Air Force Reserve, during the past year, has continued to respond pro-

professionally to Air Force requirements identified by the Air Force. Among the important achievements are the following:

#### Mobilized Units

The January and May 1968 mobilization brought 14 Air Force Reserve units to active duty. These units included two wing headquarters with five airlift groups of C-124's, one HC-97 aerospace rescue and recovery squadron, one C-119 tactical airlift group, three aerial port squadrons, one aeromedical evacuation squadron, and one medical service squadron.

Within 4 hours after mobilization, one military airlift group was flying a C-124 carrying supplies to Southeast Asia. Sixteen C-124's with crews and support personnel are on rotational temporary duty at Mildenhall, England, supporting units in Europe. Other C-124's are operating in the United States, the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

During 1968 these mobilized units flew 1,148 missions, 828 of them to Southeast Asia. They flew 33,668 hours airlifting 15,187 tons of cargo, approximately 2,000 tons were to Southeast Asia.

A part of the C-119 tactical airlift group at Bakalar Air Force Base, Ind., was trained in AC-119 Special Operations Mission (gunship) and is now in Vietnam flying combat missions.

The mobilized HC-97 aerospace rescue and recovery squadron has had two aircraft stationed in Iceland since shortly after mobilization. Other HC-97's have covered such locations as Spain, Okinawa, Libya, and the Philippines. The aeromedical evacuation unit from Kelly Air Force Base, Tex., was deployed to Yokota, Japan. Three aerial port squadrons augmented Military Airlift Command port operations at their home stations until demobilization in December 1968. Personnel from other aerial port units were moved to Korea to augment aerial port forces there.

#### Nonmobilized Units

The nonmobilized Air Force Reserve units continued to respond to Air Force requirements performing productive missions as a byproduct of training. Last year the C-124, C-119, HC-97 and HU-16 units flew 74,353 hours in support of the Military Airlift Command and other agencies. They carried 23,741 tons of cargo and 59,621 passengers on these missions. Reserve rescue crews flew 1,523 hours on 251 rescue and orbit missions. Most of these missions released active duty aircraft for more important missions.

#### Training Support

In 1968 the Air Force Reserve formed a C-130 combat crew training squadron at Ellington Air Force Base to train aircrew members, active as well as Reserve crews. They graduated 142 qualified pilots and 35 flight engineers.

We are also operating a C-119 combat crew training squadron. This school graduated 61 pilots, 82 navigators and 53 flight engineers.

#### Joint Exercises and Army Support

Air Force Reserve units participated in three joint exercises. One was at Fort Bragg, N.C. We airdropped 1,897 troops for the 82d Airborne Division. This was followed by exercises "Run-Awake" and "Combat Fox". Sixty C-119's and C-124's flew 175 missions. We also furnished C-119 aircraft and crews to support the Army Jump School, Fort Benning and Army airborne divisions at Fort Campbell by airdropping 126,000 paratroopers.

#### Support of Aerial Ports

Eight of the nine aerial port squadrons performed their annual active duty tours away from home station, two were at Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii. These personnel were integrated with the active duty units and worked as Reserve crews under active duty supervision. This contributed greatly to the Active Forces.

#### Movement of Troops and Supplies During Civil Disturbance Actions

The Reserve airlift units participated in Operation Garden Plot and provided 35 percent of the airlift necessary to move troops and supplies to major cities affected.

## C-141 ASSOCIATE UNITS

We implemented the new concept in total force utilization when we established the first C-141 associate unit. Under this program reservists fly and perform maintenance in the modern MAC C-141 aircraft. The first C-141 airlift mission to Southeast Asia flown by an all-Reserve crew took place in August 1968, less than 5 months after the first unit was formed.

## MEDICAL UNITS

Air Force Reserve medical units contributed immeasurably to support training of the flying units and the aeromedical evacuation mission. Aeromedical units with 295 nurses and 962 technicians trained at home and on Military Airlift Command routes. They handled 5,574 patients of which 3,781 were combat casualties. Medical service units at 100 locations train in Air Force hospitals. Officers and airmen contributed approximately 18,000 man-days to active Air Force hospital mission.

## TRANSFER OF AIR NATIONAL GUARD C-97 AIRCRAFT FOR BIAFRAN RELIEF PROJECT

Mr. LIPSCOMB. There apparently were eight C-97 transport aircraft made available to various relief agencies operating in Nigeria and Biafra. Do you know where these C-97 aircraft came from?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. They came from the Air National Guard units that were scheduled for conversion to the C-124. Four of them came from Salt Lake City. The others came from other Air Guard units, making a total of eight. These were sold to the agencies at a very reasonable price, \$3,670 apiece, with the understanding that we would furnish those airplanes with a minimum of 50 hours remaining before major inspection.

We were also told by Air Force to furnish a kit of some 61 line items to go along with this buy. That was to end the total support that we were to furnish. The balance of it would be furnished from off-the-shelf buy from civilian suppliers.

I know there has been quite a bit of discussion that the Guard is not supporting this. We were not in this to support this program at all. There have been Guard pilots who have been hired by the agency in California that has contracted to do this job.

The organization is having a problem with maintenance, which we expected they would have unless they put in the necessary civilian support to maintain the aircraft.

This is a program where they wanted airplanes. They originally wanted them out of storage at Davis-Monthan AFB. We had airplanes that were flyable due to the phaseout of the C-97's and conversion to C-124's so we were able to furnish them rather than from Davis-Monthan.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Did the transfer of the C-97 aircraft entail any cost to the Air Force?

General WILSON. None other than those items that were directed to go along with the airplane, which is some 61 line items of equipment, which included a total, I believe, of eight built-up engines and certain other spare parts, which gave them a flyaway kit, sir. That was all included in the deal that we were directed from OSD to furnish.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. You said we sold them at a very nominal cost.

General WILSON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Can you set forth for the record the cost and all the facts?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. I have a complete almost day-to-day program on this whole thing that I will be glad to put in the record, which I think would clarify what our responsibilities were and what we were directed to do.

(The information follows:)

#### TRANSFER COST OF C-97 FOR BIAFRAN RELIEF PROJECT

In addressing your question, it is appropriate to bring to fore the relationship of the National Guard Bureau in this relief project. The Air Force is the action agency within the Department of Defense and the Guard Bureau involvement has been limited in scope and responsive only to specific requests from the Air Force project monitor, the Director of Supply and Services. Generally speaking, the aircraft, the initial selected spares and repair parts, spare engines and peculiar aerospace ground equipment were made available from Guard units which were phasing out of C-97 operations. These surplus aircraft would have been processed to the Air Force Military Aircraft Storage and Distribution Center for disposition.

Although the Guard Bureau per se has not been the overall monitor, we have been kept up to date on the support of the Biafran relief project as it pertains to the Joint Church Aid—USA, Inc., and International Committee of the Red Cross.

In December 1968, a decision was made to make available four C-97 aircraft to the International Committee of the Red Cross and four to the Joint Church Aid—USA, Inc. The Department of the Air Force was authorized to conclude these sale agreements pursuant to section 607 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. sec. 2357). Each aircraft was made available to the designated recipient at a sale price of \$3,670. Under terms of the Department of the Air Force sale agreements:

(a) Aircraft made available were on an as-is, where-is basis, without any warranty, express or implied, other than warranty of title;

(b) The Air Force would provide with the aircraft specialized ground equipment and tools, supply and maintenance spares and spare engines normally associated with the operation of these aircraft for a 90-day period away from their home base. The contract further stated that beyond this initial supply kit, the buyers would obtain all required supply and maintenance support from commercial sources. In consideration of this sale the purchasers further warrant that they will reoffer the aircraft and all support spares, equipment and manuals to the USAF at such time as they are no longer required for support of relief activities in West Africa or elsewhere. Items returned in approximately the same condition as when delivered will be at no charge to the purchaser. Items consumed will be paid for by the purchaser at the standard stock list price, including standard prices for overhaul of items returned in reparable condition. However, all items used will be screened against Air Force supply records and those items identified as excess to the requirement of the USAF will be priced at scrap value only.

To date, the Air Force has been responsive to the additional requirements requested beyond the initial supply and maintenance kits provided. The Air Force realizes that the several additional lists for support requirements from the recipients of these aircraft are over and above the contractual agreements, but they have continued to assist these groups on a case-by-case basis in identifying commercial sources and providing limited quantities of military peculiar or long leadtime items, where possible, without jeopardizing USAF (including ANG) internal support.

The efforts of the Air Force to support the Biafran relief have been responsive and timely and the support to the Joint Church Aid—USA, Inc., for spares, engines and tools has resulted in total issues on the above basis of \$761,788 and to the International Committee of the Red Cross of \$721,199.

Mr. LIPSCOMB. Thank you very much.

Mr. SLACK. Mr. Minshall?

Mr. MINSHALL. No questions.

Mr. SLACK. If there are no further questions, we thank you, General Wilson, General Marchbanks, and gentlemen.

TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 1969.

RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE

WITNESSES

LEROY J. SPENCE, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY)

COL. M. P. DIFUSCO, U.S. ARMY, OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 07-05-0030-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
<u>Program by activities:</u>			
1. Nondisability.....	1,459,195	1,721,772	1,923,174
2. Temporary disability.....	37,757	44,830	52,987
3. Permanent disability.....	342,169	383,266	415,084
4. Fleet reserve.....	246,488	291,202	333,491
5. Survivors' benefits.....	7,869	8,930	10,264
10 Total obligations (object class 13.0).....	2,093,478	2,450,000	2,735,000
<u>Financing:</u>			
25 Unobligated balance lapsing.....	1,522	.....	.....
<u>Budget authority</u> .....	2,095,000	2,450,000	2,735,000
<u>Budget authority</u>			
40 <u>Appropriation</u> .....	2,095,000	2,275,000	2,735,000
44.30 <u>Proposed supplemental for military pay act increases</u> ....	.....	13,000	.....
44.40 <u>Proposed supplemental for increased retired pay costs</u> ....	.....	162,000	.....

STANDARD FORM 3  
Apr. 1961, Bureau of the Budget  
Circular No. 4-71, Revised  
9-64

Type  
HR 10  
p. 188

Use for all 2-column budget or budget  
except detail of personal services

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE

Program and Financing (in thousands of dollars)

Identification code 07-05-0030-0-1-051	19 68 actual	19 69 estimate	19 70 estimate
Relation of obligations to outlays:			
71 Obligations incurred, net.....	2,093,478	2,288,000	2,735,000
72 Obligated balance, start of year.....	7,622	6,880	15,680
74 Obligated balance, end of year.....	-6,880	-15,680	-30,880
77 Adjustments in expired accounts.....	527	.....	.....
90 Outlays excluding pay increase supplemental.....	2,094,746	2,266,200	2,719,800
91.30 Outlays from military pay act supplemental.....	.....	13,000	.....
91.40 Outlays from increased retired pay costs.....	.....	161,800	200

STANDARD FORM 3  
 May 1961, Bureau of the Budget  
 Circular No. 5-11, Revised  
 5-64

Type size:  
 8 point  
 11 and 12  
 plus

APPROPRIATION LANGUAGE

RETIRED PAY, DEFENSE

For retired pay and retirement pay, as authorized by law, of military personnel on the retired lists of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force, including the reserve components thereof, retainer pay for personnel of the inactive Fleet Reserve, and payments under chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code: ~~/\$2,275,000,000/~~ \$2,735,000,000. (Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1969.)

(1)

EXPLANATION OF LANGUAGE CHANGE

(1) Change in amount to \$2,735,000,000 from \$2,275,000,000.

Appropriation Introduction

	(In Thousands of Dollars)		
	<u>FY 1968</u>	<u>FY 1969</u>	<u>FY 1970</u>
Appropriation or Estimate	\$2,095,000	\$2,279,000	\$2,735,000
Proposed supplemental for military pay increases, P. L. 90-207	--	13,000	--
Proposed supplemental for increased costs, including Consumer Price Index	--	162,000	--
Unobligated balance of appropriation	1,522	--	--
Total Obligations	<u>\$2,093,478</u>	<u>\$2,450,000</u>	<u>\$2,735,000</u>

This appropriation provides for the pay, as authorized and at rates prescribed by law, of military personnel on the retired lists of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force and provides for payments to survivors pursuant to the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan. These expenses include the pay of retired officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel, female nurses and members of the women's medical specialist corps, Philippine Scouts, and authorized personnel of the reserve components, including retainer pay of the inactive Fleet Reserve.

The estimate excludes payments to individuals who elect to receive compensation for physical disability from the Veterans Administration. The amount requested is also exclusive of any administrative expense. The estimate provides for military pay increases effective July 1, 1968 under the provisions of P. L. 90-207, and increased retired pay costs, including amounts related to increases in the Consumer Price Index.

SUMMARY OF OBLIGATIONS BY MAJOR CATEGORY

(Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>1968 (Actual)</u>		<u>1969 (Estimate)</u>		<u>1970 (Estimate)</u>	
	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Dollars</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1. Nondisability.....	\$1,459,195	69.70	\$1,721,772	70.28	\$1,923,174	70.32
2. Temporary Disability.....	37,757	1.80	44,830	1.83	52,987	1.94
3. Permanent Disability	342,169	16.34	383,266	15.64	415,084	15.18
4. Fleet Reserve	246,488	11.77	291,202	11.89	333,491	12.19
5. Survivors' Benefits	7,869	.38	8,930	.36	10,264	.38
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$2,093,478</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>\$2,450,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>\$2,735,000</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Mr. ADDABBO. The committee will come to order.

We will now turn to retired pay for the Department of Defense. We have with us today Mr. LeRoy J. Spence, of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy. It is noted that in fiscal year 1969 \$2,275 million was appropriated for retired pay. A proposed supplemental would increase the 1969 estimate by \$175 million in order to take care of Military Pay Act increases. In fiscal year 1970 you are requesting \$2,735 million for retired pay, an increase of \$330 million over funds expected to be available for fiscal year 1969.

#### GENERAL STATEMENT

Mr. Spence, you may now proceed with your prepared statement.  
Mr. Spence.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee in behalf of the Department of Defense to discuss the appropriation for Retired Pay for fiscal year 1970.

The appropriation requested is a consolidation of the estimates of the military departments for retired pay of military personnel on the retired lists of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force; retainer pay for members of the Fleet Reserve of the Navy and Marine Corps and payments to survivors of retired military personnel under the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan.

The appropriation request for FY 1970 is \$2,735 million compared with \$2,275 million appropriated for FY 1969 plus a supplemental request for \$175 million, for a total of \$2,450 million. The amount requested for FY 1970 will provide for payments to an average of 759,617, an increase of 65,061 over our current estimate for FY 1969.

The supplemental request for FY 1969 will provide for the additional costs resulting from two cost of living increases, an increase in the military pay of military personnel retiring during the year, and an expected increase in the average numbers of military personnel on the retired rolls. Under law when the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases by 3% over the last adjustment to retired pay and sustains that level for three consecutive months, retired pay is adjusted to the highest percent of increase in that three month period, to be effective on the first day of the third month following that period. Two increases have occurred since the FY 1969 budget estimate was submitted to the Congress; an increase of 3.9% effective April 1, 1968, and an increase of 4.0% effective February 1, 1969. The increase in military pay was authorized by Public Law 91-207 and became effective July 1, 1968.

#### MAJOR CATEGORIES OF PERSONNEL

##### Nondisability

This category includes personnel who were retired for age or length of service.

It is estimated that \$1,923.2 million or 70.3% of the total appropriation request will be required to provide for an average of 492,541 annuitants in the nondisability category in FY 1970. This compares with an average of 449,837 annuitants now estimated for FY 1969.

##### Temporary Disability

The temporary disability category is an interim classification for disabled personnel where there is some doubt as to the degree or permanence of their disability. Personnel are placed on the temporary disability list for a period not to exceed five years in accordance with Title IV of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, which has now been codified as Chapter 61 of Title 10, United States Code. During this five year period, physical examinations are required at least once every eighteen months to determine whether such individuals (a) have recovered from their disability and can be returned to active duty; (b) should be discharged; or (c) should be transferred to the permanent disability rolls.

It is estimated that \$53.0 million or 1.9% of this appropriation will be required to provide for an average of 18,763 annuitants as compared with 16,794 in FY 1969.

Permanent Disability

This category is composed of personnel whose disability has been definitely established as "permanent." Persons may be placed on the permanent disability rolls immediately following the termination of their active duty or by transfer from the temporary disability rolls. It is estimated that \$415.1 million or 15.2% of the appropriation will be required in FY 1970 for an average of 120,597 permanently disabled retired military personnel. This compares with an average of 112,275 for FY 1969.

Fleet Reserve

The Fleet Reserve category is composed of Navy and Marine Corps enlisted personnel with 20 but less than 30 years of service who elect to transfer from active duty to the Fleet Reserve. Upon completion of 30 years of combined active service and service in the Fleet Reserve or upon being found physically unfit for further military service, such personnel are transferred to the regular retired rolls. It is estimated that \$333.5 million or 12.2% of the appropriation will be required in FY 1970 to provide for an average of 119,844 Fleet Reservists. This compares with an average of 108,731 for FY 1969.

Survivors' Benefits

The Survivors' Benefits category includes the amounts estimated to be required to make payments to survivors of retired personnel pursuant to the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan. This is a self-supporting Plan which permits members of the uniformed services to receive a reduced amount of retired pay in order to provide one or more annuities specified in the Plan for his survivors. The amount of the reduction in each member's case is computed by the actuarial equivalent method; that is, the total amount of reduced retired pay received by the member and the benefit payments made to his survivors will, on the average, not exceed the total amount of retired pay the member would have received had he not participated in the program.

It is estimated that \$10.3 million or .4% of the total appropriation request will be required to provide for an average of 7,872 in FY 1970. This compares with an average of 6,919 in FY 1969.

SUMMARY

The amounts included for each of the categories are mathematical computations of averages of the rates presently prescribed by law applied to the best available projections of the number of personnel to be carried on the rolls in fiscal years 1969 and 1970.

Payments under this appropriation are required by law and any funds not required revert to the Treasury at the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. Chairman, Colonel M. P. DiFusco, USA, the Director of Compensation Affairs of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Personnel Policy is with me today. We will attempt to answer any questions the Chairman or Committee Members may have.

## NEW OBLIGATIONAL AUTHORITY, OBLIGATIONS, AND UNOBLIGATED BALANCE

Fiscal Years 1950-1968

(In Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>New</u>		<u>Unobligated Balance</u>
	<u>Obligational Authority</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	
1950	\$306,016	\$304,376	\$1,640
1951	342,000	324,089	17,911
1952	345,000	330,598	14,402
1953	357,000	356,385	615
1954	387,000	386,298	702
1955	423,500	422,102	1,398
1956	495,000	478,932	16,068
1957	515,000	510,784	4,216
1958	567,000	560,962	6,038
1959	640,000	634,542	5,458
1960	715,000	692,922	22,078
1961	789,500	787,806	1,694
1962	920,000	895,854	24,146
1963	1,029,000 <sup>1/</sup>	1,014,775	10,925
1964	1,228,000	1,211,215	16,785
1965	1,399,000	1,385,578	13,422
1966	1,600,000	1,592,352	7,648
1967	1,839,000	1,831,160	7,840
1968	2,095,000	2,093,478	1,522

1/ \$3.3 million transferred to "claims, Defense"

NET INCREASES BY CATEGORY IN YEAR-END STRENGTHS FROM THE PREVIOUS FISCAL YEAR  
FOR THE FISCAL YEARS 1968, 1969 AND 1970

<u>Category</u>	<u>Fiscal Year 1968</u>		<u>Fiscal Year 1969</u>		<u>Fiscal Year 1970</u>	
	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Non-disability	42,686	69.7%	52,301	69.3%	38,319	63.6%
Temporary Disability	1,878	3.1	2,831	3.8	1,193	2.0
Permanent Disability	5,391	8.8	8,994	11.9	8,371	13.9
Fleet Reserve	10,512	17.2	10,431	13.8	11,366	18.8
Survivors' Benefits	730	1.2	888	1.2	1,005	1.7
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>61,197</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>75,445</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>60,254</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED OBLIGATIONS FOR MILITARY  
RETIRED PAY, FISCAL YEARS 1950-1974

(In Thousands of Dollars)

Fiscal Years

Under Existing Law

Actual

1950	\$304,376
1951	324,089
1952	330,598
1953	356,385
1954	386,298
1955	422,102
1956	478,932
1957	510,784
1958	560,962
1959	634,542
1960	692,922
1961	787,806
1962	895,854
1963	1,014,775
1964	1,211,215
1965	1,385,578
1966	1,592,352
1967	1,831,160
1968	2,093,478

Estimate

1969	2,450,000
1970	2,735,000
1971	2,952,000
1972	3,168,000
1973	3,384,000
1974	3,600,000

ACTUAL END STRENGTHS, OBLIGATIONS AND EXPENDITURES  
JULY-DECEMBER 1968

(Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>End Strengths</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Expenditures</u>
July	657,365	188,424	186,378
August	666,858	193,378	192,924
September	675,814	195,419	195,111
October	682,173	197,876	197,624
November	687,515	199,080	198,770
December	693,205	201,312	200,936
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>\$1,175,489</b>	<b>\$1,171,743</b>

**MILITARY RETIRED PAY COSTS**  
**ACTUAL AND PROJECTED NUMBER OF RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL**  
**AND RETIRED PAY DISBURSEMENTS FISCAL YEARS 1957-1974**

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Average Number</u>	<u>Actual and Estimated Obligation</u>
<u>Actual</u>		
1957	192,209	510,784,009
1958	208,570	560,961,693
1959	222,545	634,542,051
1960	242,904	692,922,172
1961	275,914	787,806,000
1962	313,436	895,854,000
1963	358,830	1,014,775,000
1964	410,853	1,211,200,000
1965	462,463	1,385,577,000
1966	508,566	1,592,352,000
1967	564,280	1,831,160,000
1968	624,496	2,093,500,000
<u>Estimated</u>		
1969	694,556	2,450,000,000
1970	759,617	2,735,000,000
1971	820,000	2,952,000,000
1972	880,000	3,168,000,000
1973	940,000	3,384,000,000
1974	1,000,000	3,600,000,000

**ACTUAL AND PROJECTED NUMBER OF RETIREMENTS AMONG MILITARY PERSONNEL**  
**ON ACTIVE DUTY, FY 1957-1974**

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>By Category</u>		<u>By Type of Retirement</u>	
		<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Nondisability</u>	<u>Disability</u>
<u>Actual</u>					
1957	18,429	5,818	12,611	11,904	6,525
1958	21,180	6,563	14,617	13,674	7,506
1959	21,290	5,778	15,512	14,029	7,261
1960	29,353	6,823	22,530	22,626	6,727
1961	42,034	12,886	29,148	35,198	6,836
1962	40,929	10,153	30,776	34,110	6,819
1963	57,629	14,319	43,310	49,166	8,463
1964	57,384	13,609	43,775	48,900	8,484
1965	55,772	13,872	41,900	46,635	9,137
1966	54,032	11,852	42,180	43,334	10,696
1967	67,003	12,880	54,123	54,404	12,599
1968	69,086	11,927	57,159	53,066	16,020
<u>Projected</u>					
1969	62,507	14,588	47,919	52,492	10,015
1970	54,951	12,996	41,955	45,111	9,840
1971	60,779	12,801	47,978	50,904	9,875
1972	64,843	12,848	51,995	54,566	10,277
1973	63,117	12,054	51,063	52,762	10,355
1974	61,879	11,598	50,281	51,667	10,212

"Normal" for an active force of present size with current retention rates:

59,209	8,676	50,533	49,646	9,563
--------	-------	--------	--------	-------

The substantial increase in the number on the retired rolls can be directly attributed to the fact that a large number of the personnel who entered the Armed Forces during the World War II period have attained eligibility for retirement after twenty or more years of active military service.

## TITLE III, PUBLIC LAW 810, RETIREMENTS -- FISCAL YEARS 1968, 1969 AND 1970

(10 U.S.C. 1331)

(Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>FY 1968 Actual</u>			<u>FY 1969 Estimate</u>			<u>FY 1970 Estimate</u>		
	<u>Year</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Avg.</u>	<u>Amount</u>
	<u>End</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>End</u>	<u>Number</u>		<u>End</u>	<u>Number</u>	
Officers	31,056	29,718	\$77,902	34,153	32,676	\$90,150	37,410	35,846	\$102,591
Enlisted	<u>2,898</u>	<u>2,656</u>	<u>3,409</u>	<u>3,493</u>	<u>3,212</u>	<u>4,227</u>	<u>3,940</u>	<u>3,729</u>	<u>5,133</u>
TOTAL	33,954	32,374	\$81,311	37,646	35,888	\$94,377	41,350	39,575	\$107,724

## COMPARISON OF RETIRED PAY EXPENDITURES WITH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

(Dollars in Millions)

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>All Military Functions</u>	<u>Retired Pay</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1937	\$934	\$55	5.89
1938	1,033	59	5.71
1939	1,075	61	5.67
1940	1,492	66	4.42
1941	5,998	73	1.22
1942	23,570	84	.36
1943	62,664	49	.08
1944	75,797	57	.08
1945	80,048	57	.07
1946	42,044	85	.20
1947	13,838	140	1.01
1948	10,937	175	1.60
1949	11,573	193	1.67
1950	11,891	193	1.62
1951	19,764	321	1.62
1952	38,897	329	.85
1953	43,604	357	.82
1954	40,326	386	.96
1955	35,531	419	1.18
1956	35,792	477	1.33
1957	38,436	511	1.33
1958	39,071	562	1.44
1959	41,223	641	1.55
1960	41,215	694	1.68
1961	43,227	786	1.82
1962	46,815	894	1.91
1963	48,252	1,015	2.10
1964	49,760	1,209	2.43
1965	46,173	1,384	3.00
1966	54,409	1,591	2.92
1967	67,466	1,830	2.71
1968	77,373	2,095	2.71
1969 (Estimated)	77,790	2,441	3.14
1970 (Estimated)	78,471	2,720	3.47

## Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan

(Dollars in Thousands)

<u>Fiscal Years</u>	<u>No. of Retirees Electing to Participate<sup>1/</sup></u>	<u>Reduction in Retired Pay</u>	<u>Survivors Receiving Benefits<sup>1/</sup></u>	<u>Payment to Survivors</u>
<u>Actual</u>				
1954 (last 8 months)	11,243	\$1,597	149	\$67
1955	11,401	4,308	499	462
1956	12,580	4,692	814	797
1957	14,859	5,424	1,128	1,136
1958	17,890	6,251	1,469	1,479
1959	19,846	7,204	1,881	1,880
1960	22,967	7,786	2,312	2,422
1961	27,997	8,933	2,807	3,003
1962	33,659	10,806	3,271	3,495
1963	43,254	13,141	3,713	3,992
1964	52,143	14,906	4,187	4,595
1965	60,996	18,447	4,643	5,295
1966	69,445	21,338	5,149	6,046
1967	80,102	24,762	5,746	6,850
1968	91,371	28,446	6,476	7,869
<u>Estimated</u>				
1969	103,376	32,356	7,364	8,930
1970	114,497	<u>35,841</u>	8,369	<u>10,264</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>\$246,235<sup>2/</sup></b>		<b>\$68,582</b>

<sup>1/</sup> Number at end of fiscal year.<sup>2/</sup> Annual amounts will not add to total due to rounding.

**RETIRED MILITARY PERSONNEL ELECTING SURVIVORS' BENEFITS AND AMOUNT OF DEDUCTION FROM RETIRED PAY BY CATEGORY**

(Dollars in Thousands)

	<u>Past Year FY 1968</u>		<u>Current Year FY 1969</u>		<u>Budget Year FY 1970</u>	
	<u>No. on Rolls End of FY</u>	<u>Amount of Deduction</u>	<u>No. on Rolls End of FY</u>	<u>Amount of Deduction</u>	<u>No. on Rolls End of FY</u>	<u>Amount of Deduction</u>
<u>Nondisability</u>						
Regular Officers	18,307	\$9,459	20,352	\$10,617	22,390	\$11,720
Regular Enlisted	22,434	3,121	26,681	3,831	30,114	4,405
Nonregular Officers	22,938	9,414	25,625	10,710	28,139	11,798
Nonregular Enlisted	406	63	472	75	539	87
Subtotal	<u>64,085</u>	<u>\$22,057</u>	<u>73,130</u>	<u>\$25,233</u>	<u>81,182</u>	<u>\$28,010</u>
<u>Temporary Disability</u>						
Regular Officers	436	\$255	447	\$258	456	\$259
Regular Enlisted	581	72	567	69	553	65
Nonregular Officers	275	59	303	64	331	66
Nonregular Enlisted	32	3	32	2	32	1
Subtotal	<u>1,324</u>	<u>\$389</u>	<u>1,349</u>	<u>\$393</u>	<u>1,372</u>	<u>\$391</u>
<u>Permanent Disability</u>						
Regular Officers	2,983	\$2,008	3,370	\$2,308	3,745	\$2,584
Regular Enlisted	2,967	521	3,579	664	4,194	788
Nonregular Officers	4,589	1,821	4,718	1,922	4,955	2,031
Nonregular Enlisted	91	8	159	10	221	13
Subtotal	<u>10,630</u>	<u>\$4,358</u>	<u>11,826</u>	<u>\$4,904</u>	<u>13,115</u>	<u>\$5,416</u>
<u>Fleet Reserve</u>						
Regular Enlisted	13,683	\$1,343	15,266	\$1,498	16,871	\$1,656
Nonregular Enlisted	566	62	641	70	716	78
Subtotal	<u>14,249</u>	<u>\$1,405</u>	<u>15,907</u>	<u>\$1,568</u>	<u>17,587</u>	<u>\$1,734</u>
Total Receiving Reduced Retired Pay	90,288	\$28,209	102,212	\$32,098	113,256	\$35,551
Cash Contributions	1,083	\$237	1,164	\$261	1,241	\$279
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>91,371</b>	<b>\$28,446</b>	<b>103,376</b>	<b>\$32,359</b>	<b>114,497</b>	<b>\$35,830</b>

TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL RECEIVING RETIRED OR RETAINER PAY AS OF 30 JUNE 1968

Retired Pay Grade	All Retirements <sup>1/</sup>			Nondisability Retirements <sup>1/</sup>			Disability Retirements		
	No. of Persons	Monthly Amount	Avg. No. Ret. Pay	No. of Persons	Monthly Amount	Avg. No. Ret. Pay	No. of Persons	Monthly Amount	Avg. No. Ret. Pay
O- 10	118	\$165,313	\$1,401	68	\$94,478	\$1,389	50	\$70,835	\$1,417
O- 9	271	330,796	1,221	166	201,941	1,217	105	128,855	1,227
O- 8	1,524	1,560,110	1,024	1,025	1,007,365	983	499	552,745	1,108
O- 7	1,572	1,321,551	841	1,134	913,565	806	438	407,986	931
O- 6	34,460	21,993,251	638	28,622	17,739,774	620	5,838	4,253,477	729
O- 5	63,718	31,568,341	495	55,405	27,093,347	489	8,313	4,474,994	538
O- 4	51,652	21,077,339	408	42,344	17,359,050	410	9,308	3,718,289	399
O- 3	26,577	8,599,408	324	13,736	4,753,408	346	12,841	3,846,000	300
O- 2	15,372	3,778,456	246	3,262	912,938	280	12,110	2,865,518	237
O- 1	5,410	1,131,006	209	568	136,770	241	4,842	994,236	205
W- 4	6,644	2,874,267	433	5,953	2,543,070	427	691	331,197	479
W- 3	8,315	2,694,447	324	7,613	2,445,857	321	702	248,590	354
W- 2	12,876	3,589,990	279	11,345	3,154,922	278	1,531	435,068	284
W- 1	4,383	1,040,530	237	3,013	733,643	243	1,370	306,887	224
<b>Total Officers</b>	<b>232,892</b>	<b>\$101,724,805</b>	<b>\$437</b>	<b>174,254</b>	<b>\$79,090,128</b>	<b>\$454</b>	<b>58,638</b>	<b>\$22,634,677</b>	<b>\$386</b>
E- 9	12,291	\$4,096,805	\$333	11,208	\$3,693,903	\$330	1,083	\$402,902	\$372
E- 8	29,925	8,223,465	275	27,515	7,484,477	272	2,410	738,988	307
E- 7	172,237	39,081,964	227	156,929	35,439,984	226	15,308	3,641,980	238
E- 6	106,465	20,436,533	192	93,982	18,074,693	192	12,483	2,361,840	189
E- 5	60,147	9,677,117	161	47,150	7,708,527	163	12,997	1,968,590	151
E- 4	18,562	2,184,822	118	9,222	1,169,129	127	9,340	1,015,692	109
E- 3	8,255	652,378	79	1,529	145,221	95	6,726	507,157	75
E- 2	3,395	203,107	60	342	29,679	87	3,053	173,428	57
E- 1	686	45,589	66	94	10,898	116	592	34,691	59
<b>Total Enlisted</b>	<b>411,963</b>	<b>\$84,601,779</b>	<b>\$205</b>	<b>347,971</b>	<b>\$73,756,511</b>	<b>\$212</b>	<b>63,992</b>	<b>\$10,845,268</b>	<b>\$169</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>644,855</b>	<b>\$186,326,584</b>	<b>\$289</b>	<b>522,225</b>	<b>\$152,846,639</b>	<b>\$293</b>	<b>122,630</b>	<b>\$33,479,945</b>	<b>\$273</b>

1/ Includes Fleet Reserve      2/ Includes 12 NAVCADS

**Analysis by Fiscal Years of the Number of Retired Personnel and Cost for the Department of Defense**  
(Cost in Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Actual FY 1968</u>			<u>Estimate FY 1969</u>			<u>Estimate FY 1970</u>		
	<u>Year End</u>	<u>Avg. No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Year End</u>	<u>Avg. No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Year End</u>	<u>Avg. No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>
<u>Non-disability</u>									
Regular Officers	69,236	67,552	\$419,888	75,721	73,245	\$487,585	81,704	79,297	\$544,811
Regular Enlisted	241,529	228,324	561,807	278,117	262,897	690,436	302,510	291,306	784,105
Nonregular Officers	105,018	101,697	472,976	113,615	109,976	538,323	121,099	117,679	587,827
Nonregular enlisted	3,385	3,140	4,524	4,016	3,719	5,428	4,475	4,259	6,431
Subtotal	<u>419,168</u>	<u>400,713</u>	<u>\$1,459,195</u>	<u>471,469</u>	<u>449,837</u>	<u>\$1,721,772</u>	<u>509,788</u>	<u>492,541</u>	<u>\$1,923,174</u>
<u>Temporary Disability</u>									
Regular Officers	1,261	1,246	\$8,912	1,467	1,372	\$10,611	1,576	1,531	\$12,319
Regular Enlisted	11,759	11,144	22,354	13,154	12,505	25,577	13,642	13,400	29,210
Nonregular Officers	1,012	953	5,064	1,288	1,139	6,263	1,517	1,396	7,944
Nonregular Enlisted	1,299	1,037	1,426	2,253	1,778	2,379	2,620	2,436	3,514
Subtotal	<u>15,331</u>	<u>14,380</u>	<u>\$37,756</u>	<u>18,162</u>	<u>16,794</u>	<u>\$44,830</u>	<u>19,355</u>	<u>18,763</u>	<u>\$52,987</u>
<u>Permanent Disability</u>									
Regular Officers	15,992	15,714	\$94,428	16,884	16,509	\$106,234	17,682	17,313	\$114,935
Regular Enlisted	47,933	45,646	92,879	54,559	51,564	110,842	60,974	57,838	126,902
Nonregular Officers	40,373	40,367	151,659	41,102	40,785	162,129	41,449	41,291	168,131
Nonregular Enlisted	3,001	2,806	3,202	3,748	3,417	4,061	4,559	4,155	5,116
Subtotal	<u>107,299</u>	<u>104,533</u>	<u>\$342,168</u>	<u>116,293</u>	<u>112,275</u>	<u>\$383,266</u>	<u>124,664</u>	<u>120,597</u>	<u>\$415,084</u>
<u>Fleet Reserve</u>	<u>103,057</u>	<u>98,754</u>	<u>\$246,488</u>	<u>113,488</u>	<u>108,731</u>	<u>\$291,202</u>	<u>124,854</u>	<u>119,844</u>	<u>\$333,491</u>
<u>Survivors' Benefits</u>	<u>6,476</u>	<u>6,116</u>	<u>\$7,870</u>	<u>7,364</u>	<u>6,919</u>	<u>\$8,930</u>	<u>8,369</u>	<u>7,872</u>	<u>\$10,264</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u><u>651,331</u></u>	<u><u>624,496</u></u>	<u><u>\$2,093,477</u></u>	<u><u>726,776</u></u>	<u><u>694,556</u></u>	<u><u>\$2,450,000</u></u>	<u><u>787,030</u></u>	<u><u>759,617</u></u>	<u><u>\$2,735,000</u></u>

**Analysis by Fiscal Years of the Number of Retired Personnel and Cost for the Department of the Army**  
(Cost in Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Actual FY 1968</u>			<u>Estimate FY 1969</u>			<u>Estimate FY 1970</u>		
	<u>Year End</u>	<u>Avg. No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Year End</u>	<u>Avg. No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Year End</u>	<u>Avg. No.</u>	<u>Cost</u>
<u><b>Nondisability</b></u>									
Regular Officers	14,045	13,654	\$109,324	16,025	15,160	\$127,985	17,230	16,627	\$143,800
Regular Enlisted	108,382	103,725	253,036	125,780	118,375	309,319	135,040	130,410	353,988
Nonregular Officers	63,747	62,030	278,803	68,700	66,483	312,016	72,840	70,770	340,446
Nonregular Enlisted	1,206	1,118	1,271	1,490	1,349	1,591	1,685	1,588	2,067
Subtotal	<u>187,380</u>	<u>180,527</u>	<u>\$642,434</u>	<u>211,995</u>	<u>201,367</u>	<u>\$750,911</u>	<u>226,795</u>	<u>219,395</u>	<u>\$840,301</u>
<u><b>Temporary Disability</b></u>									
Regular Officers	202	189	\$1,551	295	256	\$2,287	345	320	\$2,932
Regular Enlisted	2,570	2,298	4,996	3,800	3,243	7,348	4,410	4,105	9,852
Nonregular Officers	472	432	2,388	675	560	3,260	860	767	4,608
Nonregular Enlisted	884	645	780	1,860	1,378	1,742	2,260	2,060	2,841
Subtotal	<u>4,128</u>	<u>3,564</u>	<u>\$9,715</u>	<u>6,630</u>	<u>5,437</u>	<u>\$14,637</u>	<u>7,875</u>	<u>7,252</u>	<u>\$20,233</u>
<u><b>Permanent Disability</b></u>									
Regular Officers	5,565	5,576	\$33,192	5,695	5,627	\$35,513	5,730	5,712	\$37,050
Regular Enlisted	14,168	13,930	27,810	15,700	15,177	32,151	16,965	16,333	35,908
Nonregular Officers	25,049	25,238	90,302	25,265	25,186	94,596	25,115	25,190	96,994
Nonregular Enlisted	1,597	1,423	1,307	2,285	1,983	2,026	3,065	2,675	2,959
Subtotal	<u>46,379</u>	<u>46,167</u>	<u>\$152,611</u>	<u>48,945</u>	<u>47,973</u>	<u>\$164,286</u>	<u>50,875</u>	<u>49,910</u>	<u>\$172,911</u>
<u><b>Fleet Reserve</b></u>									
	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
<u><b>Survivors' Benefits</b></u>									
	3,021	2,882	\$3,266	3,425	3,225	\$3,692	3,910	3,667	\$4,284
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>240,908</u>	<u>233,140</u>	<u>\$808,026</u>	<u>270,995</u>	<u>258,002</u>	<u>\$933,526</u>	<u>289,455</u>	<u>280,224</u>	<u>\$1,037,729</u>

Analysis by Fiscal Years of the Number of Retired Personnel and Cost for the Department of the Navy  
(Cost in Thousands of Dollars)

Category	Actual FY 1968			Estimate FY 1969			Estimate FY 1970		
	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost
<u>Nondisability</u>									
Regular Officers	36,541	36,149	\$195,794	38,380	37,752	\$216,719	40,327	39,650	\$235,999
Regular Enlisted	33,529	31,903	80,411	35,911	34,850	91,475	38,181	37,104	99,148
Nonregular Officers	8,496	8,039	25,172	9,392	9,028	30,016	10,310	9,936	34,062
Nonregular Enlisted	1,963	1,836	2,996	2,250	2,122	3,498	2,446	2,356	3,933
Subtotal	80,529	77,927	\$304,373	85,933	83,752	\$341,708	91,264	89,046	\$373,142
<u>Temporary Disability</u>									
Regular Officers	716	737	\$5,215	740	730	\$5,410	749	747	\$5,894
Regular Enlisted	4,371	4,296	8,923	3,924	4,106	8,848	3,588	3,742	8,964
Nonregular Officers	213	208	1,061	232	222	1,159	241	233	1,265
Nonregular Enlisted	315	314	557	279	292	510	255	266	542
Subtotal	5,615	5,555	\$15,756	5,175	5,350	\$15,927	4,833	4,988	\$16,665
<u>Permanent Disability</u>									
Regular Officers	5,665	5,659	\$30,254	5,698	5,711	\$32,197	5,732	5,745	\$33,291
Regular Enlisted	10,669	10,461	18,901	11,722	11,234	21,340	12,586	12,190	23,311
Nonregular Officers	3,275	3,290	11,516	3,278	3,286	12,070	3,279	3,288	12,410
Nonregular Enlisted	997	977	1,520	1,060	1,028	1,658	1,090	1,077	1,771
Subtotal	20,606	20,387	\$62,191	21,758	21,259	\$67,265	22,687	22,300	\$70,783
Fleet Reserve	91,393	87,989	\$218,419	100,223	96,016	\$254,164	110,161	105,745	\$291,950
Survivors' Benefits	1,816	1,720	\$2,193	2,009	1,917	\$2,448	2,202	2,110	\$2,695
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>199,959</b>	<b>193,578</b>	<b>\$602,932</b>	<b>215,098</b>	<b>208,294</b>	<b>\$681,512</b>	<b>231,147</b>	<b>224,189</b>	<b>\$755,235</b>

**Analysis by Fiscal Years of the Number of Retired Personnel and Cost for the Marine Corps**  
(Cost in Thousands of Dollars)

Category	Actual FY 1968			Estimate FY 1969			Estimate FY 1970		
	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost
<b><u>Non-disability</u></b>									
Regular Officers	6,116	5,978	\$33,077	6,517	6,364	\$37,967	6,891	6,741	\$40,877
Regular Enlisted	3,120	2,920	7,660	3,641	3,427	10,798	4,339	4,001	12,832
Nonregular Officers	752	727	3,036	892	833	5,304	1,020	963	6,221
Nonregular Enlisted	56	52	87	60	59	98	63	62	105
Subtotal	<u>10,044</u>	<u>9,677</u>	<u>\$43,860</u>	<u>11,110</u>	<u>10,683</u>	<u>\$54,167</u>	<u>12,313</u>	<u>11,767</u>	<u>\$60,035</u>
<b><u>Temporary Disability</u></b>									
Regular Officers	165	172	\$1,154	206	189	\$1,550	220	220	\$1,806
Regular Enlisted	2,443	2,238	3,787	2,824	2,673	4,759	2,878	2,868	5,331
Nonregular Officers	67	65	295	71	68	329	73	71	338
Nonregular Enlisted	88	67	83	96	94	109	84	92	104
Subtotal	<u>2,763</u>	<u>2,542</u>	<u>\$5,319</u>	<u>3,197</u>	<u>3,024</u>	<u>\$6,747</u>	<u>3,255</u>	<u>3,251</u>	<u>\$7,579</u>
<b><u>Permanent Disability</u></b>									
Regular Officers	1,296	1,266	\$6,626	1,329	1,315	\$7,375	1,383	1,356	\$7,767
Regular Enlisted	3,363	3,038	4,692	4,048	3,709	6,109	5,009	4,563	7,670
Nonregular Officers	809	811	2,456	831	823	2,657	853	846	2,783
Nonregular Enlisted	331	330	271	323	329	265	321	323	267
Subtotal	<u>5,799</u>	<u>5,445</u>	<u>\$14,045</u>	<u>6,531</u>	<u>6,176</u>	<u>\$16,406</u>	<u>7,566</u>	<u>7,088</u>	<u>\$18,487</u>
<b><u>Fleet Reserve</u></b>	<u>11,664</u>	<u>10,765</u>	<u>\$28,069</u>	<u>13,265</u>	<u>12,715</u>	<u>\$37,038</u>	<u>14,693</u>	<u>14,099</u>	<u>\$41,541</u>
<b><u>Survivors' Benefits</u></b>	<u>176</u>	<u>164</u>	<u>\$248</u>	<u>193</u>	<u>186</u>	<u>\$303</u>	<u>209</u>	<u>202</u>	<u>\$327</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<u>30,446</u>	<u>28,593</u>	<u>\$91,541</u>	<u>34,296</u>	<u>32,784</u>	<u>\$114,661</u>	<u>38,036</u>	<u>36,407</u>	<u>\$127,969</u>

Analysis by Fiscal Years of the Number of Retired Personnel and Cost for the Department of the Air Force  
(Cost in Thousands of Dollars)

Category	Actual FY 1968			Estimate FY 1969			Estimate FY 1970		
	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost	Year End	Avg. No.	Cost
<u>Nondisability</u>									
Regular Officers	12,534	11,771	\$81,693	14,799	13,969	\$104,914	17,256	16,279	\$124,135
Regular Enlisted	96,498	89,776	220,700	112,785	106,245	278,844	124,950	119,791	318,137
Nonregular Officers	32,023	30,901	165,965	34,631	33,632	190,987	36,929	36,010	207,098
Nonregular Enlisted	160	134	170	216	189	241	281	253	326
Subtotal	<u>141,215</u>	<u>132,582</u>	<u>\$468,528</u>	<u>162,431</u>	<u>154,035</u>	<u>\$574,986</u>	<u>179,416</u>	<u>172,333</u>	<u>\$649,696</u>
<u>Temporary Disability</u>									
Regular Officers	178	148	\$992	226	197	\$1,364	262	244	\$1,687
Regular Enlisted	2,375	2,312	4,648	2,606	2,483	4,622	2,766	2,685	5,063
Nonregular Officers	260	248	1,320	310	289	1,515	343	325	1,733
Nonregular Enlisted	12	11	6	18	14	18	21	18	27
Subtotal	<u>2,825</u>	<u>2,719</u>	<u>\$6,966</u>	<u>3,160</u>	<u>2,983</u>	<u>\$7,519</u>	<u>3,392</u>	<u>3,272</u>	<u>\$8,510</u>
<u>Permanent Disability</u>									
Regular Officers	3,466	3,213	\$24,356	4,162	3,856	\$31,149	4,837	4,500	\$36,827
Regular Enlisted	19,733	18,217	41,476	23,089	21,444	51,242	26,414	24,752	60,013
Nonregular Officers	11,240	11,028	47,385	11,728	11,490	52,806	12,202	11,967	55,944
Nonregular Enlisted	76	76	104	80	77	112	83	80	119
Subtotal	<u>34,515</u>	<u>32,534</u>	<u>\$113,321</u>	<u>39,059</u>	<u>36,867</u>	<u>\$135,309</u>	<u>43,536</u>	<u>41,299</u>	<u>\$152,903</u>
Fleet Reserve	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Survivors' Benefits	<u>1,463</u>	<u>1,350</u>	<u>\$2,163</u>	<u>1,737</u>	<u>1,591</u>	<u>\$2,487</u>	<u>2,048</u>	<u>1,893</u>	<u>\$2,958</u>
TOTAL	<u><u>180,018</u></u>	<u><u>169,185</u></u>	<u><u>\$590,978</u></u>	<u><u>206,387</u></u>	<u><u>195,476</u></u>	<u><u>\$720,301</u></u>	<u><u>228,392</u></u>	<u><u>218,797</u></u>	<u><u>\$814,067</u></u>

## STUDY OF THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Spence, at this time last year, in the 1969 appropriation hearings, you referred to a study underway in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower regarding military retirement and survivorship system to determine whether or not the system as it now exists, is performing the function which the retirement system is supposed to perform, and whether it is performing it in the most efficient way possible. Has this study been completed, and what are its findings?

Mr. SPENCE. The work of the staff who were involved in this study has been substantially completed. However, the study is in the process of review at the present time and there is no firm conclusions as to what recommendations should be made as an outgrowth of that study.

Mr. ADDABBO. How soon do you expect the study to be completed?

Mr. SPENCE. As I say, the actual assembly of material and data has been completed. It is a question now of trying to determine which way we should go. Now, as far as the time is concerned, I would suspect that within the next few months we should have conclusions as to what we should do as a result of the facts found in that study.

Mr. ADDABBO. Will you supply the committee with a copy of those findings?

Mr. SPENCE. Sir, we would be happy to furnish you with a copy of the findings when they have been finally approved, but at the present time they are in a state of flux.

Mr. ADDABBO. In the testimony at page 567 of part 5 of the "Military personnel" appropriations hearings for 1969 you stated there that a study was underway and your concluding sentence was, "What will be the outcome of that study we do not know at this time." How much further advanced are we today from when this testimony was given back in 1968?

Mr. SPENCE. Certainly, sir, we are much farther down the road. There have been a number of recommendations as to what should be done. For example, one of the committee's recommendations was the development of a two-step retirement system. Whether or not this is the direction that we should go we don't know. In fact, about all that I can say at this time is that the study is still undergoing review and we are not prepared to submit any final statement as to what the outcome of that study will be.

## CONSUMER PRICE INDEX INCREASE

Mr. ADDABBO. Have there been any other changes in the retired pay situation since last year?

Mr. SPENCE. There were a number of facts which occurred. For example, the continuing increase in the cost of living which causes automatic increases in the requirements for retired pay. There have been two increases growing out of the Consumer Price Index increases.

Other than that, I would say the situation is approximately what we had as of this time last year.

## RETIREMENT PROJECTIONS

Mr. ADDABBO. For the record, would you please update the table appearing on page 570 of last year's hearings, giving the projected number of military personnel receiving retired or retainer pay from now through the year 2000?

Mr. SPENCE. Yes, sir. I believe we have that, and, in any event, we will supply it for the record.

(The information follows:)

PROJECTED NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL RECEIVING RETIRED OR RETAINER PAY AND ANNUAL DISBURSEMENTS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(Number of persons in thousands; dollar amounts in millions)

Fiscal Year	Constant Active Force <sup>1</sup>	
	Number receiving retired pay	No pay or price increases
1975.....	1,029	\$4,033
1980.....	1,255	5,088
1985.....	1,426	5,876
1990.....	1,568	6,505
1995.....	1,671	6,980
2000.....	1,738	7,318

<sup>1</sup> Assumes that the Active Force remains unchanged at the June 30, 1966, level.

Note: The figures assume a 12.6-percent increase in basic pay effective July 1, 1969.

Mr. ADDABBO. Would you also update the table appearing on page 573 of last year's hearings showing the projected number of military personnel receiving retired or retainer pay with an assumed pay or Price Index increase?

Mr. SPENCE. We will submit that for the record.

(The information follows:)

PROJECTED NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL RECEIVING RETIRED OR RETAINER PAY AND ANNUAL DISBURSEMENTS, WITH ASSUMED PAY OR PRICE INDEX INCREASES, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(Number of persons in thousands; dollar amounts in millions)

Fiscal year	Constant Active Force <sup>1</sup>	
	Number receiving retired pay	Pay and price increases <sup>2</sup>
1975.....	1,029	\$4,422
1980.....	1,255	6,260
1985.....	1,426	6,636
1990.....	1,568	8,173
1995.....	1,671	10,328
2000.....	1,738	12,766

<sup>1</sup> Assumes that the Active Force remains unchanged at the June 30, 1966 level.

<sup>2</sup> Pay rates are assumed to increase by 3.5 percent annually from fiscal year 1971 to the year 2000 and then to increase at a rate declining to 2½ percent in 2040. The price index is assumed to increase by 1½ percent annually to the year 2000 and then to increase at a rate declining to zero in 2040.

Note: The figures assume a 12.6-percent increase in basic pay effective July 1, 1969.


Mr. ADDABBO. Thank you.

Mr. Lipscomb?

Mr. LIPSCOMB. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Spence, we appreciate your appearance and thank you for your testimony.


Mr. SPENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



## LIST OF WITNESSES

---

	Page
Bellochi, Lt. Col. J. F.....	1
Berg, Maj. Gen. W. W.....	343
Boylan, Maj. Gen. G. S., Jr.....	343, 423
Bull, Col. D. H.....	343
Burke, Rear Adm. J. T., Jr.....	168
Cassidy, Maj. Gen. P. F.....	1
Conaty, Col. F. S., Jr.....	1
Conner, Lt. Gen. A. O.....	1
Crutchfield, Rear Adm. R. R.....	168
Davis, Vice Adm. G. M.....	168
DiFusco, Col. M. P.....	474
Duncan, Vice Adm. C. K.....	168
Engen, Capt. D. D.....	168
Faver, Brig. Gen. D. E.....	343
Gaddis, Rear Adm. W. D.....	168, 278
Greenlief, Maj. Gen. F. S.....	105
Griffiths, Capt. C. H.....	168
Hannum, Brig. Gen. C. P.....	105
Heaton, Lt. Gen. L. D.....	1
Henshaw, R. H.....	343
Hightower, Maj. Gen. J. M.....	105
Holsington, Col. E. P.....	1
Holm, Col. J. M.....	343
Kenyon, A. P.....	168
Lenihan, Capt. R.....	168
Lobl, J. A.....	278
Loretti, Col. O. P.....	423
Lotterhos, Capt. A., Jr.....	168
Maness, Brig. Gen. L. E.....	1, 105
Marchbanks, Maj. Gen. T. E., Jr.....	423
Maxwell, Maj. H. L.....	423
Meade, R. W.....	278
Minton, A. N.....	168
Nutt, G. B.....	1
Nuttmann, H. F.....	168
Pethal, B. E.....	105
Pitts, Brig. Gen. W. F.....	343, 423
Platt, Maj. Gen. J. M.....	278
Simmons, Brig. Gen. E. H.....	278
Spence, L. J.....	474
Sustad, Col. J. I.....	278
Sutton, Maj. Gen. W. J.....	105
Taylor, Maj. Gen. L. B.....	1
Troen, L. G.....	278
Widdecke, Brig. Gen. C. F.....	278
Wilson, Maj. Gen. W. P.....	423



# INDEX

## A

	Page
<b>Air Force, Department of the :</b>	
<b>Military personnel, Air Force</b> .....	343-423
Allowances, special supplemental.....	418
<b>Assignment of military personnel to activities outside the military departments</b> .....	77
B-52 aircraft, phasedown of.....	384
C-5A aircraft.....	394
Early release of military personnel.....	371, 373, 400
Flight surgeons.....	389, 402
Free world forces, support of.....	416
Housing and temporary lodging allowances.....	417
Intelligence personnel.....	376
Management engineering performance standards.....	380
Management improvement.....	372, 374
Medical personnel.....	403
Officer retention rates.....	399, 402
Officer training school.....	401
Pay, special.....	415
Pilot production.....	381, 390, 397
Proficiency pay.....	409, 412
Reenlistment bonuses.....	409, 418
Shipment of private vehicles.....	419
Strength determinations.....	371
Subsistence allowance.....	418
Temporary promotion of officers.....	406
Terminal leave payments.....	417
Travel, accession.....	418
Travel, commercial air.....	419
Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program.....	422
<b>Vietnam :</b>	
Casualties in.....	412
Missing in action and prisoners of war.....	412
Tour of duty in.....	400
<b>Welfare payments to servicemen</b> .....	410
<b>Women in the Air Force</b> .....	404
<b>Reserve components :</b>	
Adjustments associated with new missions.....	451
Missions of.....	465
<b>National Guard personnel</b> .....	423, 446
Accomplishments of.....	468
Aircraft inventory.....	461
C-97 aircraft, transfer to Biafran relief project.....	472
Changes in budget.....	451
Pilot program.....	461
Readiness of.....	455
Strength of.....	456
<b>Reserve personnel, Air Force</b> .....	423, 438
Equipment inventory.....	463
Changes in budget.....	451
Drill meetings.....	456
Office of Air Force Reserve and Reserve Management.....	456
Readiness of.....	453
Release of reserve units from active duty.....	462
ROTC program.....	455, 458
School training.....	457
Strength of.....	454
<b>Riot control training</b> .....	463

IV

Army, Department of the:	Page
Military Personnel.....	1-105
AWOL cases.....	62, 84
Accessions, 1969 and 1970.....	16
Accessions, source of.....	102
Amounts budgeted compared with actual expenses, fiscal years 1966-68.....	24
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, personnel in support of.....	79
Assignment of military personnel outside the Department.....	77
Assignment of military personnel to non-military duties.....	96
Aviators, requirements for trained.....	38
Budget for fiscal year 1970:	
Accuracy of estimates.....	73
Changes from 1969 appropriations.....	17
Increase over 1969.....	16
Pay increase.....	92, 93
Reduction by DOD.....	31
Budgetary control.....	22
Change of station, permanent.....	89, 96
Clothing and uniform allowances.....	22, 75
Cost-of-living allowances for enlisted personnel.....	101, 102
Demonstrations, participation of military personnel in.....	64
Dentists, requirement for.....	42
Desertions.....	33, 62, 80, 83
Determination of personnel requirements.....	15
Distribution of Army strength by mission and grades.....	104
Doctors:	
Assignment of.....	70
Continuation program.....	72
Off-duty practice by.....	59
Requirement for.....	42
Drugs, efforts to reduce problem.....	83
Early release policy.....	40
Europe, readiness of Army units in.....	29, 32
Extensions of tour of duty, voluntary.....	37
Food program, new.....	27
Grade structure, determination of.....	17
Grades of officers.....	105
Above permanent rank.....	75
Handicapped, drafting of.....	66
Medical officers, assignment and continuation program for.....	70, 72
Morale and discipline.....	55, 68, 82
Nurses, shortage of.....	42
Office of Economic Opportunity, assignment of personnel in sup- port of.....	78
Officer-enlisted men ratio.....	26, 72
Officer ratios to total strength.....	104
Officers, retention of junior.....	36
Pay allowance, special.....	74
Pay increase.....	92, 93
Personnel management.....	94
Prisoner population and facilities.....	79, 81
Prisoners, cost of apprehending.....	81
Project evaluation studies.....	48
Project One Hundred Thousand.....	46, 51
Cost of.....	54
Disciplinary problems.....	55
Remedial reading training.....	46, 53
Project Transition.....	57
Project Utility.....	52
Rations, operational.....	76
Reassignment with regard to individual preference.....	65
Recruitment costs.....	103
Reduction in strength.....	8, 15

Army, Department of the—Continued  
 Military Personnel—Continued

	Page
Reenlistments:	
Efforts to improve.....	44, 71
Pay increase, effect of.....	64
Reenlistment bonuses.....	20, 45
ROTC program.....	18
Rotation of Army personnel.....	99
Shipment of privately owned vehicles.....	90
Station allowances.....	100, 101
Stockade study.....	52
Support of free world forces.....	28
Terminal leave payments for officers.....	100
Transportation costs.....	90
Vietnam:	
Drugs, use in.....	36, 63
Effect on troop strength in Europe.....	32
First Cavalry Division, status of.....	32
Helicopter pilots, South Vietnamese.....	39
Involuntary reassignment to.....	29
Medical services in.....	41, 60
Officer and enlisted men ratio in.....	28
Troop strength in.....	73
Venereal disease in.....	69
Volunteer army, feasibility of.....	34, 45
Welfare, Army personnel on.....	46
West Point, appointments to.....	74
Women's Army Corps.....	43
Reserve components.....	105-168
Assignment to Reserves of men separated from the Army.....	167
Discharges.....	146
Enlistment program.....	141
Equipment, lack of modern.....	155
Equipment shortage.....	154
Military service obligation.....	136
Misfits.....	160
National Guard.....	105, 115, 131
Age of enlistees.....	147
Aircraft in use.....	160
Aircraft inventory.....	153
Aviator strength.....	159, 166
Equipment inventory.....	160
Federalization of.....	166
Readiness of.....	166
Vietnam, Guardsmen on duty in.....	136
Negro participation in.....	138, 140
Office of Reserve Components.....	148
Reserve personnel, Army.....	105, 127
Drills.....	139
Equipment inventory.....	153
Reassignment between units.....	137
Reorganization of.....	149
ROTC officer procurement.....	159
ROTC program, changes to.....	161
Travel to meetings.....	143
Vietnam, reservists in.....	140
Retirement, mandatory.....	147
Riot control, preparation for.....	157, 165
Training of recruits.....	143
Waiting time to enter Reserves.....	142
Assignment of military to activities outside the military departments.....	77

## VI

## N

	Page
<b>Navy, Department of the:</b>	
<b>Military personnel, Marine Corps</b> .....	278-320
Accessions .....	207
Agitators .....	323
<b>Assignment of military personnel to activities outside the military departments</b> .....	77
Change in personnel structure.....	201
Change of station travel.....	315
Control of appropriations.....	308
Desertions .....	322
Drugs, use of.....	323
Early releases.....	207, 325
Educational levels of marines.....	205
Enlistment, terms of.....	301
Free world forces, support of.....	300, 312
Increase in funds requested.....	202
Inductees .....	202
Korean marines.....	311
Management improvement.....	208
Manpower requirements.....	204
Officer-enlisted men ratio.....	202
Officer procurement.....	200
Proficiency pay.....	301, 304
Project One Hundred Thousand.....	320
Project, transition.....	324
Recruitment, effect of draft on.....	205
Reenlistment bonuses.....	301, 302, 304
Reenlistments, number of.....	304
Reprogramming .....	306
Revenue and Expenditure Control Act, impact of.....	305
Review of manpower requirements.....	206
Shipment of private vehicles.....	318
<b>Strengths:</b>	
Average .....	205
By grade.....	200
Gains and losses.....	200
Subsistence for enlisted personnel.....	304
Temporary rank of officers.....	324
Trailer allowance.....	312
Training of recruits.....	208
Travel and transportation costs.....	315
Overcharges for.....	314
<b>Vietnam:</b>	
Casualties in.....	294
Second tours in.....	303
South Vietnamese marines.....	311
Training for .....	301
Women Marine Corps.....	310
<b>Military personnel, Navy</b> .....	168-249
Accession travel for enlisted members.....	212
Accessions in 1969 and 1970, officer and enlisted men.....	190
Amounts requested compared with obligations fiscal years 1967-69.....	215
Amount requested of DOD.....	180
Berry Plan.....	210
Budget for fiscal year 1969, reduction in.....	193, 197
Chief of Naval Personnel, statement of.....	181
Control of funds.....	214
Dentists .....	220, 221
Desertions .....	203
Doctors .....	218, 221
Drugs, use of.....	234
Early release of 2-year enlistees.....	189
Enlistments, effect of draft on.....	203

VII

Navy, Department of the—Continued	
Military personnel, Navy—Continued	Page
Fleet manning levels, increase in.....	187, 191
Hospitals .....	221
Improvements planned in personnel administration.....	209
Increase in strength.....	187, 199
Lieutenant commanders, shortage of.....	199
Medical technicians .....	221
Military Sea Transportation billing.....	244
Mothballing and reactivation compared to operating at reduced level .....	190
Naval Academy, nominations to.....	249
Nurse program.....	220, 221
Nurse shortage.....	217, 221
Pay supplemental.....	210
Pilot candidate recruitment difficulties.....	201
Pilot training.....	201
Preparatory School at Bainbridge, Md.....	212
Prisoner population .....	245
Proficiency pay.....	204
Project One Hundred Thousand.....	230
Project Transition .....	237
Promotion of officers above permanent rank.....	247
Public affairs activities, personnel assigned to.....	195
Public relations programs.....	246
Reduction in 1969 appropriation, allocation of.....	198
Reenlistment bonuses.....	204, 244
Reprogramming of funds.....	214
ROTC program .....	216
Rotation of medical personnel.....	228
Separation travel .....	214
Shipment of privately owned vehicles.....	239
Ships deactivated in fiscal year 1969.....	196
<b>Strengths:</b>	
Increase in .....	187, 199
Officers above permanent rank.....	247
Submarine officers, resignation of.....	206, 224
Subsistence of personnel.....	211
Terminal leave payments.....	210
Travel expenses.....	248
Venereal disease rate.....	237
WAVE training.....	212, 228
Reserve personnel, Marine Corps.....	326-348
Aircraft, shortage of.....	342
Budget for fiscal year 1970, validity of.....	340
Drill attendance .....	337
Equipment, improvement in.....	342
Readiness of.....	336, 339, 341
Reduction in 1969 funding requirements.....	340
Strength, total.....	336
Reserve personnel, Navy.....	249-278
Administration and support.....	265
Construction battalions, callup of.....	262
Equipment .....	272
Naval air reserve.....	274
Personnel by pay status.....	259
Readiness posture.....	260
Reserve officer candidate program.....	270
ROTC program .....	266-270
Total reserve strength.....	260
Vietnam, casualties in.....	276, 277
Vitalization Act, training under.....	284
Vietnam, casualties in.....	276, 277, 294

R

Retired pay, Defense.....	474-496
---------------------------	---------